CPI Inflation Slows in October but Not as Much as Expected

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Today’s report on the consumer price index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) provided mixed news about inflation. The rate of inflation slowed in October as energy inflation eased, but food inflation accelerated and inflation in other goods and services remained high. The report makes it likely that members of the Federal Reserve’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will raise the committee’s target for the federal funds rate at its next meeting on December 8–9.

The following figure compares headline CPI inflation (the blue line) and core CPI inflation (the red line).

  • Normally, we measure the headline inflation rate by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous. But, because of a federal government shutdown, there is no CPI data for October 2025. Instead, the figure shows the percentage change in the CPI from the previous month. The CPI increased by 0.35 percent in October, which was down from 0.65 percent in September.
  • The core inflation rate, which excludes the prices of food and energy, was 0.30 percent in October, down from 0.33 percent in September.

Headline inflation and core inflation were both higher than the forecasts of economists surveyed by FactSet.

In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, headline inflation (the blue line) declined from a very high 8.1 percent in September to a still high 4.3 percent in October. Core inflation (the red line) declined from 4.1 percent in September to 3.6 percent in October.

We can also look at 3-month Inflation—that is the inflation rate over the three months prior to the current month, expressed as an annual rate. The following figure shows the 3-month inflation rate for each month since January 2019. The 3-month headline inflation rate in October was 5.7 percent, up from 4.6 percent in September. The 3-month core inflation in October was 3.7 percent, up from 3.4 percent in September. So inflation over the last three months has been well above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target.

Note, though, that the Fed uses the 12-month change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, not the change in the CPI, when gauging whether it is meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target. Historically, PCE inflation has been about 0.4 percentage points to 0.5 percentage points lower than CPI inflation. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) won’t release its estimate of October PCE inflation until November 25.

The fact that the gap between headline and core inflation narrowed in October compared with September is explained by a sharp decline in the rate of increase in energy prices. In the following figure, the red line shows the inflation rate in all energy prices included in the CPI, measured as the percentage change from the previous month. Inflation in energy prices was 1.0 percent in October, down from 5.2 percent in September. The blue line shows the monthly inflation rate in gasoline prices, which was also 1.0 percent in October, down from 9.1 percent in September.

In October, while inflation in energy prices slowed, inflation in food prices increased. The following figure shows inflation, measured as the percentage change from the previous month, in the CPI category “food at home” (the blue bar)—primarily food purchased at grocery stores—and in the category “food away from home” (the red bar)—primarily food purchased at restaurants. Grocery prices increased 0.52 percent in October, up from –0.07 percent in September (when grocery prices slightly declined). Restaurant prices also increased 0.52 percent October, up from 0.23 percent in September.

Today’s report showing that inflation remains persistently above the Fed’s 2 percent annual target has made it more likely that Federal Reserve policymakers will increase their target range for the federal funds rate from the current 3.75 percent to 4.00 percent by o.25 percentage points (or 25 basis points) at the next meeting of the FOMC on December 8–9. The inflation report has also increased speculation that the committee may increase its target range by 50 basis points. In recent speeches, both Fed Governor Christopher Waller and Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Lorie Logan have raised that possibility.

Trading in the federal funds futures market this afternoon indicates that investors assign an 88.2 percent probability to the FOMC raising its target range by 25 basis points at its December meeting, which is up from an 84.0 percent probability yesterday. Trading indicated that investors assign an 11.8 percent probability to the committee increasing its target range by 50 basis points at that meeting, up from 0 percent yesterday.

An Unexpectedly Strong October Jobs Report

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This morning (November 6), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Employment Situation” report (often called the “jobs report”) for October. Following September’s disappointing report, October brought better news: Payroll employment increased by 165,000, well above the 65,000 increase economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal had forecast. The unemployment rate edged down from 4.2 percent to 4.1 percent. Revisions to earlier months also made recent job growth look stronger than previously reported.

The jobs report draws on two surveys. The establishment survey counts jobs on employers’ payrolls, while the household survey counts employed people and provides the unemployment rate. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1), the surveys cover somewhat different groups. The payroll survey generally provides a less volatile measure of monthly employment changes. The household survey supplies information about workers that payroll records cannot provide.

The BLS revised August’s payroll employment increase from 133,000 to 186,000 and September’s increase from 29,000 to 60,000. Together, those revisions added 84,000 jobs to the previously reported totals. ((The BLS notes that: “Monthly revisions result from additional reports received from businesses and government agencies since the last published estimates and from the recalculation of seasonal factors.”) With the revisions, job growth averaged 137,000 per month from August through October, compared with just 28,000 from May through July. Through October, payroll employment growth has averaged about 86,000 per month this year, compared with 10,000 per month in 2025 and 122,000 in 2024. Employment is growing faster than last year, but the average pace remains below that of 2024. The following figure from the jobs report shows the substantial monthly fluctuations in employment, as well as the stronger job growth over the past three months.

The professional and business services employment category led October’s job gains, adding 70,000. Health care added about 42,000 jobs, transportation and warehousing added about 25,000, and manufacturing added 19,000. These four groups accounted for about 94 percent of the net increase in employment. The leisure and hospitality and wholesale trade categories lost jobs. Of the overall 165,000 increase in jobs, 159,000 were in the private sector and 6,000 were in government. The following figure shows the contributions of the four leading groups and all other industries combined.

The unemployment rate, which is calculated from data in the household survey, was 4.1 percent in October, down slightly from 4.2 percent in September. The estimated size of the labor force and the number of workers employed increased in October, while the number of workers unemployed fell. The following figure shows that the unemployment rate has been remarkably stable over the past year and a half, staying between 4.0 percent and 4.4 percent in each month since June 2024. The Federal Open Market Committee’s most recent estimate of the natural rate of unemployment—the normal rate of unemployment over the long run—is 4.2 percent. So, currently the unemployment rate is slightly below that estimate of the natural rate. (We discuss the natural rate of unemployment in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9 and Economics, Chapter 19.)

As the following figure shows, the monthly net change in jobs from the household survey moves much more erratically than does the net change in jobs from the establishment survey. As measured by the household survey, there was a net increase of 463,000 jobs in October, far larger than the net increase in employment shown in the establishment survey. Since January, the household survey has shown a net increase in jobs in only four months, with a total net decrease of 377,000 jobs over the period. In contrast, the establishment survey has shown a net increase of 861,000 jobs over the same period. (Note that because of last year’s shutdown of the federal government, there are no data for October or November.)

The household survey has another important labor market indicator: the employment-population ratio for prime age workers—those workers aged 25 to 54. In October, the ratio was 80.7 percent, unchanged from September. The prime-age population ratio can show volatility from month to month but has remained above 80 percent every month since December 2022.

The establishment survey also includes data on average hourly earnings (AHE) measure of wages and salaries. The following figure shows the percentage change in AHE from the same month in the previous year. AHE increased 3.1 percent in October, down from 3.2 percent in September. That was the smallest increase since May 2021. The rate of increase in AHE has been below 4.0 percent each month since August 2025, indicating that cost pressure from wage increases has not been a significant source of price inflation during the past year. Over this same period, wage increases have struggled to keep up with price increases, resulting in a decline in real wages.

