Wendy’s management intends to begin using dynamic pricings in its fast-food restaurants. As we discuss in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 (Essentials of Economics, Chapter 10, Section 10.5), dynamic pricing is a form of price discrimination, which is the business practice of charging different prices to different customers for the same good or service. The ability of firms to analyze customer data using machine learning models has increased the ability to price discriminate.
One form of price discrimination involves charging customers different prices at different times, as, for instance, when movie theaters charge a lower price during afternoon showings than during evening showings. As a group, people who can choose whether to attend either an afternoon or an evening showing are more sensitive to changes in the price of a ticket—that is, their demand for tickets is more price elastic—than are people who can only attend an evening showing. Price discrimination with respect to movie tickets results in movie theaters earning a greater profit than if they charged the same price for all showings.
In a conference call with investors in February, Wendy’s CEO Kirk Tanner indicated that next year the firm would begin using dynamic pricing of its hamburgers and other menu items by charging different prices at different times of the day. Tanner didn’t provide details on how prices would differ in high demand times, such as during lunch and dinner, and low demand times, such as the middle of the afternoon. Some business commentators, though, assumed that Wendy’s dynamic pricing strategy would resemble Uber’s surge pricing strategy. As we discuss in Microeconomics, Economics, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 4, Section 4.1, Uber increases prices during periods of high demand, such as on New Year’s Eve.
The idea that Wendy’s would increase prices at peak times sparked a strong reaction on social media with many people criticizing the firm for “price gouging.” Rival fast-food restaurants joined the criticism. Burger King posted on X (formerly Twitter) that “we don’t believe in charging people more when they’re hungry.” As we note in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 10, Section 10.3 (Essentials of Econmics, Chapter 7, Section 7.3), surveys indicate that many people believe that it is fair for firms to raise prices following an increase in the firms’ costs, but unfair to raise prices following an increase in demand.
One way for firms to avoid this reaction from consumers while still price discriminating is to frame the issue by stating that they charge regular prices during times of peak demand and discount prices during times of low demand. For example, recently one AMC theater was charging $13.99 for a 7:15 PM showing of Dune: Part Two, but a “Matinee Discount Price” of $10.39 for a 1:oo PM showing of the film. Note that there is no real economic difference between AMC calling the evening price the normal price and the afternoon price the discoung price and the firm calling the afternoon price the normal price and the evening price a “surge price.” But one of the lessons of behavioral economics is that firms should pay attention to how consumers intepret a policy. Many consumers clearly see the two pricing strategies as different even though economically they aren’t. (We discuss behavioral economics in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 10, Section 10.4, and in Essentials of Economics, Chapter 7, Section 7.4.)
Not surprisingly, following the adverse reaction to its annoucement that it would begin using dynamic pricing, Wendy’s responded with a blog post in which it stated that its new pricing strategy was “misconstrued in some media reports as an intent to raise prices when demand is highest at our restaurants. We have no plans to do that and would not raise prices when our customers are visiting us most.” And that: “Digital menuboards could allow us to change the menu offerings at different times of day and offer discounts and value offers to our customers more easily, particularly in the slower times of day.” In effect, Wendy’s was framing its pricing strategy the way movie theaters do rather than the way Uber does.
Wendy’s CEO probably realizes now that how a pricing strategy is presented to consumers can affect how successful the strategy will be.
Action Comics No. 1, published in June 1938, is often consider the first superhero comic book. (Image from comics.org.)
In a political advertisement that ran before the broadcast of the Super Bowl, President Joe Biden discussed shrinkflation, which refers to firms reducing the quantity of a product in container while keeping the price unchanged. In this post from the summer of 2022, we discussed examples of shrinkflation—including Chobani reducing the quantity of yogurt in the package shown here from 5.3 ounces to 4.5 ounces—and noted that shrinkflation complicates the job of the Bureau of Labor Statistics when compiling the consumer price index.
This yogurt remained the same price although the quantity of yogurt in the container shrank from 5.3 ounces to 4.5 ounces.
Shrinkflation isn’t new; firms have used the strategy for decades. Firms are particularly likely to use shrinkflation during periods of high inflation or during periods when the federal government implements price controls. Firms also sometimes resort to shrinkflation when the the price of a product has remained constant for long enough that the firms fear that consumers will react strongly to the firms increasing the price.
Comic books provide an interesting historical example of shrinkflation. David Palmer, a professor of management at South Dakota State University published an article in 2010 in which he presented data on the price and number of pages in copies of Action Comics from 1938 to 2010. When DC Comics introduced Superman in the first issue of Action Comics in June 1938, it started the superhero genre of comic books. Action Comics No. 1 had a price of $0.10 and was 64 pages.
