This morning (May 3), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Employment Situation” report for April. The report has two estimates of the change in employment during the month: one estimate from the establishment survey, often referred to as the payroll survey, and one from the household survey. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1), many economists and policymakers at the Federal Reserve believe that employment data from the establishment survey provides a more accurate indicator of the state of the labor market than do either the employment data or the unemployment data from the household survey. (The groups included in the employment estimates from the two surveys are somewhat different, as we discuss in this post.)
According to the establishment survey, there was a net increase of 175,000 jobs during April. This increase was well below the increase of 240,000 that economists had forecast in a survey by the Wall Street Journal and well below the net increase of 315,000 during March. The following figure, taken from the BLS report, shows the monthly net changes in employment for each month during the past to years.
As the following figure shows, the net change in jobs from the household survey moves much more erratically than does the net change in jobs in the establishment survey. The net increase in jobs as measured by the household survey fell from 498,000 in March to 25,000 in April.
The unemployment rate, which is also reported in the household survey, ticked up slightly from 3.8 percent to 3.9 percent. It has been below 4 percent every month since February 2022.
The establishment survey also includes data on average hourly earnings (AHE). As we note in this recent post, many economists and policymakers believe the employment cost index (ECI) is a better measure of wage pressures in the economy than is the AHE. The AHE does have the important advantage that it is available monthly, whereas the ECI is only available quarterly. The following figure show the percentage change in the AHE from the same month in the previous year. The 3.9 percent value for April continues a downward trend that began in February.
The following figure shows wage inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month wage inflation, whereas this figure shows 1-month wage inflation.) One-month wage inflation is much more volatile than 12-month inflation—note the very large swings in 1-month wage inflation in April and May 2020 during the business closures caused by the Covid pandemic.
The 1-month rate of wage inflation of 2.4 percent in April is a significant decrease from the 4.2 percent rate in March, although it’s unclear whether the decline was a sign that the labor market is weakening or reflected the greater volatility in wage inflation when calculated this way.
The macrodata released during the first three months of the year had, by and large, indicated strong economic growth, with the pace of employment increases being particularly rapid. Wages were also increasing at a pace above that during the pre-Covid period. Inflation appeared to be stuck in the range of 3 percent to 3.5 percent, above the Fed’s target inflation rate of 2 percent.
Today’s “Employment Situation” report may be a first indication that growth is slowing sufficiently to allow the inflation rate to fall back to 2 percent. This is the outcome that Fed Chair Jerome Powell indicated in his press conference on Wednesday that he expected to occur at some point during 2024. Financial markets reacted favorably to the release of the report with stock prices jumping and the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note falling. Many economists and Wall Street analysts had concluded that the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was likely to keep its target for the federal funds rate unchanged until late in the year and might not institute a cut in the target at all this year. Today’s report caused some Wall Street analysts to conclude, as the headline of an article in the Wall Street Journal put it, “Jobs Data Boost Hopes of a Late-Summer Rate Cut.”
This reaction may be premature. Data on employment from the establishment survey can be subject to very large revisions, which reinforces the general caution against putting too great a weight one month’s data. Its most likely that the FOMC would need to see several months of data indicating a slowing in economic growth and in the inflation rate before reconsidering whether to cut the target for the federal funds rate earlier than had been expected.
Chair Jerome Powell at a meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (photo from federalreserve.gov)
At the beginning of the year, there was an expectation among some economists and policymakers that the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) would begin cutting its target range for the federal funds rate at the meeting that ended today (May 1). The Fed appeared to be bringing the U.S. economy in for a soft landing—inflation returning to the Fed’s 2 percent target without a recession occurring.
During the first quarter of 2024, production and employment have been expanding more rapidly than had been expected and inflation has been higher than expected. As a result, the nearly universal expectation prior to this meeting was that the FOMC would leave its target for the federal funds rate unchanged. Some economists and investment analysts have begun discussing the possiblity that the committee might not cut its target at all during 2024. The view that interest rates will be higher for longer than had been expected at the beginning of the year has contributed to increases in long-term interest rates, including the interest rates on the 10-year Treasury Note and on residential mortgage loans.
The statement that the FOMC issued after the meeting confirmed the consensus view:
“Recent indicators suggest that economic activity has continued to expand at a solid pace. Job gains have remained strong, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Inflation has eased over the past year but remains elevated. In recent months, there has been a lack of further progress toward the Committee’s 2 percent inflation objective.”
In his press conference after the meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell emphasized that the FOMC was unlikely to cut its target for the federal funds rate until data indicated that the inflation rate had resumed falling towards the Fed’s 2 percent target. At one point in the press conference Powell noted that although it was taking longer than expected for the inflation rate to decline he still expected that the pace of economic actitivity was likely to slow sufficiently to allow the decline to take place. He indicated that—contrary to what some economists and investment analysts had suggested—it was unlikely that the FOMC would raise its target for the federal funds rate at a future meeting. He noted that the possibility of raising the target was not discussed at this meeting.
Was there any news in the FOMC statement or in Powell’s remarks at the press conference? One way to judge whether the outcome of an FOMC meeting is consistent with the expectations of investors in financial markets prior to the meeting is to look at movements in stock prices during the time between the release of the FOMC statement at 2 pm and the conclusion of Powell’s press conference at about 3:15 pm. The following figure from the Wall Street Journal, shows movements in the three most widely followed stock indexes—the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the S&P 500, and the Nasdaq composite. (We discuss movements in stock market indexes in Macroeconomics and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 6, Section 6.2 and in Economics, Chapter 8, Section 8.2.)
If either the FOMC statement or the Powell’s remarks during his press conference had raised the possibility that the committee was considering raising its target for the federal funds rate, stock prices would likely have declined. The decline would reflect investors’ concern that higher interest rates would slow the economy, reducing future corporate profits. If, on the other hand, the statement and Powell’s remarks indicated that the committee would likely cut its target for the federal funds rate relatively soon, stock prices would likely have risen. The figure shows that stock prices began to rise after the 2 pm release of the FOMC statement. Prices rose further as Powell seemed to rule out an increase in the target at a future meeting and expressed confidence that inflation would resume declining toward the 2 percent target. But, as often happens in the market, this sentiment reversed towards the end of Powell’s press conference and two of the three stock indexes ended up lower at the close of trading at 4 pm. Presumably, investors decided that on reflection there was no news in the statement or press conference that would change the consensus on when the FOMC might begin lowering its target for the federal funds rate.
The next signficant release of macroeconomic data will come on Friday when the Bureau of Labor Statistics issues its employment report for April.
The latest significant piece of macroeconomic data that will be available to the Federal Reserve’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) before it concludes its meeting tomorrow is the report on the Employment Cost Index (ECI), released this morning by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). As we’ve noted in earlier posts, as a measure of the rate of increase in labor costs, the FOMC prefers the ECI to average hourly earnings (AHE) .
The AHE is calculated by adding all of the wages and salaries workers are paid—including overtime and bonus pay—and dividing by the total number of hours worked. As a measure of how wages are increasing or decreasing during a particular period, AHE can suffer from composition effects because AHE data aren’t adjusted for changes in the mix of occupations workers are employed in. For example, during a period in which there is a decline in the number of people working in occupations with higher-than-average wages, perhaps because of a downturn in some technology industries, AHE may show wages falling even though the wages of workers who are still employed have risen. In contrast, the ECI holds constant the mix of occupations in which people are employed. The ECI does have the drawback, that it is only available quarterly whereas the AHE is available monthly.
The data released this morning indicate that labor costs continue to increase at a rate that is higher than the rate that is likely needed for the Fed to hit its 2 percent price inflation target. The following figure shows the percentage change in the employment cost index for all civilian workers from the same quarter in 2023. The blue line looks only at wages and salaries while the red line is for total compensation, including non-wage benefits like employer contributions to health insurance. The rate of increase in the wage and salary measure decreased slightly from 4.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 4.3 percent in the first quarter of 2024. The rate of increase in compensation was unchanged at 4.2 percent in both quarters.
If we look at the compound annual growth rate of the ECI—the annual rate of increase assuming that the rate of growth in the quarter continued for an entire year—we find that the rate of increase in wages and salaries increased from 4.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 4.5 percent in the first quarter of 2024. Similarly, the rate of increase in compensation increased from 3.8 percent in the third quarter of 2023 to 4.5 percent in the first quarter of 2024.
Some economists and policymakers prefer to look at the rate of increase in ECI for private industry workers rather than for all civilian workers because the wages of government workers are less likely to respond to inflationary pressure in the labor market. The first of the following figures shows the rate of increase of wages and salaries and in total compensation for private industry workers measured as the percentage increase from the same quarter in the previous year. The second figure shows the rate of increase calculated as a compound growth rate.
The first figure shows a slight decrease in the rate of growth of labor costs from the fourth quarter of 2023 to the first quarter of 2024, while the second figure shows a fairly sharp increase in the rate of growth.
Taken together, these four figures indicate that there is little sign that the rate of increase in employment costs is falling to a level consistent with a 2 percent inflation rate. At his press conference tomorrow afternoon, following the conclusion of the FOMC’s meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell will give his thoughts on the implications for future monetary policy 0f recent macroeconomic data.
Supports:Macroeconomics, Chapter 18, Economics, Chapter 28, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 19.
In a recent post, economics blogger Noah Smith discussed the effects on the Japanese economy of a “weaker yen”: “A weaker yen is making Japanese people feel suddenly poorer ….” But “let’s remember that a ‘weaker’ exchange rate isn’t always a bad thing.”
When the yen becomes weaker, does one yen exchange for more or fewer U.S. dollars?
Why might a weaker yen make Japanese people feel poorer?
Are there any ways that a weaker yen might help the Japanese economy? Briefly explain.
Considering your answers to parts b. and c., can you determine whether a weak yen is good or bad for the Japanese economy? Briefly explain.
Solving the Problem
Step 1:Review the chapter material. This problem is about the effect of changes in a country’s exchange rate on the country’s economy, so you may want to review Macroeconomics, Chapter 18, Section 18.2, “The Foreign Exchange Market and Exchange Rates,” (Economics, Chapter 28, Section 18.2, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.6.
Step 2:Answer part a. by explaining what a “weaker” yen means. A weaker yen will exchange for fewer U.S. dollars (or other currencies), or, equivalently, more yen will be required in exchange for a U.S. dollar. (This situation is illustrated in the figure at the top of this post, which shows the substantial weakening of yen against the dollar in the period since the end of the 2020 recession.)
Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining why a weaker yen might make people in Japan feel poorer. A weaker yen raises the yen price of imported goods. For example at an exchange rate of ¥100 = $1, a $1 Hershey candy bar imported from the United States will sell in Japan for ¥100. But if the yen becomes weaker and the exchange rate moves to ¥120 = $1, then the imported candy bar will have increased in price to ¥120. (Note that this discussion is simplified because a change in the exchange rate won’t necessarily be fully passed through to the prices of imported goods, particularly in the short run. But we would still expect that a weaker yen will result in higher yen prices of imports.) A weaker yen will require people in Japan to pay more for imports, leaving them with less to spend on other goods. Because they will be able to consume less, people in Japan will feel poorer. (As we note in Section 18.3, many goods traded internally are priced in U.S. dollars—oil being an important example. Because Japan imports nearly all of its oil and more than half of its food, a decline in the value of the yen in exchange for the dollar will increase the yen price of key consumer goods.)
Step 4: Answer part c. by explaining how a weaker yen might help the Japanese economy. A weaker yen increases the yen price of Japanese imports but it also decreases the foreign currency price of Japanese exports. This effect would be the main way in which a weaker yen might help the Japanese economy but we can also note that Japanese businesses that compete with foreign imports will also be helped by the increase in import prices.
Step 5: Answer part d. by explaining that a weaker yen isn’t all bad or all good for the Japanese economy. As the answers to parts b. and c. indicate, a weaker yen creates both winners and losers in the Japanese economy. Japanese consumers lose as a result of a weaker yen but Japanese firms that export or that compete against foreign imports will be helped.
One of the key lessons of economics is that competition serves to push firms toward serving the interests of consumers. When existing firms in an industry are making an economic profit, new firms will enter the industry, which increases the quantity of the good produced and lowers the good’s price. Entry is the essential mechanism that drives a competitive market economy towards achieving allocative efficiency—with the mix of goods and services produced matching consumer preferences—and productive efficiency—with goods and services being produced at the lowest possible cost. (We discuss allocative efficiency and productive efficiency in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.)
For entry to occur requires the efforts of entrepreneurs, who constantly search for opportunities to make a profit. (We discuss the role of entrepreneurs in a market economy in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.) Although, not well remembered today, Victor S. Fox was one of the more flamboyant entrepreneurs in U.S. business history. Fox was born in England in 1893 and moved with his family to Massachusetts three years later. As a young man, he started a firm to manufacture women’s clothing. In 1917, with the entry of the United States into World War I, Fox’s firm switched to producing military uniforms. In 1920, after the end of the war, Fox founded Consolidated Maritime Lines to buy from the U.S. government confiscated German and Austrian cargo ships. Fox also purchased a coal mine in Virginia to provide fuel for the ships. This effort ended in bankruptcy.
In 1929, Fox founded Allied Capital Corporation to invest in the stock market. This firm also failed amid accusations that Fox had broken securities laws. (Most of the information on Fox’s early career is from this site, which relies primarily on mentions of Fox in newspapers.) In 1936, Fox founded Fox Feature Syndicate to produce magazines. At that point, very few comic books were being published. That changed in April 1938, when National Allied Publications released Action Comics, featuring Superman—generally considered the first superhero to appear in comic books. Sales of Superman comic books soared and Fox responded by entering the comic book industry, publishing a comic book starring Wonder Man. Wonder Man was an obvious copy of Superman, which led Superman’s publisher to file a lawsuit against Fox for copyright infringement. Fox agreed to stop publishing Wonder Man, but continued to publish comic books starring superheroes who weren’t such obvious copies of Superman.
As this summary of Fox’s career indicates, he was an entrepreneur who was willing to enter a new industry whenever he saw a profit opportunity, even if he lacked previous experience in the industry. In 1941, the continuing success of Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola led Fox to attempt to enter the cola industry in what was his most audacious entrepreneurial effort. The high sales of his comic books gave Fox a platform to advertise his new soft drink —Kooba cola. The following are some of Fox’s advertisements for Kooba cola.
Fox also advertised Kooba on a radio program featurning the Blue Beetle, one of his comic book superheroes. In the print advertisements for Kooba, Fox seems to have focused on two points in an attempt to differentiate his cola from existing colas, particularly Coke and Pepsi. (We discuss the role product differentiation plays in competition among firms in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 13.) First, to help overcome the belief among some consumers that colas were an unhealthy drink, Fox emphasized that Kooba cola would contain vitamin B1. In 1941, vitamin B1 had only recently become available and was the subject of newspaper stories. Second, at 12 ounces, bottles of Kooba were nearly twice as large as the standard 6.5 ounce Coke bottle but would sell for the same 5 cent price. One of the advertisements above notes that a six-pack of Kooba had a price of only 25 cents.
How was Fox able to sell his new cola for about half the price per ounce of Coke or Pepsi? That’s unclear because—amazingly—at the time Fox was running these advertisements, not only was Kooba not “available everywhere,” as the advertisements claimed, it wasn’t available anywhere. Fox was heavily advertising a product that didn’t actually exist.
How did Fox hope to earn a profit selling a nonexistent product? Fox’s strategy was apparently to begin by heavily advertising Kooba in the hopes of sparking a demand for it. He seems to have believed that if enough people were inspired by his advertisements to ask for the cola at grocery stores and newsstands, he could approach an existing soft drink company and offer to license the Kooba name. He seems never to have intended to actually manufacture the cola, relying instead on royalties paid by the soft drink company he hoped to license the name to.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Fox’s strategy failed. To capitalize on Fox’s advertising, a firm licensing the Kooba name would have had to find a way to make a profit despite selling the cola at a price about half the price charged by competitors. Because Fox had no experience in manufacturing colas, he presumably had no advice to give on how production costs could be reduced sufficiently to allow Kooba to be sold at a profit.
Fox engaged in other entrepreneurial efforts before passing away in 1957. Over the years, Fox pursued a number of business strategies, some of which were successful, at least for a time. But his attempt to make a profit by promoting a nonexistent cola ranks among the the most dubious strategies in U.S. business history. A strategy that likely left some consumers puzzled that a cola that appeared in advertisements was never available in store.
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell (Photo from federalreserve.gov)
In a post yesterday, we noted that the quarterly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index in the latest GDP report released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) indicated that inflation was running higher than expected. Today (April 26), the BEA released its “Personal Income and Outlays” report for March, which includes monthly data on the PCE. The monthly data are consistent with the quarterly data in showing that PCE inflation remains higher than the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent annual inflation target. (A reminder that PCE inflation is particularly important because it’s the inflation measure the Fed uses to gauge whether it’s hitting its inflation target.)
The following figure shows PCE inflation (blue line) and core PCE inflation (red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. Many economists believe that core inflation gives a better gauge of the underlying inflation rate. Measured this way, PCE inflation increased from 2.5 percent in February to 2.7 percent in March. Core PCE inflation remained unchanged at 2.8 percent.
The following figure shows PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation, while this figure shows 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, PCE inflation declined from 4.1 percent in February to 3.9 percent in March. Core PCE inflation increased from 3.2 percent in February to 3.9 in March. So, March was another month in which both PCE inflation and core PCE inflation remained well above the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target.
The following figure shows other ways of gauging inflation by including the 12-month inflation rate in the PCE (the same as shown in the figure above—although note that PCE inflation is now the red line rather than the blue line), inflation as measured using only the prices of the services included in the PCE (the green line), and the rate of inflation (the blue line) excluding the prices of housing, food, and energy. Fed Chair Jerome Powell has said that he is particularly concerned by elevated rates of inflation in services. Some economists believe that the price of housing isn’t accurately measured in the PCE, which makes it interesting to see if excluding the price of housing makes much difference in calculating the inflation rate. All three measures of inflation increased from February to March, with inflation in services remaining well above overall inflation and inflation excluding the prices of housing, food, and energy being somewhat lower than overall inflation.
The following figure uses the same three inflation measures as the figure above, but shows the 1-month inflation rate rather than the 12-month inflation rate. Measured this way, inflation in services increased sharply from 3.2 percent in February to 5.0 percent in March. Inflation excluding the prices of housing, food, and energy doubled from 2.0 percent in February to 4.1 percent in March.
Overall, the data in this report indicate that the decline in inflation during the second half of 2023 hasn’t continued in the first three months of 2024. In fact, the inflation rate may be slightly increasing. As a result, it no longer seems clear that the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will cut its target for the federal funds rate this year. (We discuss the possibility that the FOMC will keep its target unchanged through the end of the year in this blog post.) At the press conference following the FOMC’s next meeting on April 30-May 1, Fed Chair Jerome Powell may explain what effect the most recent data have had on the FOMC’s planned actions during the remainder of the year.
Arthur Burns was Fed chair during the stagflation of the 1970s. (Photo from the Wall Street Journal)
This morning, Thursday April 25, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of real GDP growth during the first quarter of 2024. The two most striking points in the report are, first, that real GDP increased in the first quarter at an annual rate of only 1.6 percent—well below the 2.5 percent increase expected in a survey of economists and the 2.7 percent increase indicated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s GDPNow forecast. As the following figure shows, the growth rate of real GDP has declined in each of the last two quarters from the very strong growth rate of 4.9 percent during the third quarter of 2023.
The second striking point in the report was an unexpected increase in inflation, as measured using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. As the following figure shows, PCE inflation (the red line), measured as a compound annual rate of change, increased from 1.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 3.4 percent in the first quarter of 2024. Core PCE inflation (the blue line), which excludes food and energy prices, increased from 2.0 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 3.7 percent in the first quarter of 2024. These data indicate that inflation in the first quarter of 2024 was running well above the Federal Reserve’s 2.0 percent target.
A combination of weak economic growth and above-target inflation poses a policy dilemma for the Fed. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 13, Section 13.3 (Economics, Chapter 23, Section 23.3), the combination of slow growth and inflation is called stagflation. During the 1970s, when the U.S. economy suffered from stagflation, Fed Chair Arthur Burns (whose photo appears at the beginning of this post) was heavily criticized by members of Congress for his inability to deal with the problem. Stagflation poses a dilemma for the Fed because using an expansionary monetary policy to deal with slow economic growth may cause the inflation rate to rise. Using a contractionary monetary policy to deal with high inflation can cause growth to slow further, possibly pushing the economy into a recession.
Is Fed Chair Jerome Powell in as difficult a situation as Arthur Burns was in the 1970s? Not yet, at least. First, Burns faced a period of recession—declining real GDP and rising unemployment—whereas currently, although economic growth seems to be slowing, real GDP is still rising and the unemployment rate is still below 4 percent. In addition, the inflation rate in these data are below 4 percent, far less than the 10 percent inflation rates during the 1970s.
Second, it’s always hazardous to draw conclusions on the basis of a single quarter’s data. The BEA’s real GDP estimates are revised several times, so that the value for the first quarter of 2024 may well be revised significantly higher (or lower) in coming months.
Third, the slow rate of growth of real GDP in the first quarter is accounted for largely by a surge in imports—which are subtracted from GDP—and a sharp decline in inventory investment. Key components of aggregate demand remained strong: Consumption expenditures increased at annual rate of 2.5 per cent and business investment increased at an annual rate of 3.2 percent. Residential investment was particularly strong, growing at an annual rate 0f 13.2 percent—despite the effects of rising mortgage interest rates. One way to strip out the effects of net exports, inventory investment, and government purchases—which can also be volatile—is to look at final sales to domestic purchasers, which includes only spending by U.S. households and firms on domestic production. As the following figure shows, real final sales to domestic purchasers declined only modertately from 3.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 3.1 percent in the first quarter of 2024.
