Money. Banking, and the Financial System – HubbardOBrienEconomics.com Blog

CPI Inflation Increases in September

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After the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) increased its target for the federal funds rate at its September meeting, there was uncertainty as to whether it would raise its target again at its meeting on October 27–28. Today’s report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on the consumer price index (CPI) for September showed that inflation had risen more than expected, likely increase somewhat the probability of the committee raising its target range at its October meeting.

As we’ve noted before, and as we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15 (Economics, Chapter 25), monetary policy affects the economy with, in the words of Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, “long and variable lags.” As a result, most economists agree that the Federal Reserve should not attempt to “fine tune” the economy by responding to each government release of macroeconomic data. Nevertheless, in practice, it’s clear that during times when Fed policymakers are split over what course of action to take, a single data report can have a significant effect on their decision.

The following figure compares headline CPI inflation (the blue line) and core CPI inflation (the red line).

The headline inflation rate, which is measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous year, was 3.7 percent in September, up from 3.4 percent in August.
The core inflation rate, which excludes the prices of food and energy, was 2.6 percent in September, up from 2.4 percent in August.

Headline inflation and core inflation were both higher than the forecasts of economics surveyed by the Wall Street Journal. (Note that because of last year’s federal government shutdown, inflation data for October 2025 are not available.)

In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, headline inflation (the blue line) soared to 8.1 percent in September, up from 4.9 percent in August. Core inflation (the red line) was 4.1 percent in September, up from 3.5 percent in August.

As the large gap between the headline and core 1-month inflation rates indicates, energy prices, particularly gasoline prices, rose sharply in September. In the following figure, the red line shows the 12-month inflation rate in all energy prices included in the CPI. Inflation in energy prices was 20.4 percent in September, up from 16.4 percent in August. The blue line shows the 12-month inflation rate in gasoline prices, which increased to 34.2 percent in September from 27.4 percent in August.

There has been a fear that the rise in energy prices that began in March will pass through to increases in food prices, which are a key concern for many consumers. The following figure shows 12-month inflation in the CPI category “food at home” (the blue bar)—primarily food purchased at grocery stores—and in the category “food away from home” (the red bar)—primarily food purchased at restaurants. Grocery prices increased 3.5 percent in September from a year ago, down from 3.7 percent in August. Restaurant prices increased 3.5 percent from a year ago, up slightly from 3.4 percent in August. To this point, increases in energy prices seem to have had some effect on grocery prices and restaurant prices, although the extent of the effect is unclear.

Fed Chair Kevin Warsh has indicated that he favors measures of the inflation rate that exclude particularly small or particularly large changes in the prices of some goods or services—so-called outliers. Median CPI, which is compiled monthly by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, is calculated by ranking the price changes of every good or service in the index from the largest price change to the smallest price change, and then choosing the price change in the middle. The idea is to eliminate the effect on measured inflation of any short-lived events that cause the prices of some goods and services to be particularly high or particularly low. Economists at the Cleveland Fed have conducted research that shows that, in their words, “the median CPI provides a better signal of the underlying inflation trend than either the all-items CPI or the CPI excluding food and energy. The median CPI is even better at forecasting [personal consumption expenditures] PCE inflation in the near and longer term than the core PCE price index.”

Trimmed-mean inflation, also compiled by economists at the Cleveland Fed, excludes the highest 8 percent of price changes and the lowest 8 percent. The following figure shows 12-month trimmed mean (the blue line) and median (the red line) CPI inflation. Trimmed-mean inflation was 2.7 percent in September, up from 2.6 percent in August. Median inflation was 2.6 percent in September, unchanged from August. So these measures of inflation are both lower than the conventional headline and core CPI inflation measures, which indicates that the acceleration in inflation during September was not affecting all sectors of the economy.

Note that the Fed uses the 12-month change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, not the change in the CPI, when gauging whether it is hitting its 2 percent annual inflation target. Historically, PCE inflation has been about 0.4 percentage points to 0.5 percentage points lower than CPI inflation. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) won’t release its estimate of September PCE inflation until October 29, one day after the next FOMC meeting.

Today’s report showing that inflation remains persistently above the Fed’s 2 percent annual target has likely raised the chance that Federal Reserve policymakers will increase their target range for the federal funds rate from the current 3.75 percent to 4.00 percent by o.25 percentage points (or 25 basis points) at the next meeting of the FOMC on October 27–28. Trading in the federal funds futures market this afternoon indicates that investors assign a 33.8 percent probability to the FOMC raising its target range at that meeting, which is up from a 22.1 percent probability yesterday. Trading indicated that investors assign a 89.7 percent probability to the committee increasing its target range by at least 25 basis points at its last meeting of the year on December 8–9. Some analysts have speculated that the committee will postpone its next rate increase until December to avoid raising the rate before the midterm election on November 3.

Hall and Woodford Win 2026 Nobel Prize in Economics

Photo of Robert Hall from news.stanford.edu

Photo of Michael Woodford from politicaleconomy.columbia.edu

Robert Hall of Stanford and Michael Woodford of Columbia have been awarded the 2026 Nobel Prize in Economics. Their careers have helped define the evolution of macroeconomics during the past 50 years.