Will the strong October jobs report matter for Federal Reserve policy? At its October 27–28 meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) left its target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at 3.75 percent to 4.00 percent. Inflation remains a concern: The personal consumption expenditures price index in September was up 3.6 percent from September 2025, well over the Fed’s 2 percent annual target. Today’s jobs report indicates strength in labor market, which may make Fed policymakers more willing to focus on inflation. That would increase the likelihood that the committee will raise the target for the federal funds rate at its next meeting on December 8–9.

Trading in the federal funds futures market this afternoon indicates that investors believe that the committee will increase its federal funds rate target at its December meeting. Yesterday, trading in the federal funds futures market indicated that investors assigned a 66.9 percent probably to a rate increase at the December meeting, while this afternoon the probability had increased to 79.1 percent.

Solved Problem: Anthropic Is Losing Money So How Can It Be Worth $1.5 Trillion?

Supports: Microeconomics, Chapter 8, Macroeconomics, Chapter 6, and Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 6

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A firm’s initial public offering (IPO) is the first time it sell stock to the public. The total value of a firm’s outstanding shares of stock is called the firm’s market capitalization, or market cap. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, the AI firm Anthropic was expecting that the price of the stock in its IPO would result in the firm having a market cap of $1.5 trillion. Before a firm can undertake an IPO it must file an S1 form with the Securities and Exchange Commission, disclosing all the information that would be relevant to investors who are considering buying the firm’s stock. In its S1, Anthropic noted that, although in the previous quarter it had revenue of $17.0 billion, it had suffered a net loss of $23.3 billion.

Explain how a firm that is losing billions of dollars can have a market cap of $1.5 trillion.

Solving the Problem

Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about how investors value a firm’s stock, so you may want to review Microeconomics, Chapter 8, “The Fluctuating Stock Market,” (Macroeconomics, Chapter 6) or the more complete discussion in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 6, “The Fundamental Value of Stock.”

Step 2: Answer the question by explaining how investors value a firm’s stock. Ownership of a firm’s stock represents a claim on the firm’s profits. So we would expect that the larger a firm’s profits are, the higher the firm’s stock price (and market cap) will be. But a key point is that investors’ demand for a firm’s stock is based less on the current profitability of a firm than on the firm’s expected future profitability. If you own a stock in a profitable firm, the firm will pay you dividends. Therefore, the fundamental value of a share of stock is equal to the present value of the dividends to be received from owning that share. (We show the arithmetic of valuing stocks in Chapter 6 of Money, Banking, and the Financial System.)

Anthropic was expecting to be able to price its IPO to give the firm a market cap of $1.5 trillion despite currently experiencing billions of dollars in losses. We can conclude that investors must be expecting the firm to earn enough profits in the future to justify that high valuation. Of course, investors’ expectations could be wrong (they frequently are!) and Anthropic may never earn profits high enough to justify its IPO price.

How Should We Measure the Underlying Inflation Rate?

Photo of a meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee earlier this year from federalreserve.gov

What’s inflation? The answer seems easy: Inflation means that prices are rising …. but there are complications. When we experience inflation, does every price rise? If not, does it matter which prices or how many prices are rising? If a price rises one month and falls the next, is that still inflation?

We answer these questions in Macroeconomics, Chapter 19. As we discuss in that chapter, we measure inflation as the increase in the price level from one year to the next. We focus on the price level rather than on the prices of any particular goods or services because we want to know what is happening to a measure of average prices. Because we are looking at an average of prices, we would expect that when the economy experiences inflation, some prices will rise, but other prices may fall, and some prices may be unchanged.

Put another way, when we measure inflation, we are asking a macroeconomic question: Are there forces in the economy that are making an average of prices increase, and if so, by how much? When we look at individual prices, we are typically asking microeconomic questions: How much will an outbreak of avian flu increase the price of eggs? How much will a surge in constructing data centers increase the price of computer chips? Microeconomic developments do sometimes affect our inflation measures. For example, if conflict in the Middle East disrupts the flow of oil, raising oil prices, the effect may be large enough to increase the price level.

Image created by ChatGPT of oil tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz

The two most closely watched measures of the price level are the consumer price index (CPI), which is compiled monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, which is compiled monthly by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Economists and Federal Reserve policymakers prefer the PCE measure of the price level because it includes more goods and services than does the CPI.  Each month’s release of CPI and PCE data can help answer three questions:

  1. How much inflation are consumers experiencing?
  2. How well is the Federal Reserve meeting its mandate from Congress to achieve price stability?
  3. How likely is inflation to persist?

The public’s strongly negative reaction to the Covid-era surge in inflation that began in the spring of 2021 made it clear that high inflation rates were an important political issue. The persistence of inflation rates above the Fed’s 2 percent annual target caused “affordability” to be an important issue in the 2026 midterm elections in the United States.

The CPI is designed to answer question 1. Although the inflation any individual household experiences will depend on the particular mix of goods and services consumed, the percentage change in the CPI provides a good measure of the inflation experienced by the typical household. The Fed answers question 2. using the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. Fed policymakers have met the Congressional mandate for stable prices if the annual inflation rate as measured by the PCE is 2 percent or less. (Note that there is some debate whether 2 percent inflation represents “price stability” in the way Congress intended.)

Question 3. is the most difficult to answer. Future inflation rates depend partly on macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy, and on geopolitical developments, such as the likelihood that conflict in the Middle East will be resolved or will accelerate. But the details of how particular prices have been changing can also provide clues as to how persistent inflation is likely to be. Federal statistical agencies, economists, and policymakers make adjustments to the CPI and PCE with the aim of better identifying the underlying rate of inflation—that is, the movement in average prices after eliminating prices that may be increasing or decreasing for short-run, microeconomic reasons.

The best-known adjustments to the CPI and PCE are the core measures that exclude the prices of food and energy. The BLS began issuing a monthly measure of core CPI in 1977 and the BEA began issuing a monthly measure of core PCE in 2000, although it had been compiling a similar measure since 1974.

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The BLS explains why it began issuing data on core CPI:

“Food and especially energy have been more volatile in recent years than almost everything else in the CPI, and their sharp short-term movements up and down can dominate the movement of the All items [CPI] index, obscuring longer term underlying trends or important changes in other categories. … Inflation due largely to higher food or energy prices might have different policy implications than broader inflation.”

Fed policymakers have looked at a number of other ways to adjust the PCE to gauge the underlying inflation rate. For example, as we discuss in a recent blog post, Fed policymakers believe that inflation in non-market services can skew PCE inflation. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices rise, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also rise. Former Fed Chair Jerome Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.”

Image created by ChatGPT of Kevin Warsh testifying before the Senate Banking Committee

At his confirmation hearing before the Senate Banking Committee, Fed Chair Kevin Warsh, addressed the issue of determining the underlying inflation rate:

“What I’m most interested in is, what’s the underlying inflation rate? Not what’s the one time change in prices because of a change in geopolitics or a change in beef, but what’s the underlying generalized change in prices in the economy? … The measures I prefer are looking at things that are called trimmed averages, where we take out all of the tail risks, all of the one-off items, and we ask ourselves whether the generalized change in prices is having second order effects on the economy. … Some in the economics profession are increasingly looking to these median type measures ….”