After the United States entered World War II in December 1941, the federal government imposed price controls to try to limit the inflation caused by the surge in spending to fight the war. Rising costs of producing comic books, combined with the difficulty in raising prices because of the controls, led comic book publishers to engage in shrinkflation. In 1943, the publishers reduced the number of pages in their comics from 64 to 56. In 1944, the publishers engaged in further shrinkflation, reducing the number of pages from 56 to 48.
In 1951, during the Korean War, the federal government again imposed price controls. Comic book publishers responded with further shrinkflation, keeping the price at $0.10, while reducing the number of pages from 48 to 40. In 1954, they shrank the number of pages to 36, which remains the most common number of pages in a comic book today. At that time, the publishers also slightly reduced the width of comics from 7 3/4 inches to 7 1/8 inches. (Today the typical comic book has a width of 6 7/8 inches.)
By the late 1950s, comic book publishers became convinced that they would be better off raising the prices of comic books rather than further shrinking the number of pages. But they were reluctant to raise their prices because they had been a constant $0.10 for more than 20 years, so children and their parents might react very negatively to a price increase, and because no firm wanted to be the first to raise its price for fear of losing sales to its competitors. They were caught in a prisoner’s dilemma: Comic book publishers would all have been better off if they had raised their prices but the antitrust laws kept them from colluding to raise prices and no individual firm had an incentive to raise prices alone. (We discuss collusion, prisoner’s dilemmas, and other aspects of oligopolistic firm behaviour in Chapter 14 of Microeconomics and Economics.)
The most successful publisher in the 1950s was Dell, which sold very popular comic books featuring Donald Duck, Uncle Scrooge, and other characters that particularly appealed to younger children. Because the prices of Dell’s comic books, like those of other publishers, been unchanged at $0.10 since the late 1930s, the firm didn’t have a clear idea of the price elasticity of demand for its comics. In 1957, the firm’s managers decided to use a market experiment to gather data on the price elasticity of demand. In most cities, Dell kept the price of its comics at $0.10, but in some cities it sold the identical comics at a price of $0.15.
The experiment lasted from March 1957 to August 1958 when the company discontinued it by reverting to selling all of its comics for $0.10. Although we lack the data necessary to compare the sales of Dell comics with a $0.15 price to the sales of Dell comics with a $0.10 price, the fact that no other publisher raised its prices during that period and that Dell abandoned the experiment indicates that the demand curve for Dell’s comics was price elastic—the percentage decline in the quantity sold was greater than the 50 percent increase in price—so Dell’s revenue from sales in the cities selling comics with a price of $0.15 likely declined. Dell’s strategy can be seen as a failed example of price leadership. (We discuss the relationship between the price elasticity of demand for a good and the total revenue a firm earns from selling the good in Chapter 6, Section 6.3 of Microeconomics and Economics. We discuss price leadership in Microeconomic and Economics, Chapter 14, Section 14.2.)
In March 1961, Dell increased the price of all of its comics from $0.10 to $0.15. At first, Dell’s competitors kept the prices of their comics at $0.10. As a result, in September 1961, Dell cut the price of its comics from $0.15 to $0.12. By early 1962, Dell’s competitors, including DC Comics, Marvel Comics—publishers of Spider-Man and the Fantastic Four—along with several smaller publishers, had increased the prices of their comics from $0.10 to $0.12. The managers at DC decided that raising the price of comics after having kept it constant for so long required an explantion. Accordingly, they printed the following letter in each of their comics.
H/T to Buddy Saunders for the image.
Comic book publishers have raised their prices many times since the early 1960s, with most comics currently having a price of $4.99. During the recent period of high inflation, comic publishers did not use a strategy of shrinkflation perhaps because they believe that 36 pages is the minimum number that buyers will accept.
The first 25 years of the comic book industry represents an interesting historical example of shrinkflation.
On Friday, February 2, Apple released Vision Pro, its long-awaited, much discussed virtual reality (VR) headset. The Vision Pro headset allows users to experience either VR, in which the user sees only virtual objects, as for instance when the user sees only images from a video game; or augmented reality (AR), in which the user sees virtual objects, such as icon apps or web pages superimposed on the real world (as in the two photos below). Apple refers to people using the headsets as being engaged in “spatial computing” and sometimes refers to the headsets as “face computers.”
Photo from Apple via the Wall Street Journal.
Photo from Apple via the Wall Street Journal.