Principles of economics is often taught as one semester of microeconomics and one semester of macroeconomics. In microeconomics we focus on analyzing the households’ decisions about which products to buy and on firms’ decisions about which products to sell and what prices to charge. In macroeconomics we switch the focus to the economy as a whole, analyzing what determines total production in the economy, as measured by GDP, and what determines the price level, as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) or the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. An important part of macroeconomics is analyzing the effects of the federal government’s monetary and fiscal policies on production, employment, and prices.

Microeconomics and macroeconomics are connected because macroeconomic aggregates (like GDP, the unemployment rate, and the price level) ultimately depend on the decisions of households and firms. Similarly, the effects of fiscal and monetary policies on the economy depend on how households and firms react to the policies.

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The focus on economic aggregates in macroeconomics dates back to the publication of John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money in 1936. Keynes’s book was long and complicated, which led shorter, more straightforward, interpretations of his ideas by Nobel laureate John Hicks of Oxford and Alvin Hansen of Harvard to become widely accepted. The Hicks-Hansen interpretation was embodied in the IS-LM model, which focused on the relationships among a few macroeconomic variables. (We discuss the IS-LM model in the appendix to Chapter 18 of Money, Banking, and the Financial System.)

During the Great Inflation of the 1970s of the 1970s and early 1980s, many economists concluded that the basic IS-LM model was no longer a good guide to understanding events in the U.S. economy. That conclusion increased the interest in grounding macroeconomics in the basic decision making of households and firms. This approach became known as the microfoundations of macroeconomics.

This new focus on microeconomics led some economists to reject the idea that discretionary monetary and fiscal policy was able to stabilize the economy by reducing fluctuations in aggregate output and employment. This approach is called the New Classical Macroeconomics. (We discuss the New Classical Macroeconomics in the appendix to Macroeconomics, Chapter 13.) Other economists argue that discretionary policy can play a role in stabilizing the economy, which is a key argument advanced by Keynesians since the 1930s, but believe that policymakers need to take into account how households and firms react to policy. This approach is called the New Keynesian economics. The work of Hall and Woodford contributed to the development of New Keynesian economics.

Early in his career, Hall published an academic article making a major contribution to understanding the microfoundations of consumption spending. Hall’s work elaborated Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 12, Section 12.2 and Chapter 16, Section 16.5, consumers are forward looking, which means their consumption decisions take into account not just their current income but also their expected future income—which Friedman called permanent income. For example, a real estate agent might have a high income in a year when she earns a commission on the sale of 15 houses and a much lower income in a year when the local housing market is weak and she earns a commission on only 2 houses. Most people like to smooth out their consumption over time, so the agent is likely to spend less of her current income in good sales years and more of her current income in the bad sales years.

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Hall formalized Friedman’s insight using the tools of dynamic optimization and also showed that the model fit the macroeconomic data well. One important implication of Hall’s work is that households are unlikely to significantly adjust their spending in response to temporary policy changes, such as a temporary cut in personal income taxes. Hall made a number of additional contributions to macroeconomics, including by analyzing why prices and wages don’t always respond quickly to changes in total spending. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 10, Section 10.3, the federal government produces many statistics that make it possible to monitor the state of the economy, but the federal government does not officially decide when a recession begins or when it ends. Instead, most economists and policymakers accept the decisions of the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), a private research group located in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Hall served as chair of the committee for 46 years, from 1978 to 2024.

Image of the NBER building from the Wikipedia Commons

Woodford has made wide-ranging contributions to the development of New Keynesian economics. In particular, he developed a model that synthesized the contributions of a number of other economists to provide a general framework for understanding macroeconomics and for evaluating the effects of monetary policy. His 2003 book, Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, has been particularly influential.

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The Nobel Committee’s announcement of the prize can be found here. A longer discussion of the Hall and Woodford’s work can be found here. The scope of their research can be seen by reviewing their curricula vitae, which can be found here and here. The amount of the prize this year is 12 million Swedish kronor (about $1.2 million).

Solved Problem: A Half-Price Sale on U.S. Treasury Bonds?

Supports: Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 3.

Image generated by ChatGPT of the U.S. Treasury building in Washington, DC

In a recent book review in the Wall Street Journal, financial analyst James Grant wrote: “The Treasury may indeed pay off every claim in freshly printed dollars. But 30-year Treasurys issued at the sub-2% yields prevailing in 2020 change hands today for less than 45 cents on the dollar.”

To illustrate Grant’s point: On May 15, 2020, the U. S. Treasury issued a 30-year bond with a $12.50 coupon and a face value, or par value, of $1,000. On October 6, the market price of the bond was $424.25. If you buy this bond today, you will receive a payment of $1,000 from the U.S. Treasury on May 15, 2050. The U.S. Treasury most recently issued 30-year bonds on August 17, 2026. Those 30-year bonds have a coupon of $51.25.

a. What does Grant mean by writing that 30-year Treasury bonds issued in 2020 “change hands today for less than 45 cents on the dollar”?

b. Why would anyone would be willing to sell you a bond for less than 50 percent of the amount the seller would receive by holding the bond to maturity?

Solving the Problem
Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about why bond prices fluctuate, so you may want to review Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 3, “Interest Rates and Rates of Return,” particularly the section “What Happens to Bond Prices When Interest Rates Change?”

Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining what Grant meant by bonds changing hands at less than 45 cents on the dollar. By “changing hands” Grant is referring to buying and selling bonds in the bond market. By “less than 45 cents on the dollar,” Grant means that bonds with a face value of $1,000 are selling for less than $450.

Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining why someone would be willing to sell you a bond for only $450 even though the bond has a face value of $1,000. In the bond market, as bonds are bought and sold, bonds of the same characteristics should have the same yield, as measured by the yield to maturity on the bonds. The 30-year bonds the Treasury issued in August of this year currently have a yield to maturity of about of about 5.31%. (The yield to maturity on these bonds is greater than the bonds coupon rate of 5.125% because the prices of the bonds are currently less than $1,000.) As an investor, you would only be willing to buy the 30-year bonds the Treasury issued in 2020 with a coupon rate of 1.25% if the price of the bonds will result in your receiving a yield to maturity of 5.31%.

The expression that links the price of a coupon bond, P, to the yield to maturity on the bond, i, is:

Keeping mind that the coupon, C, on a bond is fixed once the bond is issued, an increase in the yield to maturity must cause a decline in price of the bond. Because the gap in coupon rates between Treasury bonds issued in 2020 and in 2026 is so large, the 2020 bonds must have much lower prices in order to have the same yield to maturity.

Extra credit. The U.S. Treasury only started regularly issuing coupon bonds in the 1970s as the federal government began to run substantial budget deficits nearly every year. Prior to that, individuals rarely bought Treasury bonds with the exception of the tens of billions of “war bonds” the Treasury issued to raise funds during World War I and World War II.

Image from the American Museum of Natural History

As the following figure shows, since the 1970s, the yields on 30-year Treasury bonds have changed dramatically over time, from more than 15% in 1981 to less than 2% in 2020. These variations in yields reflect the higher or lower coupon rates the Treasury needs to offer investors as a result of fluctuations in inflation and in other factors that affect the demand for bonds.

Solved Problem: Why Do Bond Prices and Bond Yields Move Inversely?

Supports: Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 3, and Microeconomics, Chapter 8, Appendix.

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A recent article in the Wall Street Journal was titled “A Primer on Why Bond Prices Fall When Yields Rise.” A student reading the title of the article asks, “How can that be right? Investors would prefer to own bonds that have higher yields, so when the yields on bonds rise, investors should demand more of them. When the demand for something goes up, the price increases. Therefore, bond yields and bond prices should go up (or down) together.” Briefly explain the error in this student’s reasoning.

Solving the Problem
Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the relationship between bond yields and bond prices, so you may want to review Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 3 (for a complete discussion) or Microeconomics, Chapter 8, Appendix (for a brief discussion).

Step 2: Solve the problem by explaining what is wrong with the argument that if bond yields increase, so will bond prices, and if bond yields decrease, so will bond prices. In solving the problem, we should first consider the sometimes confusing number of “interest rates” on a coupon bonds. Coupon bonds pay interest in the form of coupons, which are usually quoted on an annual basis although typically paid twice per year. For example, Apple may issue a bond that pays a coupon of $47.50. The coupon rate on this bond is quoted per $1,000 of face value, or par value, which in this case would be 4.750%.

Bonds, like other financial assets such as shares of stock, are bought and sold in financial markets. A key point is that in financial markets, bonds with similar characteristics—including the same level of default risk, the same liquidity, and the same tax treatment of the bonds’ coupons—should provide investors with the same expected return. If this condition didn’t hold—for instance, if a bond issued by Apple was expected to provide a higher return than comparable bonds—then investors would increase their demand for the Apple bond, forcing up its price until its yield fell by enough to make its expected return the same as on other comparable bonds.

The price of a bond can fluctuate depending on how its coupon rate compares to the coupon rates on newly issued bonds, changes in investors’ expectations of future inflation, changes in investors’ expectations of the default risk of the bond, and other factors. For example, an article in the Wall Street Journal reported that, “Lenders on Monday demanded higher yields on bonds from a new data-center project in El Paso, Texas, leased by Meta compared with a similar project last year.” According to the article, the reason for the higher yields was that investors had raised their estimates of the default risk on bonds issued to fund data centers. Investors needed higher yields on bonds to compensate them for the higher default risk.

An image created by ChatGPT of Meta’s data-center complex under construction in El Paso, Texas.

What happens to the prices of existing bonds when newly issued bonds have higher coupon rates? Keeping in mind that, because the coupon rate on a bond is fixed and won’t change after the bond has been issued, the only way that the yield on a bond can change is if the price of the bond declines. By “yield” we are here referring to the yield to maturity, which is the best way of calculating the yield on a bond and which is ordinarily what economists and investors mean when they refer to the interest rate on a bond.

Formally, the yield to maturity is defined as the interest rate that makes the present value of the payments from the bond equal to the bond’s current price. In the following expression, where C is the coupon on the bond, FV is the face value of the bond, and n is the number of years until the bond matures, i is the yield to maturity.

The arithmetic of this expressions shows that if the yield to maturity increases, because, for example, the coupon rate on similar newly issued bonds are higher than the coupon rate on this bond, the price of the bond must decline. The economics of this expression is that an increase in the yield to maturity reduces the present value of a bond’s coupon payments and face value.

The reverse happens if the yield to maturity on a bond falls: The price of the bond will rise as a matter of arithmetic. As a matter of economics, a lower yield to maturity increases the present value of a bond’s coupon payments and face value.

So, although the student’s assertion seems logical, the economics of bond prices shows that the prices and yields on bonds move inversely.