As we’ve discussed in previous blog posts, two widely available measures of the type Warsh is referring to are:

  1. Trimmed-mean PCE inflation, which drops the 31 percent of goods and services with the highest inflation rates and the 24 percent of goods and services with the lowest inflation rates, and
  2. Median PCE inflation, which is calculated by listing the inflation rate in each individual good or service included in the PCE and identifying the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates.

The following figure, from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland shows the relationship of headline PCE inflation (the green line), core PCE inflation (the blue line), and median PCE inflation (the brown line). Since March 2026, median inflation has been below both headline and core inflation, which may indicate that it is a better indicator of underlying inflation in the months since the conflict in the Middle East intensified.

In an address in August at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s economic policy symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Warsh discussed a less familiar indicator of underlying inflation: “To try to gauge underlying inflation, I find it instructive to disaggregate the 199 individual components of the PCE price measure. Over the past 12 months, 54 percent of goods and services in the PCE basket showed price increases above 3 percent. This is well below the post-pandemic highs of about 77 percent, but it remains well above the level of 32 percent in the two decades that preceded the pandemic.”

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The following figure shows for each month from January 2018 through September 2026, the fraction of PCE components that experienced price increases of greater than 3 percent. For instance, prices included in the PCE component “Personal computers/tablets and peripheral equipment” increased 9.7 percent from September 2025 to September 2026, while prices in the PCE component “Telephone and related communication equipment” decreased by 12.7 percent over the same period. The figure confirms Warsh’s statement: During 2018 and 2019, when headline PCE inflation was less than 2 percent in most months, 25.7 percent of PCE components experienced price increases of more than 3 percent, while in September 2026, 47.5 percent did.

As the following figure shows, we get a similar result if we plot the same indicator for the CPI.

So, we have a number of ways of attempting to measure the underlying inflation rate. The reason, once again, why Fed policymakers are concerned about the underlying inflation rate rather than just the headline inflation rate is that monetary policy is better equipped to respond to movements in the underlying inflation rate than it is to respond to blips in the headline inflation rate that may be caused by transitory factors such as a sharp increase or decrease in energy prices.

Which measure of underlying inflation might be best? Here is ChatGPT’s (very long!) analysis.

ChatGPT on measures of underlying inflation

The three approaches answer different questions. A trimmed mean or median estimates a central rate of price increase after limiting the influence of unusually large increases and decreases. The percentage of categories rising more than 3% measures how widespread relatively rapid price increases are. My preference would be to use a trimmed mean and a median to assess the underlying inflation rate, and breadth to assess how generalized the pressure is.

The distinction matters because these measures can move in different directions without either being incorrectly calculated.

1. What each measure is trying to tell us

It helps to distinguish the measured change in the overall price index from indicators intended to extract a more persistent signal.

MeasureMain question it answersPrincipal strengthPrincipal limitation
Headline inflationHow much did the full price index increase?Includes the entire consumption basketLarge movements in a few components can obscure the broader trend
Conventional core inflationHow much did prices excluding food and energy increase?Simple, familiar, and consistently definedExcludes some informative movements while retaining large movements elsewhere
Trimmed meanWhat is the average increase among components in the middle of the price-change distribution?Reduces sensitivity to extremes while preserving information about the size of central price changesResults depend on trimming choices; excluded movements can contain useful information
MedianWhat price increase lies at the expenditure-weighted midpoint?Strong protection against unusually large increases and decreasesDiscards most information about the rest of the distribution
Share above 3%How much of the basket—or how many categories—has inflation above a chosen threshold?Makes the breadth of faster price increases easy to seeDoes not measure how far above or below the threshold prices are rising

The first conceptual caution is that an outlying price increase is not necessarily an error or a temporary disturbance. It can be a genuine, persistent change in a relative price. Removing its influence may help estimate the common inflation trend, but it also removes part of what consumers are paying.

A simple illustration

Suppose a hypothetical fixed-weight basket contains ten equally weighted categories. For illustration, calculate a trimmed mean by dropping the highest and lowest observations. All changes refer to the same period.

Category price changesFull-basket averageTrimmed meanMedianShare above 3%
All ten rise 2%2%2%2%0%
Nine rise 2%; one rises 22%4%2%2%10%
Nine rise 4%; one falls 16%2%4%4%90%

These are hypothetical calculations, not the precise construction of any published index.

The second row captures the usual argument for robust inflation measures: one exceptionally large increase raises the average even though most categories are rising moderately.

The third row is equally important. One exceptionally large decline can hold down headline inflation while most prices rise rapidly. Median and trimmed mean measures can therefore indicate more inflation pressure than the headline measure. Their purpose is to reduce the influence of both tails, rather than systematically produce a lower number.

2. Trimmed mean: a useful compromise between robustness and information

A trimmed mean ranks component price changes and removes a specified portion from each end of the distribution. It averages the remaining changes using their expenditure weights.

The precise implementation matters:

  • The Dallas Fed trimmed mean PCE removes 24% of expenditure weight from the lower tail and 31% from the upper tail, retaining the middle 45%.
  • The Cleveland Fed 16% trimmed mean CPI removes 8% of expenditure weight from each tail, retaining the middle 84%.

These are percentages of expenditure weight, not percentages of the number of category names. They are also quite different degrees of trimming, so “the trimmed mean” does not identify a unique estimator. Sources: Dallas methodologyand Cleveland methodology.

Advantages

It adapts to where the unusual movements occur. Conventional core inflation always excludes food and energy. A trimmed mean instead excludes whichever components have the most extreme changes that month. Food or energy can remain in the calculation when their changes are near the middle; a large movement elsewhere can be removed.

That is attractive because the economic reason for discounting a price movement is generally its usefulness as a signal of continuing inflation, rather than its membership in a permanently excluded category.

It retains information about the magnitude of many price changes. If numerous components in the retained middle rise from 2% to 4%, the trimmed mean responds to the size of those increases. It uses more of the distribution than a median and substantially more information about magnitude than a threshold count.

It limits offsetting distortions from the two tails. It can help identify whether low headline inflation reflects broadly moderate increases or a combination of substantial increases and a few very large declines.

Disadvantages

The trimming rule requires judgment. How much should be trimmed? Should the upper and lower tails be treated symmetrically? The answers depend partly on the distribution of relative-price changes and the statistical objective being pursued.

The Dallas proportions were selected using historical data. That provides an empirical foundation, but it does not guarantee that the same proportions will remain optimal in every subsequent inflation regime. Its asymmetric trimming also illustrates that a simple symmetric distribution of price changes cannot be taken for granted. Dallas methodology

It can remove economically important signals. An extreme increase may be the first sign of pressure that will spread to other categories. Alternatively, a sector may experience sustained inflation for several years. The trimming procedure classifies observations by their position in the distribution; it does not know whether the underlying cause is temporary, persistent, supply driven, or demand driven.

It cannot remove a shock merely because the shock is temporary. If a temporary common disturbance moves most prices, it moves the middle of the distribution too. A trimmed mean is robust to sufficiently concentrated extremes, not to every disturbance that policymakers might wish to look through.