Vision Pro has a price of $3,499, which can increase to more than $4,000 when including the cost of the insert necessary for anyone who wears prescription eyeglasses or contact lenses and who chooses to buy additional storage capacity. The price is much higher than Meta’s Quest Pro VR headset (shown in the photo below), which has a price of $999.
Photo from meta.com.
In this post, we can briefly discuss some of the economic issues raised by the Vision Pro. First, why would Apple charge such a high price? In her review of the Vision Pro in the Wall Street Journal, Joanna Stern, the site’s personal technology writer, speculated that: “You’re probably not going to buy the $3,500 Apple Vision Pro. Unless you’re an app developer or an Apple die-hard ….”
There are several reasons why Apple may believe that a price of $3,499 is profit maximizing. But we should bear in mind that pricing any new product is difficult because firms lack good data on the demand curve and are unsure how consumers will respond to changes in price. In our new ninth edition of Economics and Microeconomics, in Chapter 6 on price elasticity we discuss how Elon Musk and managers at Tesla experimented with the cutting the price of the Model 3 car as they attempted to discover the effect on price changes on the quantity demanded. Managers at Apple are in similar situation of lacking good data on how many headsets they are likely to sell at $3,499.
If Apple lacks good data on how consumers are likely to respond to different prices, why pick a price four times as high as Meta is charging for its Quest Pro VR headsets?
First, Apple expects to be able to clearly differentiate its headset from Meta’s headset. If consumers considered the two headsets to be close substitutes, the large price difference would make it unlikely that Apple would sell many headsets. Apple has several marketing advantages over Meta that make it likely that Apple can convince many consumers that the Meta headset is not a close substitute for the Vision Pro:
Apple has a history of selling popular electronic products, such as the iPhone, iPad, Air Pods, and the Apple Watch. It also owns the most popular app store. Apple has succeeded in seamlessly integrating these electronic products with each other and with use of the app store. As a result, a significant number of consumers have a strong preference for Apple products over competitors. Meta has a much more limited history of selling popular electronic products. For instance, it doesn’t produce its own smartphone.
Apple has an extensive network of retail stores inside and outside of the United States. The stores have been successful in giving consumers a chance to try a new electronic product before buying it and to receive help at the stores’ Genius Bars with setting up the device or dealing with any later problems. Meta operates few retail stores, relying instead on selling through other retailers, such as Best Buy, or through its online site. For some consumers Meta’s approach is less desirable than Apple’s.
Second, as we discuss in Economics and Microeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5, charging a high price for a new electronic product is common, partly because doing so allows firms to price discriminate across time. With this strategy, firms charge a higher price for a product when it is first introduced and a lower price later. Some consumers are early adopters who will pay a high price to be among the first to own certain new products. Early adopers are a particularly large segment of buyers of Apple products, with long lines often forming at Apple stores on the days when a new product is released. That firms price discriminate over time helps explain why products such as Blu-ray players and 4K televisions sold for very high prices when they were first introduced. After the demand of the early adopters was satisfied, the companies reduced prices to attract more price-sensitive customers. For example, the price of Blu-ray players dropped by 95 percent within five years of their introduction. Similarly, we can expect that Apple will cut the price of Vision Pro significantly over time.
Third, because Apple is initially producing a relatively small number of units, it is likely experiencing a high average cost of producing the Vision Pro. The production of the components of the headset and the final assembly are likely to be subject to large economies of scale. (We discuss economies of scale in Economics and Microeconomics, Chapter 11, Section 11.6.) Apple hasn’t released information on how many units of the headset it intends to produce during 2024, but estimates are that it will be fewer than 400,000 and perhaps as few as 180,000. (Estimates can be found here, here, and here.) Compare that number to the 235 million iPhones Apple sold during 2023. We would expect as Apple’s suppliers increase their production runs, the average cost of production will decline as Apple moves down its long-run average cost curve. As a result, over time Apple is likely to cut the price.
In addition, when producing a new good, firms often experience learning as managers better understand the most efficient way to produce and assemble the new good. For example, the best method of assembling iPhones may not be the best method of assembling headsets, but this fact may only become clear after assembling several thousand headsets. Apple is likely to experience a learning curve with the average cost of producing headsets declining as the total number of headsets produced increases. While economies of scale involve a movement down a static long-run average cost curve, learning results in the long-run average cost curve shifting down. This second reason why Apple’s average cost of producing headsets will decline contributes to the liklihood that Apple will cut the price of the Vision Pro over time.