Looking at these details of the GDP report indicate that growth may have slowed less during the first quarter than the growth rate of real GDP seems to indicate. Investors on Wall Street may have come to this same conclusion. As shown by this figure from the Wall Street Journal, shows that stock prices fell sharply when trading opened at 9:30 am, but by 2 pm has recovered some of their losses as investors considered further the implications of the GDP report. (As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 6, Section 6.2 and Economics, Chapter 8, Section 8.2, movements in stock price indexes can provide some insight into investors’ expectations of future movements in corporate profits, which, in turn, depend in part on future movements in economic growth.)
Finally, we may get more insight into the rate of inflation tomorrow morning when the BEA releases its report on “Personal Income and Outlays,” which will include data on PCE inflation during March. The monthly PCE data provide more current information than do the quarterly data in the GDP report.
In short, today’s report wasn’t good news, but may not have been as bad as it appeared at first glance. We are far from being able to conclude that the U.S. economy is entering into a period of stagflation.
Silver pennies used in England during the 600s. (Image from Jane Kershaw, et al.)
As economies move from subsistence agriculture towards specialization and trade, the inefficiency of barter exchange pushes them toward developing money. Any commodity that is widely accepted in payment for goods and services—that is, any commodity that can function as a medium of exchange—can be used as money. As we discuss in a recent blog post, in frontier America animal hides were used as money. In a World War II German prisoner of war camp, the British prisoners used cigarettes as money. Most economies made a transition from using commodities like animal skins to using coins made of precious metals, such as copper, silver, and gold. (We discuss the development of money in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.1, Economics, Chapter 24, Section 24.1, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 16, Section 16.1.)
Coins were typically minted by kings, local warlords, bishops, or other people with control over a sufficient sized territory to make minting coins worthwhile. Where did they get the metal needed to mint coins? During the height of the gold standard in the 1800s and early 1900s, governments could rely on supplies of precious metals from domestic mines or from trade with other countries. In earlier periods, access to sufficient supplies of precious metals could be more difficult.
A recent academic paper by Jane Kershaw, of the University of Oxford; Stephen W. Merkel and Paolo D’Imporzano, of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; and Rory Naismith the University of Cambridge, examined the case of coins minted by kings of England during the year 660 to 820. During the time from the year 43 to the year 409, most of modern England and Wales was part of the Roman Empire. (A non-technical summary of the paper, with a video, is here. A timeline of Roman Britain is here.) During that time, the Roman province of Britannia used the same gold, silver, and copper coins used throughout the empire. After the withdrawal of the last Roman legions, England experienced waves of invasions from Saxons, Angles, and other Germanic tribes that destroyed most of Roman civilization on the island. Very few written records have survived from 409 through the end of the 500s. But it’s likely that few, if any, coins were minted during this period.
As trade within England began to revive in the second half of the 600s, the demand for coins increased. Given the inefficiency of barter, the absence of a sufficient supply of coins would have hobbled the growth of trade. With more than 200 years having passed since the end of Roman rule, Roman coins were no longer available in significant quantities. The increased demand for coins was met by silver pennies, like those shown in the photo at the top of this post.
Where did the rulers of the various English kingdoms get the silver to mint pennies, given that there were no known silver mines operating during this period? Searching for clues, Jane Kershaw and her colleagues analyzed the composition of the silver used in the pennies. Surprisingly, the silver turned out to have the same composition as silver used in the Byzantine Empire in the eastern Mediterranean. Because in this period there was little to no trade between England and the Byzantine Empire, Kershaw and colleagues believe that the silver was likely obtained from melting silver objects, like the plate shown above, obtained from trade with the Byzantine Empire in earlier periods.
The work of these researchers has provided insight into an historical example of governments supplying the money needed to facilitate the transition away from barter.
This op-ed orginally appeared in the Wall Street Journal.
Put Growth Back on the Political Agenda
In a campaign season dominated by the past, a central economic topic is missing: growth. Rapid productivity growth raises living standards and incomes. Resources from those higher incomes can boost support for public goods such as national defense and education, or can reconfigure supply chains or shore up social insurance programs. A society without growth requires someone to be worse off for you to be better off. Growth breaks that zero-sum link, making it a political big deal.
So why is the emphasis on growth fading? More than economics is at play. While progress from technological advances and trade generally is popular, the disruption that inevitably accompanies growth and hits individuals, firms and communities has many politicians wary. Such concerns can lead to excessive meddling via industrial policy.
As we approach the next election, the stakes for growth are high. Regaining the faster productivity that prevailed before the global financial crisis requires action. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates potential gross domestic product growth of 1.8% over the coming decade, and somewhat lower after that. Those figures are roughly 1 percentage point lower than the growth rate over the three decades before the pandemic. Many economists believe productivity gains from generative artificial intelligence can raise growth in coming decades. But achieving those gains requires an openness to change that is rare in a political climate stuck in past grievances about disruption—the perennial partner of growth.
Traditionally, economic policy toward growth emphasized support for innovation through basic research. Growth also was fostered by reducing tax burdens on investment, streamlining regulation (which has proliferated during the Biden administration) and expanding markets. These important actions have flagged in recent years. But such attention, while valuable, masks inattention to adverse effects on some individuals and communities, raising concerns about whether open markets advance broad prosperity.
This opened a lane for backward-looking protectionism and industrial policy from Democrats and Republicans alike. Absent strong national-defense arguments (which wouldn’t include tariffs on Canadian steel or objections to Japanese ownership of a U.S. steel company), protectionism limits growth. According to polls by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, roughly three-fourths of Americans say international trade is good for the economy. Finally, protectionism belies ways in which gains from openness may be preserved, such as by simultaneously offering support for training and work for communities of individuals buffeted by trade and technological change.
On industrial policy, it is true that markets can’t solve every allocation problem. But such concerns underpin arguments for greater federal support of research for new technologies in defense, climate-change mitigation, and private activity, not micromanaged subsidies to firms and industries. If a specific defense activity merits assistance, it could be subsidized. These alternatives mitigate the problems in conventional industrial policy of “winner picking” and, just as important, the failure to abandon losers. It is policymakers’ hyperattention to those buffeted by change that hampers policy effectiveness and, worse, invites rent-seeking behavior and costly regulatory micromanagement.
Examples abound. Appending child-care requirements to the Chips Act and the inaptly named Inflation Reduction Act has little to do with those laws’ industrial policy purpose. The Biden administration’s opposition to Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel raises questions amid the current wave of industrial policy. How is a strong American ally’s efficient operation of an American steel company with U.S. workers an industrial-policy problem? Flip-flops on banning TikTok fuel uncertainty about business operations in the name of industrial policy.
The wrongly focused hyperattention is supposedly grounded in putting American workers first. But it raises three problems. First, the interventions raise the cost of investments, and the jobs they are to create or protect, by using mandates and generating policy uncertainty. Second, they contradict the economic freedom in market economies of voluntary transactions. Absent a strong national-security foundation, why is public policy directing investment in or ownership of assets? Such policies threaten the nation’s long-term prosperity by discouraging investment and invite rent-seeking in a way that voluntary market transactions don’t. Both problems hamstring growth.
Third, and perhaps most important, such micromanagement misses the economic and political mark of actually helping individuals and communities disrupted by growth-enhancing openness. A more serious agenda would focus on training suited to current markets (through, for example, more assistance to community colleges), on work (through expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit), and on aid to communities hit by prolonged employment loss (through services that enhance business formation and job creation). The federal government could also establish research centers around the country to disseminate ideas for businesses.
Growth matters—for individual livelihoods, business opportunities and public finances. Pro-growth policies that account for disruption’s effects while encouraging innovation, saving, capital formation, skill development and limited regulation must return to the economic agenda. A shift to prospective, visionary thinking would reorient the bipartisan, backward-looking protectionism and industrial policy that weaken growth and fail to address disruption.
It’s not surprising that waste management firms often recycle metals that have either been separated by households and firms in recycling bins or have been thrown away mixed in with other trash. But according to a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, Reworld, a nationwide waste management firm headquartered in Morristown, New Jersey, has been recovering metal that you wouldn’t ordinarily expect to find in garbage: U.S. coins. Are these coins that people have accidentally thrown in the garbage? Some of the coins were probably mistakenly included in garbage but the article indicates that most were likely intentionally thrown away:
“Coins are as good as junk for many Americans…. [Many people believe that] change is often more trouble than it is worth to carry around.”
Why would people throw coins—things of obvious value—into the garbarge? As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.1 (Economics, Chapter 24, Sextion 24.1 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 16, Section 16.1), consumers have been buying things using paper money and coins much less frequently in recent years. People have relied more on making purchases or transferring funds using credit and debit cards, Apple Pay and Google Pay, or smartphones apps like Venmo.
Even if people use cash to buy things, they are more likely to use paper currency rather than coins. As prices increase, the amount of goods or services you can buy with a coin of a given face value decreases. For instance, the following figure shows that with a quarter you could have bought 25 cents worth of goods and services in 1980 but, because of inflation, only 7 cents worth of goods and services in 2023.
In other words, coins have become less useful both because more convenient means of payment, such as Apple Pay or Venmo, have become more widely and available and because inflation has eroded the purchasing power of coins. In addition, for decades, drinks, snacks, and other products sold from vending machines could only be purchased using coins. But in recent years, most vending machines have been modified to accept credit cards. Because fewer people use coins to buy things, if they receive coins in change after paying with paper currency, they are likely to just accumulate the coins in a jar or other container or, as Reworld has discovered, throw the coins in the garbage.
If an increasing number of coins are being thrown away, should the government stop minting them? It’s unlikely that the U.S. Mint will stop producing all coins, but there have been serious proposals to at least stop producing the penny and, perhaps, also the nickel. Governments make a profit from issuing money because it is usually produced using paper or low-value metals that cost far less than the face value of the money. The government’s profit from issuing money is called seigniorage.
As the following figure shows (cents are measured on the vertical axis), in recent decades, the penny and the nickel have cost more to produce than their face value. In other words, the federal government has experienced negative seigniorage in minting pennies and nickels, paying more to produce them than they are worth. For instance, in 2023, as the blue line shows, it cost 3.1 cents to produce a penny and distribute it to Federal Reserve Banks (which, in turn, distribute coins to local commercial banks). Similarly, each nickel (the orange line) cost 11.5 cents to produce and distribute. The penny is made from copper and zinc and the other coins are made from copper and nickel. As the market prices of these metals change, so does the cost to the Mint of producing the coins, as shown in the figure.
Data in the figure were compiled from the U.S. Mint’s biennial reports to Congress.
François Velde, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, has come up with a possible solution to the problem of the penny: The federal government would simply declare that Lincoln pennies are now worth five cents. There would then be two five-cent coins in circulation—the current Jefferson nickels and the current Lincoln pennies—and no one-cent coins. In the future, only the Lincoln coins—now worth five cents—would be minted. This would solve the problem of consumers and retail stores having to deal with pennies, it would make the face value of the Lincoln five-cent coin greater than its cost of production, and it would also deal with the problem that the current Jefferson nickel costs more than five cents to produce.
With some consumers valuing coins so little that they throw them out in the trash and with the U.S. Mint spending more than their face value to produce pennies and nickels, it seems likely that at some point Congress will make changes to U.S. coinage.
Federal Reserve Vice Chair Philip Jefferson (photo from the Federal Reserve)
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell (photo from the Federal Reserve)
At the beginning of 2024, investors were expecting that during the year the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) would cut its target range for the federal funds rate six or seven times. At its meeting on March 19-20 the economic projections of the members of the FOMC indicated that they were expecting to cut the target range three times from its current 5.25 percent to 5.50 percent. But, as we noted in this recent post and in this podcast, macroeconomic data during the first three months of this year indicated that the U.S. economy was growing more rapidly than the Fed had expected and the reductions in inflation that occurred during the second half of 2023 had not persisted into the beginning of 2024.
The unexpected strength of the economy and the persistence of inflation above the Fed’s 2 percent target have raised the issue of whether the FOMC will cut its target range for the federal funds rate at all this year. Earlier this month, Neel Kashkari, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis raised the possibility that the FOMC would not cut its target range this year.
Today (April 16) both Fed Vice Chair Philip Jefferson and Fed Chair Jerome Powell addressed the issue of monetary policy. They gave what appeared to be somewhat different signals about the likely path of the federal funds target during the remainder of this year—bearing in mind that Fed officials never commit to any specific policy when making a speech. Adressing the International Research Forum on Monetary Policy, Vice Chair Jefferson stated that:
“My baseline outlook continues to be that inflation will decline further, with the policy rate held steady at its current level, and that the labor market will remain strong, with labor demand and supply continuing to rebalance. Of course, the outlook is still quite uncertain, and if incoming data suggest that inflation is more persistent than I currently expect it to be, it will be appropriate to hold in place the current restrictive stance of policy for longer.”
One interpretation of his point here is that he is still expecting that the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate sometime this year unless inflation remains persistently higher than the Fed’s target—which he doesn’t expect.
Chair Powell, speaking at a panel discussion at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., seemed to indicate that he believed it was less likely that the FOMC would reduce its federal funds rate target in the near future. The Wall Street Journal summarized his remarks this way:
“Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said firm inflation during the first quarter had introduced new uncertainty over whether the central bank would be able to lower interest rates this year without signs of an economic slowdown. His remarks indicated a clear shift in the Fed’s outlook following a third consecutive month of stronger-than-anticipated inflation readings ….”
An article on bloomberg.com had a similar interpretation of Powell’s remarks: “Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell signaled policymakers will wait longer than previously anticipated to cut interest rates following a series of surprisingly high inflation readings.”
Politics may also play a role in the FOMC’s decisions. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 17, Section 17.4 (Economics, Chapter 27, Section 27.4), the Federal Reserve Act, which Congress passed in 1913 and has amended several times since, puts the Federal Reserve in an unusal position in the federal government. Although the members of the Board of Governors are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, the Fed was intended to act independently of Congress and the president. Over the years, Fed Chairs have protected that independence by, for the most part, avoiding taking actions beyond the narrow responsibilites Congress has given to the Fed by Congress and by avoiding actions that could be interpreted as political.
This year is, of course, a presidential election year. The following table from the Fed’s web site lists the FOMC meetings this year. The presidential election will occur on November 5. There are four scheduled FOMC meetings before then. Given that inflation has been running well above the Fed’s target during the first three months of the year, it would likely take at least two months of lower inflation data—or a weakening of the economy as indicated by a rising unemployment rate—before the FOMC would consider lowering its federal funds rate target. If so, the meeting on July 30-31 might be the first meeting at which a rate reduction would occur. If the FOMC doesn’t act at its July meeting, it might be reluctant to cut its target at the September 17-18 meeting because acting close to the election might be interpreted as an attempt to aid President Joe Biden’s reelection.
Although we don’t know whether avoiding the appearance of intervening in politics is an important consideration for the members of the FOMC, some discussion in the business press raises the possibility. For instance, a recent article in the Wall Street Journal noted that:
“The longer that officials wait, the less likely there will be cuts this year, some analysts said. That is because officials will likely resist starting to lower rates in the midst of this year’s presidential election campaign to avoid political entanglements.”
These are clearly not the easiest times to be a Fed policymaker!
Supports:Macroeconomics, Chapter 18, Section 18.2; Economics, Chapter 28, Section 28.2; and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.6.
As the figure above shows, federal government debt, sometimes called the national debt, has been increasing rapidly in the years since the 2020 Covid pandemic. (The figure show federal government debt held by the public, which excludes debt held by federal government trust funds, such as the Social Security trusts funds.) The debt grows each year the federal government runs a budget deficit—that is, whenever federal government expenditures exceed federal government revenues. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecasts large federal budget deficits over the next 30 years, so unless Congress and the president increase taxes or cut expenditures, the size of the federal debt will continue to increase rapidly. (The CBO’s latest forecast can be found here. We discuss the long-run deficit and debt situation in this earlier blog post.)
When the federal government runs a budget deficit, the U.S. Treasury must sell Treasury bills, notes, and bonds to raise the funds necessary to bridge the gap between revenues and expenditures. (Treasury bills have a maturity—the time until the debt is paid off by the Treasury—of 1 year or less; Treasury notes have a maturity of 2 years to 10 years; and Treasury bonds have a maturity of greater than 10 years. For convenience, we will refer to all of these securities as “bonds.”) A recent article in the Wall Street Journal discussed the concern among some investors about the ability of the bond market to easily absorb the large amounts of bonds that Treasury will have to sell. (The article can be found here. A subscription may be required.)
According to the article, one source of demand is likely to be European and Japanese investors.
“The euro and yen are both sinking relative to the dollar, in part because the Bank of Japan is still holding rates low and investors expect the European Central Bank to slash them soon. That could increase demand for U.S. debt, with Treasury yields remaining elevated relative to global alternatives.”
a. What does the article mean by “the euro and the yen are both sinking relative to the dollar”?
b. Why would the fact that U.S. interest rates are greater than interest rates in Europe and Japan cause the euro and the yen to sink relative to the dollar?
c. If you were a Japanese investor, would you rather be invested in U.S. Treasury bonds when the yen is sinking relative to the dollar or when it is rising? Briefly explain.
Solving the Problem
Step 1:Review the chapter material. This problem is about the determinants of exchange rates, so you may want to review Macroeconomics, Chapter 18, Section 18.2, “The Foreign Exchange Market and Exchange Rates” (Economics, Chapter 28, Section 28.2; Essentials of Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.6.)
Step 2:Answer part a. by explaining what it means that the euro and the yen “sinking relative to the dollar.” Sinking relative to the dollar means that the exchange rates between the euro and the dollar and between the yen and the dollar are declining. In other words, a dollar will exchange for more yen and for more euros.
Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining how differences in interest rates between countries can affect the exchange between the countries’ currencies. Holding other factors that can affect the attractiveness of an investment in a country’s bonds constant, the demand foreign investors have for a country’s bonds will depend on the difference in interest rates between the two countries. For example, a Japanese investor will prefer to invest in U.S. Treasury bonds if the interest rate is higher on Treasury bonds than the interest rate on Japanese government bonds. So, if interest rates in Europe decline relative to interest rates in the United States, we would expect that European investors will increase their investments in U.S. Treasury bonds. To invest in U.S. Treasury bonds, European investors will need to exhange euros for dollars, causing the supply curve for euros in exchange for dollars to shift to the right, reducing the value of the euro.
Step 4: Answer part c. by discussing whether if you were a Japanese investor, you would you rather be invested in U.S. Treasury bonds when the yen is sinking relative to the dollar or when it is rising. In answering this part, you should draw a distinction between the situation of a Japanese investor who already owns U.S. Treasury bonds and one who is considering buying U.S. Treasury bonds. A Japanese investor who already owns U.S. Treasury bonds would definitely prefer to own them when the value of the yen if falling against the dollar. In this situation, the investor will receive more yen for a given amount of dollars the investor earns from the Treasury bonds. A Japanese investor who doesn’t currently own U.S. bonds, but is thinking of buying them, would want the value of the yen to be increasing relative to the dollar because then the investor would have to pay fewer yen to buy a Treasury bond with a price in dollars, all other factors being equal. (The face value of a Treasury bond is $1,000, although at any given time the price in the bond market may not equal the face value of the bond.) If the interest rate difference between U.S. and Japanese bonds is increasing at the same time as the value of the yen is decreasing (as in the situation described in the article) a Japanese investor would have to weigh the gain from the higher interest rate against the higher price in yen the investor would have to pay to buy the Treasury bond.
Supports:Macroeconomics, Chapter 5, Section 5.3 or Chapter 6, Section 6.1; Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 7, Section 7.3 or Chapter 8, Section 8.1.
Image from Reuters via the Wall Street Journal.
A recent paper by Iyah Rahwan, of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin Germany, and colleagues raises the possibility that dating apps, like Tinder, OkCupid, and Bumble, may have a principal-agent problem. Dating apps—like nearly all other subscription apps—generate more income if subscribers pay for the app over a longer period of time. Many people use dating apps in the hope of connecting with another app user with whom they can have a long-term relationship.
a. What is the principal-agent problem?
b. Explain whether dating apps may have a principal-agent problem. If they do, who is the principal and who is the agent?
c. How does your answer to part b. affect your estimate of how likely people using dating apps are to find a long-term relationship using these apps?
Solving the Problem
Step 1:Review the chapter material. This problem is about the principal-agent problem, so you may want to review either of the two sections in which the principal-agent problem is discussed: Macroeconomics, Chapter 5, Section 5.3, “Information Problems and Externalities in the Market for Health Care” or Chapter 6, Section 6.1, “Types of Firms” (Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 7, Section 7.3 or Chapter 8, Section 8.1.)
Step 2:Answer part a. by defining “principal-agent” problem. Principal-agent is defined in the textbook this way: A problem caused by an agent pursuing the agent’s own interests rather than the interests of the principal who hired the agent.
Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining why dating apps may have a principal-agent problem and by identifying who is the principal and who is the agent in this situation. With dating apps, the principal is the app user who, typically, uses the app to help find a partner for a long-term relationship. The owners of the dating app are the agent because they have been hired by the app user to help the user achieve the goal of starting a long-term relationship. Unfortunately, the owners of the dating app have a different goal than does the app user. The goal of the owners is to have users keep subscribing to the app. Anyone who finds a long-term relationship using the app is likely (we hope!) to drop his or her subscription to the app. Therefore, whereas the app user would like to quickly find a partner for a long-term relationship, the owners of the app want the app user to take a long time to find such a partner.