Unexpectedly Weak September Jobs Report

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This morning (October 2), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Employment Situation” report (often called the “jobs report”) for September. The August jobs report had showed an unexpectedly large increase in employment, while the September report shows an unexpectedly small increase in employment.

The jobs report has two estimates of the change in employment during the month: one estimate from the establishment survey, often referred to as the payroll survey, and one from the household survey. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1), many economists and Federal Reserve policymakers believe that employment data from the establishment survey provide a more accurate indicator of the state of the labor market than do the household survey’s employment and unemployment data. (The groups included in the employment estimates from the two surveys are somewhat different, as we discuss in this post.)

The BLS is housed in the Suitland Federal Center in Maryland. (Image created by ChatGPT)

According to the establishment survey, there was a net increase of only 29,000 nonfarm jobs during September. Economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal had forecast an increase of 90,000 jobs. Economists surveyed by FactSet had forecast a net increase of 95,000 jobs. The BLS revised downward its previous estimates of employment in July and August by a combined 60,000 jobs. The estimate of the net employment change in July was revised from an increase of 21,000 to a decrease of 10,000. (The BLS notes that: “Monthly revisions result from additional reports received from businesses and government agencies since the last published estimates and from the recalculation of seasonal factors.”)

The following figure from the jobs report shows the net change in nonfarm payroll employment for each month in the last two years. The figure shows that since peaking in March with a net increase of 214,000 jobs, job growth slowed markedly over the following four months, then strongly rebounding in August, before returning to slower growth in September. In 2026, monthly net employment growth has averaged 68,000. That is much higher than the 2025 average monthly employment growth of only 10,000, but well below the 2024 average monthly employment growth of 122,000.

The unemployment rate, which is calculated from data in the household survey, was 4.2 percent in September, up slightly from 4.1 percent in August. The estimated size of the labor force, the number of workers employed, and the number of workers unemployed all increased in September. The following figure shows that the unemployment rate has been remarkably stable over the past year and a half, staying between 4.0 percent and 4.4 percent in each month since June 2024. The Federal Open Market Committee’s most recent estimate of the natural rate of unemployment—the normal rate of unemployment over the long run—is 4.2 percent. So, currently the unemployment rate is equal to that estimate of the natural rate. (We discuss the natural rate of unemployment in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9 and Economics, Chapter 19.)

As the following figure shows, the monthly net change in jobs from the household survey moves much more erratically than does the net change in jobs from the establishment survey. As measured by the household survey, there was a net increase of 406,000 jobs in August, far larger than the net increase in employment shown in the establishment survey. Since January, the household survey has shown a net increase in jobs in only three months, with a total net decrease of 840,000 jobs over the period. In contrast, the establishment survey has shown a net increase of 612,000 jobs over the same period. (Note that because of last year’s shutdown of the federal government, there are no data for October or November.)

The household survey has another important labor market indicator: the employment-population ratio for prime age workers—those workers aged 25 to 54. In September, the ratio was 80.7 percent, up from 80.4 in August. The prime-age population ratio can show volatility from month to month but has remained above 80 percent every month since December 2022.

The rapid adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) by many firms has led to forecasts of substantial layoffs of workers in information systems. The following figure shows net employment changes in the BLS employment category of “computing infrastructure providers, data processing, web hosting, and related services.” Employment in this sector has been declining during most months since the beginning of 2023. In September, there was a net decrease of 1,600 jobs.

The establishment survey also includes data on average hourly earnings (AHE). As we noted in earlier posts, many economists and policymakers believe the employment cost index (ECI) is a better measure of wage pressures in the economy than is AHE. AHE does have the important advantage of being available monthly, whereas the ECI is only available quarterly. The following figure shows the percentage change in AHE from the same month in the previous year. AHE increased 3.0 percent in September, down from 3.1 percent in August. That was the smallest increase since May 2021. The rate of increase in AHE has been below 4.0 percent each month since August 2025, indicating that cost pressure from wage increases has not been a significant source of price inflation during the past year. Over this same period, wage increases have struggled to keep up with price increases, resulting in a decline in real wages.

With inflation having been above the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent annual target every month since March 2021, the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) raised its target range for the federal funds rate at its September meeting. At that time, many analysts expected that the committee would raise its target again at its next meeting on October 27–28.

Trading in the federal funds futures market this morning indicates that investors no longer believe that the committee will increase its federal funds target at its October meeting. A week ago, trading in the federal funds futures market indicated that investors assigned a 64.2 percent to a rate increase at that meeting, while this morning the probability had declined to 21.6 percent. Investors still expect that the committee will increase its target for the federal funds rate at its meeting on December 8–9, although the probability has declined from 92.6 percent a week ago to 85.1 percent today.

New BEA Data Releases Show Higher Growth and Lower Inflation than Expected

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The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released two reports this morning (September 30). One report indicated that economic growth was higher in the second quarter of 2026 than the BEA had previously estimated. The other report indicated that inflation as measured by the percentage increase in personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index was lower than expected.

The BEA’s latest estimate is that real GDP increased at an annual rate of 2.2 percent in the second quarter (May, June, and July) of 2026. That is a sharp upward revision of the BEA’s previous estimate that real GDP had increased at an annual rate of 1.5 percent in the second quarter. The following figure from the report shows that upward revisions of investment, consumer spending, and government spending account for the upward revision of real GDP growth. The figure shows the BEA’s advance (original estimate) and two subsequent revised estimates. The BEA revises its estimates of real GDP growth as over time as it collects more complete and accurate data on growth in the components of GDP.