Finally, we can discuss a key factor that will determine how successful Apple is in selling headsets. In Chapter 11 of the new ninth edition of Economics and Microeconomics, we have a new Apply the Concept, “Mark Zuckerberg … Alone in the Metaverse?” In that feature, we note that Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg has invested heavily in the metaverse, a word that typically means software programs that allow people to access either AR or VR images and information. Zuckerberg believed so strongly in the importance of the metaverse that he changed the name of the company from Facebook to Meta. The metaverse, which is accessed using headsets likes Meta’s Quest Pro or Apple’s Vision Pro, is subject to large network externalities—the usefulness of the headsets increases with the number of consumers who use them. The network externalities arise because many software applications, such as Meta’s Horizon World, depend on interactions among users and so are not very useful when there aren’t many users.
Meta hasn’t sold as many headsets as they expected because they have had difficulty attracting enough users to make their existing software useful and the failure to have enough users has reduced the incentive for other firms to develop apps for Meta’s headsets. Initially, some reviewers made similar comments about Apple’s Vision Pro. For instance, even though streaming films in 3D is one of the uses that Apple promotes, some streaming services, including Netflix and YouTube, have not yet released apps for Vision Pro. Some important business related apps, such as FaceTime and Zoom, aren’t yet available. There are also currently no workout apps. As one reviewer put it “there are few great apps” for Vision Pro. Another reviewer wondered whether the lack of compelling software and apps might result in the Vision Pro headset suffering the fate of “every headset I test [which] ends up in my closet collecting dust.”
So, a key to the success of the Vision Pro will be the ability of Apple to attract enough users to exploit the network externalities that exist with VR/AR headsets. If successful, the Vision Pro may represent an important development in the transition to spatial computing.
An electric vehicle (EV) charging station. (Photo from the Associated Press via the Wall Street Journal.)
Secretary of Energy Jennifer Granholm recently took a road trip in a caravan of electric vehicles (EVs). The road trip “was intended to draw attention to the billions of dollars the White House is pouring into green energy and clean cars.” A reporter for National Public Radio (NPR) went on the trip and wrote an article on her experience.
One conclusion the reporter drew was: “Riding along with Granholm, I came away with a major takeaway: EVs that aren’t Teslas have a road trip problem, and the White House knows it’s urgent to solve this issue.” The problem was that charging stations are less available and less likely to be functioning than would be needed for a road trip in an EV to be as smooth as a similar trip in a gasoline-powered car. The reporter noted that in her experience with her own EV: “I use multiple apps to find chargers, read reviews to make sure they work and plot out convenient locations for a 30-minute pit stop (a charger by a restaurant, for instance, instead of one located at a car dealership).”
EVs exhibit network externalities. As we discuss in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 10, 10.3 (Essentials of Economics, Chapter 7, Section 7.3), Network externalities are a situation in which the usefulness of a product increases with the number of consumers who use it. For example, the more iPhones people buy, the more profit firms and individuals can earn by creating apps for the iPhone. And the more apps that are available, the more useful an iPhone becomes to people who use it.
In this blog post, we discuss how Mark Zuckerberg’s Meta Platforms (which was originally named Facebook) has had difficulty selling Oculus augmented reality headsets. Many people have been reluctant to buy these headsets because they don’t believe there are enough software programs available to use the headsets with. Software designers don’t have much incentive to produce such programs because not many consumers own a headset necessary to use the programs.
The difficulty that Meta has experienced with augmented reality headsets can be overcome if the product is sufficiently useful that consumers are willing to buy it even if complementary products are not yet available. That was the case with the iPhone, which experienced strong sales even before Apple opened its app store. Or to take an historical example relevant to the current situation with EVs: When the Ford Motor Company introduced the Model T car in the early twentieth century, many people found that owning a car was such an advance over using a horse-drawn vehicle that they were willing to buy one despite there being realtively few gas stations and repair shops available. Because so many cars were being sold, entrepreneurs had an incentive to begin opening gas stations and repair shops, which increased the attractiveness of using a car, thereby further increasing demand.
As the NPR reporter’s experience shows, consumers choosing between buying an EV or a gasoline-powered car are in a situation similar to that faced by early twentieth century consumers in choosing between cars and horse-drawn vehicles. One difference between the two situations is that Congress and the Biden administration are attempting to ease the transition to EVs by subsidizing the construction of charging stations and by providing tax credits to people who buy EVs.
In October 2021, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg did something unusual–he changed the name of the company from Facebook, Inc. to Meta Platforms, Inc. According to Zuckerberg, he did so because he said, “Over time I hope our company will be seen as a metaverse company.” What is the metaverse? Definitions differ, but it typically refers to software programs that allow people to access either augmented reality (AR) or virtual reality (VR) images and information.