Step 4: Answer part c. by discussing how the principal-agent problem may affect the likelihood of someone using a dating app successfully finding someone for a long-term relationship. The answer to part b. indicates that dating apps may have an incentive to make it somewhat more difficult to find a long-term relationship using the app—perhaps by employing a matching algorithm that doesn’t result in users easily finding good matches. Therefore, it’s likely that the principal-agent problem make it less likely that people using dating apps will successfully find a partner for a long-term relationship.
Source: Iyah Rahwan, et al., “Price of Anarchy in Algorithmic Matching of Romantic Partners,” ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1-25.
In a recent podcast we discussed what actions the Fed may take if inflation continues to run well above the Fed’s 2 percent target. We are likely a step closer to finding out with the release this morning (April 10) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of data on the consumer price index (CPI) for March. The inflation rate measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous month—headline inflation—was 3.5 percent, slightly higher than expected (as indicated here and here). As the following figure shows, core inflation—which excludes the prices of food and energy—was 3.8 percent, the same as in January.
If we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year—the values seem to confirm that inflation, while still far below its peak in mid-2022, has been running somewhat higher than it did during the last months of 2023. Headline CPI inflation in March was 4.6 percent (down from 5.4 percent in February) and core CPI inflation was 4.4 percent (unchanged from February). It’s worth bearing in mind that the Fed’s inflation target is measured using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, not the CPI. But CPI inflation at these levels is not consistent with PCE inflation of only 2 percent.
As has been true in recent months, the path of inflation in the prices of services has been concerning. As we’ve noted in earlier posts, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has emphasized that as supply chain problems have gradually been resolved, inflation in the prices of goods has been rapidly declining. But inflaion in services hasn’t declined nearly as much. Last summer he stated the point this way:
“Part of the reason for the modest decline of nonhousing services inflation so far is that many of these services were less affected by global supply chain bottlenecks and are generally thought to be less interest sensitive than other sectors such as housing or durable goods. Production of these services is also relatively labor intensive, and the labor market remains tight. Given the size of this sector, some further progress here will be essential to restoring price stability.”
The following figure shows the 1-month inflation rate in services prices and in services prices not included including housing rent. Some economists believe that the rent component of the CPI isn’t well measured and can be volatile, so it’s worthwhile to look at inflation in service prices not including rent. The figure shows that inflation in all service prices has been above 4 percent in every month since July 2023. Inflation in service prices increased from 5.8 percent in February to 6.6 percent in March . Inflation in service prices not including housing rent was even higher, increasing from 7.5 percent in February to 8.9 percent in March. Such large increases in the prices of services, if they were to continue, wouldn’t be consistent with the Fed meeting its 2 percent inflation target.
Finally, some economists and policymakers look at median inflation to gain insight into the underlying trend in the inflation rate. If we listed the inflation rate in each individual good or service in the CPI, median inflation is the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates. As the following figure shows, although median inflation declined in March, it was still high at 4.3 percent. Median inflation is volatile, but the trend has been generally upward since July 2023.
Financial investors, who had been expecting that this CPI report would show inflation slowing, reacted strongly to the news that, in fact, inflation had ticked up. As of late morning, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had decline by nearly 500 points and the S&P 5o0 had declined by 59 points. (We discuss the stock market indexes in Macroeconomics, Chapter 6, Section 6.2 and in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 8, Section 8.2.) The following figure from the Wall Street Journal shows the sharp reaction in the bond market as the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note rose sharply following the release of the CPI report.
Lower stock prices and higher long-term interest rates reflect the fact that investors have changed their views concerning when the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will cut its target for the federal funds and how many rate cuts there may be this year. At the start of 2024, the consensus among investors was for six or seven rate cuts, starting as early as the FOMC’s meeting on March 19-20. But with inflation remaining persistently high, investors had recently been expecting only two or three rate cuts, with the first cut occurring at the FOMC’s meeting on June 11-12. Two days ago, Neel Kashkari, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis raised the possibility that the FOMC might not cut its target for the federal funds rate during 2024. Some economists have even begun to speculate that the FOMC might feel obliged to increase its target in the coming months.
After the FOMC’s next meeting on April 30-May 1 first, Chair Powell may provide some additional information on the committee’s current thinking.
On Friday, April 5—the first Friday of the month—the Bureau of labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Employment Situation” report with data on the state of the labor market in March. The BLS reported a net increase in employment during March of 303,000, which was well above the increase that economists had been expecting. The previous estimates of employment in January and February were revised upward by 22,000 jobs. (We also discuss the employment report in this podcast.)
Employment increases during the second half of 2023 had slowed compared with the first half of the year. But, as the following figure from the BLS report shows, since December 2023, employment has increased by more than 250,000 in each month. These increases are far above the estimated increases of 70,000 to 100,000 new jobs needed to keep up with population growth. (But note our later discussion of this point.)
The unemployment rate had been expected to stay steady at 3.9 percent, but declined slightly to 3.8 percent. As the following figure shows, the unemployment rate has been remarkably stable for more than two years and has been below 4.0 percent each month since December 2021. The members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) expect that the unemployment rate for 2024 will be 4.0 percent, a forcast that is beginning to seem too high.
The monthly employment number most commonly reported in media accounts is from the establishment survey (sometimes referred to as the payroll survey), whereas the unemployment rate is taken from the household survey. The results of both surveys are included in the BLS’s monthly “Employment Situation” report. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1), many economists and policymakers at the Federal Reserve believe that employment data from the establishment survey provides a more accurate indicator of the state of the labor market than do either the employment data or the unemployment data from the household survey.
As we noted in a previous post, whereas employment as measured by the establishment survey has been increasing each month, employment as measured by the household surve declined each month from December 2023 through February 2024. But, as the following figure shows, this trend was reversed in March, with employment as measured by the household survey increasing 498,000—far more than the 303,000 increase in employment in establishment survey. This reversal may be another indication of the underlying strength of the labor market.
As the following figure shows, despite the substantial increases in employment, wages, as measured by the percentage change in average hourly earnings from the same month in the previous year, have been trending down. The increase in average hourly earnings declined from 4.3 percent February in to 4.1 percent in March.
The following figure shows wage inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month wage inflation, whereas this figure shows 1-month wage inflation.) One-month wage inflation is much more volatile than 12-month inflation—note the very large swings in 1-month wage inflation in April and May 2020 during the business closures caused by the Covid pandemic.
Wages increased by 6.1 percent in January 2024, 2.1 percent in February, and 4.2 percent in March. So, the 1-month rate of wage inflation did show an increase in March, although it’s unclear whether the increase was a result of the strength of the labor market or reflected the greater volatility in wage inflation when calculated this way.
Some economists and policymakers are surprised that low levels of unemployment and large monthly increases in employment have not resulted in greater upward pressure on wages. One possibility is that the supply of labor has been increasing more rapidly than is indicated by census data. In a January report, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) argued that the Census Bureau’s estimate of the population of the United States is too low by about 6 million people. This undercount is attributable, according to the CBO, largely the Census Bureau having underestimated the amount of immigration that has occurred. If the CBO is correct, then the economy may need to generate about 200,000 net new jobs each month to accomodate the growth of the labor force, rather than thw 80,000 to 100,000 we mentioned earlier in this post.
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell noted in a press conference following the most recent meeing of the FOMC that: “Strong job creation has been accompanied by an increase in the supply of workers, reflecting increases in participation among individuals aged 25 to 54 years and a continued strong pace of immigration.” As a result:
“what you would have is potentially kind of what you had last year, which is a bigger economy where inflationary pressures are not increasing. In fact, they were decreasing. So you can have that if you have a continued supply-side activity that we had last year with—both with supply chains and also with, with growth in the size of the labor force.”
If Powell is correct, in the coming months the U.S. economy may be able to sustain rapid increases in employment without those increases leading to an increase in the rate of inflation.
Join authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien as they react to the jobs report of over 300K jobs created which was way over expectations of about 200K. They consider the impact of this report as the Fed considers the next steps for the economy. Are we on a glide path for a soft landing at 2% inflation or will the Fed reconsider its long-standing target by adopting a higher 3% target? Glenn and Tony offer interesting viewpoints on where this is headed.
Supports: Microeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.6; Economics, Chapter 55, Section 15.6; and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 10, Sections 10.6.
PG&E workers moving a powerline underground. (Photo from the Wall Street Journal.)
PG&E, Southern California Edison, and San Diego Gas and Electric are public utilities that provide electricity and natural gas to households and firms in California. (For the most part, they provide these services in different parts of the state.) The California Public Utilities Commission regulates the prices that these utilities charge. In March 2024, an article in the San Francisco Chronicle reported that the commission proposed that the utilities begin charging households who receive their electricity from these utilities an additional flat fee of $24 per month (that would not depend on the quantity of electricity a household uses), while reducing the price households pay for each kilowatt hour they use by about 6 cents.
Isn’t this policy contradictory—adding a flat fee to households’ electric bills while reducing the price per kilowatt hour households pay? Can you explain why the policy might make economic sense? Draw a graph showing the situation of a public utility to illustrate your answer.
Solving the Problem
Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about how the government regulates public utilities, so you may want to review the section in Microeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.6, on “Regulating Natural Monopolies,” (Economics, Chapter 15, Section 15.6 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 10, Section 10.6).
Step 2: Explain why the policy isn’t contradictory and why it might make economic sense. It may seem as if the commission is being contradictory in imposing a new flat rate fee on households while at the same time lowering the price they pay per kilowatt hour used. But, as we discuss in Chapter 15, public utilities are typically natural monoplies because economies of scale are so large in that industy that one firm can supply the electricity in a market at a lower average cost than can two or more firms. Figure 15.1, reproduced below, shows this situation.
As we discuss in the “Regulating Monopoly” section of Chapter 15, Section 15.6, as a result of the large economies of scale in generating electricity, at the quantity at which the marginal cost curve crosses the demand curve, the marginal cost curve is below the demand curve. The economically efficient price is the price equal to the marginal cost of generating electricity. But if the public utility commission requires the utility to charge this price, the utility will suffer losses because it will not be covering its average total cost. The combination of charging households a flat fee while lowering the price they pay per kilowatt hour can help overcome this problem.
Step 3: Finishing solving the problem by drawing a graph to illustrate your answer. You should draw graph similar to Figure 18.8, which we reproduce below. In this graph, if the utility is required to charge the economically efficient price, PE, it will suffer a loss equal to red rectangle. As a result, public utility commissions often set the price of electricity equal to PR, but at that price households demand the quantity of electricity, QR, which is less than the economically efficient quantity, QE. Note, though, that if a public utility commission allows a utillity to collect a flat fee from households equal to the amount shown by the red rectangle, it can require the utility to charge the economically efficient price, PE.
The key point here is that, because it doesn’t change as the quantity of electricity generated and used changes, the flat fee doesn’t affect either the utility’s marginal cost of generating electricity or the cost to households of using another kilowatt of electricity.
We don’t know from the discussion in the article whether the flat fee will cover the entire amount of the utilities’ losses or if the new price will be equal to the efficient price. But the policy can still make economic sense if the new price is closer to the efficient price than was the previous price.
Source: Julie Johnson, “California Proposes A $24 Flat Fee on Utility Bills in Exchange for Lower Electricity Prices,” San Francisco Chronicle, March 28, 2024.
McDonald’s raising the price of its burgers by 10 percent in 2023 led to a decline in sales. (Photo from mcdonalds.com)
Inflation as measured by changes in the consumer price index (CPI) receives the most attention in the media, but the Federal Reserve looks instead to inflation as measured by changes in personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index when evaluating whether it is meeting its 2 percent inflation target. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released PCE data for February as part of its “Personal Income and Outlays” report on March 29.
The following figure shows PCE inflation (blue line) and core PCE inflation (red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2015 with inflation measured as the change in PCE from the same month in the previous year. Measured this way, PCE inflation increased slightly from 2.4 percent in January to 2.5 percent in February. Core PCE inflation decreased slightly from 2.9 percent to 2.8 percent.
The following figure shows PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation, while this figure shows 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, both PCE inflation and core PCE inflation declined in February, but the decline only partly offset the sharp increases in December and January. Both PCE inflation—at 4.1 percent—and core PCE inflation—at 3.2 percent—remained well above the Fed’s 2 percent target.
The following figure shows another way of gauging inflation by including the 12-month inflation rate in the PCE (the same as shown in the figure above—although note that PCE inflation is now the red line rather than the blue line), inflation as measured using only the prices of the services included in the PCE (the green line), and the trimmed mean rate of PCE inflation (the blue line). Fed Chair Jerome Powell has said that he is particularly concerned by elevated rates of inflation in services. The trimmed mean measure is compiled by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas by dropping from the PCE the goods and services that have the highest and lowest rates of inflation. It can be thought of as another way of looking at core inflation.
In February, 12-month trimmed mean PCE inflation was 3.1 percent, a little below core inflation of 3.3 percent. Twelve-month inflation in services was 3.8 percent, a slight decrease from 3.9 percent in January. Trimmed mean and services inflation tell the same story as PCE and PCE core inflation: Inflation has decline significantly from its highs of mid-2022, but remains stubbornly above the Fed’s 2 percent target.
It seems unlikely that this month’s PCE data will have much effect on when the members of the Federal Open Market Committee will decide to lower the target for the federal funds rate.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has issued its third estimate of real GDP for the fourth quarter of 2023. The BEA now estimates that real GDP increased in the fourth quarter of 2023 at an annual rate of 3.4 percent, an increase from the BEA’s second estimate of 3.2 percent. The BEA noted that: “The update primarily reflected upward revisions to consumer spending and nonresidential fixed investment that were partly offset by a downward revision to private inventory investment.”
As the blue line in the following figure shows, despite the upward revision, fourth quarter growth in real GDP decline significantly from the very high growth rate of 4.9 percent in the third quarter. In addition, two widely followed “nowcast” estimates of real GDP growth in the first quarter of 2024 show a futher slowdown. The nowcast from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta estimates that real GDP will have grown at an annualized rate of 2.1 percent in the first quarter and the nowcast from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimates a growth rate of 1.9 percent. (The Atlanta Fed describes its nowcast as “a running estimate of real GDP growth based on available economic data for the current measured quarter.” The New York Fed explains: “Our model reads the flow of information from a wide range of macroeconomic data as they become available, evaluating their implications for current economic conditions; the result is a ‘nowcast’ of GDP growth ….”)
Data on growth in real gross domestic income (GDI), on the other hand, show an upward trend, as indicated by the red line in the figure. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 8, Section 8.4 (Economics, Chapter 18, Section 18.4), gross domestic product measures the economy’s output from the production side, while gross domestic income does so from the income side. The two measures are designed to be equal, but they can differ because each measure uses different data series and the errors in data on production can differ from the errors in data on income. Economists differ on whether data on growth in real GDP or data on growth in real GDI do a better job of forecasting future changes in the economy. Accordingly, economists and policymakers will differ on how much weight to put on the fact that while the growth in real GDI had been well below growth in real GDP from the fourth quarter of 2022 to the fourth quarter of 2023, during the fourth quarter of 2023, growth in real GDI was 1.5 percentage points higher than growth in real GDP.
On balance, it seems likely that these data will reinforce the views of those members of the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) who were cautious about reducing the target for the federal funds rate until the macroeconomic data indicate more clearly that the economy is slowing sufficiently to ensure that inflation is returning to the Fed’s 2 percent target. In a speech on March 27 (before the latest GDP revisions became available), Fed Governor Christopher Waller reviewed the most recent macro data and concluded that:
“Adding this new data to what we saw earlier in the year reinforces my view that there is no rush to cut the [federal funds] rate. Indeed, it tells me that it is prudent to hold this rate at its current restrictive stance perhaps for longer than previously thought to help keep inflation on a sustainable trajectory toward 2 percent.”
Most other members of the FOMC appear to share Waller’s view.
Counterfeit 1899 Peruvian dinero. (Image from Luis Ortega-San-Martín and Fabiola Bravo-Hualpa article.)
What counts as money is an interesting topic. For instance, in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.2 (Economics, Chapter 24, Section 24.2, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 16, Section 16.2), we discuss whether bitcoin is money (spoiler alert: it isn’t).
Of the four functions of money that we discuss in Chapter 14, the most important is that money serves as a medium of exchange. Anything can be used as money if most people are willing to accept it in exchange for goods and services. In that chapter, we mention that at one time in West Africa cowrie shells were used as money. In the early years of the United States, animal skins were sometimes used as money. For instance, the first governor of Tennessee received an annual salary of 1,000 deerskins.
In a famous article in the academic journal Economica, economist Richard A. Radford who had been captured in 1942 by German troops while fighting with the British Army in North Africa described his experiences in a prisoner-of-war camp. The British prisoners in the camp developed an economy in which cigarettes were used as money:
“Everyone, including nonsmokers, was willing to sell for cigarettes, using them to buy at another time and place. Cigarettes became the normal currency .… Laundrymen advertised at two cigarettes a garment …. There was a coffee stall owner who sold tea, coffee or cocoa at two cigarettes a cup, buying his raw materials at market prices and hiring labour ….”
In Chapter 24, in end of chapter problem 1.8, we note that according to historian Peter Heather, during the time of the Roman Empire, German tribes east of the Rhine river used Roman coins as money even though Rome didn’t govern that area. Roman coins were apparently also used as money in parts of India during those years even though the nearest territory the Romans controlled was hundreds of miles to the west. Again we have an example of something—roman coins in this case—being used as money because people were willing to aceept it in exchange for goods and services even though the government that issued the coins didn’t control that area.
Even more striking case is the case of Iraqi paper currency issued by the government of Saddam Hussein. This currency continued to circulate even after Saddam’s government had collapsed following the invasion of Iraq by U.S. and British troops. U.S. officials in Iraq had expected that as soon as the war was over and Saddam had been forced from power, the currency with his picture on it would lose all its value. This result had seemed inevitable once the United States had begun paying Iraqi officials in U.S. dollars. However, for some time many Iraqis continued to use the old currency because they were familiar with it. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, the Iraqi manager of a currency exchange put it this way: “People trust the dinar more than the dollar. It’s Iraqi.” In fact, for some weeks after the invasion, increasing demand for the dinar caused its value to rise against the dollar. Eventually, a new Iraqi government was formed, and the government ordered that dinars with Saddam’s picture be replaced by a new dinar. Again we see that anything can be used as money as long as people are willing to accept it in exchange for goods and services, even paper currency issued by a government that no longer exists.
Finally, there is the case of the coin shown at the beginning of this post. The coin looks like the dineros—small denomination silver coins—issued by the Peruvian government. But the coin is dated 1899, a year in which the Peruvian government did not issue any dineros. An analysis of one of these coins by Luis Ortega-San-Martín, Fabiola Bravo-Hualpa, and their students at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru showed that it was made of copper, nickel, and zinc, in contrast to deniros from other years, which where made primarily of silver with a small amount of copper. They concluded that the coin was a counterfeit made around 1900:
“It is our belief that this counterfeit coin was not made as a numismatic rarity to deceive modern collectors … but rather to be used as current money (its worn state indicates ample use) …. [C]ounterfeiters usually make common coins that do not draw attention expecting them to pass unnoticed.”
In other words, as long as people are willing to accept counterfeit coins—which they likely will do if they do not recognize them as being counterfeit—they can serve as money. In fact, even if coins are easily recognizable as being counterfeit, they might still be used as money—particularly in a time and place where there is a shortage of government issued coins. In the British North American colonies, there was frequently a shortage of coins. Some people would clip small amounts off gold and silver coins, either selling the metal or having it minted into coins. The clipped coins, while not actually counterfeit, contained less precious metal than did unclipped coins, yet they continued to be used in buying and selling because of the general shortage of coins.
In March 2023, First Citizens Bank agreed to buy SVB after SVB had been taken over by the FDIC. (Photo courtesy of Lena Buonanno.)
On Wednesday, March 8, 2023, Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), headquartered in Santa Clara in the heart of California’s Silicon Valley surprised its depositors and Wall Street investors by announcing that in order to raise funds it had sold $21 billion in securities at a loss of $1.8 billion. The announcement raised concerns about the bank’s solvency—that is, there were questions as to whether the value of the bank’s assets, including bonds and other securities, was greater than the value of the bank’s liabilities, primarily deposits. The result was a run on the bank as depositors withdrew most of their funds. On Friday, March 10, 2023, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) took control of SVB before the bank could open for business that day.
Mandatory Credit: Photo by GEORGE NIKITIN/EPA-EFE/Shutterstock (13817875h)
The run on SVB in 2023 resembled …
bank runs during the 1930s.
In this blog post, we discuss the economics of bank runs and go into detail on what happened to SVB. In response to the failure of SVB, the FDIC declared that selling the bank’s assets and forcing depositors above the $250,000 deposit limit to suffer losses would pose a systemic risk to the financial system. As a result, with concurrence of the FDIC’s Board of Directors, two-thirds of the Fed’s Board of Governors, and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, the FDIC announced that all deposits in SVB—including deposits above the normal $250,000 dollar limit—would be insured. The waiving of the deposit insurance limit was also applied to Signature Bank, which failed a few days later. The run on SVB had been set off by the loses the bank had experienced on its long-term Treasury bonds. To reassure depositors in other banks that also held long-term debt, the Fed announced that it was establishing the Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP). Banks and other depository institutions, such as savings and loans and credit unions, can use the BTFP to borrow against their holdings of Treasury and mortgage-backed securities.