As we’ve discussed in previous blog posts, to better gauge the state of the economy, Federal Reserve policymakers often prefer to strip out the effects of imports, inventory investment, and government expenditures—which can be volatile—by looking at real final sales to private domestic purchasers, which includes only spending by U.S. households and firms on domestic production. As the following figure shows, real final sales to domestic purchasers increased at an annual rate of 4.6 percent in the second quarter, revised upward from 4.4 percent. The growth rate in real final sales to domestic purchasers was more than twice the growth rate of real GDP, as well as much higher than the U.S. economy’s expected long-run annual real growth rate of 1.8 percent. So estimated growth in real final sales to domestic purchasers indicates that the U.S. economy is expanding more rapidly than is indicated by estimated growth in real GDP. Typically, growth in real final sales to domestic purchasers is steadier than growth in real GDP and is likely a better indicator of the underlying growth rate in the economy.

The BEA’s “Personal Income and Outlays” report this morning included monthly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. The Fed relies on annual changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target. As we noted in an earlier blog post, Fed Chair Kevin Warsh indicated in his press conference following the July meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) that the committee intended to continue using the PCE price index as its gauge of inflation, although that decision would be revisited early next year. Some analysts have interpreted Warsh’s statement that the decision would be revisited next year as an indication that he favored moving to a measure that would show lower rates of inflation than those shown by the PCE.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2019, with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. In August, headline PCE inflation was 3.4 percent, unchanged from July. Core PCE inflation in August was 3.0 percent, also unchanged from July. Headline and core PCE inflation were both lower than forecast by economists surveyed by FactSet. Both headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation remain well above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (Often referred to as 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, headline PCE inflation increased from 0.6 in July to 3.8 percent in August. Core PCE inflation increased from 1.5 percent in July to 3.0 percent in August. In contrast with the 12-month inflation rates, the 1-month inflation rates show noticeable acceleration in inflation during August. Of course, it’s important not to overinterpret the data from a single month.

Fed policymakers believe that inflation in non-market services can skew PCE inflation. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices rise, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also rise. Former Fed Chair Jerome Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.” The following figure shows 12-month headline inflation (the blue line) and 12-month core inflation (the red line) for market-based PCE. (The BEA explains the market-based PCE measure here.)

Headline market-based PCE inflation was 3.5 percent in August, up slightly from 3.4 percent July. Core market-based PCE inflation was 3.0 percent in August, up from 2.9 percent in July. So, both market-based measures show inflation in August remaining well above the Fed’s 2 percent target.

Fed Chair Kevin Warsh argued in testimony at his confirmation hearing before the Senate that the Fed should stop relying on headline PCE inflation: “The measures [of inflation] I prefer are looking at things that are called trimmed averages. We take out all of the tail-risks, all of the one-off items, and we ask ourselves whether the generalized change in prices is having second-order effects on the economy.”

Trimmed-mean PCE inflation drops the 31 percent of goods and services with the highest inflation rates and the 24 percent of goods and services with the lowest inflation rates. A closely related measure, median PCE inflation, is calculated by listing the inflation rate in each individual good or service included in the PCE and identifying the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates.

The following figure shows 12-month headline PCE inflation the (blue line), core PCE inflation (the red line) and trimmed-mean PCE inflation (the green line). Trimmed-mean PCE inflation in August was 2.2 percent, well below both headline and core PCE inflation.

The following figure from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland shows headline PCE inflation (the green line), core PCE inflation (the blue line), and median PCE inflation (the brown line). In August, median PCE inflation was 2.6 percent, which was down from 2.7 percent in July. So Warsh has a point that these two measures of inflation, which are less affected by particularly high or low rates of inflation in some goods and services, indicate that inflation has been running below the Fed’s currently preferred measure. But these measures also show inflation still running well above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target.

Today’s macro data releases appear to have caused of investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts to believe that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is now less likely to raise its target for the federal funds rate at the committee’s next meeting on October 27–28. Trading on the federal funds futures market this afternoon implies that the probability of a target rate increase at that meeting is 39.3 percent, down from a probability of 50.9 percent yesterday.

As Expected, the FOMC Raises Its Federal Funds Rate Target

Photo from federalreserve.gov

Today, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) met expectation by raising its target range for the federal funds rate by 0.25 percentage points (25 basis points) from the range of 3.50 percent to 3.75 percent that had prevailed since December 10 of last year. As of yesterday, trading in the federal funds rate futures market had implied a 93.5 percent probability of a 25 basis point increase. Financial markets had been convinced that a rate increase was coming since Fed Chair Kevin Warsh’s speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s economic policy symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming in late August. (We discussed Warsh’s speech in this blog post.) There had been some speculation in the business press that one or more committee members would dissent from a rate increase, but the vote turned out to be unanimous. Today was the first time the committee had increased the target range since July 2023.

The following figure shows for the period from 2001 through yesterday, the upper bound (the blue line) and the lower bound (the green line) for the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate, as well as the actual values for the federal funds rate (the red line). Before December 2008, the Fed announced a single numerical target for the federal funds rate, rather than a target range. Note that the Fed has been successful in keeping the value of the federal funds rate in its target range. (We discuss the monetary policy tools the FOMC uses to maintain the federal funds rate within its target range in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.2).)