In both AR and VR, people wear headsets, goggles, or glasses to see images and information displayed. In VR, you wear goggles and have to remain stationary because your whole field of vision is a digital projection, so if you walk around you run the risk of tripping over furniture or other obstacles. With AR, you can walk through the physical world because your goggles display only limited amounts of information.
For example, Peggy Johnson, CEO of Magic Leap describes the device her firm sells this way: “You wear it over your eyes. You can actually think of it as a computer on your eyes. And you still see your physical world around you, but we place digital content very smartly in that physical world.” Among other uses, Magic Leap’s device can help to train a worker to use a new piece of equipment by overlaying a virtual version of the equipment over the actual piece of equipment. The virtual version would place instructions in the worker’s field of view. That worker would be in the metaverse.
While Meta has been selling Oculus AR headsets, Zuckerberg has focused more on VR than on AR. An article in the Wall Street Journal described the VR metaverse that Zuckerberg is hoping to help build: “Eventually, the idea is that people will be able to do almost anything in the metaverse: go shopping, attend school, participate in work meetings.” They would do these things while sitting at their desk or armchair. Meta’s first significant VR product was Horizon Worlds. On Horizon, after choosing an avatar, or virtual figure that represents you, you can shop, play games, or hang out with other people. You enter Horizon by using Meta’s Quest VR headset, which has a price of $400 to $700, depending on the headset’s configuration. Meta set a goal of having 500,000 monthly users of Horizon by the end of 2022 but ended the year with only around 200,000 active users.
Horizon’s main problem seems to have been that the app was subject to large network externalities. As we discuss in Chapter 10, Section 10.3 of Economics and Microeconomics, network externalities describe the situation in which the usefulness of a product increases with the number of consumers who use it. The Horizon app is enjoyable to use only if many other people are using it. But because few people regularly use the app, many new users don’t find it enjoyable and soon stop using it. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, in late 2022, “Most visitors to Horizon generally don’t return to the app after the first month … there are rarely any girls in the Hot Girl Summer Rooftop Pool Party, and in Murder Village there is often no one to kill. Even the company’s showcase worlds… are mostly barren of users.” Reality Labs, the division of Meta in charge of Horizon, the Quest headset, and other metaverse projects, had total losses of $27 billion by the end of 2022. The losses were partly the result of Meta selling Quest headsets for a price below the cost of producing them in an attempt to get more people to use Horizon.
Zuckerberg peisists in believing that the firm’s future lies with the metaverse and continues to spend billions on metaverse projects. Investors aren’t convinced that this strategy will work because, as an article on economist.com put it in early 2023: “Few people are burning to migrate to the metaverse.” As investors’ became more skeptical of Zuckerberg’s strategy, Meta’s stock price declined by more than half between the fall of 2021 and early 2023. To be successful in its metaverse strategy, Meta will eventually have to attract enough buyers of its Quest headsets and users of its Horizon app to begin taking advantage of network externalities.
Source: Dylan Croll, “Magic Leap CEO Peggy Johnson on the AR revolution,” news.yahoo. com, January 4, 2023; “Things Are Looking Up for Meta,” economist.com, February 3, 2023; “How Much Trouble Is Mark Zuckerberg In?” economist.com, October 16, 2022; Jeff Horwitz, Salvador Rodriguez, and Meghan Bobrowsky, “Company Documents Show Meta’s Flagship Metaverse Falling Short,” Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2022; Sarah E. Needleman, “Facebook Changes Company Name to Meta in Focus on Metaverse,” Wall Street Journal, October 28, 2021; Meghan Bobrowsky and Sarah E. Needleman, “What is the Metaverse? The Future Vision for the Internet,” Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2022.
In the Apply the Concept “Trying to Use the Apple Approach to Save J.C. Penney” in Chapter 10, Section 10.4 in both Microeconomics and Economics, we discussed how Ron Johnson had been successful as head of Apple’s retail stores but failed when he was hired as CEO of J. C. Penney. Insights from behavioral economics indicate that Johnson made a mistake in eliminating Penney’s previous strategy of keeping prices high but running frequent sales. Although Penney’s “every day prices” under Johnson were lower than they had been under the previous management, many consumers failed to recognize that fact and began shopping elsewhere.
Johnson’s experience may indicate the dangers of changing a firm’s long-standing business model. Customers at brick-and-mortar retail stores fall into several categories: Some people shop in a number of stores, depending on which store has the lowest price on the particular product they’re looking for; some shop only for products such as televisions or appliances that they hesitate to buy from Amazon or other online sites; while others shop primarily in the store that typically meets their needs with respect to location, selection of products, and pricing. It’s the last category of customer that was most likely to stop shopping at Penney because of Johnson’s new pricing policy because they were accustomed to primarily buying products that were on sale.