Maturity Mismatch and Moral Hazard
The failure of SVB highlighted two problems in commercial banking.
Maturity mismatch. Banks use short-term deposits to fund long-term investments, such as mortgage loans and purchases of Treasury bonds. In other words, banks fund investments in long maturity assets using short maturity liabilities. The resulting maturity mismatch causes two problems: 1) If, as happened at SVB, the bank experiences a run and needs to pay off depositors, it may only be able to do so by selling assets at a loss, which may push the bank to insolvency; and 2) bonds with long maturities are subject to greater interest rate risk than are bonds with shorter maturities: If market interest rates rise, the prices of long-term bonds fall by more than do the prices of short-term bonds. To compensate investors for this greater interest rate risk, long-term bonds typically have higher interest rates than do short-term bonds. (We explain these points in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.) The higher interest rates can lead a bank’s managers to invest deposits in long-term bonds in order to earn higher interest rates and boost the bank’s profits, even though they are taking on greater risk by doing so. The decision of SVB’s managers to hold a large number of long-term bonds greatly contributed to the failure of the bank.
Moral hazard. Why might bank managers take on more risk by buying long-term bonds and potentially making other risking investments, such as making commercial real estate loans? For instance, recently, New York Community Bancorp suffered losses on loans made to buyers of office buildings and apartments. A key to the explanation is the extent of moral hazard in banking. In the financial system—including banking—moral hazard is the problem investors experience in verifying that borrowers are using their funds as intended. Although we don’t usually think of bank depositors as being investors who lend their money to banks, in effect, that is the relationship depositors and banks are in. Banks borrow depositors money and use these funds to make a profit. Bank managers are typically rewarded on the basis of how profitable the bank is. As a result, bank managers may make riskier investments than depositors would make if depositors were deciding which investments to make.
In principle, depositors could monitor which investments a bank’s managers are making and withdraw their deposits if the investments are too risky. In practice, depositors rarely monitor bank managers for two key reasons: 1) Depositors often lack the information to accurately gauge the risk of an investment; and 2) Depositors are insured by the FDIC for up to $250,000 per deposit per bank. When a bank fails, the FDIC typically makes insured depositors funds available with no delay, often by establishing a “bridge bank” to continue the failed banks operations, including keeping ATMs open and stocked with cash. Deposit insurance increases the extent of moral hazard in the banking system. If depositors come to believe that in practice even deposits above the $250,000 are insured because of the actions bank regulators took the following the failures of SVB and Signature Bank, moral hazard is further increased. Still, reason 1. above gives reason to believe that, even in the absence of deposit insurance, depositors are unlikely to closely monitor bank managers. If depositors suddenly receive new information on a bank’s health—as happened when SVB suffered a loss on its sale of Treasury bonds—the likely result is a run. Runs potentially can lead other bank managers to become more cautious in their investments, but it will be too late to change the behavior of the managers of a bank that closes because of a run.
Bank Leverage
Because banks are highly leveraged, they are less able to withstand declines in the prices of their assets without becoming insolvent. A business is insolvent if the value of its assets is less than the value of its liabilities. Ordinarily, the FDIC will close an insolvent bank. A bank’s leverage is the ratio of the value of a bank’s assets to the value of its capital. A bank’s capital equals the funds contributed by the bank’s shareholders through their purchases of the bank’s stock plus the bank’s accumulated earnings. Put another way, a bank’s capital represents the value of the bank’s shareholders’ investment in the bank.
Shareholders focus on the return on their investment (ROI). Because banks are highly leveraged, a relatively small return on the banks assets—such as loans and mortgages—can result in a large return on the shareholders’ investment. This relationship holds because the shareholders’ investment (the bank’s capital) is much smaller than the bank’s assets. But just as high leverage increases a bank’s profits if the bank earns a positive return on its assets, it also increases a bank’s losses if the bank suffers a negative return on its assets. Banks would have a greater ability to absorb losses on their investments without becoming insolvent if the banks had more capital. But the more capital banks hold relative to the value of their assets—in other words, the less leveraged a bank is—the smaller the profit banks earn for a given return on their assets. Just as moral hazard can lead bank managers to make riskier investments than their depositors would prefer, it can also lead bank managers to become more leveraged than their depositors would prefer.
Regulatory Responses to the Failure of SVB
As we’ve noted, the problems that led to the failure of SVB were rooted in the problems that all commercial banks are subject to. (The reasons why SVB turned out to be particularly vulnerable to a bank run are discussed in this earlier blog post.) Although there have been extensive discussions among federal regulators, including the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, about steps to increase the stability of the U.S. banking sector, as of now no significant regulatory changes have occurred. However, there have been a number of proposals that regulators have been considering.
Increased capital. As we noted, banks hold relatively little capital relative to their assets. On average, U.S. commercial banks hold capital equal to about 9.5 percent of the value of their assets. Holding more capital would reduce bank leverage, making banks less vulnerable to declines in the value of their assets. More capital would also mean that banks have more funds available to pay out to depositors making withdrawals during a run. In regulating bank capital, the United States has largely followed the Basel accord, which was established by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). We discuss the Basil accord in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 12, Section 12.4. Here we can note that the most recent proposed capital regulations are Basel III, sometimes called the “Basel III Endgame.”
Basel III would require large banks to hold more capital. The proposal has been heavily criticized by the banking industry. Some economists strongly support banks holding more capital to increase the stability of the banking system, but other economists are more skeptical. These economists argue that even if banks held twice as much capital as they currently do, it would likely prove insufficient to meet depositor withdrawals in bank run similar to the one SVB experienced. Holding more capital is also likely to reduce the volume of loans that banks will be able to make. Finally, the problems in the banking system in recent years have typically involved mid-sized regional banks rather than the large banks—those holding more than $100 billion in assets—that are the focus of Basel III. In any event, in testimony before Congress earlier this month, Fed Chair Jerome Powell stated that: “I do expect that there will be broad and material changes to the proposal.” His statement makes it likely that the United States won’t fully adopt the proposed Basel III regulations in their current form.
2. Revising deposit insurance. The establishment of the FDIC in 1934 stopped the bank runs that had seriously damaged the U.S. economy during the early 1930s. Because of deposit insurance, people knew that they didn’t have to quickly withdraw their funds from a bank experiencing losses because even if the bank failed, deposits were insured. But, as we noted earlier, deposit insurance also increases moral hazard in banking by reducing the incentive of depositors to monitor the investments bank managers make. One proposed reform would increase deposit insurance for accounts held by households and small and mid-sized firms because these deposits are less likely to be quickly withdrawn if a banks experiences difficulties and because these depositors are less likely to be able to monitor bank managers. Large firms, investors, and financial firms would not be eligible for the increased deposit insurance. (Under Basel III, banks might be required to hold additional liquid assets so that they would be able to have funds available to meet sudden withdrawals by large firms, investors, and financial firms. It was withdrawals by those types of depositors that led to SVB’s failure.)
3. Increased use of the Fed’s discount window. Congress established the Federal Reserve in 1914 partly in response to the bank panics that plagued the U.S. financial system during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The Federal Reserve Act was intended to allow the Fed to serve as a lender of last resort by making discount loans to banks having temporary liquidity problems as a result of deposit withdrawals. In practice, however, banks were often reluctant to borrow at the Fed’s discount window because they were afraid that discount borrowing came with a stigma indicating that the bank was in trouble. As a result, discount lending has not played a significant role in stopping bank runs. For instance, SVB had not prepared to request discount loans and so weren’t able to use discount loans to provide the funds needed to meet deposit withdrawals. Some economists and policymakers have proposed requiring banks to provide the Fed with enough collateral, primarily in the form of business and consumer loans, to meet their liquidity needs in the event of a run. By identifying sufficien collateral ahead of time, banks would be able to immediately receive discount loans in an emergency. If SVB had provided collateral equal to the value of its uninsured deposits, it might have been able to withstand the run that occurred.
4. Require more securities to be marked to market. Banking regulations allow banks to keep bonds and other securities on their balance sheets at face value even if the market value of the securities has declined, provided the securities are identified as being held to maturity. When a bank experiences liquidity problems it may be forced to sell securities that it previously designated as being held to maturity, which is the situation SVB found itself in. Some economists and policymakers have proposed that more—possibly all—of a bank’s holdings of securities be “marked to market,” which means that the securities’ current market values rather than their face values would be used on the bank’s balance sheet. Economists and policymakers are divided in their opinions on this proposals. Marking more securities to market may give depositors and investors a clearer idea of the true financial health of a bank. But doing so might also be misleading because banks will not take losses on those securities that they actually hold until maturity.
5. Bank examiners become more focused on emerging threats. Some economists and policymakers argue that in practice bank examiners from the FDIC, the Fed, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (which regulates larger banks) are in the best position to determine whether bank managers are taking on too much risk, particularly as economic conditions change. For example, as the Federal Reserve began to increase its target for the federal funds rate in the spring of 2022, other interest rates also rose, causing the prices of long-term bonds to fall. In retrospect, bank examiners overseeing SVB and other banks were slow to question the managers of these banks about the degree of risk involved in their investments in long-term bonds. Similarly, bank examiners were slow to realize the risk that banks like SVB were taking in relying on deposits above the $250,000 insurance limit. These depositors are likely to be the first to withdraw funds in the event of a bank encountering a problem. In principle, if bank examiners were more alert to the effect changing economic condidtions have on the riskiness of bank investments, the examiners might be able to prod bank managers to reduce their risky investments before a crisis occurs.
6. Further consolidation of the banking system. As we discuss in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 10, Section 10.4, for many years restrictions on banks operating in more than one state resulted in the United States having many more banks than is true of other high-income countries. In the mid-1990s, after Congress authorized interstate banking, a wave of consolidation in the banking industry resulted in some banks operating nationwide. However, the United States still has many small and mid-size, or regional, banks. The largest banks have typically not encountered liquity problems or experienced runs. Some economists and policymakers have argued that further consolidation could lead to a banking system in which nearly all banks had the financial resources to withstand bank runs. Other economists and policymakers argue, however, that small businesses often rely for credit on smaller community banks. These banks engage in relationship banking, which means that they have long-term relationships with borrowers. These relationships enable the banks to accurately assess the creditworthiness of borrowers because the banks possess private information on the borrowers. Larger banks are more likely to use standard algorithms to assess the creditworthiness of borrowers. In doing so a larger bank may refuse to make loans that a community bank would have made. As a result, further signficant consolidation in the banking system might make it more difficult for small businesses to access the credit they need to operate and to expand.
Finally, as we note in Chapter 12 of Money, Banking, and the Financial System, government regulation of banking has followed a familiar pattern dating back decades. When banks or another part of the financial system, experience a crisis, Congress, the president, and the regulatory agencies respond with new regulations. The regulations, though, can lead financial firms to innovate in ways that undermine the effects of the regulation. If these financial innovations result in a crisis, the government reponds with additional regulations, which lead to new financial innovations. And so on. The nature of banking and the many other channels through which funds flow from savers and investors to borrowers are sufficiently varied and evolve so quickly that it’s unlikely that any particular regulations will be capable of permanently stabilizing the financial system.
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell (Photo from the New York Times)
As always, economists and investors had been awaiting the outcome of today’s meeting of the Federal Reserve’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) to get further insight into future monetary policy. The expectation has been that the FOMC would begin reducing its target for the federal funds rate, mostly likely beginning with its meeting on June 11-12. Financial markets were expecting that the FOMC would make three 0.25 percentage point cuts by the end of the year, reducing its target range from the current 5.25 to 5.50 percent to 4.50 to 4.75 percent.
There appears to be nothing in the committees statement (found here) or in Powell’s press conference following the meeting to warrant a change in expectations of future Fed policy. The committee’s statement noted that: “The Committee does not expect it will be appropriate to reduce the target range until it has gained greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent.” As Powell stated in his press conference, although the committee found the general trend in inflation data to be encouraging, they would have to see additional months of data that were consistent with their 2 percent inflation target before reducing their target for the federal funds rate.
As we’ve noted in earlier blog posts (here, here, and here), inflation during January and February has been somewhat higher than expected. Some economists and investors had wondered if, as a result, the committee might delay its first cut in the federal funds target range or implement only two cuts rather than three. In his press conference, Powell seemed unconcerned about the January and February data and expected that falling inflation rates of the second half of 2023 to resume.
Typically, at the FOMC’s December, March, June, and December meetings, the committee releases a “Summary of Economic Projections” (SEP), which presents median values of the committee members’ forecasts of key economic variables.
The table shows that the committee members made relatively small changes to their projections since their December meeting. Most notable was an increase in the median projection of growth in real GDP for 2024 from 1.4 percent at the December meeting to 2.1 percent at this meeting. Correspondingly, the median projection of unemployment during 2024 dropped from 4.1 percent to 4.0 percent. The key projection of the value of the federal funds rate at the end of 2024 was left unchanged at 4.6 percent. As noted earlier, that rate is consistent with three 0.25 percent cuts in the target range during the remainder of the year.
The SEP also includes a “dot plot.” Each dot in the plot represents the projection of an individual committee member. (The committee doesn’t disclose which member is associated with which dot.) Note that there are 19 dots, representing the 7 members of the Fed’s Board of Governors and the 12 presidents of the Fed’s district banks. Although only the president of the New York Fed and the presidents of 4 of the 11 district banks are voting members of the committee, all the district bank presidents attend the committee meetings and provide economic projections.
The plots on the far left of the figure represent the projections of each of the 19 members of the value of the federal funds rate at the end of 2024. These dots are bunched fairly closely around the median projection of 4.6 percent. The dots representing the projections for 2025 and 2026 are more dispersed, representing greater uncertainty among committee members about conditions in the future. The dots on the far right represent the members’ projections of the value of the federal funds rate in the long run. As Table 1 shows, the median projected value is 2.6 percent (up slightly from 2.5 percent in December), although the plot indicates that all but one member expects that the long-run rate will be 2.5 percent or higher. In other words, few members expect a return to the very low federal funds rates of the period from 2008 to 2016.
A bookstore in New York City closed during Covid. (Photo from the New York Times)
Four years ago, in mid-March 2020, Covid–19 began to significantly affect the U.S. economy, with hospitalizations rising and many state and local governments closing schools and some businesses. In this blog post we review what’s happened to key macro variables during the past four years. Each monthly series starts in February 2020 and the quarterly series start in the fourth quarter of 2019.
Production
Real GDP declined by 5.8 percent from the fourth quarter of 2019 to the first quarter of 2020 and by an additional 28.0 percent from the first quarter of 2020 to the second quarter. This decline was by far the largest in such a short period in the history of the United States. From the second quarter to the third quarter of 2020, as businesses began to reopen, real GDP increased by 34.8 percent, which was by far the largest increase in a single quarter in U.S. history.
Industrial production followed a similar—although less dramatic—path to real GDP, declining by 16.8 percent from February 2020 to April 2020 before increasing by 12.3 percent from April 2020 to June 2020. Industrial production did not regain its February 2020 level until March 2022. The swings in industrial production were smaller than the swings in GDP because industrial production doesn’t include the output of the service sector, which includes firms like restaurants, movie theaters, and gyms that were largely shutdown in some areas. (Industrial production measures the real output of the U.S. manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities industries. The data are issued by the Federal Reserve and discussed here.)
Employment
Nonfarm payroll employment, collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in its establishment survey, followed a path very similar to the path of production. Between February and April 2020, employment declined by an astouding 22 million workers, or by 14.4 percent. This decline was by far the largest in U.S. history over such a short period. Employment increased rapidly beginning in April but didn’t regain its February 2020 level until June 2022.
The employment-population ratio measures the percentage of the working-age population that is employed. It provides a more comprehensive measure of an economy’s utilization of available labor than does the total number of people employed. In the following figure, the blue line shows the employment-population ratio for the whole working-age population and the red line shows the employment-population ratio for “prime age workers,” those aged 25 to 54.
For both groups, the employment-population ratio plunged as a result of Covid and then slowly recovered as the production began increasing after April 2020. The employment-population ratio for prime age workers didn’t regain its February 2020 value until February 2023, an indication of how long it took the labor market to fully overcome the effects of the pandemic. As of February 2024, the employment-population ratio for all people of working age hasn’t returned to its February 2020 value, largely because of the aging of the U.S. population.
Average weekly hours worked followed an unusual pattern, declining during March 2020 but then increasing to beyond its February 2020 level to a peak in April 2021. This increase reflects firms attempting to deal with a shortage of workers by increasing the hours of those people they were able to hire. By April 2023, average weekly hours worked had returned to its February 2020 level.
Income
Real average hourly earnings surged by more than six percent between February and April 2020—a very large increase over a two-month period. But some of the increase represented a composition effect—as workers with lower incomes in services industries such as restaurants were more likely to be out of work during this period—rather than an actual increase in the real wages received by people employed during both months. (Real average hourly earnings are calculated by dividing nominal average hourly earnings by the consumer price index (CPI) and multiplying by 100.)
Median weekly real earnings, because it is calculated as a median rather than as an average (or mean), is less subject to composition effects than is real average hourly earnings. Median weekly real earnings increased sharply between February and April of 2020 before declining through June 2022. Earnings then gradually increased. In February 2024 they were 2.5 percent higher than in February 2020.
Inflation
The inflation rate most commonly mentioned in media reports is the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous year. The following figure shows that inflation declined from February to May 2020. Inflation then began to rise slowly before rising rapidly beginning in the spring of 2021, reaching a peak in June 2022 at 9.0 percent. That inflation rate was the highest since November 1981. Inflation then declined steadily through June 2023. Since that time it has fluctuated while remaining above 3 percent.
As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.5), the Federal Reserve gauges its success in meeting its goal of an inflation rate of 2 percent using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. The following figure shows that PCE inflation followed roughly the same path as CPI inflation, although it reached a lower peak and had declined below 3 percent by November 2023. (A more detailed discussion of recent inflation data can be found in this post and in this post.)
Monetary Policy
The following figure shows the effective federal funds rate, which is the rate—nearly always within the upper and lower bounds of the Fed’s target range—that prevails during a particular period in the federal funds market. In March 2020, the Fed cut its target range to 0 to 0.25 percent in response to the economic disruptions caused by the pandemic. It kept the target unchanged until March 2022 despite the sharp increase in inflation that had begun a year earlier. The members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had initially hoped that the surge in inflation was largely caused by disuptions to supply chains and would be transitory, falling as supply chains returned to normal. Beginning in March 2022, the FOMC rapidly increased its target range in response to continuing high rates of inflation. The targer range reached 5.25 to 5.50 percent in July 2023 where it has remained through March 2024.
Although the money supply is no longer the focus of monetary policy, some economists have noted that the rate of growth in the M2 measure of the money supply increased very rapidly just before the inflation rate began to accelerate in the spring of 2021 and then declined—eventually becoming negative—during the period in which the inflation rate declined.
As we discuss in the new 9th edition of Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.5), some economists believe that the FOMC should engage in nominal GDP targeting. They argue that this approach has the best chance of stabilizing the growth rate of real GDP while keeping the inflation rate close to the Fed’s 2 percent target. The following figure shows the economy experienced very high rates of inflation during the period when nominal GDP was increasing at an annual rate of greater than 10 percent and that inflation declined as the rate of nominal GDP growth declined toward 5 percent, which is closer to the growth rates seen during the 2000s. (This figure begins in the first quarter of 2000 to put the high growth rates in nominal GDP of 2021 and 2022 in context.)
Fiscal Policy
As we discuss in the new 9th edition of Macroeconomics, Chapter 15 (Economics, Chapter 25), in response to the Covid pandemic Congress and Presidents Trump and Biden implemented the largest discretionary fiscal policy actions in U.S. history. The resulting increases in spending are reflected in the two spikes in federal government expenditures shown in the following figure.
The initial fiscal policy actions resulted in an extraordinary increase in federal expenditures of $3.69 trillion, or 81.3 percent, from the first quarter to the second quarter of 2020. This was followed by an increase in federal expenditures of $2.31 trillion, or 39.4 percent, from the fourth quarter of 2020 to the first quarter of 2021. As we recount in the text, there was a lively debate among economists about whether these increases in spending were necessary to offest the negative economic effects of the pandemic or whether they were greater than what was needed and contributed substantially to the sharp increase in inflation that began in the spring of 2021.
Saving
As a result of the fiscal policy actions of 2020 and 2021, many households received checks from the federal government. In total, the federal government distributed about $80o billion directly to households. As the figure shows, one result was to markedly increase the personal saving rate—measured as personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income—from 6.4 percent in December 2019 to 22.0 in April 2020. (The figure begins in January 2020 to put the size of the spike in the saving rate in perspective.)
The rise in the saving rate helped households maintain high levels of consumption spending, particularly on consumer durables such as automobiles. The first of the following figure shows real personal consumption expenditures and the second figure shows real personal consumption expenditures on durable goods.
Taken together, these data provide an overview of the momentous macroeconomic events of the past four years.
An Automated Teller Machine (ATM) located in Egypt that dispenses gold bars rather than currency. (Photo from ahrm.org.)
A recent article in the New York Times (available here, but a subscription may be required) discusses how consumers in Egypt are dealing with inflation. According to statistics from the International Monetary Fund, consumer prices in Egypt rose 23.5 percent in 2023 and are projected to increase by 32.2 percent in 2024, although in early 2024 inflation may have been running at an annual rate of 50 percent. In response to the inflation, many Egyptian businesses have begun quoting prices in U.S. dollars rather than in Egyptian pounds. The value of the Egyptian pound has declined from about 18 pounds to the U.S. dollar in early 2022 to about 48 pounds to the dollar today. In practice, many Egyptian consumers can have difficulty obtaining dollars except on the black market, where the exchange rate is generally worse than the rate quoted by the Egyptian central bank.