As with the policy statements issued following Warsh’s previous two FOMC meetings, today’s policy statement was short and did not include any discussion of the circumstances under which further target rate increases might occur—so-called forward guidance. We discuss forward guidance in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15 (Economics, Chapter 25).

After the meeting, the committee also released a “Summary of Economic Projections” (SEP)—as it typically does at its March, June, September, and December meetings. The SEP presents median values of the, typically, 19 committee members’ forecasts of key economic variables. In a press conference following the meeting, Warsh indicated that he didn’t submit forecasts, just as he hadn’t submitted forecasts for the SEP released after the June meeting. He indicated that the future of the SEP is one of the issues to be considered by his new committee on Fed communications.

The forecasts of key economic variables from the SEP are summarized in the following table, reproduced from the release. (Note that only 5 of the district bank presidents vote at FOMC meetings, although all 12 presidents participate in the discussions and prepare forecasts for the SEP.)

There are several aspects of these forecasts worth noting:

Compared with the previous SEP in June, the committee members raised their forecast of real GDP growth in 2026 slightly from 2.2 percent to 2.3 percent. The committee members left unchanged their forecast of long-run growth in real GDP at 2.0 percent. The unchanged long-range forecast indicates that the committee members are not anticipating a large, sustained increase in economic growth caused by increased use of artificial intelligence (AI). Consistent with raising their forecast of real GDP growth in 2026, the committee lowered its forecast of the unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 2026 from 4.3 percent to 4.1 percent. The committee members left their forecast of the long-run rate of unemployment, often called the natural rate of unemployment, unchanged at 4.2 percent.
Committee members raised their forecast of personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price inflation in 2026 to 3.7 percent from 3.6 percent in June. They left their forecast of inflation in 2027 unchanged at 2.3 percent and forecast that PCE inflation would not decline to the Fed’s 2.0 percent annual target until 2029.
The committee’s forecasts of the federal funds rate at the end of each year from 2026 through 2028 were increased, indicating that the committee sees the federal funds rate as likely to be “higher for longer.” The forecast for the long-run federal funds rate was raised from 3.1 percent to 3.2 percent.

There is always much discussion in the business press and among investment analysts about the dot plot, shown below. Each dot in the plot represents the projection of an individual committee member. (The committee doesn’t disclose which member is associated with which dot.) Note that there are 18 dots, representing the 6 members of the Fed’s Board of Governors who provided forecasts and all 12 presidents of the Fed’s district banks.

The dots plotted on the far left of the figure represent the projections by the 18 members of the value of the federal funds rate at the end of 2026. The plots indicate that, at this point, 16 members of the committee (circled in red) forecast at least one additional 25 basis point increase in the target range for the federal funds rate before the end of the year, with only 2 members expecting that there will be no further increases this year. For 2027, four members (circled in red) expect that the target range will be cut during the year, with the rest expecting either that the rate increases made this year will be maintained or that there will be one additional 25 basis point increase. The dots plotted on the far right of the figure indicate that there is substantial disagreement among committee members as to what the long-run value of the federal funds rate—the so-called neutral rate—should be. Of course, the plots only represent the forecasts of the committee members and individual committee members are likely to adjust their forecasts as additional macroeconomic data become available in the coming months.

At his press conference following the meeting, Warsh resisted attempts by reporters to get him to expand on the circumstances under which the committee might implement further increases in the target range. He characterized today’s rate increase as removing “a dose of accommodation” from the economy, which reflected the committee’s belief that the economy was experiencing full employment with persistently high inflation. The closest he came to engaging in forward guidance was the statement that “We must be confident that underlying inflation is moving towards our objective. This has not been satisfied.”

Warsh was asked what had changed since the July meeting at which the committee had kept the target range unchanged. in reply, he indicated that the committee believed that since July the economy had strengthened, inflation had continued to above target, and “geopolitical” factors had contributed to higher prices.

No Sign of Cooling Inflation in September CPI Report

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Today’s report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on the consumer price index (CPI) for August was eagerly awaited by economists and policy analysts. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15 (Economics, Chapter 25), monetary policy affects the economy with, in the words of Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman, “long and variable lags.” As a result, most economists agree that the Federal Reserve should not attempt to “fine tune” the economy by responding to each government release of macroeconomic data.

There are some instances, however, including the present, when the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) appears to be uncertain as to whether a change in policy is needed. As a result, there was a widespread expectation that if today’s report indicated that inflation is slowing, the FOMC would likely leave its target for the federal funds rate unchanged at its meeting on Tuesday and Wednesday of next week. But if the report didn’t indicate that inflation is slowing, the committee would likely raise its target. The report gave few indications that inflation is slowing.

The following figure compares headline CPI inflation (the blue line) and core CPI inflation (the red line).

The headline inflation rate, which is measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous year, was 3.4 percent in August, the same as in July.
The core inflation rate, which excludes the prices of food and energy, was 2.4 percent in August, down from 2.5 in July.

Headline inflation was slightly higher, and core inflation was equal, to the forecasts of economists surveyed by FactSet. (Note that because of last year’s federal government shutdown, inflation data for October 2025 are not available.)