Bed Bath & Beyond was founded in 1971 by Warren Eisenberg and Leonard Feinstein. As the name indicates, it has focused on selling household goods—sometimes called “home goods”—such as small appliances, towels, and sheets. It was perhaps best known for mailing massive numbers of 20 percent off coupons, printed on thin blue cardboard and nicknamed Big Blue, to households nationwide. Although by 2019, the firm was operating more than 1,500 stores in the United States, some investors were concerned that Bed Bath & Beyond could be run more profitably. In March 2019, the firm’s board of directors replaced the current CEO with Mark Tritton who had helped make Target stores very profitable.
In an approach similar to the one Ron Johnson had used at J.C. Penney, Tritton cut back on the number of coupons sent out, reorganized the stores to reduce the number of different products available for sale, and replaced some name brand goods with so-called private-label brands produced by Bed Bath & Beyond. Unfortunately, Tritton’s strategy was a failure and the firm, which had been profitable in 2018, suffered losses each year between 2019 and 2022. The losses totaled almost $1.5 billion. In June 2022, the firm’s board of directors replaced Tritton with Sue Grove who had been serving on the board.
Why did Tritton’s strategy fail? Partly because in March 2020, the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic forced the closure of many Bed Bath & Beyond stores. Unlike some other chains, Bed Bath & Beyond’s web site struggled to fulfill online orders. The firm also never developed a system that would have made it easy for customers to order goods online and pick them up at the curb of their retail stores. That approach helped many competitors maintain sales during the pandemic. Covid-19 also disrupted the supply chains that Tritton was depending on to produce the private-label brands he was hoping to sell in large quantities.
But the larger problems with Tritton’s strategy would likely have hurt Bed Bath & Beyond even if there had been no pandemic. Tritton thought the stores were too cluttered, particularly in comparison with Target stores, so he reduced the number of products for sale. It turned out, though, that many of Bed Bath & Beyond’s most loyal customers liked searching through the piles of goods on the shelves. One customer was quoted as saying, “I used to find so many things that I didn’t need, that I’d end up buying anyway, like July 4th-themed corn holders.” Customers who preferred to shop in less cluttered stores were likely to already be shopping elsewhere. And it turned out that many Bed Bath & Beyond customers preferred national brands and switched to shopping elsewhere when Tritton replaced those brands with private-label brands. Finally, many customers were accustomed to shopping at Bed Bath & Beyond shortly after receiving a Big Blue 20 percent off coupon. Sending out fewer coupons meant fewer trips to Bed Bath & Beyond by those customers.
In a manner similar to what happened to Johnson in his overhaul of the Penney department stores, Tritton’s changes to Bed Bath & Beyond’s business model caused many existing customer to shop elsewhere while attracting relatively few new customers. An article in the Wall Street Journal quoted an industry analyst as concluding: “Mark Tritton entered the business and ripped up its playbook. But the strategy he replaced it with was not tested and nowhere near sharp enough to compensate for the loss of traditional customers.”
Sources: Jeanette Neumann, “Bed Bath & Beyond Traced an Erratic Path to Its Current Crisis,” bloomberg.com, September 29, 2022; Kelly Tyko, “What to expect at Bed Bath & Beyond closing store sales,” axios.com September 22, 2022; Inti Pacheco and Jodi Xu Klein, “Bed Bath & Beyond to Close 150 Stores, Cut Staff, Sell Shares to Raise Cash,” Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2022; Suzanne Kapner and Dean Seal, “Bed Bath & Beyond CEO Mark Tritton Exits as Sales Plunge,” Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2022; Suzanne Kapner, “Bed Bath & Beyond Followed a Winning Playbook—and Lost,” Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2022; and Ron Lieber, “An Oral History of the World’s Biggest Coupon,” New York Times, November 3, 2021.
Supports: Microeconomics, Chapter 6, Section 6.3 and Chapter 10, Section 10.3, Economics Chapter 6, Section 6.3 and Chapter 10, Section 10.3, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 7, Section 7.4 and Section 7.7.
In August 2022, an article in the Wall Street Journal discussed the Disney Company increasing the prices it charges for admission to its Disneyland and Walt Disney World theme parks. As a result of the price increases, “For the quarter that ended July 2 [2022], the business unit that includes the theme parks … posted record revenue of $5.42 billion and record operating income of $1.65 billion.” The increase in revenue occurred even though “attendance at Disney’s U.S. parks fell by 17% compared with the previous year….”
The article also contains the following observations about Disney’s ticket price increases:
“Disney’s theme-park pricing is determined by ‘pure supply and demand,’ said a company spokeswoman.”