According to the article, many Egyptians, losing faith in value of the pound and unable to easily obtain U.S. dollars, have turned to gold as a potentially “safe financial harbor.” The article notes that: “The market [for gold] grew so fevered that the government announced in November that it was partnering with a financial technology company to install A.T.M.s [Automated Teller Machines] that would dispense gold bars instead of cash.” That ATM is shown in the photo above.
This episode raises two questions:
Is gold a good hedge (a “safe harbor”) against inflation?
Are ATMs that dispense gold rather than currency a good idea?
As we discuss in Chapter 14, Section 14.3 of Money, Banking, and the Financial System, gold has not been a good hedge against inflation for U.S. investors. Although many people believe that the price of gold can be relied on to increase if the general price level increases, in fact, the data show that the price of gold can’t be counted on to keep up with increases in the general price level. In the following figure, the blue line shows the market price of gold during each month since January 1976. The red line shows the real price of gold, which is calculated by dividing the nominal price of gold by the consumer price index (CPI). (For convenience, we set the value of the CPI equal to 100 in January 1976.) The price of gold is measured in dollars per ounce.
The figure shows that the market price of gold can fall even as the price level rises. For example, the price of gold rose from $132 per ounce in January 1976 to $670 per ounce in September 1980. As a result, during that period the real price of gold more than tripled, and holding gold during this period was a good hedge against inflation. Unfortunately, the market price of gold then went into a long decline and didn’t again reach its September 1980 value until April 2007, a period during which the CPI more than doubled. In other words, over this more than 25-year period gold provided no hedge at all against the effects of inflation. Consumers in India today shouldn’t count on buying gold as way to protect the real value of their savings from being reduced by inflation.
The New York Times article refers to only a single ATM in Egypt that dispenses gold bars rather than Egyptian pounds. Would we expect that the number of these ATMs will increase in Egypt and other countries experiencing very high inflation rates? Does the existence of these ATMs indicate that people in Egypt are now—or will likely begin—using gold bars rather than currency for routine buying and selling?
The answer to both questions is likely “no.” Although the article refers to an “ATM,” it might be better to think of this facility as instead being a vending machine. Similar ATMs/vending machines that dispense gold bars are available in the United States (as indicated here, here, and here), and, most likely, in other countries as well.
We usually think of vending machines as selling soda and water or snacks. But there are many vending machines that sell other products as well. For instance, most large airports have vending machines that sell small electronic products, such as cell phone batteris or earphones. The term ATM is usually reserved for machines that enable people who have deposits at a bank or other financial firms to withdraw currency. So, the article seems to be describing something that is more a vending machine than an ATM. The article discusses the many small businesses in Egypt that buy and sell gold, which makes it likely that most consumers will continue to rely on those businesses rather than on a machine when they want to buy and sell gold.
It seems unlikely that people in Egypt will beging using gold bars for routine buying and selling—that is, using gold as a medium of exchange. Most goods in Egypt have their prices denominated in either Egyptian pounds or in U.S. dollars or in both. Anyone attempting to buy goods with gold bars would need first to determine the market price of gold at that time before making the purchase and would have to locate a seller who was willing to accept gold in exchange for their goods. In effect, sellers would be engaging in two transactions at the same time: buying gold from the buyer and selling goods to the buyer. Although in a time of high inflation a seller takes on the risk that currency he accepts for a purchase may decline in value while the seller is holding it, a seller accepting gold also takes on the risk that the market price of gold may fall while the seller is holding it.
It’s interesting that the Egyptian government reacted to consumers buying gold as a hedge against inflation by partnering with a financial firm to make available an “ATM” that dispenses gold bars. But it probably doesn’t represent a significant development in the Egyptian financial system.
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell (Photo from Bloomberg News via the Wall Street Journal.)
Economists, policymakers, and Wall Street analysts have been waiting for macroeconomic data to confirm that the Federal Reserve has brought the U.S. economy in for a soft landing, with inflation arrving back at the Fed’s target of 2 percent without the economy slipping into a recession. Fed officials have been cautious about declaring that they have yet seen sufficient data to be sure that a soft landing has actually been achieved. Accordingly, they are not yet willing to begin cutting their target for the federal funds rate.
For instance, on March 6, in testifying before the Commitee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, Fed Chair Jerome Powell stated that the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) “does not expect that it will be appropriate to reduce the target range until it has gained greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent.” (Powell’s statement before his testimony can be found here.)
The BLS’s release today (March 12) of its report on the consumer price index (CPI) (found here) for February indicated that inflation was still running higher than the Fed’s target, reinforcing the cautious approach that Powell and other members of the FOMC have been taking. The increase in the CPI that includes the prices of all goods and services in the market basket—often called headline inflation—was 3.2 percent from the same month in 2023, up slightly from 3.1 In January. (We discuss how the BLS constructs the CPI in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 19.4, Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.4, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 3, Section 13.4.) As the following figure shows, core inflation—which excludes the prices of food and energy—was 3.8 percent, down slightly from 3.9 percent in January.
If we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year—the values are more concerning, as indicated in the following figure. Headline CPI inflation is 5.4 percent (up from 3.7 percent in January) and core CPI inflation is 4.4 percent (although that is down from 4.8 percent in January). The Fed’s inflation target is measured using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, not the CPI. But CPI inflation at these levels is not consistent with PCE inflation of only 2 percent.
Even more concerning is the path of inflation in the prices of services. As we’ve noted in earlier posts, Chair Powell has emphasized that as supply chain problems have gradually been resolved, inflation in the prices of goods has been rapidly declining. But inflaion in services hasn’t declined nearly as much. Last summer he stated the point this way:
“Part of the reason for the modest decline of nonhousing services inflation so far is that many of these services were less affected by global supply chain bottlenecks and are generally thought to be less interest sensitive than other sectors such as housing or durable goods. Production of these services is also relatively labor intensive, and the labor market remains tight. Given the size of this sector, some further progress here will be essential to restoring price stability.”
The following figure shows the 1-month inflation rate in services prices and in services prices not included including housing rent. Some economists believe that the rent component of the CPI isn’t well measured and can be volatile, so it’s worthwhile to look at inflation in service prices not including rent. The figure shows that inflation in all service prices has been above 4 percent in every month since July 2023. Although inflation in service prices declined from January, it was still a very high 5.8 percent in February. Inflation in service prices not including housing rent was even higher at 7.5 percent. Such large increases in the prices of services, if they were to continue, wouldn’t be consistent with the Fed meeting its 2 percent inflation target.
Finally, some economists and policymakers look at median inflation to gain insight into the underlying trend in the inflation rate. If we listed the inflation rate in each individual good or service in the CPI, median inflation is the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates. As the following figure shows, although median inflation declined in February, it was still high at 4.6 percent and, although median inflation is volatile, the trend has been generally upward since July 2023.
The data in this month’s BLS report on the CPI reinforces the view that the FOMC will not move to cut its target for the federal funds rate in the meeting next week and makes it somewhat less likely that the committee will cut its target at the following meeting on April 30-May 1.
On the first Friday of each month, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) releases its “Employment Sitution” report for the previous month. The data for February in today’s report at first glance seem contradictory: The BLS reported that the net increase in employment in February was 275,000, which was above the increase of 200,000 that economists participating in media surveys had expected (see here and here). But the unemployment rate, which had been expected to remain constant at 3.7 percent, rose to 3.9 percent.
The apparent paradox of employment and the unemployment rate both increasing in the same month is (partly) attributable to the two numbers being from different surveys. The employment number most commonly reported in media accounts is from the establishment survey (sometimes referred to as the payroll survey), whereas the unemployment rate is taken from the household survey. The results of both surveys are included in the BLS’s monthly “Employment Situation” report. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1), many economists and policymakers at the Federal Reserve believe that employment data from the establishment survey provides a more accurate indicator of the state of the labor market than do either the employment data or the unemployment data from the household survey. Accordingly, most media accounts interpreted the data released today as indicating continuing strength in the labor market.
However, it can be worth looking more closely at the differences between the measures of employment in the two series because it’s possible that the household survey data is signalling that the labor market is weaker than it appears from the establishment survey data. The following table shows the data on employment from the two surveys for January and February.
Establishment Survey
Household Survey
January
157,533,000
161,152,000
February
157,808,000
160,968,000
Change
+275,000
-184,000
Note that in addition to the fact that employment as measured by the household survey is falling, while employment as measured by the establishment survey is increasing, household survey employment is significantly higher in both months. Household survey employment is always higher than establishment survey employment because the household survey includes employment of three groups that are not included in the establishment survey:
Self-employed workers
Unpaid family workers
Agricultural workers
(A more complete discuss of the differences in employment in the two surveys can be found here.) The BLS also publishes a useful data series in which it attempts to adjust the household survey data to more closely mirror the establishment survey data by, among other adjustments, removing from the household survey categories of workers who aren’t included in the payroll survey. The following figure shows three series—the establishment series (gray line), the reported household series (orange line), and the adjusted household series (blue line)—for the months since 2021. For ease of comparison the three series have been converted to index numbers with January 2021 set equal to 100.
Note that for most of this period, the adjusted household survey series tracks the establishment survey series fairly closely. But in November 2023, both household survey measures of employment begin to fall, while the establishment survey measure of employment continues to increase. Falling employment in the household survey may be signalling weakness in the labor market that employment in the establishment survey may be missing, but it might also be attributed to the greater noisiness in the household survey’s employment data.
There are three other things to note in this month’s employment report. First, the BLS revised the initially reported increase in December establishement survey employment downward by 35,000 jobs and the January increase downward by 124,000 jobs. The January adjustment was large—amounting to more than 35 percent of the initially reported increase of 353,000. It’s normal for the BLS to revise its initial estimates of employment from the establishment survey but a series of negative revisions is typical of periods just before or at the beginning of a recession. It’s important to note, though, that several months of negative revisions to establishment employment are far from an infallible predictor of recessions.
Second, as shown in the following figure, the increase in average hourly earnings slowed from the high rate of 6.8 percent in January to 1.7 percent in February—the smallest increase since early 2022.. (These increases are measured at a compounded annual rate, which is the rate wages would increase if they increased at that month’s rate for an entire year.) A slowing in wage growth may be another sign that the labor market is weakening, although the data are noisy on a month-to-month basis.
Finally, one positive indicator of the state of the labor market is that average weekly hours worked increased. As shown in the following figure, average hours worked had been slowly, if irregularly, trending downward since early 2021. In February, average hours worked increased slightly to 34.3 hours per week from 34.2 hours per week in January. But, again, it’s difficult to draw strong conclusions from one month’s data.
In testifying before Congress earlier this week, Fed Chair Jerome Powell noted that:
“We believe that our policy rate [the federal funds rate] is likely at its peak for this tightening cycle. If the economy evolves broadly as expected, it will likely be appropriate to begin dialing back policy restraint at some point this year. But the economic outlook is uncertain, and ongoing progress toward our 2 percent inflation objective is not assured.”
It seems unlikely that today’s employment report will change how Powell and the other memebers of the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee evaluate the current economic situation.
Wendy’s management intends to begin using dynamic pricings in its fast-food restaurants. As we discuss in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 (Essentials of Economics, Chapter 10, Section 10.5), dynamic pricing is a form of price discrimination, which is the business practice of charging different prices to different customers for the same good or service. The ability of firms to analyze customer data using machine learning models has increased the ability to price discriminate.
One form of price discrimination involves charging customers different prices at different times, as, for instance, when movie theaters charge a lower price during afternoon showings than during evening showings. As a group, people who can choose whether to attend either an afternoon or an evening showing are more sensitive to changes in the price of a ticket—that is, their demand for tickets is more price elastic—than are people who can only attend an evening showing. Price discrimination with respect to movie tickets results in movie theaters earning a greater profit than if they charged the same price for all showings.
In a conference call with investors in February, Wendy’s CEO Kirk Tanner indicated that next year the firm would begin using dynamic pricing of its hamburgers and other menu items by charging different prices at different times of the day. Tanner didn’t provide details on how prices would differ in high demand times, such as during lunch and dinner, and low demand times, such as the middle of the afternoon. Some business commentators, though, assumed that Wendy’s dynamic pricing strategy would resemble Uber’s surge pricing strategy. As we discuss in Microeconomics, Economics, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 4, Section 4.1, Uber increases prices during periods of high demand, such as on New Year’s Eve.
The idea that Wendy’s would increase prices at peak times sparked a strong reaction on social media with many people criticizing the firm for “price gouging.” Rival fast-food restaurants joined the criticism. Burger King posted on X (formerly Twitter) that “we don’t believe in charging people more when they’re hungry.” As we note in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 10, Section 10.3 (Essentials of Econmics, Chapter 7, Section 7.3), surveys indicate that many people believe that it is fair for firms to raise prices following an increase in the firms’ costs, but unfair to raise prices following an increase in demand.
One way for firms to avoid this reaction from consumers while still price discriminating is to frame the issue by stating that they charge regular prices during times of peak demand and discount prices during times of low demand. For example, recently one AMC theater was charging $13.99 for a 7:15 PM showing of Dune: Part Two, but a “Matinee Discount Price” of $10.39 for a 1:oo PM showing of the film. Note that there is no real economic difference between AMC calling the evening price the normal price and the afternoon price the discoung price and the firm calling the afternoon price the normal price and the evening price a “surge price.” But one of the lessons of behavioral economics is that firms should pay attention to how consumers intepret a policy. Many consumers clearly see the two pricing strategies as different even though economically they aren’t. (We discuss behavioral economics in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 10, Section 10.4, and in Essentials of Economics, Chapter 7, Section 7.4.)
Not surprisingly, following the adverse reaction to its annoucement that it would begin using dynamic pricing, Wendy’s responded with a blog post in which it stated that its new pricing strategy was “misconstrued in some media reports as an intent to raise prices when demand is highest at our restaurants. We have no plans to do that and would not raise prices when our customers are visiting us most.” And that: “Digital menuboards could allow us to change the menu offerings at different times of day and offer discounts and value offers to our customers more easily, particularly in the slower times of day.” In effect, Wendy’s was framing its pricing strategy the way movie theaters do rather than the way Uber does.
Wendy’s CEO probably realizes now that how a pricing strategy is presented to consumers can affect how successful the strategy will be.
Supports: Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 12, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 9.
The entrance to the Lincoln Tunnel, which connects New Jersey to Midtown Manhattan. (Photo from the Associated Press via the New York Times.)
This spring, New York City will begin charging an additional fee—referred to as a congestion price or congestion toll—on vehicles entering the borough of Manhattan below 60th Street. The purpose of the fee is to reduce the congestion and pollution that additional vehicles cause when driving in that part of the city. (Note that the fee can be thought of as Pigovian tax because it is intended to address a negative externality caused by driving a vehicle. We discuss Pigovian taxes in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 5, Section 5.3, and in Essentials of Economics, Chapter 4, Section 4.5.)
Trans-Bridge Lines operates buses between the Lehigh Valley in Pennsylvania and Manhattan. The firm will have to pay a fee of $24 each time one of its buses enters Manhattan. An article in the (Allentown, PA) Morning Call quotes the president of Trans-Bridge Lines as objecting to the fee: “It doesn’t make sense and punishes bus operators who are part of the solution to the congestion problem.” However, the article also notes that “Trans-Bridge is not considering fare increases at this time.”
If Trans-Bridge’s cost of providing bus service between the Lehigh Valley and Manhattan increases by $24 per bus, shouldn’t the firm raise the price it charges passengers? Does the failure of Trans-Bride to raise ticket prices following the enactment of the fee mean that the firm isn’t its maximizing profit? Briefly explain.
Solving the Problem
Step 1:Review the chapter material.This problem is about what costs firms take into account when determining the profit-maximizing price to charge in the short run, so you may want to review Microeconomics or Economics, Chapter 12, Section 12.2, “How a Firm Maximizes Profit in a Perfectly Competitive Market” (Essentials of Economics, Chapter 9, Section 9.2)
Step 2:Answer the two questions by explaining what type of cost the $24 fee is and whether the fee should affect the profit-maximizine price Trans-Bridge Lines should charge passengers for a ticket on a bus going to Manhattan. The fee is a flat $24 per bus and, so, it doesn’t change with the number of passengers on a bus. Therefore, the fee is a fixed cost to Trans-Bridge. Trans-Bridge should set the price of a ticket so that the last ticket sold on a bus increases the firm’s marginal cost and marginal revenue by the same amount. Because the $24 fee doesn’t change the marginal cost (or the marginal revenue) to the firm of transporting another passenger, the fee doesn’t change the firm’s profit-maximizing price. The answer to the first question in the problem is that an increase (or decrease) in a firm’s fixed cost won’t cause the firm to change its profit-maximizing price in the short run. The answer to the second question follows from the answer to the first question: That Trans-Bridge isn’t raising the price of a ticket following the enactment of the doesn’t mean that the firm isn’t maximizing profit.
Extra credit: Note that in the answer we refer to Trans-Bridge’s decision in the short run. It’s possible that the $24 fee will cause Trans-Bridge to suffer an economic loss on at least some of the bus trips it offers during different times during the day. As we discuss in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 12, Section 12.4 (Essentials of Economics, Chapter 9, Section 9.4), in that case, Trans-Bridge will continue to offer those bus trips in the short run, but, if nothing else changes, it will stop offering the trips in the long run.
Wall Street Journal columnist Justin Lahart notes that when the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) releases its monthly report on the consumer price index (CPI), the report “generates headlines, features in politicians’ speeches and moves markets.” When the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) releases its monthly report “Personal Income and Outlays,” which includes data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, there is much less notice in the business press or, often, less effect on financial markets. (You can see the difference in press coverage by comparing the front page of today’s online edition of the Wall Street Journal after the BEA released the latest PCE data with the paper’s front page on February 13 when the BLS released the latest CPI data.)
This difference in the weight given to the two inflation reports seems curious because the Federal Reserve uses the PCE, not the CPI, to determine whether it is achieving its 2 percent annual inflation target. When a new monthly measure of inflation is released much of the discussion in the media is about the effect the new data will have on the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) decision on whether to change its target for the federal funds rate. You might think the result would be greater media coverage of the PCE than the CPI. (The PCE includes the prices of all the goods and services included in the consumption component of GDP. Because the PCE includes the prices of more goods and services than does the CPI, it’s a broader measure of inflation, which is the key reason that the Fed prefers it.)
That CPI inflation data receive more media discussion than PCE inflation data is likely due to three factors:
The CPI is more familiar to most people than the PCE. It is also the measure that politicians and political commentators tend to focus on. The media are more likely to highlight a measure of inflation that the average reader easily understands rather than a less familiar measure that would require an explanation.
The monthly report on the CPI is typically released about two weeks before the monthly report on the PCE. Therefore, if the CPI measure of inflation turns out to be higher or lower than expected, the stock and bond markets will react to this new information on the value of inflation in the previous month. If the PCE measure is roughly consistent with the CPI measure, then the release of new data on the PCE measure contains less new information and, therefore, has a smaller effect on stock and bond prices.
Over longer periods, the two measures of inflation often move fairly closely together as the following figure shows, although CPI inflation tends to be somewhat higher than PCE inflation. The values of both series are the percentage change in the index from the same month in the previous year.
Turning to the PCE data for January released in the BEA’s latest “Personal Income and Outlays” report, the PCE inflation data were broadly consistent with the CPI data: Inflation in January increased somewhat from December. The first of the following figures shows PCE inflation and core PCE inflation—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2015 with inflation measured as the change in PCE from the same month in the previous year. The second figure shows PCE inflation and core PCE inflation measured as the inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The first figure shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation and the second figure shows 1-month inflation.)
The two inflation measures are telling markedly different stories: 12-month inflation shows a continuation in the decline in inflation that began in 2022. Twelve-month PCE inflation fell from 2.6 percent in December to 2.4 percent in January. Twelve-month core PCE inflation fell from 2.9 percent in December to 2.8 percent in December. So, by this measure, inflation continues to approach the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target.
One-month PCE and core PCE inflation both show sharp increases from December to January: From 1.4 percent in December to 4.2 percent for 1-month PCE inflation and from 1.8 percent in December to 5.1 percent in January for 1-month core PCE inflation.
The one-month inflation data are bad news in that they may indicate that inflation accelerated in January and that the Fed is, therefore, further away than it seemed in December from hitting its 2 percent inflation target. But it’s important not to overinterpret a single month’s data. Although 1-month inflation is more volatile than 12-month inflation, the broad trend in 1-month inflation had been downwards from mid-2022 through December 2023. It will take at least a more months of data to assess whether this trend has been broken.
Fed officials didn’t appear to be particularly concerned by the news. For instance, according to an article on bloomberg.com, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta President Raphael Bostic noted that: “The last few inflation readings—one came out today—have shown that this is not going to be an inexorable march that gets you immediately to 2%, but that rather there are going to be some bumps along the way.” Investors appear to continue to expect that the Fed will cut its target for the federal funds rate at its meeting on June 11-12.
Recent articles in the business press have discussed the possibility that the U.S. economy is entering a period of higher growth in labor productivity:
“US Productivity Is on the Upswing Again. Will AI Supercharge It?” (link)
“Can America Turn a Productivity Boomlet Into a Boom?” (link)
In Macroeconomics, Chapter 16, Section 16.7 (Economics, Chapter 26, Section 26.7), we highlighted the role of growth in labor productivity in explaining the growth rate of real GDP using the following equations. First, an identity:
Real GDP = Number of hours worked x (Real GDP/Number of hours worked),
where (Real GDP/Number of hours worked) is labor productivity.