My assessment is that a trimmed mean offers an appealing balance: it reduces the influence of exceptional observations while retaining meaningful information about the size of price changes across a substantial portion of spending.

3. Median inflation: greater resistance to extremes, greater loss of information

The published Cleveland Fed median measures are expenditure weighted. The components are ranked by their monthly price changes, and the median is the change at the 50th percentile of expenditure weight. It is not the inflation rate of the middle category in a list where every category receives one vote. See the median CPI and median PCE descriptions.

Advantages

The median is highly resistant to the size of extreme observations. If a component already in the upper tail rises 30% instead of 10%, that change generally has no effect on the median. The same applies to exceptionally large declines.

It provides a clear indication of movement in the center of the distribution. An increase in the median suggests that the distribution’s midpoint has shifted. It is less vulnerable to the interpretation that a rise in the average reflects only one or two extreme observations.

It avoids having to choose particular trimming percentages. Within the family of measures that focus on the middle of the distribution, the median has a transparent definition. That does not eliminate every methodological choice—component definitions, weights, and seasonal adjustment still matter—but it removes the choice between, say, an 8% and a 15% trim.

Disadvantages

A large amount of inflation pressure can occur away from the midpoint. Suppose 51% of expenditure weight has inflation of 2%, while the remaining 49% has inflation of 8%. In a simple fixed-weight calculation:

  • Average inflation is 4.94%.
  • Median inflation is 2%.

The median accurately describes the midpoint, but a policymaker would lose important information by looking only at that number.

It can also change abruptly. Reverse the weights to 49% at 2% and 51% at 8%, and the median jumps from 2% to 8%, even though average inflation rises only from 4.94% to 5.06%. Real data are more complicated, but the example shows why the median is not always a smooth measure of changes in the whole distribution.

Large expenditure categories can have considerable influence over which observation becomes the median. A large category occupies a wide interval of cumulative expenditure weight. Housing is particularly relevant. Cleveland revised its CPI methodology by dividing owners’ equivalent rent into four regional components to reduce the distortion that a single large OER component could create. This is a concrete example of how the level of aggregation affects a median. Cleveland methodology revision

The median need not have the same long-run average as headline inflation. Persistent relative-price trends and asymmetry in the distribution can create a systematic gap between the median and the mean. A Cleveland study found such a positive gap for median PCE in its historical sample. Consequently, a median reading of 2% is not automatically equivalent to aggregate PCE inflation being at the Fed’s 2% objective. Carroll and Verbrugge, 2019

I would use the median as a valuable check on whether the center is moving, while continuing to examine what is happening on either side of it.

4. The share above 3%: particularly useful for breadth, limited as an estimate of the inflation rate

For the unweighted version we have been considering, the calculation is:\[ \text{Breadth}_t = 100\times \frac{\text{number of categories with inflation above 3%}} {\text{number of categories observed}}. \]

An expenditure-weighted version instead adds up the spending shares of the categories above 3%. Those two calculations answer different questions.

Advantages

It directly addresses whether inflation is concentrated or widespread. An aggregate rate can be high because of a few exceptional increases or because of moderate increases across many categories. Breadth helps distinguish those situations.

Extreme observations have bounded influence. In an unweighted count, a category rising 50% contributes exactly as much as a category rising 4%. Each category can change the numerator by at most one. This makes the measure well suited to the particular question of how widely elevated inflation is distributed.

It can reveal changes that the median misses. Suppose the share above 3% rises from 20% to 45%. The median can remain below 3% throughout, yet the growing upper portion of the distribution may be informative. Breadth shows that development directly.

An unweighted count can reveal generalization across sectors without being dominated by the largest spending categories. That can be useful when each category is being treated as a separate signal about price-setting behavior. Equal weighting has a coherent purpose, even though it sacrifices a direct interpretation in terms of household spending.

Disadvantages

It throws away information about magnitude

Consider two hypothetical changes:

  • Every category slows from 10% inflation to 4%. The share above 3% remains 100%, despite substantial disinflation.
  • Every category moves from 2.9% to 3.1%. The share jumps from 0% to 100%, despite an increase of only 0.2 percentage point in every category.

The first example shows how breadth can miss major progress. The second shows how a hard threshold can exaggerate the apparent importance of a small movement.

This is why I would examine several thresholds or inflation-rate ranges, rather than place too much weight on whether a single 3% line has been crossed.

Weighting changes the economic interpretation

Suppose six small categories each account for 5% of spending and have inflation of 4%, while four larger categories each account for 17.5% of spending and have inflation of 1%.

Then:

StatisticResult
Percentage of categories above 3%60%
Percentage of expenditure weight above 3%30%
Expenditure-weighted median1%
Simple expenditure-weighted average1.9%

The unweighted measure correctly reports that most categories have relatively rapid increases. It does not establish that most consumer spending is experiencing those increases.

Both versions are useful, provided their interpretation is explicit. For example, the Federal Reserve’s 2026 research on inflation breadth uses weighted shares of the CPI basket, as specified in its accessible figures. Those shares should not be compared directly with unweighted counts. Federal Reserve, Figures 2–3

The category classification can materially change the answer

If a category with inflation above 3% is divided into ten subcategories, each with the same inflation rate, its influence on an unweighted count increases even though nothing economic has changed.

A count therefore requires a consistent set of mutually exclusive categories at a reasonably stable level of detail. Counting both a broad category and its subcategories would effectively give some prices multiple votes.

Expenditure weighting avoids the particular problem of splitting an otherwise identical category: its total spending weight remains unchanged. But aggregation can still matter when subcategories have different inflation rates.

There is no universal “normal” share implied by the 2% target

The Fed’s objective concerns aggregate PCE inflation, not the inflation rate of every individual component.

For example, five equally weighted categories with inflation rates of:\[ -1\%,\quad 1\%,\quad 2\%,\quad 4\%,\quad 4\% \]

have average inflation of 2%, median inflation of 2%, and 40% of categories above 3%.

A substantial share above 3% can therefore coexist with aggregate inflation at target. What matters is how the share compares with an appropriate historical benchmark calculated in the same way. Warsh’s comparison with the prepandemic 32% is informative for that reason. But the historical average is an empirical benchmark, not an additional policy target.

5. Time horizon creates an especially important difference

There are two separate issues here.

Annual breadth can remain elevated after current price increases have stopped

Suppose many prices rise 4% once and then remain unchanged. Their year-over-year inflation rates will continue to exceed 3% for roughly a year after the increase.

A persistently high annual breadth measure could therefore reflect the continued presence of a past price-level adjustment in the calculation. It does not necessarily mean that comparable increases are continuing each month.

Shorter horizons help. Six-month annualized inflation responds more quickly than twelve-month inflation, while three-month inflation responds more quickly still. The tradeoff is greater sensitivity to short-run fluctuations and seasonal-adjustment issues.

Warsh’s 49% six-month share, compared with 54% over twelve months, is consistent with less widespread rapid increases in the more recent window. It does not, by itself, establish how much the aggregate inflation rate has slowed or where it will go next.

Published annual median inflation is not the median of annual component inflation

This is easy to overlook.