In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, headline (the blue line) was 4.6 percent In August, up from 0.9 percent in July. Core inflation (the red line) was 3.5 percent in August, up from 2.6 percent in July.

The following figure illustrates the role played by energy prices in contributing to the large swings in the monthly inflation rate since the conflict in Iran began at the end of February. The red line shows the 1-month inflation rate in all energy prices included in the CPI. Inflation in energy prices, which had declined at an annual rate of 16.4 percent in July, increased at an annual rate of 28.3 percent in August. The blue line shows the 1-month inflation rate in gasoline prices, which had declined at an annual rate of 29.4 percent in July, increased at an annual rate of 58.3 percent in August.

There had been a fear that the rise in energy prices that began in March would pass through to increases in food prices, which are a key concern for many consumers. The following figure shows 1-month inflation in the CPI category “food at home” (the blue bar)—primarily food purchased at grocery stores—and in the category “food away from home” (the red bar)—primarily food purchased at restaurants. Grocery prices, which had declined at annual rate of 0.9 percent in July, increased at an annual rate of 0.4 percent in August. Food prices away from home increased 3.1 percent in August, down from 3.9 percent in July. To this point, increases in energy prices seem to have had some effect on grocery prices and restaurant prices, although the extent of the effect is unclear.

Trimmed-mean inflation, also compiled by economists at the Cleveland Fed, excludes the highest 8 percent of price changes and the lowest 8 percent. The following figure shows 1-month trimmed mean (the blue line) and median (the red line) CPI inflation. Trimmed-mean inflation was 2.7 percent in August, unchanged from July. Median inflation was 2.1 percent in August, down from 3.1 percent in July. So these measures of inflation are both lower than the conventional headline and core CPI inflation measures, although as the figure shows, both measures are volatile.

Note that the Fed uses the 12-month change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, not the change in the CPI, when gauging whether it is hitting its 2 percent annual inflation target. Historically, PCE inflation has been about 0.4 percentage points to 0.5 percentage points lower than CPI inflation. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) won’t release its estimate of August PCE inflation until September 30, after the next FOMC meeting.

Today’s report showing that inflation remains persistently above the Fed’s 2 percent annual target, following last week’s jobs report showing an unexpectedly large increase in employment, has likely raised the chance that Federal Reserve policymakers will increase their target range for the federal funds rate from the current 3.50 percent to 3.75 percent by o.25 percentage points (or 25 basis points) at the next meeting of the FOMC on September 15–16. Trading in the federal funds futures market this afternoon indicates that investors assign a 86.5 percent probability to the FOMC raising its target range at that meeting, which is up from a 72.4 probability yesterday. Trading indicated that investors assign a 74.5 percent probability to the committee increasing its target range by at least 50 basis points by the end of the year, up from 64.6 percent yesterday and from 44.7 percent one week ago.

Fed Chair Warsh Takes a More Hawkish Stand in Address at Jackson Hole

Federal Reserve Chair Kevin Warsh (Photo from federalreserve.com)

Each year since 1982, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City has sponsored an economic policy symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. (The site was supposedly first chosen in the hopes that Fed Chair Paul Volcker would attend because of the opportunities for fly fishing in the local area.)

In most years since 1989, the Fed chair has given the keynote address at the symposium. The address gives the Fed chair a chance to provide his or her assessment of the state of the U.S. economy and the outlook for inflation and employment—the two parts of the dual mandate Congress has given to the Fed.

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This year’s address by Fed Chair Kevin Warsh was highly anticipated. In his press conference following the last meeting of the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), Warsh reiterated his determination to bring inflation back to the Fed’s 2 percent annual target. But he faced a number of questions from reporters as to why, with inflation running well above 2 percent, he wasn’t advocating an increase in the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate. Warsh has stated that he wantesto steer the committee from using forward guidance to affect interest rates. Accordingly he was reluctant to state explicitly what direction Fed policy might take.

Investors in the bond market appear to have interpreted Warsh’s statements as “dovish”; that is, they believed that his reluctance to support rate increases indicated that inflation might remain above the Fed’s target for longer. As we discussed in earlier blog posts, when investors believe that inflation will be higher they require that bond yields rise enough to compensate them for the additional purchasing power. (As we discuss in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 4, economists refer to the increase in nominal interest rates following an increase in the expected inflation rate as the Fisher effect.) The rise in the yield on the 30-year Treasury bond in the days following Warsh’s press conference likely reflected bond investors expecting somewhat higher inflation than they had previously.

In today’s address, Warsh attempted to counter the conclusion that he is reluctant to increase interest rates to slow the rate of inflation. First, though, he repeated his opposition to Fed chairs routinely engaging in forward guidance: “Oversharing policy deliberations and overcommitting to future decisions can lead markets, businesses, and households astray. And I believe when policymakers make quasi-commitments on interest rates through the cycle, we inhibit our own freedom to make the right calls when it’s time to decide.”

He again stated forcefully his commitment to the Fed’s inflation target: “The Fed’s price-stability objective of 2 percent, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, is a firm, fixed target. … It is the Fed’s job to deliver stable prices.” He noted that all measures of inflation “tell a similar story: Inflation is running above our 2 percent target. So the Fed’s predominant focus right now should be on prices.”

Warsh also observed that “progress over the past two years [toward the 2 percent target] has been modest.” He concluded that: “There is one signal nobody can miss: The responsibility for 65 months of sustained, elevated inflation sits squarely with the central bank. And that is where it belongs.”