And because an equation in which variables are multiplied together is equal to an equation in which the growth rates of these variables are added together, we have:
Growth rate of real GDP = Growth rate of hours worked + Growth rate of labor productivity
From 1950 to 2023, real GDP grew at annual average rate of 3.1 percent. In recent years, real GDP has been growing more slowly. For example, it grew at a rate of only 2.0 percent from 2000 to 2023. In February 2024, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecasts that real GDP would grow at 2.0 percent from 2024 to 2034. Although the difference between a growth rate of 3.1 percent and a growth rate of 2.0 percent may seem small, if real GDP were to return to growing at 3.1 percent per year, it would be $3.3 trillion larger in 2034 than if it grows at 2.0 percent per year. The additional $3.3 trillion in real GDP would result in higher incomes for U.S. residents and would make it easier for the federal government to reduce the size of the federal budget deficit and to better fund programs such as Social Security and Medicare. (We discuss the issues concerning the federal government’s budget deficit in this earlier blog post.)
Why has growth in real GDP slowed from a 3.1 percent rate to a 2.0 percent rate? The two expressions on the right-hand side of the equation for growth in real GDP—the growth in hours worked and the growth in labor productivity—have both slowed. Slowing population growth and a decline in the average number of hours worked per worker have resulted in the growth rate of hours worked to slow substantially from a rate of 2.0 percent per year from 1950 to 2023 to a forecast rate of only 0.4 percent per year from 2024 to 2034.
Falling birthrates explains most of the decline in population growth. Although lower birthrates have been partially offset by higher levels of immigration in recent years, it seems unlikely that birthrates will increase much even in the long run and levels of immigration also seem unlikely to increase substantially in the future. Therefore, for the growth rate of real GDP to increase significantly requires increases in the rate of growth of labor productivity.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes quarterly data on labor productivity. (Note that the BLS series is for labor productivity in the nonfarm business sector rather than for the whole economy. Output of the nonfarm business sector excludes output by government, nonprofit businesses, and households. Over long periods, growth in real GDP per hour worked and growth in real output of the nonfarm business sector per hour worked have similar trends.) The following figure is taken from the BLS report “Productivty and Costs,” which was released on February 1, 2024.
Note that the growth in labor productivity increased during the last three quarters of 2023, whether we measure the growth rate as the percentage change from the same quarter in the previous year or as growth in a particular quarter expressed as anual rate. It’s this increase in labor productivity during 2023 that has led to speculation that labor productivity might be entering a period of higher growth. The following figure shows labor productivity growth, measured as the percentage change from the same quarter in the previous year for the whole period from 1950 to 2023.
The figure indicates that labor productivity has fluctuated substantially over this period. We can note, in particular, productivity growth during two periods: First, from 2011 to 2018, labor productivity grew at the very slow rate of 0.9 percent per year. Some of this slowdown reflected the slow recovery of the U.S. economy from the Great Recession of 2007-2009, but the slowdown persisted long enough to cause concern that the U.S. economy might be entering a period of stagnation or very slow growth.
Second, from 2019 through 2023, labor productivity went through very large swings. Labor productivity experienced strong growth during 2019, then, as the Covid-19 pandemic began affecting the U.S. economy, labor productivity soared through the first half of 2021 before declining for five consecutive quarters from the first quarter of 2022 through the first quarter of 2023—the first time productivity had fallen for that long a period since the BLS first began collecting the data. Although these swings were particularly large, the figure shows that during and in the immediate aftermath of recessions labor productivity typically fluctuates dramatically. The reason for the fluctuations is that firms can be slow to lay workers off at the beginning of a recession—which causes labor productivity to fall—and slow to hire workers back during the beginning of an economy recovery—which causes labor productivity to rise.
Does the recent increase in labor productivity growth represent a trend? Labor productivity, measured as the percentage change since the same quarter in the previous year, was 2.7 percent during the fourth quarter of 2023—higher than in any quarter since the first quarter of 2021. Measured as the percentage change from the previous quarter at an annual rate, labor productivity grew at a very high average rate of 3.9 during the last three quarters of 2023. It’s this high rate that some observers are pointing to when they wonder whether growth in labor productivity is on an upward trend.
As with any other economic data, you should use caution in interpreting changes in labor productivity over a short period. The productivity data may be subject to large revisions as the two underlying series—real output and hours worked—are revised in coming months. In addition, it’s not clear why the growth rate of labor productivity would be increasing in the long run. The most common reasons advanced are: 1) the productivity gains from the increase in the number of people working from home since the pandemic, 2) businesses’ increased use of artificial intelligence (AI), and 3) potential efficiencies that businesses discovered as they were forced to operate with a shortage of workers during and after the pandemic.
To this point it’s difficult to evaluate the long-run effects of any of these factors. Wconomists and business managers haven’t yet reached a consensus on whether working from home increases or decreases productivity. (The debate is summarized in this National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, written by Jose Maria Barrero of Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico, and Steven Davis and Nicholas Bloom of Stanford. You may need to access the paper through your university library.)
Many economists believe that AI is a general purpose technology (GPT), which means that it may have broad effects throughout the economy. But to this point, AI hasn’t been adopted widely enough to be a plausible cause of an increase in labor productivity. In addition, as Erik Brynjolfsson and Daniel Rock of MIT and Chad Syverson of the University of Chicago argue in this paper, the introduction of a GPT may initially cause productivity to fall as firms attempt to use an unfamiliar technology. The third reason—efficiency gains resulting from the pandemic—is to this point mainly anecdotal. There are many cases of businesses that discovered efficiencies during and immediately after Covid as they struggled to operate with a smaller workforce, but we don’t yet know whether these cases are sufficiently common to have had a noticeable effect on labor productivity.
So, we’re left with the conclusion that if the high labor productivity growth rates of 2023 can be maintained, the growth rate of real GDP will correspondingly increase more than most economists are expecting. But it’s too early to know whether recent high rates of labor productivty growth are sustainable.
Tony and Glenn signing copies of the first edition of the principles text at an ASSA meeting. (Thanks to Lena Buonanno for providing the image of the caricature.)
Action Comics No. 1, published in June 1938, is often consider the first superhero comic book. (Image from comics.org.)
In a political advertisement that ran before the broadcast of the Super Bowl, President Joe Biden discussed shrinkflation, which refers to firms reducing the quantity of a product in container while keeping the price unchanged. In this post from the summer of 2022, we discussed examples of shrinkflation—including Chobani reducing the quantity of yogurt in the package shown here from 5.3 ounces to 4.5 ounces—and noted that shrinkflation complicates the job of the Bureau of Labor Statistics when compiling the consumer price index.
This yogurt remained the same price although the quantity of yogurt in the container shrank from 5.3 ounces to 4.5 ounces.
Shrinkflation isn’t new; firms have used the strategy for decades. Firms are particularly likely to use shrinkflation during periods of high inflation or during periods when the federal government implements price controls. Firms also sometimes resort to shrinkflation when the the price of a product has remained constant for long enough that the firms fear that consumers will react strongly to the firms increasing the price.
Comic books provide an interesting historical example of shrinkflation. David Palmer, a professor of management at South Dakota State University published an article in 2010 in which he presented data on the price and number of pages in copies of Action Comics from 1938 to 2010. When DC Comics introduced Superman in the first issue of Action Comics in June 1938, it started the superhero genre of comic books. Action Comics No. 1 had a price of $0.10 and was 64 pages.
After the United States entered World War II in December 1941, the federal government imposed price controls to try to limit the inflation caused by the surge in spending to fight the war. Rising costs of producing comic books, combined with the difficulty in raising prices because of the controls, led comic book publishers to engage in shrinkflation. In 1943, the publishers reduced the number of pages in their comics from 64 to 56. In 1944, the publishers engaged in further shrinkflation, reducing the number of pages from 56 to 48.
In 1951, during the Korean War, the federal government again imposed price controls. Comic book publishers responded with further shrinkflation, keeping the price at $0.10, while reducing the number of pages from 48 to 40. In 1954, they shrank the number of pages to 36, which remains the most common number of pages in a comic book today. At that time, the publishers also slightly reduced the width of comics from 7 3/4 inches to 7 1/8 inches. (Today the typical comic book has a width of 6 7/8 inches.)
By the late 1950s, comic book publishers became convinced that they would be better off raising the prices of comic books rather than further shrinking the number of pages. But they were reluctant to raise their prices because they had been a constant $0.10 for more than 20 years, so children and their parents might react very negatively to a price increase, and because no firm wanted to be the first to raise its price for fear of losing sales to its competitors. They were caught in a prisoner’s dilemma: Comic book publishers would all have been better off if they had raised their prices but the antitrust laws kept them from colluding to raise prices and no individual firm had an incentive to raise prices alone. (We discuss collusion, prisoner’s dilemmas, and other aspects of oligopolistic firm behaviour in Chapter 14 of Microeconomics and Economics.)
The most successful publisher in the 1950s was Dell, which sold very popular comic books featuring Donald Duck, Uncle Scrooge, and other characters that particularly appealed to younger children. Because the prices of Dell’s comic books, like those of other publishers, been unchanged at $0.10 since the late 1930s, the firm didn’t have a clear idea of the price elasticity of demand for its comics. In 1957, the firm’s managers decided to use a market experiment to gather data on the price elasticity of demand. In most cities, Dell kept the price of its comics at $0.10, but in some cities it sold the identical comics at a price of $0.15.
The experiment lasted from March 1957 to August 1958 when the company discontinued it by reverting to selling all of its comics for $0.10. Although we lack the data necessary to compare the sales of Dell comics with a $0.15 price to the sales of Dell comics with a $0.10 price, the fact that no other publisher raised its prices during that period and that Dell abandoned the experiment indicates that the demand curve for Dell’s comics was price elastic—the percentage decline in the quantity sold was greater than the 50 percent increase in price—so Dell’s revenue from sales in the cities selling comics with a price of $0.15 likely declined. Dell’s strategy can be seen as a failed example of price leadership. (We discuss the relationship between the price elasticity of demand for a good and the total revenue a firm earns from selling the good in Chapter 6, Section 6.3 of Microeconomics and Economics. We discuss price leadership in Microeconomic and Economics, Chapter 14, Section 14.2.)
In March 1961, Dell increased the price of all of its comics from $0.10 to $0.15. At first, Dell’s competitors kept the prices of their comics at $0.10. As a result, in September 1961, Dell cut the price of its comics from $0.15 to $0.12. By early 1962, Dell’s competitors, including DC Comics, Marvel Comics—publishers of Spider-Man and the Fantastic Four—along with several smaller publishers, had increased the prices of their comics from $0.10 to $0.12. The managers at DC decided that raising the price of comics after having kept it constant for so long required an explantion. Accordingly, they printed the following letter in each of their comics.
H/T to Buddy Saunders for the image.
Comic book publishers have raised their prices many times since the early 1960s, with most comics currently having a price of $4.99. During the recent period of high inflation, comic publishers did not use a strategy of shrinkflation perhaps because they believe that 36 pages is the minimum number that buyers will accept.
The first 25 years of the comic book industry represents an interesting historical example of shrinkflation.
As we’ve discussed in several blog posts (for instance, here and here), recent macro data have been consistent with the Federal Reserve being close to achieving a soft landing. The Fed’s increases in its target for the federal funds rate have slowed the growth of aggregate demand sufficiently to bring inflation closer to the Fed’s 2 percent target, but haven’t, to this point, slowed the growth of aggregate demand so much that the U.S. economy has been pushed into a recession.
By January 2024, many investors in financial markets and some economists were expecting that at its meeting on March 19-20, the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee would be cutting its target for the federal funds. However, members of the committee—notably, Chair Jerome Powell—have been cautious about assuming prematurely that inflation had, in fact, been brought under control. In fact, in his press conference on January 31, following the committee’s most recent meeting, Powell made clear that the committee was unlikely to reduce its target for the federal funds rate at its March meeting. Powell noted that “inflation is still too high, ongoing progress in bringing it down is not assured, and the path forward is uncertain.”
Powell’s caution seemed justified when, on February 2, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its most recent “Employment Situation Report” (discussed in this post). The report’s data on growth in employment and growth in wages, as measured by the change in average hourly earnings, might be indicating that aggregate demand is growing too rapidly for inflation to continue to decline.
The BLS’s release today (February 13) of its report on the consumer price index (CPI) (found here) for January provided additional evidence that the Fed may not yet have put inflation on a firm path back to its 2 percent target. The average forecast of economists surveyed before the release of the report was that the increase in the version of the CPI that includes the prices of all goods and services in the market basket—often called headline inflation—would be 2.9 percent. (We discuss how the BLS constructs the CPI in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 19.4, Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.4, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 3, Section 13.4.) As the following figure shows, headline inflation for January was higher than expected at 3.1 percent (measured by the percentage change from the same month in the previous year), while core inflation—which excludes the prices of food and energy—was 3.9 percent. Headline inflation was lower than in December 2023, while core inflation was almost unchanged.
Although the values for January might seem consistent with a gradual decline in inflation, that conclusion may be misleading. Headline inflation in January 2023 had been surprisingly high at 6.4 percent. Hence, the comparision between the value of the CPI in January 2024 with the value in January 2023 may be making the annual CPI inflation rate seem artificially low. If we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year—the values are more concerning, as indicated in the following figure. Headline CPI inflation is 3.7 percent and core CPI inflation is 4.8 percent.
Even more concerning is the path of inflation in the prices of services. Chair Powell has emphasized that as supply chain problems have gradually been resolved, inflation in the prices of goods has been rapidly declining. But inflaion in services hasn’t declined nearly as much. Last summer he stated the point this way:
“Part of the reason for the modest decline of nonhousing services inflation so far is that many of these services were less affected by global supply chain bottlenecks and are generally thought to be less interest sensitive than other sectors such as housing or durable goods. Production of these services is also relatively labor intensive, and the labor market remains tight. Given the size of this sector, some further progress here will be essential to restoring price stability.”
The following figure shows the 1-month inflation rate in services prices. The figure shows that inflation in services has been above 4 percent in every month since July 2023. Inflation in services was a very high 8.7 percent in January. Clearly such large increases in the prices of services aren’t consistent with the Fed meeting its 2 percent inflation target.
How should we interpret the latest CPI report? First, it’s worth bearing in mind that a single month’s report shouldn’t be relied on too heavily. There can be a lot of volatility in the data month-to-month. For instance, inflation in the prices of services jumped from 4.7 percent in December to 8.7 percent in January. It seems unlikely that inflation in the prices of services will continue to be over 8 percent.
Second, housing prices are a large component of service prices and housing prices can be difficult to measure accurately. Notably, the BLS includes in its measure the implicit rental price that someone who owns his or her own home pays. The BLS calculates that implict rental price by asking consumers who own their own homes the following question: “If someone were to rent your home today, how much do you think it would rent for monthly, unfurnished and without utilities?” (The BLS discusses how it measures the price of housing services here.) In practice, it may be difficult for consumers to accurately answer the question if very few houses similar to theirs are currently for rent in their neighborhood.
Third, the Fed uses the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, not the CPI, to gauge whether it is achieving its 2 percent inflation target. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) includes the prices of more goods and services in the PCE than the BLS includes in the CPI and measures housing services using a different approach than that used by the BLS. Although inflation as measured by changes in the CPI and as measured by changes in the PCE move roughly together over long periods, the two measures can differ significantly over a period of a few months. The difference between the two inflation measures is another reason not to rely too heavily on a single month’s CPI data.
Despite these points, investors on Wall Street clearly interpreted the CPI report as bad news. Investors have been expecting that the Fed will soon cut its target for the federal funds rate, which should lead to declines in other key interest rates. If inflation continues to run well above the Fed’s 2 percent target, it seems likely that the Fed will keep its federal funds target at its current level for longer, thereby slowing the growth of aggregate demand and raising the risk of a recession later this year. Accordingly, the Dow Jones Industrial Average declined by more than 500 points today (February 13) and the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note rose above 4.3 percent.
The FOMC has more than a month before its next meeting to consider the implications of the latest CPI report and the additional macro data that will be released in the meantime.
On Friday, February 2, Apple released Vision Pro, its long-awaited, much discussed virtual reality (VR) headset. The Vision Pro headset allows users to experience either VR, in which the user sees only virtual objects, as for instance when the user sees only images from a video game; or augmented reality (AR), in which the user sees virtual objects, such as icon apps or web pages superimposed on the real world (as in the two photos below). Apple refers to people using the headsets as being engaged in “spatial computing” and sometimes refers to the headsets as “face computers.”
Photo from Apple via the Wall Street Journal.
Photo from Apple via the Wall Street Journal.
Vision Pro has a price of $3,499, which can increase to more than $4,000 when including the cost of the insert necessary for anyone who wears prescription eyeglasses or contact lenses and who chooses to buy additional storage capacity. The price is much higher than Meta’s Quest Pro VR headset (shown in the photo below), which has a price of $999.
Photo from meta.com.
In this post, we can briefly discuss some of the economic issues raised by the Vision Pro. First, why would Apple charge such a high price? In her review of the Vision Pro in the Wall Street Journal, Joanna Stern, the site’s personal technology writer, speculated that: “You’re probably not going to buy the $3,500 Apple Vision Pro. Unless you’re an app developer or an Apple die-hard ….”
There are several reasons why Apple may believe that a price of $3,499 is profit maximizing. But we should bear in mind that pricing any new product is difficult because firms lack good data on the demand curve and are unsure how consumers will respond to changes in price. In our new ninth edition of Economics and Microeconomics, in Chapter 6 on price elasticity we discuss how Elon Musk and managers at Tesla experimented with the cutting the price of the Model 3 car as they attempted to discover the effect on price changes on the quantity demanded. Managers at Apple are in similar situation of lacking good data on how many headsets they are likely to sell at $3,499.
If Apple lacks good data on how consumers are likely to respond to different prices, why pick a price four times as high as Meta is charging for its Quest Pro VR headsets?
First, Apple expects to be able to clearly differentiate its headset from Meta’s headset. If consumers considered the two headsets to be close substitutes, the large price difference would make it unlikely that Apple would sell many headsets. Apple has several marketing advantages over Meta that make it likely that Apple can convince many consumers that the Meta headset is not a close substitute for the Vision Pro:
Apple has a history of selling popular electronic products, such as the iPhone, iPad, Air Pods, and the Apple Watch. It also owns the most popular app store. Apple has succeeded in seamlessly integrating these electronic products with each other and with use of the app store. As a result, a significant number of consumers have a strong preference for Apple products over competitors. Meta has a much more limited history of selling popular electronic products. For instance, it doesn’t produce its own smartphone.
Apple has an extensive network of retail stores inside and outside of the United States. The stores have been successful in giving consumers a chance to try a new electronic product before buying it and to receive help at the stores’ Genius Bars with setting up the device or dealing with any later problems. Meta operates few retail stores, relying instead on selling through other retailers, such as Best Buy, or through its online site. For some consumers Meta’s approach is less desirable than Apple’s.
Second, as we discuss in Economics and Microeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5, charging a high price for a new electronic product is common, partly because doing so allows firms to price discriminate across time. With this strategy, firms charge a higher price for a product when it is first introduced and a lower price later. Some consumers are early adopters who will pay a high price to be among the first to own certain new products. Early adopers are a particularly large segment of buyers of Apple products, with long lines often forming at Apple stores on the days when a new product is released. That firms price discriminate over time helps explain why products such as Blu-ray players and 4K televisions sold for very high prices when they were first introduced. After the demand of the early adopters was satisfied, the companies reduced prices to attract more price-sensitive customers. For example, the price of Blu-ray players dropped by 95 percent within five years of their introduction. Similarly, we can expect that Apple will cut the price of Vision Pro significantly over time.
Third, because Apple is initially producing a relatively small number of units, it is likely experiencing a high average cost of producing the Vision Pro. The production of the components of the headset and the final assembly are likely to be subject to large economies of scale. (We discuss economies of scale in Economics and Microeconomics, Chapter 11, Section 11.6.) Apple hasn’t released information on how many units of the headset it intends to produce during 2024, but estimates are that it will be fewer than 400,000 and perhaps as few as 180,000. (Estimates can be found here, here, and here.) Compare that number to the 235 million iPhones Apple sold during 2023. We would expect as Apple’s suppliers increase their production runs, the average cost of production will decline as Apple moves down its long-run average cost curve. As a result, over time Apple is likely to cut the price.
In addition, when producing a new good, firms often experience learning as managers better understand the most efficient way to produce and assemble the new good. For example, the best method of assembling iPhones may not be the best method of assembling headsets, but this fact may only become clear after assembling several thousand headsets. Apple is likely to experience a learning curve with the average cost of producing headsets declining as the total number of headsets produced increases. While economies of scale involve a movement down a static long-run average cost curve, learning results in the long-run average cost curve shifting down. This second reason why Apple’s average cost of producing headsets will decline contributes to the liklihood that Apple will cut the price of the Vision Pro over time.
Finally, we can discuss a key factor that will determine how successful Apple is in selling headsets. In Chapter 11 of the new ninth edition of Economics and Microeconomics, we have a new Apply the Concept, “Mark Zuckerberg … Alone in the Metaverse?” In that feature, we note that Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg has invested heavily in the metaverse, a word that typically means software programs that allow people to access either AR or VR images and information. Zuckerberg believed so strongly in the importance of the metaverse that he changed the name of the company from Facebook to Meta. The metaverse, which is accessed using headsets likes Meta’s Quest Pro or Apple’s Vision Pro, is subject to large network externalities—the usefulness of the headsets increases with the number of consumers who use them. The network externalities arise because many software applications, such as Meta’s Horizon World, depend on interactions among users and so are not very useful when there aren’t many users.