“[T]he changes driving the increases in revenue and profit have drawn the ire of what Disney calls ‘legacy fans,’ or longtime parks loyalists.”
Briefly explain what must be true of the demand for tickets to Disney’s theme parks if its revenue from ticket sales increased even though 17 percent fewer tickets were sold. [For the sake of simplicity, ignore any other sources of revenue Disney earns from its theme parks apart from ticket sales.]
In Chapter 10, Section 10.3 the textbook discusses social influences on decision making, in particular, the business implications of fairness. Briefly discuss whether the analysis in that section is relevant as Disney determines the prices for tickets to its theme parks.
Solving the Problem
Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the effects of price increases on firms’ revenues and on whether firms should pay attention the possibility that consumers might be concerned about fairness when making their consumption decisions, so you may want to review Chapter 6, Section 6.3, “The Relationship between Price Elasticity of Demand and Total Revenue” and Chapter 10, Section 10.3, “Social Influences on Decision Making,” particularly the topic “Business Implications of Fairness.”
Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining what must be true of the demand for tickets to Disney’s theme parks if revenue from ticket sales increased even though Disney sold fewer tickets. Assuming that the demand curve for tickets to Disney’s theme parks is unchanged, a decline in the quantity of tickets sold will result in a move up along the demand curve for tickets, raising the price of tickets. Only if the demand curve for theme park tickets is price inelastic will the revenue Disney receives from ticket sales increase when the price of tickets increases. Revenue increases in this situation because with an inelastic demand curve, the percentage increase in price is greater than the percentage decrease in quantity demanded.
Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining whether the textbook’s discussion of the business implications of fairness is relevant as Disney as determines ticket prices. Section 10.3 may be relevant to Disney’s decisions because the section discusses that firms sometimes take consumer perceptions of fairness into account when deciding what prices to charge. Note that ordinarily economists assume that the utility consumers receive from a good or service depends only on the attributes of the good or service and is not affected by the price of the good or service. Of course, in making decisions on which goods and services to buy with their available income, consumers take price into account. But consumers take price into account by comparing the marginal utilities of products realtive to their prices, with the marginal utilities assumed not to be affected by the prices.
In other words, a consumer considering buying a ticket to Disney World will compare the marginal utility of visiting Disney World relative to the price of the ticket to the marginal utility of other goods and services relative to their prices. The consumer’s marginal utility from spending a day in Disney World will not be affected by whether he or she considers the price of the ticket to be unfairly high.
The textbook gives examples, though, of cases where a business may fail to charge the price that would maximize short-run profit because the business believes consumers would see the price as unfair, which might cause them to be unwilling to buy the product in the future. For instance, restaurants frequently don’t increase their prices during a particularly busy night, even though doing so would increase the profit they earn on that night. They are afraid that if they do so, some customers will consider the restaurants to have acted unfairly and will stop eating in the restaurants. Similarly, the National Football League doesn’t charge a price that would cause the quantity of Super Bowl tickets demanded to be equal to the fixed supply of seats available at the game because it believes that football fans would consider it unfair to do so.
The Wall Street Journal article quotes a Disney spokeswomen as saying that the company sets the price of tickets according to demand and supply. That statement seems to indicate that Disney is charging the price that will maximize the short-run profit the company earns from selling theme park tickets. But the article also indicates that many of Disney’s long-time ticket buyers are apparently upset at the higher prices Disney has been charging. If these buyers consider Disney’s prices to be unfair, they may in the future stop buying tickets.
In other words, it’s possible that Disney might find itself in a situation in which it has increased its profit in the short run at the expense of its profit in the long run. The managers at Disney might consider sacrificing some profit in the long run to increase profit in the short run an acceptable trade-off, particularly because it’s difficult for the company to know whether in fact many of its customers will in the future stop buying admission tickets because they believe current ticket prices to be unfairly high.
Sources: Robbie Whelan and Jacob Passy, “Disney’s New Pricing Magic: More Profit From Fewer Park Visitors,” Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2022.
Buying athletic shoes and reselling them for a higher price has become a popular way for some people to make money. The mostly young entrepreneurs involved in this business are often called sneakerheads. Note that economists call buying a product at a low price and reselling it at a high price arbitrage. The profits received from engaging in arbitrage are called arbitrage profits. One estimate puts the total value of sneakers being resold at $2 billion per year.