The published median and trimmed mean measures are constructed from monthly component price changes. Their longer-horizon rates accumulate those monthly robust changes. Taking the median across components first and then accumulating through time can produce a different answer from calculating annual inflation for every component first and then taking the median. Cleveland median PCE methodology; Dallas calculation code

A hypothetical example makes the difference clear:

  • There are three equally weighted categories.
  • Category A rises 4% in January and is otherwise unchanged.
  • Category B is unchanged throughout the year.
  • Category C rises 4% in July and is otherwise unchanged.

Every month, at least two categories have zero inflation. The monthly median is therefore always zero, and an index built by compounding those medians has zero annual inflation.

Yet at year-end, two of the three categories have risen 4%. The median of their annual inflation rates is 4%, and annual breadth above 3% is 66.7%.

This is one reason an annual breadth measure and a published annual median series can give different signals.

There is a useful mathematical connection when the weights, categories, and horizon are identical: if more than half the weight has inflation above 3%, the corresponding weighted median exceeds 3%. If Warsh’s 54% is an unweighted count, it implies that the unweighted median of those annual component changes exceeds 3%. It does not directly establish the value of the published expenditure-weighted median inflation series.

6. None of these measures identifies the cause or persistence of inflation by itself

The motivation for robust measures is strongest when unusually large component movements are mainly idiosyncratic disturbances around a more persistent common trend. But that is an economic interpretation of the distribution, rather than something established by trimming it.

A common supply shock can raise prices across many categories. Tariffs, for example, can affect final imported goods and domestic goods or services that use imported inputs. Federal Reserve research explicitly traces both channels across PCE categories. Minton and Somale, 2025

Consequently:

  • High breadth does not establish that excess aggregate demand is the cause.
  • A rise in the median does not establish that the shock will persist.
  • A concentrated increase does not establish that its effects will soon disappear.

Breadth does help assess the claim that high inflation is confined to a few unusual categories. But distinguishing an ongoing inflation process from a price-level adjustment requires additional evidence about subsequent price changes, quantities, expectations, and the propagation of the original shock.

The same caution applies to smoothness. A smoother series is easier to interpret, but smoothness alone does not establish that it is a better forecast of future inflation.

7. What does the empirical evidence say?

The research supports using robust measures, but it does not identify a universal winner across objectives, samples, and forecast horizons.

Dallas Fed research finds a useful distinction between filtering and forecasting. Dolmas and Koenig’s 2019 comparison concludes that trimmed mean PCE is helpful for filtering transitory variation and has advantages as an estimate of underlying inflation. However, it does not clearly dominate conventional core PCE in real-time forecasts of headline PCE inflation. Those are different tests of usefulness. “Two Measures of Core Inflation: A Comparison”

Cleveland research finds that many trimming choices perform similarly. Meyer and Venkatu find a broad range of trimmed mean estimators with statistically indistinguishable performance, including the median. Their results support the usefulness of focusing on the middle of the distribution, while providing less support for claiming that one finely chosen trim is uniquely best. “Trimmed-Mean Inflation Statistics: Just Hit the One in the Middle”

Relative performance can change across periods. Carroll and Verbrugge’s comparison of median PCE, trimmed mean PCE, and conventional core measures finds that the performance of the median measures changed after the Great Recession. Their analysis emphasizes the role of changes in the asymmetry of the component-price distribution. “Behavior of a New Median PCE Measure: A Tale of Tails”

For breadth, an additional distinction is necessary. A measure can correlate closely with inflation in the same periodwithout being an especially good predictor of future inflation. The Federal Reserve’s 2026 breadth study estimates contemporaneous relationships and examines how those relationships changed after the pandemic. It does not establish that a count above 3% forecasts future inflation better than median or trimmed mean measures. Federal Reserve breadth study

These studies also cover different historical samples. Their results provide reasons to use the measures and evaluate them carefully, rather than guarantees about their ranking in the current environment.

8. How I would use them together

For assessing the inflation outlook relevant to Fed policy, I would give the measures distinct roles.

  1. Keep headline PCE as the outcome to explain and forecast. It is the index to which the Fed’s inflation objective applies. Conventional core PCE remains a useful, familiar comparison.
  2. Use trimmed mean PCE as a central estimate of underlying inflation, with median PCE as a check. My preference for the trimmed mean reflects its retention of more information about the magnitude of price changes. Agreement between it and the median increases confidence that the center of the distribution is moving. Disagreement is a reason to inspect the distribution.
  3. Use breadth to assess generalization. I would look at both category counts and expenditure-weighted shares, with consistent definitions and historical benchmarks. Examining several thresholds would reveal whether a change reflects a substantial distributional shift or many observations barely crossing 3%.
  4. Compare horizons and investigate the components driving disagreement. Twelve-month measures provide perspective; shorter-horizon measures help identify recent changes. The sector composition matters when deciding whether the signal reflects continuing pressure, an earlier adjustment, or an unusual pattern of offsetting increases and declines.

Applied to Warsh’s speech, the comparison of 54% with a prepandemic 32% is meaningful evidence that faster price growth was more widespread than in the benchmark period, assuming a consistent calculation. The fall from about 77% also documents a substantial reduction in breadth. Neither fact supplies a numerical estimate of the underlying inflation rate or determines its future persistence.

Breadth adds valuable distributional information to median and trimmed mean inflation. Its strongest role is as a complement: it tells us how far relatively rapid price increases extend across the basket, while the robust rate measures tell us more about the pace of price increases near the center.

New BEA Data Releases Show Higher GDP Growth and Higher Inflation

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This morning (October 29), the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released two reports that show economic growth increased in the third quarter of 2026 compared with the second quarter and that inflation in September as measured by the percentage increase in personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index also increased.

The BEA estimates that real GDP increased at an annual rate of 3.4 percent in the third quarter (July, August and September) of 2026, which is an increase from a 2.2 percent annual growth rate in the second quarter. As the following figure shows, real GDP grew at the fastest rate since the third quarter of 2025. Economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal had expected real GDP to grow at a slower 3.1 percent rate in the third quarter.

As we’ve discussed in previous blog posts, to better gauge the state of the economy, Federal Reserve policymakers often prefer to strip out the effects of imports, inventory investment, and government expenditures—which can be volatile—by looking at real final sales to private domestic purchasers, which includes only spending by U.S. households and firms on domestic production. As the following figure shows, real final sales to domestic purchasers increased at an annual rate of 4.9 percent in the third quarter, up from 4.6 percent in the second quarter. The growth rate in real final sales to domestic purchasers was well above the growth rate of real GDP, as well as more than twice the U.S. economy’s expected long-run annual real growth rate of 1.8 percent. So estimated growth in real final sales to domestic purchasers indicates that the U.S. economy is expanding more rapidly than is indicated by estimated growth in real GDP. Typically, growth in real final sales to domestic purchasers is steadier than growth in real GDP and is likely a better indicator of the underlying growth rate in the economy.