The following figure from the Wall Street Journal reflects the bond market’s immediate reaction when the text of Warsh’s address was released.

The two-year Treasury note is directly affected by investors’ expectations of the future path of the federal funds rate. (We discuss this link in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 5.) Investors interpreted Warsh’s address as indicating he would take a more “hawkish” view of the need to raise the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate than he had appeared to take in his earlier press conference.

Investors in the federal funds future market also quickly revised their expectations of the likelihood of the FOMC raising its target for the federal funds rate. Trading in the futures marker resulted in the probability increasing from 35.4 percent yesterday to 57.5 percent this afternoon of the committee raising its target range for the federal funds by 0.25 percentage points (25 basis points) at its next meeting on September 15–16. The probability that after the meeting on October 27–28, the committee will have raised its target range by at least 25 basis points increased from 52.6 percent yesterday to 70.7 percent this afternoon.

New BEA Releases Show Steady Inflation and Higher Output Growth

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The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released two reports this morning (August 26): “GDP (Second Estimate) and Corporate Profits, 2nd Quarter 2026” and “Personal Income and Outlays, July 2026.” The BEA’s second estimate is that real GDP grew at annual rate of 1.5 percent in second quarter of 2026, which is unchanged from the BEA’s initial estimate released last month and is equal to the forecast of economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal.

As we’ve discussed in previous blog posts, to better gauge the state of the economy, Federal Reserve policymakers often prefer to strip out the effects of imports, inventory investment, and government expenditures—which can be volatile—by looking at real final sales to private domestic purchasers, which includes only spending by U.S. households and firms on domestic production. As the following figure shows, real final sales to domestic purchasers increased at an annual rate of 4.2 percent in the second quarter, up from 3.9 percent in last month’s initial estimate. The growth rate in real final sales to domestic purchasers was more than twice the rate of growth of real GDP, as well as far above the U.S. economy’s expected long-run annual real growth rate of 1.8 percent. So growth in real final sales to domestic purchasers indicates that the U.S. economy is expanding rapidly, as opposed to the much weaker growth shown by real GDP data. Typically, growth in real final sales to domestic purchasers is steadier than growth in real GDP and is likely a better indicator of the underlying growth rate in the economy.

The BEA’s “Personal Income and Outlays” report this morning included monthly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. The Fed relies on annual changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target. As we noted in a recent blog post, Fed Chair Kevin Warsh indicated in his press conference following the July meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) that the committee intended to continue using the PCE price index as its gauge of inflation, although that decision would be revisited early next year. Warsh may have intended this statement to reassure financial markets that there would be continuity in the Fed’s measure of inflation. However, some investors appear to have interpreted Warsh’s statement that the decision would be revisited next year as an indication that he favored moving to a measure that would show lower rates of inflation than those shown by the PCE.

In other words, some investors believe that in the future the FOMC might be willing to accept higher levels of PCE inflation. Perhaps in response to this interpretation, the yield on the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond increased in the days following Warsh’s press conference. Higher expected inflation can lead to lower bond prices and higher bond yields. (We discuss this point in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 5, which is now available in a new edition.) Warsh is scheduled to speak on Friday at the Kansas City Fed’s annual Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium. His speech will cover his views on the current state of the economy and may give clues as to the future monetary policy actions he may support.

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The following figure shows headline PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2019, with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. In July, headline PCE inflation was 3.7 percent, unchanged from June. Core PCE inflation in July was 3.3 percent, also unchanged from June. Headline PCE inflation was slightly higher than forecast by economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal, while core PCE was equal to the forecast. Both headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation remain well above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (Often referred to as 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, headline PCE inflation increased from –1.3 in June to 1.9 percent in July. Core PCE inflation increased from 1.8 percent in June to 3.0 percent in July. Headline inflation was very low in June—prices actually fell during the month—largely because of falling gasoline prices. Today’s data show here was a noticeable acceleration in inflation during July. Of course, it’s important not to overinterpret the data from a single month.

Headline market-based PCE inflation was 3.5 percent in July, unchanged from June. Core market-based PCE inflation was 3.0 percent in July, also unchanged from June. So, both market-based measures show inflation in July remaining well above the Fed’s 2 percent target.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation the (red line), core PCE inflation (the brown line) and trimmed-mean PCE inflation (the blue line). Trimmed-mean PCE inflation in July was 2.3 percent, well below both headline and core PCE inflation.

The following figure from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland shows headline PCE inflation (the green line), core PCE inflation (the blue line), and median PCE inflation (the brown line). In July, median PCE inflation was 2.7 percent, which was unchanged from June. So Warsh has a point that these two measures of inflation, which are less affected by particularly high or low rates of inflation in some goods and services, indicate that inflation has been running below the Fed’s currently preferred measure. But these measures also show inflation still running well above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target.

Today’s macro data releases appear to have had little effect on the views of investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. These investors believe that the FOMC will likely not raise its target for the federal funds rate at its meeting on September 15–16 as some analysts have speculated. The probability that the committee will leave its target range unchanged at 3.50 percent to 3.75 percent declined only slightly from 60.4 percent yesterday to 59.9 percent this afternoon. Investors assign a probability of 54.7 percent to the FOMC raising its target range by o.25 percentage points (25 basis points) at its meeting on October 27–28.