Meta hasn’t sold as many headsets as they expected because they have had difficulty attracting enough users to make their existing software useful and the failure to have enough users has reduced the incentive for other firms to develop apps for Meta’s headsets. Initially, some reviewers made similar comments about Apple’s Vision Pro. For instance, even though streaming films in 3D is one of the uses that Apple promotes, some streaming services, including Netflix and YouTube, have not yet released apps for Vision Pro. Some important business related apps, such as FaceTime and Zoom, aren’t yet available. There are also currently no workout apps. As one reviewer put it “there are few great apps” for Vision Pro. Another reviewer wondered whether the lack of compelling software and apps might result in the Vision Pro headset suffering the fate of “every headset I test [which] ends up in my closet collecting dust.”
So, a key to the success of the Vision Pro will be the ability of Apple to attract enough users to exploit the network externalities that exist with VR/AR headsets. If successful, the Vision Pro may represent an important development in the transition to spatial computing.
An issue of the American Economic Review celebrating the 100th anniversary of the journal in 2011.
The American Economic Association (AEA) was founded in 1885 and is the leading organization of business and academic economists in the United States. It first began publishing the American Economic Review (AER) in 1911. The AER remains the leading academic economic journal in the United States. Like most other academic journals, in recent years the AER has been available in both digital format and in paper copies mailed to subscribers. In January 2024, the AEA announced that the paper version of the journal will soon end:
“The AEA will phase out print journals over the next year by no longer offering print subscriptions for members and institutional subscribers as of February 1. Existing print subscriptions for members and institutions will be honored through January 2025 but will be unable to be renewed.”
The transition of the AER from a paper-only to a digital-only format has been a long one, strecthing over three decades. The tranisition began in the 1990s when the development of the internet made electronic publishing feasible. An important step in making academic journals available electronically was the establishment by William Bowen of the Mellon Foundation of JSTOR in 1994. JSTOR was intended to make electronic versions of back issues of academic journals available inexpensively to libraries and other institutions.
Typically, at the end of a year, libraries would send the issues of academic journals published during that year to be bound into volumes. The libraries would then put the volumes on library shelves making them available to faculty, students, and researchers. University libraries that subscribed to large numbers of academic journals found that over time they were devoting more and more space to shelving bound volumes of academic journals. Many libraries began storing the volumes off site in warehouses, making the volumes less accessible to faculty and students. JSTOR made it possible for libraries to store back issues of journals electronically rather than physically. Many academic societies, like the AEA, were happy to allow JSTOR to make electronic copies of the back issues of their journals. Although academic societies often fund their activities in part from subscriptions to their journals, the societies earned little or no revenue from back issues of their journals.
During the 1990s, the AEA and other academic societies began to make current issues of some journals available on CD-ROMs as more factulty began to use personal computers that had those drives available. Many faculty—including Glenn and Tony!—found the CD-ROM versions of journal issues a little awkward and time consuming to use. CD-Roms never became an important way of distributing journal issues to subscribers. (This article published in 1997 by Hal Varian, who was then at the University of California, Berkeley and is now the chief economist at Google, provides an interesting discuss of the AEA’s first steps toward transitioning its journals to electronic formats.)
By the 2000s, the AEA was offering subscribers to the AER the choice of electronic-only subscriptions—with issues available for download on the AEA’s website—or electronic access along with print copies at a higher annual price. This model was one widely used by non-academic magazines and newspapers. As the number of subscribers receiving print copies of the AER dwindled, the leadership of the AEA eventually decided to eliminate print copies, as indicated in the announcement quoted at the beginning of this post.
For better or worse, in most fields, print copies of academic journals seem to be well on their way to extinction.
This morning of Friday, February 2, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) issued its “Employment Situation Report” for January 2024. Economists and policymakers—notably including the members of the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)—typically focus on the change in total nonfarm payroll employment as recorded in the establishment, or payroll, survey. That number gives what is generally considered to be the best gauge of the current state of the labor market.
Economists surveyed in the past few days by business news outlets had expected that growth in payroll employment would slow to an increase of between 180,000 and 190,000 from the increase in December, which the BLS had an initially estimated as 216,00. (For examples of employment forecasts, see here and here.) Instead, the report indicated that net employment had increased by 353,000—nearly twice the expected amount. (The full report can be found here.)
In this previous blog post on the December employment report, we noted that although the net increase in employment in that month was still well above the increase of 70,000 to 100,000 new jobs needed to keep up with population growth, employment increases had slowed significantly in the second half of 2023 when compared with the first.
That slowing trend in employment growth did not persist in the latest monthly report. In addition, to the strong January increase of 353,000 jobs, the November 2023 estimate was revised upward from 173,000 jobs to 182,000 jobs, and the December estimate was substantially revised from 216,000 to 333,000. As the following figure from the report shows, the net increase in jobs now appears to have trended upward during the last three months of 2023.
Economists surveyed were also expecting that the unemployment rate—calculated by the BLS from data gathered in the household survey—would increase slightly to 3.8 percent. Instead, it remained constant at 3.7 percent. As the following figure shows, the unemployment rate has been remarkably stable for more than two years and has been below 4.0 percent each month since December 2021. The members of the FOMC expect that the unemployment rate during 2024 will be 4.1 percent, a forcast that will be correct only if the demand for labor declines significantly over the rest of the year.
The “Employment Situation Report” also presents data on wages, as measured by average hourly earnings. The growth rate of average hourly earnings, measured as the percentage change from the same month in the previous year, had been slowly declining from March 2022 to October 2023, but has trended upward during the past few months. The growth of average hourly earnings in January 2024 was 4.5 percent, which represents a rise in firms’ labor costs that is likely too high to be consistent with the Fed succeeding in hitting its goal of 2 percent inflation. (Keep in mind, though, as we note in this blog post, changes in average hourly earnings have shortcomings as a measure of changes in the costs of labor to businesses.)
Taken together, the data in today’s “Employment Situation Report” indicate that the U.S. labor market remains very strong. One implication is that the FOMC will almost certainly not cut its target for the federal funds rate at its next meeting on March 19-20. As Fed Chair Jerome Powell noted in a statement to reporters after the FOMC earlier this week: “The Committee does not expect it will be appropriate to reduce the target range until it has gained greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent. We will continue to make our decisions meeting by meeting.” (A transcript of Powell’s press conference can be found here.) Today’s employment report indicates that conditions in the labor market may not be consistent with a further decline in price inflation.
It’s worth keeping several things in mind when interpreting today’s report.
The payroll employment data and the data on average hourly earnings are subject to substantial revisions. This fact was shown in today’s report by the large upward revision in net employment creation in December, as noted earlier in this post.
A related point: The data reported in this post are all seasonally adjusted, which means that the BLS has revised the raw (non-seasonally adjusted) data to take into account normal fluctuations due to seasonal factors. In particular, employment typically increases substantially during November and December in advance of the holiday season and then declines in January. The BLS attempts to take into account this pattern so that it reports data that show changes in employment during these months holding constant the normal seasonal changes. So, for instance, the raw (non-seasonally adjusted) data show a decrease in payroll employment during January of 2,635,000 as opposed to the seasonally adjusted increase of 353,000. Over time, the BLS revises these seasonal adjustment factors, thereby also revising the seasonally adjusted data. In other words, the BLS’s initial estimates of changes in payroll employment for these months at the end of one year and the beginning of the next should be treated with particular caution.
The establishment survey data on average weekly hours worked show a slow decline since November 2023. Typically, a decline in hours worked is an indication of a weakening labor market rather than the strong labor market indicated by the increase in employment. But as the following figure shows, the data on average weekly hours are noisy in that the fluctuations are relatively large, as are the revisons the BLS makes to these data over time.
4. In contrast to today’s jobs report, other labor market data seem to indicate that the demand for labor is slowing. For instance, quit rates—or the number of people voluntarily leaving their jobs as a percentage of the total number of people employed—have been declining. As shown in the following figure, the quit rate peaked at 3.0 percent in November 2021 and March 2022, and has declined to 2.2 percent in December 2023—a rate lower than just before the beginning of the Covid–19 pandemic.
Similarly, as the following figure shows, the number of job openings per unemployed person has declined from a high of 2.0 in March 2022 to 1.4 in December 2023. This value is still somewhat higher than just before the beginning of the Covid–19 pandemic.
To summarize, recent data on conditions in the labor market have been somewhat mixed. The strong increases in net employment and in average hourly earnings in recent months are in contrast with declining average number of hours worked, a declining quit rate, and a falling number of job openings per unemployed person. Taken together, these data make it likely that the FOMC will be in no hurry to cut its target for the federal funds rate. As a result, long-term interest rates are also likely to remain high in the coming months. The following figure from the Wall Street Journal provides a striking illustration of the effect of today’s jobs report on the bond market, as the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note rose above 4.0 percent for the first time in more than a month. The interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note plays an important role in the financial system, influencing interest rates on mortgages and corporate bonds.
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell (Photo from the New York Times.)
This afternoon, Wednesday, January 31, the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) held the first of its eight scheduled meetings during 2024. As we noted in a recent post, macroeconomic data have been indicating that the Fed is close to achieving its goal of bringing the U.S. economy in for a soft landing—reducing inflation down to the Fed’s 2 percent target without pushing the economy into a recession. But as we also noted in that post, it was unlikely that at this meeting Fed Chair Jerome Powell and the other members of the FOMC would declare victory in their fight to reduce inflation from the high levels it reached during 2022.
In fact, in Powell’s press conference following the meeting, when asked directly by a reporter whether he believed that the economy had made a safe landing, Powell said that he wasn’t yet willing to draw that conclusion. Accordingly, the committee kept its target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at 5.25 percent to 5.50 percent. This was the fifth meeting in a row at which the FOMC had left the target unchanged. Although some policy analysts expect that the FOMC might reduce its federal funds rate target at its next meeting in March, the committee’s policy statement made that seem unlikely:
“In considering any adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will carefully assess incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks. The Committee does not expect it will be appropriate to reduce the target range until it has gained greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent.”
Powell reinforced the point during his press conference by stating it was unlikely that the committee would cut the target rate at the next meeting. He noted that:
“The economy has surprised forecasters in many ways since the pandemic, and ongoing progress toward our 2 percent inflation objective is not assured. The economic outlook is uncertain, and we remain highly attentive to inflation risks. We are prepared to maintain the current target range for the federal funds rate for longer, if appropriate.”
Powell highlighted a couple of areas of potential concern. The Fed gauges its progress towards achieving its 2 percent inflation goal using the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. As we noted in a recent post, PCE inflation has declined from a high of 7.1 percent in June 2022 to 2.9 percent in December 2023. But Powell noted that PCE inflation in goods has followed a different path from PCE inflation in services, as the following figure shows.
Inflation during 2022 was much greater in the prices of goods than in the prices of services, reflecting the fact that supply chain disruptions caused by the pandemic had a greater effect on goods than on services. Inflation in goods has been less than 1 percent every month since June 2023 and has been negative in three of those months. Inflation in services peaked in February 2023 at 6.0 percent and has been declining since, but was still 3.9 percent in December. Powell noted that the very low rates of inflation in the prices of goods probably aren’t sustainable. If inflation in the prices of goods increases, the Fed may have difficulty achieving its 2 percent inflation target unless inflation in the prices of services slows.
Powell also noted that the most recent data on the employment cost index (ECI) had been released the morning of the meeting. The ECI is compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and is published quarterly. It measures the cost to employers per employee hour worked. The BLS publishes data that includes only wages and salaries and data that includes, in addition to wages and salaries, non-wage benefits—such as contributions to retirement accounts or health insurance—that firms pay workers. The figure below shows the percentage change from the same month in the previous year for the ECI including just wages and salaries (blue line) and for the ECI including all compensation (red line). Although ECI inflation has declined significantly from its peak in he second quarter of 2022, in the fourth quarter of 2023, both measures of ECI inflation were above 4 percent. Wages increasing at that pace may not be consistent with a 2 percent rate of price inflation.
Powell’s tone at his news conference (which can be watched here) was one of cautious optimism. He and the other committee members expect to be able to cut the target for the federal funds rate later this year but remain on guard for any indications that the inflation rate is increasing again.
The Federal Reserve building in Washington, DC. (Photo from the New York Times.)
Since inflation began to increase rapidly in the late spring of 2021, the key macroeconomic question has been whether the Fed would be able to achieve a soft landing—pushing inflation back to its 2 percent target without causing a recession. The majority of the members of the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) believed that increases in inflation during 2021 were largely caused by problems with supply chains resulting from the effects of the Covid–19 pandemic.
These committee members believed that once supply chains returned to normal, the increase in he inflation rate would prove to have been transitory—meaning that the inflation rate would decline without the need for the FOMC to pursue a contractionary monetary by substantially raising its target range for the federal funds rate. Accordingly, the FOMC left its target range unchanged at 0 to 0.25 percent until March 2022. As the following figure shows, by that time the inflation rate had increased to 6.9 percent, the highest it had been since January 1982. (Note that the figure shows inflation as measured by the percentage change from the same month in the previous year in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. Inflation as measured by the PCE is the gauge the Fed uses to determine whether it is achieving its goal of 2 percent inflation.)
By the time inflation reached its peak in mid-2022, many economists believed that the FOMC’s decision to delay increasing the federal funds rate until March 2022 had made it unlikely that the Fed could return inflation to 2 percent without causing a recession. But the latest macroeconomic data indicate that—contrary to that expectation—the Fed does appear to have come very close to achieving a soft landing. On January 26, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released data on the PCE for December 2023. The following figure shows for the period since 2015, inflation as measured by the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year (the blue line) and as measured by the percentage change in the core PCE, which excludes the prices of food and energy (the red line).
The figure shows that PCE inflation continued its decline, falling slightly in December to 2.6 percent. Core PCE inflation also declined in December to 2.9 percent from 3.2 percent in November. Note that both measures remained somewhat above the Fed’s inflation target of 2 percent.
If we look at the 1-month inflation rate—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year—inflation is closer to Fed’s target, as the following figure shows. The 1-month PCE inflation rate has moved somewhat erratically, but has generally trended down since mid-2022. In December, PCE inflation increased from from –0.8 percent in November (which acutally indicates that deflation occurred that month) to 2.0 percent in December. The 1-month core PCE inflation rate has moved less erratically, also trending down since mid-2022. In December, the 1-month core PCE inflation increased from 0.8 percent in November to 2.1 percent in December. In other words, the December reading on inflation indicates that inflation is very close to the Fed’s target.
The following figure shows for each quarter since the beginning of 2015, the growth rate of real GDP measured as the percentage change from the same quarter in the previous year. The figure indicates that although real GDP growth dropped to below 1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2022, the growth rate rose during each quarter of 2023. The growth rate of 3.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 remained well above the FOMC’s 1.8 percent estimate of long-run economic growth. (The average of the members of the FOMC’s estimates of the long-run growth rate of real GDP can be found here.) To this point, there is no indication from the GDP data that the U.S. economy is in danger of experiencing a recession in the near future.
The labor market also shows few signs of a recession, as indicated by the following figure, which shows the unemployment rate in the months since January 2015. The unemployment rate has remained below 4 percent in each month since December 2021. The unemployment rate was 3.7 percent in December 2023, below the FOMC’s projection of a long-run unemployment rate of 4.1 percent.
The FOMC’s next meeting is on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week (February 1-2). Should we expect that at that meeting Fed Chair Jerome Powell will declare that the Fed has succeeded in achieving a soft landing? That seems unlikely. Powell and the other members of the committee have made clear that they will be cautious in interpreting the most recent macroeconomic data. With the growth rate of real GDP remaining above its long run trend and the unemployment rate remaining below most estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, there is still the potential that aggregate demand will increase at a rate that might cause the inflation rate to once again rise.
In a speech at the Brookings Institution on January 16, Fed Governor Christopher Waller echoed what appear to be the views of most members of the FOMC:
“Time will tell whether inflation can be sustained on its recent path and allow us to conclude that we have achieved the FOMC’s price-stability goal. Time will tell if this can happen while the labor market still performs above expectations. The data we have received the last few months is allowing the Committee to consider cutting the policy rate in 2024. However, concerns about the sustainability of these data trends requires changes in the path of policy to be carefully calibrated and not rushed. In the end, I am feeling more confident that the economy can continue along its current trajectory.”
At his press conference on February 1, following the FOMC meeting, Chair Powell will likely provide more insight into the committee’s current thinking.
Supports: Microeconomics and Economics Chapter 6, Section 6.2 and Esstentials of Economics, Chapter 7, Section 7.6.
The Houthis, a rebel group based in Yemen, have been attacking shipping in the Red Sea, which freighters sail through after exiting the Suez Canal. About 30 percent of global shipping travels through the Suez Canal. An article in the Financial Times noted that maritime insurance firms have increased their charges for insuring freight passing through the Suez Canal by about $6,000 per container.” The article also noted that: “Freight demand is price inelastic in the short run and transport isn’t a big part of overall costs.” And that “the average container holds about $100,000 worth of goods wholesale, which will be sold at destination for $300,000.”
Is there a connection between the observation that freight demand is price inelastic and the observation that the charge for transporting goods isn’t a large fraction of the price of the goods shipped by container? Briefly explain.
The article notes that the main alternative to transporting freight by ship is to transport it by air, but if only 1 percent of freight sent by ship were to be sent by air instead, all the available flight capacity would be filled. Does this fact also have relevance to explaining the price inelasticity of demand for transporting freight by ship? Briefly explain.
Solving the Problem
Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the determinants of the price elasticity of demand, so you may want to review Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 6, Section 6.2 (Essentials of Economics, Chapter 7, Section 7.6), “The Determinants of the Price Elasticity of Demand and Total Revenue.”
Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining why the small fraction that transportation is of the total price of the goods in a container of freight makes it more likely that the demand for shipping is price inelastic in the short run. This section of the chapter notes that goods and services that are only a small fraction of a consumer’s budget tend to have less elastic demand than do goods and services that are a large faction. In this case, the consumer is a firm shipping freight. Because the $6,000 increase per container in the cost of shipping freight makes up only 2 percent of the dollar amount the freight can be sold for, shippers are likely not to significantly reduce the quantity of shipping services they demand. Note, though, that the article refers to the price elasticity of freight demand “in the short run.” It’s possible that over a longer period of time the market for transporting freight by ship may adjust by, for instance, firms offering to ship freight by air increasing their capacity and lowering their prices. In that case, the price elasticity of demand for transporting freight by ship will be higher in the long run than in the short tun.
Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining whether the limited amount of available capacity for sending freight by air may help explain why the demand for sending freight by ship is price inelastic. This section of the chapter notes that the most important determinant of the price elasticity of demand for a good or service is the availability of close substitutes. That there is only a small amount of unused capacity to transport goods by air indicates that transporting goods by air is not a close substitute for transporting goods by sea. Therefore, we would expect that this factor contributes to the demand for transporting goods by sea being price inelastic in the short run.
On the morning of January 11, 2024, the Bureau of Labor Statistics released its report on changes in consumer prices during December 2023. The report indicated that over the period from December 2022 to December 2023, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by 3.4 percent (often referred to as year-over-year inflation). “Core” CPI, which excludes prices for food and energy, increased by 3.9 percent. The following figure shows the year-over-year inflation rate since Januar 2015, as measured using the CPI and core CPI.
This report was consistent with other recent reports on the CPI and on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index—the measure the Fed uses to gauge whether it is achieving its target of 2 percent annual inflation—in showing that inflation has declined substantially from its peak in mid-2022 but is still above the Fed’s target.
We get a similar result if we look at the 1-month inflation rate—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year—as the following figure shows. The 1-month CPI inflation rate has moved erratically but has generally trended down. The 1-month core CPi inflation rate has moved less erratically, making the downward trend since mid-2022 clearer.
The headline on the Wall Street Journalarticle discussing this BLS report was: “Inflation Edged Up in December After Rapid Cooling Most of 2023.” The headline reflected the reaction of Wall Street investors who had hoped that the report would unambiguously show further slowing in inflation.
Overall, the report was middling: It didn’t show a significant acceleration in inflation at the end of 2023 but neither did it show a signficant slowing of inflation. At its next meeting on January 30-31, the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is expected to keep its target for the federal funds rate unchanged. There doesn’t appear to be anything in this inflation report that would be likely to affect the committee’s decision.
Agents from the National Transportation Safety Board inspect a piece of the Boeing jetliner found in a backyard in Portland, Oregon. (Photo from the AP via the New York Times.)
What causes movements in stock prices? As we explain in Economics and Microeconomics, Chapter 8, Section 8.2 (Macroeconomics, Essentials of Economics, and Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 6, Section 6.2): “Shares of stock represent claims on the profits of the firms that issue them. As the fortunes of the firms change and they earn more or less profit, the prices of the stock the firms have issued should also change.”
We also note that: “Many Wall Street investment professionals expend a great deal of effort gathering all possible information about the future profitability of firms, hoping to buy the stocks that are most likely to rise in the future. As a result of the actions of these professional investors, all of the information about a firm that is available on news and financial websites, cable TV business shows, and online discussion sites like X and Reddit is already reflected in the firm’s stock price.” As a consequence, the price of a firm’s stock will change only as a result of new information about the future profitability of the firm issuing the stock.