Today’s BEA “Personal Income and Outlays” report included monthly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. The Fed relies on annual changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target. As we noted in an earlier blog post, Fed Chair Kevin Warsh indicated in his press conference following the July meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) that the committee intended to continue using the PCE price index as its gauge of inflation, although that decision would be revisited early next year. Some analysts have interpreted Warsh’s statement as an indication that he favored moving to a measure that would show lower rates of inflation than those shown by the PCE.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2019, with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. In September, headline PCE inflation was 3.6 percent, up from 3.4 percent in August. Core PCE inflation in September was 3.1 percent, up form 3.0 percent in August. Headline PCE inflation was slightly below and core PCE inflation was equal to the forecast of economists surveyed by FactSet. Both headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation remain well above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (Often referred to as 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, headline PCE inflation increased 6.1 percent in September from 3.9 percent in August. Core PCE inflation increased to 3.9 percent in September from 3.2 percent in August. The very high 1-month headline PCE inflation rate reflects the sharp increase in energy prices, particularly gasoline prices, during September. One-month core inflation shows a smaller, although still substantial, acceleration in inflation during September.

Fed policymakers believe that inflation in non-market services can skew PCE inflation. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices rise, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also rise. Former Fed Chair Jerome Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.” The following figure shows 12-month headline inflation (the blue line) and 12-month core inflation (the red line) for market-based PCE. (The BEA explains the market-based PCE measure here.)

Headline market-based PCE inflation was 3.7 percent in September, up from 3.5 percent in August. Core market-based PCE inflation was 3.1 percent in September, up from 3.0 percent in August. So both market-based measures show inflation in September remaining well above the Fed’s 2 percent target.

Fed Chair Kevin Warsh argued in testimony at his confirmation hearing before the Senate that the Fed should stop relying on headline PCE inflation: “The measures [of inflation] I prefer are looking at things that are called trimmed averages. We take out all of the tail-risks, all of the one-off items, and we ask ourselves whether the generalized change in prices is having second-order effects on the economy.”

Trimmed-mean PCE inflation drops the 31 percent of goods and services with the highest inflation rates and the 24 percent of goods and services with the lowest inflation rates. A closely related measure, median PCE inflation, is calculated by listing the inflation rate in each individual good or service included in the PCE and identifying the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates.

The following figure shows 12-month headline PCE inflation the (blue line), core PCE inflation (the red line) and trimmed-mean PCE inflation (the green line). Trimmed-mean PCE inflation in September was 2.3 percent, well below both headline and core PCE inflation.

The following figure from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland shows headline PCE inflation (the green line), core PCE inflation (the blue line), and median PCE inflation (the brown line). In September, median PCE inflation was 2.7 percent, which was up from 2.6 percent in August. So Warsh has a point that these two measures of inflation, which are less affected by particularly high or low rates of inflation in some goods and services, indicate that inflation has been running below the Fed’s currently preferred measure of 12-month headline PCE inflation. But these measures also show inflation still running well above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target.

Today’s macro data releases appear to have caused investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts to believe that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is now somewhat less likely to raise its target for the federal funds rate at the committee’s next meeting on December 8–9. Trading on the federal funds futures market today implies that the probability of a target rate increase at that meeting is 74.9 percent, down from a probability of 84.2 percent yesterday.

FOMC Votes with Two Dissents to Keep Its Target for the Federal Funds Rate Unchanged

Photo of Fed Chair Kevin Warsh from federalreserve.gov

Today, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) met expectations by keeping its target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at 3.75 percent to 4.00 percent. As of yesterday, trading in the federal funds rate futures market had implied a 93.4 percent probability that the target range would be unchanged. Fed Governor Lisa Cook and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland President Beth Hammack dissented from the vote, preferring that the target range be increased by 0.25 percentage points (25 basis points). Hammack had also dissented at the July FOMC meeting in favor of a target range increase. Cook had not previously dissented from the majority at any meeting.

At his press conference following the meeting, Fed Chair Kevin Warsh said that political considerations did not play a role in the FOMC’s decision to leave the target range unchanged. As we noted in this earlier blog post, some analysts believe that the committee was reluctant to raise the target range so close to Tuesday’s midterm elections.

The following figure shows for the period since 2001, the upper bound (the blue line) and the lower bound (the green line) for the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate, as well as the actual values for the federal funds rate (the red line). Before December 2008, the Fed announced a single numerical target for the federal funds rate, rather than a target range. Note that the Fed has been successful in keeping the value of the federal funds rate in its target range. (We discuss the monetary policy tools the FOMC uses to maintain the federal funds rate within its target range in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.2).)

As with the policy statements issued following Warsh’s previous three FOMC meetings, today’s policy statement was short and did not include any discussion of the specific circumstances under which further target range increases might occur—so-called forward guidance. We discuss forward guidance in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15 (Economics, Chapter 25).

At his press conference following the meeting, as he typically does, Warsh resisted attempts by reporters to get him to expand on the circumstances under which the committee might implement further increases in the target range. He reiterated his belief that the Fed was currently meeting its Congressional mandate for maximum employment but had not yet met its mandate for price stability by bringing inflation back to an annual rate of 2 percent.

He did note that the period between now and the next FOMC meeting on December 8–9 would be “information rich,” presumably because there will be additional data releases on inflation and unemployment during that time. In addition, the committee might have greater clarity about what Warsh referred to as “geopolitical factors,” such as the conflict in the Middle East.

Warsh also announced at the press conference that, beginning in fall 2027, the FOMC will devote one of its eight annual meetings to discussing monetary policy strategy. In 2028, the FOMC may devote two of its eight meetings to discussing monetary policy strategy. There would be no vote on the federal funds rate target range at these meetings, and he expected that the committee would not release a policy statement. It was unclear whether he intends to hold a press conference following these meetings. If implemented, this plan would result in longer periods during which the public would not be receiving formal updates on monetary policy.

CPI Inflation Increases in September

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After the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) increased its target for the federal funds rate at its September meeting, there was uncertainty as to whether it would raise its target again at its meeting on October 27–28. Today’s report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on the consumer price index (CPI) for September showed that inflation had risen more than expected, likely increase somewhat the probability of the committee raising its target range at its October meeting.

As we’ve noted before, and as we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15 (Economics, Chapter 25), monetary policy affects the economy with, in the words of Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, “long and variable lags.” As a result, most economists agree that the Federal Reserve should not attempt to “fine tune” the economy by responding to each government release of macroeconomic data. Nevertheless, in practice, it’s clear that during times when Fed policymakers are split over what course of action to take, a single data report can have a significant effect on their decision.

The following figure compares headline CPI inflation (the blue line) and core CPI inflation (the red line).

  • The headline inflation rate, which is measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous year, was 3.7 percent in September, up from 3.4 percent in August.
  • The core inflation rate, which excludes the prices of food and energy, was 2.6 percent in September, up from 2.4 percent in August.

Headline inflation and core inflation were both higher than the forecasts of economics surveyed by the Wall Street Journal. (Note that because of last year’s federal government shutdown, inflation data for October 2025 are not available.)

In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, headline inflation (the blue line) soared to 8.1 percent in September, up from 4.9 percent in August. Core inflation (the red line) was 4.1 percent in September, up from 3.5 percent in August.

As the large gap between the headline and core 1-month inflation rates indicates, energy prices, particularly gasoline prices, rose sharply in September. In the following figure, the red line shows the 12-month inflation rate in all energy prices included in the CPI. Inflation in energy prices was 20.4 percent in September, up from 16.4 percent in August. The blue line shows the 12-month inflation rate in gasoline prices, which increased to 34.2 percent in September from 27.4 percent in August.

There has been a fear that the rise in energy prices that began in March will pass through to increases in food prices, which are a key concern for many consumers. The following figure shows 12-month inflation in the CPI category “food at home” (the blue bar)—primarily food purchased at grocery stores—and in the category “food away from home” (the red bar)—primarily food purchased at restaurants. Grocery prices increased 3.5 percent in September from a year ago, down from 3.7 percent in August. Restaurant prices increased 3.5 percent from a year ago, up slightly from 3.4 percent in August. To this point, increases in energy prices seem to have had some effect on grocery prices and restaurant prices, although the extent of the effect is unclear.

Fed Chair Kevin Warsh has indicated that he favors measures of the inflation rate that exclude particularly small or particularly large changes in the prices of some goods or services—so-called outliers. Median CPI, which is compiled monthly by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, is calculated by ranking the price changes of every good or service in the index from the largest price change to the smallest price change, and then choosing the price change in the middle. The idea is to eliminate the effect on measured inflation of any short-lived events that cause the prices of some goods and services to be particularly high or particularly low. Economists at the Cleveland Fed have conducted research that shows that, in their words, “the median CPI provides a better signal of the underlying inflation trend than either the all-items CPI or the CPI excluding food and energy. The median CPI is even better at forecasting [personal consumption expenditures] PCE inflation in the near and longer term than the core PCE price index.”

Trimmed-mean inflation, also compiled by economists at the Cleveland Fed, excludes the highest 8 percent of price changes and the lowest 8 percent. The following figure shows 12-month trimmed mean (the blue line) and median (the red line) CPI inflation. Trimmed-mean inflation was 2.7 percent in September, up from 2.6 percent in August. Median inflation was 2.6 percent in September, unchanged from August. So these measures of inflation are both lower than the conventional headline and core CPI inflation measures, which indicates that the acceleration in inflation during September was not affecting all sectors of the economy.

Note that the Fed uses the 12-month change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, not the change in the CPI, when gauging whether it is hitting its 2 percent annual inflation target. Historically, PCE inflation has been about 0.4 percentage points to 0.5 percentage points lower than CPI inflation. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) won’t release its estimate of September PCE inflation until October 29, one day after the next FOMC meeting.

Today’s report showing that inflation remains persistently above the Fed’s 2 percent annual target has likely raised the chance that Federal Reserve policymakers will increase their target range for the federal funds rate from the current 3.75 percent to 4.00 percent by o.25 percentage points (or 25 basis points) at the next meeting of the FOMC on October 27–28. Trading in the federal funds futures market this afternoon indicates that investors assign a 33.8 percent probability to the FOMC raising its target range at that meeting, which is up from a 22.1 percent probability yesterday. Trading indicated that investors assign a 89.7 percent probability to the committee increasing its target range by at least 25 basis points at its last meeting of the year on December 8–9. Some analysts have speculated that the committee will postpone its next rate increase until December to avoid raising the rate before the midterm election on November 3.

Hall and Woodford Win 2026 Nobel Prize in Economics

Photo of Robert Hall from news.stanford.edu

Photo of Michael Woodford from politicaleconomy.columbia.edu

Robert Hall of Stanford and Michael Woodford of Columbia have been awarded the 2026 Nobel Prize in Economics. Their careers have helped define the evolution of macroeconomics during the past 50 years.

Principles of economics is often taught as one semester of microeconomics and one semester of macroeconomics. In microeconomics we focus on analyzing the households’ decisions about which products to buy and on firms’ decisions about which products to sell and what prices to charge. In macroeconomics we switch the focus to the economy as a whole, analyzing what determines total production in the economy, as measured by GDP, and what determines the price level, as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) or the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. An important part of macroeconomics is analyzing the effects of the federal government’s monetary and fiscal policies on production, employment, and prices.

Microeconomics and macroeconomics are connected because macroeconomic aggregates (like GDP, the unemployment rate, and the price level) ultimately depend on the decisions of households and firms. Similarly, the effects of fiscal and monetary policies on the economy depend on how households and firms react to the policies.

Image of John Maynard Keynes created by ChatGPT

The focus on economic aggregates in macroeconomics dates back to the publication of John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money in 1936. Keynes’s book was long and complicated, which led shorter, more straightforward, interpretations of his ideas by Nobel laureate John Hicks of Oxford and Alvin Hansen of Harvard to become widely accepted. The Hicks-Hansen interpretation was embodied in the IS-LM model, which focused on the relationships among a few macroeconomic variables. (We discuss the IS-LM model in the appendix to Chapter 18 of Money, Banking, and the Financial System.)

During the Great Inflation of the 1970s of the 1970s and early 1980s, many economists concluded that the basic IS-LM model was no longer a good guide to understanding events in the U.S. economy. That conclusion increased the interest in grounding macroeconomics in the basic decision making of households and firms. This approach became known as the microfoundations of macroeconomics.

This new focus on microeconomics led some economists to reject the idea that discretionary monetary and fiscal policy was able to stabilize the economy by reducing fluctuations in aggregate output and employment. This approach is called the New Classical Macroeconomics. (We discuss the New Classical Macroeconomics in the appendix to Macroeconomics, Chapter 13.) Other economists argue that discretionary policy can play a role in stabilizing the economy, which is a key argument advanced by Keynesians since the 1930s, but believe that policymakers need to take into account how households and firms react to policy. This approach is called the New Keynesian economics. The work of Hall and Woodford contributed to the development of New Keynesian economics.

Early in his career, Hall published an academic article making a major contribution to understanding the microfoundations of consumption spending. Hall’s work elaborated Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 12, Section 12.2 and Chapter 16, Section 16.5, consumers are forward looking, which means their consumption decisions take into account not just their current income but also their expected future income—which Friedman called permanent income. For example, a real estate agent might have a high income in a year when she earns a commission on the sale of 15 houses and a much lower income in a year when the local housing market is weak and she earns a commission on only 2 houses. Most people like to smooth out their consumption over time, so the agent is likely to spend less of her current income in good sales years and more of her current income in the bad sales years.

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Hall formalized Friedman’s insight using the tools of dynamic optimization and also showed that the model fit the macroeconomic data well. One important implication of Hall’s work is that households are unlikely to significantly adjust their spending in response to temporary policy changes, such as a temporary cut in personal income taxes. Hall made a number of additional contributions to macroeconomics, including by analyzing why prices and wages don’t always respond quickly to changes in total spending. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 10, Section 10.3, the federal government produces many statistics that make it possible to monitor the state of the economy, but the federal government does not officially decide when a recession begins or when it ends. Instead, most economists and policymakers accept the decisions of the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), a private research group located in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Hall served as chair of the committee for 46 years, from 1978 to 2024.

Image of the NBER building from the Wikipedia Commons

Woodford has made wide-ranging contributions to the development of New Keynesian economics. In particular, he developed a model that synthesized the contributions of a number of other economists to provide a general framework for understanding macroeconomics and for evaluating the effects of monetary policy. His 2003 book, Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy, has been particularly influential.