During the course of a typical week, the new information that becomes available about a large company, like Apple or General Motors, is likely to indicate only minor changes in the future profitability of the firm. Therefore, we wouldn’t expect that the firm’s stock price would change very much. Sometimes, though, investors receive important new information that causes them to significantly revise their expectations of the future profitability of a firm. That’s what happened to Boeing, the jetliner manufacturer, on Friday, January 5. An Alaska Air Boeing 737 Max 9 was taking off from Portland International Airport when a piece of the plane blew out. (A Wall Street Journalarticle gives the details of the incident.)
The accident caused some industry observers to question whether Boeing’s quality control during manufacturing had deficiencies that might lead to other problems being discovered on the firm’s jetliners. Boeing was particularly at risk of having its quality control methods questioned because in 2019 two slightly different models of the 737 Max airliner had crashed, causing the planes to be grounded for almost two years.
The effect of the Alaska Air incident on Boeing’s stock price can be seen in the following figure, reproduced from the Wall Street Journal. On Friday, January 5 at 4 pm eastern time—the time at which trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) closes for the day—the price of Boeing’s stock was $249.00 per share. The accident took place at around 7:40 pm eastern time, so it occurred after the close of trading on the NYSE. When trading on the NYSE resumed at 9:30 am on Monday, January 8, Boeing’s stock price had declined to $227.79 per share. The size of the drop in price indicated that investors believed that the Portland accident would have a significantly negative affect on Boeing’s future profitability. Boeing’s profits could fall if the accident leads airlines to reduce their future purchases of 737 Max airliners or if Boeing’s costs rise significantly as a result of making repairs on Max airliners currently in servide or as a result of having to spend more on quality control measures when manufacturing the planes.
The effect of the Portland accident on Boeing’s stock price is an example of the efficiency of the stock market in processing information about a firm’s future profitability.
Glenn participated in this session hosted by the Society of Policy Modeling and the American Economic Association of Economic Educators and moderated by Dominick Salvatore of Fordham University. (Link to the page for this session in the ASSA program.)
Also making presentations at the session were Robert Barro of Harvard University, Janice Eberly of Northwestern University, Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard University, and John Taylor of Stanford University.
Here is the abstract for Glenn’s presentation:
Economic growth is foundational for living standards and as an objective for economic policy. The emergence of Artificial Intelligence as a General Purpose Technology, on the one hand, and a number of demographic and budget challenges, on the other hand, generate an unusually wide range of future economic outcomes. I focus on key ‘policy’ and ‘political economy’ considerations that increase the likelihood of a more favorable growth path given pre-existing trends and technological possibilities. By ‘policy,’ I consider mechanisms enabling growth through research, taxation, the scope of regulation, and competition. By ‘political economy’ factors, I consider mechanisms to increase economic participation in support of growth and policies that enhance it. I argue that both sets of mechanisms are necessary for a viable pro-growth economic policy framework.
These slides from the presentation highlight some of Glenn’s key points. (Note the cover of the new 9th edition of the textbook in slide 7!)
Glenn participated in this session hosted by the National Association of Economic Educators and moderated by Kim Holder of the University of West Georgia. Glenn thanks Kim for organizing the session and for inviting him to participate.
Here is the session abstract and the list of participants:
Glenn prepared some slides for his presentation. Note that “B01″ and B02” were the titles when he first taught principles of economics as an assistant professor at Northwestern. (We won’t mention how long ago that was!)
During the last few months of 2023, the macroeconomic data has generally been consistent with the Federal Reserve successfully bringing about a soft landing: Inflation returning to the Fed’s 2 percent target without the economy entering a recession. On the morning of Friday, January 5, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) issued its latest “Employment Situation Report” for December 2023. The report was generally consistent with the economy still being on course for a soft landing, but because both employment growth and wage growth were stronger than expected, the report makes it somewhat less likely that the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will soon begin reducing its target for the federal funds rate. (The full report can be found here.)
Economists and policymakers—notably including the members of the FOMC—typically focus on the change in total nonfarm payroll employment as recorded in the establishment, or payroll, survey. That number gives what is generally considered to be the best gauge of the current state of the labor market.
The report indicated that during December there had been a net increase of 216,000 jobs. This number was well above the expected gain of 160,000 to 170,000 jobs that several surveys of economists had forecast (see here, here, and here). The BLS revised downward by a total of 71,000 jobs its previous estimates for October and November, somewhat offsetting the surprisingly strong estimated increase in net jobs for December.
The following figure from the report shows the net increase in jobs each month since December 2021. Although the net number of jobs created has trended up from September to December, the longer run trend has been toward slower growth in employment. In the first half of 2023, an average of 257,000 net jobs were created per month, whereas in the second half of 2023, an average of 193,000 net jobs were created per month. Average weekly hours worked have also been slowly trending down, from 34.6 hours per week in January to 34.3 hours per week in December.
Economists surveyed were also expecting that the unemployment rate—calculated by the BLS from data gathered in the household survey—would increase slightly. Instead, it remained constant at 3.7 percent. As the following figure shows, the unemployment rate has been below 4.0 percent each month since December 2021. The members of the FOMC expect that the unemployment rate during 2024 will be 4.1 percent. (The most recent economic projections of the members of the FOMC can be found here.)
Although the employment data indicate that conditions in the labor market are easing in a way that may be consistent with inflation returning to the Fed’s 2 percent target, the data on wage growth are so far sending a different message. Average hourly earnings—data on which are collected in the establishment survey—increased by 4.1 percent in December compared with the same month in 2022. This rate of increase was slightly higher than the 4.0 percent increase in November. The following figure shows movements in the rate of increase in average hourly earnings since January 2021.
In his press conference following the FOMC’s December 13, 2023 meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell noted that increases in wages at 4 percent or higher were unlikely to result in inflation declining to the Fed’s 2 percent goal:
“So wages are still running a bit above what would be consistent with 2 percent inflation over a long period of time. They’ve been gradually cooling off. But if wages are running around 4 percent, that’s still a bit above, I would say.”
The FOMC’s next meeting is on January 30-31. At this point it seems likely that the committee will maintain its current target for the federal funds. The data in the latest employment report make it somewhat less likely that the committee will begin reducing its target at its meeting on March 19-20, as some economists and some Wall Street analysts had been expecting. (The calendar of the FOMC’s 2024 meetings can be found here.)
In recent months, the macroeconomic data has generally been consistent with the Federal Reserve successfully bringing about a soft landing: Inflation returning to the Fed’s 2 percent target without the economy entering a recession. The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ latest Employment Situation Report, released on the morning of Friday, December 8, was consistent with this trend. (The full report can be found here.)
Economists and policymakers—notably including the members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)—typically focus on the change in total nonfarm payroll employment as recorded in the establishment, or payroll, survey. That number gives what is generally considered to be the best gauge of the current state of the labor market.
The report indicated that during November there had been a net increase of 199,000 jobs. This number was somewhat above the expected gain of 153,000 jobs Reuters news service reported from its survey of economists and just slightly above an expected gain of 190,000 jobs the Wall Street Journal reported from a separate survey of economists. The BLS revised downward by 35,000 jobs its previous estimate for September. It left its estimate for October unchanged. The following figure from the report shows the net increase in jobs each month since November 2021.
Because the BLS often substantially revises its preliminary estimates of employment from the establishment survey, it’s important not to overinterpret data for a single month or even for a few months. But general trends in the data can give useful information on changes in the state of the labor market. The estimate for November is the fourth time in the past six months that employment has increased by less than 200,000. Prior to that, employment had increased by more than 200,000 every month since January 2021.
Although the rate of job increases is slowing, it’s still above the rate at which new entrants enter the labor market, which is estimated to be roughly 90,000 people per month. The additional jobs are being filled in part by increased employment among people aged 25 to 54—so-called prime-age workers. (We discuss the employment-population ratio in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1, Economics, Chapter 19, Section 9.1, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 13, Section 13.1.) As the following figure shows, the employment-population ratio for prime-age workers remains above its level in early 2020, just before the spread of the Covid–19 pandemic in the United States.
The estimated unemployment rate, which is collected in the household survey, was down slightly from 3.9 percent to 3.7 percent. A shown in the following figure, the unemployment rate has been below 4 percent every month since February 2022.
The Employment Situation Report also presents data on wages, as measured by average hourly earnings. The growth rate of average hourly earnings, measured as the percentage change from the same month in the previous year, continued its gradual decline, as shown in the following figure. As a result, upward pressure on prices from rising labor costs is easing. (Keep in mind, though, as we note in this blog post, changes in average hourly earnings have shortcomings as a measure of changes in the costs of labor to businesses.)
Taken together, the data in the latest employment report indicate that the labor market is becoming less tight, reflecting a gradual slowing in U.S. economic growth. The data are consistent with the U.S. economy approaching a soft landing. It’s still worth bearing in mind, of course, that, as Fed Chair Jerome Powell continues to caution, there’s no certainty that inflation won’t surge again or that the U.S. economy won’t enter a recession.
The meeting room of the FOMC in the Federal Reserve building in Washington, DC.
As we’ve noted in several recent posts, the inflation rate has fallen significantly from its peak in mid-2022, as U.S. economic growth has been slowing and the labor market appears to be less tight, slowing the growth of wages. Some economists and policymakers now believe that by early 2024, inflation will approach the Fed Reserve’s 2 percent inflation target. At that point, the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is likely to turn its attention from inflation to making sure that the U.S. economy doesn’t slip into a recession.
Accordingly, both economists and financial market participants have begun to anticipate the point at which the FOMC will begin to cut its target for the federal funds rate. (One note of caution: Fed Chair Jerome Powell has made clear that the FOMC stands ready to further increase its target for the federal funds rate if the inflation rate shows signs of increasing. He made this point most recently on December 1 in a speech at Spelman College in Atlanta.) There is currently an interesting disagreement between economists and investors over when the FOMC is likely to cut interest rates and by how much. We can see the views of investors reflected in the futures market for federal funds.
Futures markets allow investors to buy and sell futures contracts on commodities–such as wheat and oil–and on financial assets. Investors can use futures contracts both to hedge against risk—such as a sudden increase in oil prices or in interest rates—and to speculate by, in effect, betting on whether the price of a commodity or financial asset is likely to rise or fall. (We discuss the mechanics of futures markets in Chapter 7, Section 7.3 of Money, Banking, and the Financial System.) The CME Group was formed from several futures markets, including the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and allows investors to trade federal funds futures contracts. The data that result from trading on the CME indicate what investors in financial markets expect future values of the federal funds rate to be. The following chart from the CME’s FedWatch Tool shows values after trading of federal funds futures on December 5, 2023.
The probabilities in the chart reflects investors’ predictions of what the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate will be after the committee’s meeting on March 20, 2024. This meeting is the first after which investors currently expect that the target is likely to be lowered. The target range is currently 5.25 percent to 5.50 percent. The chart indicates that investors assign a probability of 60.2 percent to the FOMC making at least a 0.25 percentage cut in the target rate at the March meeting.
Looking at the values for federal funds futures after the FOMC’s December 18, 2024 meeting, investors assign a 66.3 percent probability of the committee having reduced its target for the federal funds rate to 4.00 to 4.25 percent of lower. In other words, investors expect that during 2024, the FOMC will have cut its target for the federal funds rate by at least 1.25 percentage points.
Interesingly, according to a survey by the Financial Times, economists disagree with investors’ forecasts of the federal funds rate. According to the survey, which was conducted between December 1 and December 4, nearly two-thirds of economists believe that the FOMC won’t cut its target for the federal funds rate until July 2024 or later. Three-quarters of the economists surveyed believe that the FOMC will cut its target by 0.5 percent point or less during 2024. Fewer than 10 percent of the economists surveyed believe that during 2024 the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate by 1.25 percent or more. (The Financial Times article describing the results of the survey can be found here. A subscription may be requred to read the article.)
So, at least among the economists surveyed by the Financial Times, the consensus is that the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate later and by less than financial markets are indicating. What explains the discrepancy? The main explanation is that economists see inflation being persistently above the Fed’s 2 percent target for longer than do financial market participants. The economists surveyed are also more optimistic that the U.S. economy will avoid a recession in 2024. If a recession occurs, the FOMC is more likely to significantly cut its target than if the economy during 2024 experiences moderate growth in real GDP and the unemployment rate remains low.
One other indication from financial markets that investors expect that the U.S. economy is likely to slow during 2024 is given by movements in the interest rate on the 10-year U.S. Treasury note. As shown in the following figure, from August to October of this year, the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note rose from less than 4 percent to nearly 5 percent—an unusually large change in such a short period of time. Since then, most of that increase has been reversed with the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note having fallen below 4.2 percent in early December
The movements in the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note typically reflect investors’ expectations of future short-term interest rates. (We discuss the relationship between short-term and long-term interests rates—which economists call the term structure of interest rates—in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.) The increase in the 10-year interest rate between August and October reflected investors’ expectation that short-term interest rates were likely to remain persistently high for a considerable period—perhaps several years or more. The decline in the 10-year rate from late October to early December reflects investors changing their expectations toward future short-term interest rates being lower than they had previously thought. Again, as in the data on federal funds rate futures, investors seem to be expecting either slower economic growth or slower inflation than do economists.
One other complication about the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note should be mentioned. Some of the increase in the rate from August to October may also have represented concern among investors that large federal budget deficit would cause the Treasury to issue more Treasury notes than investors would be willing to buy without the Treasury increasing the interest rate investors would receive on the newly issued notes. This concern may have been reinforced by data showing that foreign investors, particularly in China and Japan, appeared to have slowed or stopped adding to their holdings of Treasury notes. Part of the recent decline in the interest rate on the Treasury note may reflect investors becoming less concerned about these two factors.
Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell (photo from bloomberg.com)
In a blog post from February of this year, we discussed three possible outcomes of the contractionary monetary policy that the Federal Reserve has been pursuing since March 2022, when the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) began raising its target range for the federal funds rate:
A soft landing. The Fed’s preferred outcome; inflation returns to the Fed’s target of 2 percent without the economy falling into recession.
A hard landing. Inflation returns to the Fed’s 2 percent target, but the economy falls into a recession.
No landing. At the beginning of 2023, the unemployment remained very low and inflation, as measured by the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index from the same month in the previous year, was still above 5 percent. So, some observers, particularly in Wall Street financial firms, began discussing the possibility that low unemployment and high inflation might persist indefinitely, resulting an outcome of no landing.
At the end of 2023, the economy appears to be slowing: Retail sales declined in October; real disposable personal income increased in October, but it has been trending down, as have real personal consumption expenditures; while the increase in third quarter real GDP was recently revised upward from 4.9 percent to 5.2 percent, forecasts of growth in real GDP during the fourth quarter show a marked slowing—for instance, GDPNow, compiled by the Atlanta Fed, estimates fourth quarter growth at 2.1 percent; and while employment continues to expand, average weekly hours have been slowly declining and initial claims for unemployment insurance have been increasing.
The slowing in the growth of output, income, and employment are reflected in a falling inflation rate. The following figure show the percentage change since the same month in the previous year in PCE price index, which is the measure the Fed uses to gauge whether it is hitting its 2 percent inflation target. (We discuss the reasons for the Fed preferring the PCE price index to the consumer price index (CPI) in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 and Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.5.) The figure also shows core PCE, which excludes the prices of food and energy. Core PCE inflation typically gives a better measure of the underlying inflation rate than does PCE inflation.
PCE inflation declined from 3.4 percent in September to 3.0 percent in October. Core PCE inlation declined from 3.8 percent in September to 3.5 percent in September. Although inflation has been declining from its peak in mid-2022, both of these measures of inflation remain above the Fed’s 2 percent target.
But if we look at the 1-month inflation rate—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year—we see a much sharper decline in inflation, as the following figure shows.
The 1-month inflation rate is naturally more volatile than the 12-month inflation rate. In this case, the 1-month rate shows a sharp decline in PCE inflation from 3.8 percent in September to 0.6 percent in October. Core PCE inflation declined less sharply from 3.9 percent in September to 2.0 percent in October.
The continuing decline in inflation has caused some economists and Wall Street analysts to predict that the FOMC will not implement further increases in its target for the federal funds rate and will likely begin cutting its target by mid-2024.
On December 1 in a speech at Spelman College in Atlanta, Fed Chair Jerome Powell urged caution in assuming that the Fed has succeeded in putting inflation on a course back to its 2 percent target:
“The FOMC is strongly committed to bringing inflation down to 2 percent over time, and to keeping policy restrictive until we are confident that inflation is on a path to that objective. It would be premature to conclude with confidence that we have achieved a sufficiently restrictive stance, or to speculate on when policy might ease. We are prepared to tighten policy further if it becomes appropriate to do so.”
In terms of the three policy outcomes listed at the beginning of this post, the third—no landing, with the unemployment rate remaining very low while the inflation rate remains above the Fed’s 2 percent target—now seems unlikely. The labor market appears to be weakening, which will likely result in increases in the unemployment rate. The next “Employment Report” from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which will be released on December 8, will provide additional data on the state of the labor market.
Although we can’t entirely rule out the possibility of a no landing outcome, it seems more likely that the economy will either make a soft landing—if output and employment continue to increase, although at a slower rate, while inflation continues to decline—or a hard landing—if output and employment begin to fall as the economy enters a recession. Although a consensus seems to be building among economists, policymakers, and Wall Street analysts that a soft landing is the likeliest outcome, Powell has provided a reminder that that outcome is far from certain.
Federal Reserve Governor Christopher J. Waller (photo from the Associated Press via the Wall Street Journal)
Fed Governor Christopher Waller has a reputation for being a policy hawk, which means that since the spring of 2022 he has been a forceful advocate of multiple increases in the target for the federal funds rate as the Fed attempts to slow the economy and bring inflation back to the Fed’s 2 percent target. (Waller’s biography on the Fed’s web site can be found here.)
So, it was notable that in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) on November 28, he said that “I am increasingly confident that policy is currently well positioned to slow the economy and get inflation back to 2 percent.” Although he also stressed that “there is still significant uncertainty about the pace of future activity, and so I cannot say for sure whether the [Federal Open Market Committee] FOMC has done enough to achieve price stability” his remarks were interpreted as reinforcing the growing view among non-Fed economists and investors that the FOMC is unlikely to increase its target for the federal funds rate further and is likely to reduce the target at some point during 2024. The text of Waller’s speech can be found here.
AEI economist Michael Strain interviewed Waller following his speech. In the interview (which can be found here), Strain made the case for believing that the Fed’s ability to achieve a soft landing—returning inflation to the 2 percent target without pushing the economy into a recession—would be more difficult than Waller seems to believe. Included in the interview are discussions of whether expecting a soft landing is consistent with the historical record, what guidance the Taylor rule can give to monetary policymakers (we discuss the Taylor rule in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5, Economics, Chapter 25, Section 15.5, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 17, Section 17.5), the significance of rising labor force participation rates among prime-age workers, and the implications large federal budget deficits have for monetary policy.
Earlier this month, Sam Bankman-Fried was convicted of fraud connected with the collapse of the FTX cryptocurrency exchange he founded. (We discuss aspects of cryptocurrencies in earlier blog posts here and here.) Bankman-Fried had a reputation for dressing casually and for having bushy, unkempt hair. In preparing for his trial, Bankman-Fried paid another inmate at the Metropolitan Detention Center in New York City to cut his hair short. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, Bankman-Fried paid the other inmate not with currency but with four packets of mackerels—like the ones shown in the photo above—to cut his hair.
Although using packets of mackerels to buy and sell services may seem strange, in fact, packets of mackerel seem to be widely used in place of currency in the U.S. prison system. We explained the situation in an Apply the Concept in an earlier edition of our principles textbook. We reproduce that feature here. Note that the inmate quoted indicates that the price of a haircut at that time was only two mackerel packets rather than the four that Bankman-Fried paid. (Question to consider: Would we expect that prices of services in terms of mackerel packets would be the same across prisons at a given time or in the same prison over time?)
The Mackerel Economy in the Federal Prison System
Inmates of the federal prison system are not allowed to have money. Funds they earn working in the prison or receive from friends and relatives are placed in an account they can draw on to buy snacks and other items from the prison store. Lacking money, prisoners could barter with each other in exchanging goods and services, but we have seen that barter is inefficient. Since about 2004, in many prisons small plastic packets of mackerel fillets costing about $1 each have been used as money. [According to the Wall Street Journal article linked to earlier, the mackerel packets now sell for $1.30.] The packets are known in prison as “macks.”
Some prisoners have set up small businesses using mackerel packets for money. They sell services such as shoe shines, cell cleaning, or haircuts for macks. According to a prisoner in Lompoc prison in California, “A haircut is two macks.” A former prisoner described a fellow prisoner’s food business: “I knew a guy who would buy ingredients and use the microwaves to cook meals. Then people used mack to buy it from him.” In the Pensacola prison in Florida, the prison commissary was open only one day a week. So, several prisoners would run “prison 7-Elevens” by stocking up on goods and reselling them for macks at a profit. Very few prisoners actually eat the mackerel in the packets. In fact, apart from prison commissaries, the demand for mackerel in the United States is very small.
The mackerel economy is under pressure at some prisons, where rules exist against hoarding goods from the commissary. Prisoners caught dealing in macks can risk no longer being allowed to use the commissary or may be moved to a less desirable cell. In these prisons, the mackerel economy has been pushed underground.
The prison mackerel economy illustrates an important fact about money: Anything can be used as money, as long as people are willing to accept it in exchange for goods and services—even pouches of fish that no one wants to eat.
Source: Justin Scheck, “Mackerel Economics in Prison,” Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2008.
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