Image from amazon.com

The Nobel Committee’s announcement of the prize can be found here. A longer discussion of the Hall and Woodford’s work can be found here. The scope of their research can be seen by reviewing their curricula vitae, which can be found here and here. The amount of the prize this year is 12 million Swedish kronor (about $1.2 million).

Solved Problem: A Half-Price Sale on U.S. Treasury Bonds?

Supports: Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 3.

Image generated by ChatGPT of the U.S. Treasury building in Washington, DC

In a recent book review in the Wall Street Journal, financial analyst James Grant wrote: “The Treasury may indeed pay off every claim in freshly printed dollars. But 30-year Treasurys issued at the sub-2% yields prevailing in 2020 change hands today for less than 45 cents on the dollar.”

To illustrate Grant’s point: On May 15, 2020, the U. S. Treasury issued a 30-year bond with a $12.50 coupon and a face value, or par value, of $1,000. On October 6, the market price of the bond was $424.25. If you buy this bond today, you will receive a payment of $1,000 from the U.S. Treasury on May 15, 2050. The U.S. Treasury most recently issued 30-year bonds on August 17, 2026. Those 30-year bonds have a coupon of $51.25.

a. What does Grant mean by writing that 30-year Treasury bonds issued in 2020 “change hands today for less than 45 cents on the dollar”?

b. Why would anyone would be willing to sell you a bond for less than 50 percent of the amount the seller would receive by holding the bond to maturity?

Solving the Problem
Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about why bond prices fluctuate, so you may want to review Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 3, “Interest Rates and Rates of Return,” particularly the section “What Happens to Bond Prices When Interest Rates Change?”

Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining what Grant meant by bonds changing hands at less than 45 cents on the dollar. By “changing hands” Grant is referring to buying and selling bonds in the bond market. By “less than 45 cents on the dollar,” Grant means that bonds with a face value of $1,000 are selling for less than $450.

Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining why someone would be willing to sell you a bond for only $450 even though the bond has a face value of $1,000. In the bond market, as bonds are bought and sold, bonds of the same characteristics should have the same yield, as measured by the yield to maturity on the bonds. The 30-year bonds the Treasury issued in August of this year currently have a yield to maturity of about of about 5.31%. (The yield to maturity on these bonds is greater than the bonds coupon rate of 5.125% because the prices of the bonds are currently less than $1,000.) As an investor, you would only be willing to buy the 30-year bonds the Treasury issued in 2020 with a coupon rate of 1.25% if the price of the bonds will result in your receiving a yield to maturity of 5.31%.

The expression that links the price of a coupon bond, P, to the yield to maturity on the bond, i, is:

Keeping mind that the coupon, C, on a bond is fixed once the bond is issued, an increase in the yield to maturity must cause a decline in price of the bond. Because the gap in coupon rates between Treasury bonds issued in 2020 and in 2026 is so large, the 2020 bonds must have much lower prices in order to have the same yield to maturity.

Extra credit. The U.S. Treasury only started regularly issuing coupon bonds in the 1970s as the federal government began to run substantial budget deficits nearly every year. Prior to that, individuals rarely bought Treasury bonds with the exception of the tens of billions of “war bonds” the Treasury issued to raise funds during World War I and World War II.

Image from the American Museum of Natural History

As the following figure shows, since the 1970s, the yields on 30-year Treasury bonds have changed dramatically over time, from more than 15% in 1981 to less than 2% in 2020. These variations in yields reflect the higher or lower coupon rates the Treasury needs to offer investors as a result of fluctuations in inflation and in other factors that affect the demand for bonds.

Solved Problem: Why Do Bond Prices and Bond Yields Move Inversely?

Supports: Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 3, and Microeconomics, Chapter 8, Appendix.

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A recent article in the Wall Street Journal was titled “A Primer on Why Bond Prices Fall When Yields Rise.” A student reading the title of the article asks, “How can that be right? Investors would prefer to own bonds that have higher yields, so when the yields on bonds rise, investors should demand more of them. When the demand for something goes up, the price increases. Therefore, bond yields and bond prices should go up (or down) together.” Briefly explain the error in this student’s reasoning.

Solving the Problem
Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the relationship between bond yields and bond prices, so you may want to review Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 3 (for a complete discussion) or Microeconomics, Chapter 8, Appendix (for a brief discussion).

Step 2: Solve the problem by explaining what is wrong with the argument that if bond yields increase, so will bond prices, and if bond yields decrease, so will bond prices. In solving the problem, we should first consider the sometimes confusing number of “interest rates” on a coupon bonds. Coupon bonds pay interest in the form of coupons, which are usually quoted on an annual basis although typically paid twice per year. For example, Apple may issue a bond that pays a coupon of $47.50. The coupon rate on this bond is quoted per $1,000 of face value, or par value, which in this case would be 4.750%.

Bonds, like other financial assets such as shares of stock, are bought and sold in financial markets. A key point is that in financial markets, bonds with similar characteristics—including the same level of default risk, the same liquidity, and the same tax treatment of the bonds’ coupons—should provide investors with the same expected return. If this condition didn’t hold—for instance, if a bond issued by Apple was expected to provide a higher return than comparable bonds—then investors would increase their demand for the Apple bond, forcing up its price until its yield fell by enough to make its expected return the same as on other comparable bonds.

The price of a bond can fluctuate depending on how its coupon rate compares to the coupon rates on newly issued bonds, changes in investors’ expectations of future inflation, changes in investors’ expectations of the default risk of the bond, and other factors. For example, an article in the Wall Street Journal reported that, “Lenders on Monday demanded higher yields on bonds from a new data-center project in El Paso, Texas, leased by Meta compared with a similar project last year.” According to the article, the reason for the higher yields was that investors had raised their estimates of the default risk on bonds issued to fund data centers. Investors needed higher yields on bonds to compensate them for the higher default risk.

An image created by ChatGPT of Meta’s data-center complex under construction in El Paso, Texas.

What happens to the prices of existing bonds when newly issued bonds have higher coupon rates? Keeping in mind that, because the coupon rate on a bond is fixed and won’t change after the bond has been issued, the only way that the yield on a bond can change is if the price of the bond declines. By “yield” we are here referring to the yield to maturity, which is the best way of calculating the yield on a bond and which is ordinarily what economists and investors mean when they refer to the interest rate on a bond.

Formally, the yield to maturity is defined as the interest rate that makes the present value of the payments from the bond equal to the bond’s current price. In the following expression, where C is the coupon on the bond, FV is the face value of the bond, and n is the number of years until the bond matures, i is the yield to maturity.

The arithmetic of this expressions shows that if the yield to maturity increases, because, for example, the coupon rate on similar newly issued bonds are higher than the coupon rate on this bond, the price of the bond must decline. The economics of this expression is that an increase in the yield to maturity reduces the present value of a bond’s coupon payments and face value.

The reverse happens if the yield to maturity on a bond falls: The price of the bond will rise as a matter of arithmetic. As a matter of economics, a lower yield to maturity increases the present value of a bond’s coupon payments and face value.

So, although the student’s assertion seems logical, the economics of bond prices shows that the prices and yields on bonds move inversely.