Why would anybody buy sneakers from a sneakerhead that they could buy at a lower price online or from a retail store? Most people wouldn’t, which is why most sneakerheads resell only shoes that shoe manufacturers like Nike or Adidas produce in limited quantities—typically fewer than 50,000 pairs. To obtain the shoes, shoe resellers use two main strategies: (1) waiting in line at retail stores on the day that a new limited quantity shoe will be introduced, or (2) buying shoes online using a software application called a bot. A bot speeds up a buyer’s checkout process for an online sale. Typical customers buying at an online shoe site take a few minutes to choose a size, fill in their addresses, and provide their credit card information. But a few minutes is enough time for shoe resellers using bots to buy all of the newly-released shoes available on the site.
In addition to reselling shoes on their own sites, many sneakerheads use dedicated resale sites like StockX and GOAT. These sites have greatly increased the liquidity of sneakers, or the ease with which sneakers can be resold. In effect, limited-edition sneakers have become an asset like stocks, bonds, or gold because they can be bought and sold in the secondary market that exists on the online resale sites. (We discuss the concepts of primary and secondary markets for assets in Macroeconomics, Chapter 6, Section 6.2 and in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 8, Section 8.2.)
An article in the New York Times gives an example of the problems that bots can cause for retail shoe stores. Bodega, a shoe store in Boston, offered the limited-edition New Balance 997S sneaker on its online site. Ten minutes later, the shoe was sold out. One of the store’s owner was quoted as saying: “We got destroyed by bots. It was making it impossible for our average customers to even have a shot at the shoes.” Although the store had a policy of allowing customers to buy a maximum of three pairs of shoes, shoe resellers were able to get around the policy by having shoes shipped to their friends’ addresses or by having a group of people coordinate their purchases. An article on bloomberg.com described how one reseller along with 15 of his friends used bots to buy 600 pairs of Adidas’s Yeezy sneakers from an online site on the morning the sneakers were released. Adidas has a rule that each customer can buy only one pair of its limited-edition shoes, but the company has trouble enforcing the rule.
Shopify and other firms have developed software that retailers can use to make it difficult for resellers to use bots on the retailers’ sites. But the developers of bot software have often been able to modify the bots to get around the defenses used by the anti-bot software.
In contrast with owners of retail stores, Nike, Adidas, New Balance, and the other shoe manufacturers have a more mixed reaction to sneakerheads using bots scooping up most pairs of limited-edition shoes shortly after the shoes are released. Like the owners of retail stores, the shoe manufacturers know that they risk upsetting the typical customer if the customer can only buy hot new shoe releases from resellers at prices well above the original retail price. But an active resale market increases the demand for shoes, just as individual investors increased their demand for individual stocks when it became possible to easily buy and sell stocks online using sites like TD Ameritrade, E*Trade, and Fidelity. So manufacturers benefit from knowing that most of their limited-edition shoes will sell out. One industry analyst singled out “The durability of Nike’s … ability to fuel the sneaker resale ecosystem ….” as a particular strength of the company. In addition, manufacturers may believe that the publicity about limited edition shoes rapidly selling out may spill over to increased demand for other shoes the manufacturers sell. (In Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 10, Section 10.3 we note that some consumers may receive utility from buying goods that are widely seen as popular and fashionable.)
In the long run, is it possible for sneakerheads to make a profit reselling shoes? It seems unlikely for the reasons we discuss in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 12, Section 12.5. The barriers to entry in reselling sneakers are very low. Anyone can list shoes for sale on StockX or one of the other resale sites. Waiting in line in front of a retail store on the day a new shoe is released is something that anyone who is willing to accept the opportunity cost of the time lost can do. Similarly, bots that can be used to scoop up newly released shoes from online sites are widely available for sale. So, we would expect that in the long run entry into sneaker reselling will compete away any economic profit that sneakerheads were earning.
In fact, by the summer of 2022, prices on reselling sites were falling. In just the month of June, the average price of sneakers listed on StockX declined by 20 percent. Resellers who had stockpiled shoes waiting for prices to increase were instead selling them because they feared that prices would go even lower. And new limited-edition shoes were taking longer to sell out. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, “A pair of Air Jordans released on July 13 [2022] that might have once vanished in minutes took days to sell out from Nike Inc.’s virtual shelves.” One reseller quoted in the Wall Street Journal article indicated that entry was the reason that prices were falling: “You don’t want prices to go down, but they’re going down anyways, just because of how many people are selling in general.”
Although a seemingly unusual market, sneaker reselling is subject to the same rules of competition that we see in other markets.
Sources: Inti Pacheco, “Flipping Air Jordans Is No Longer a Slam Dunk,” Wall Street Journal, July 23, 2022; Shoshy Ciment, “Sneaker Reselling Side Hustle: Your Guide to Making Thousands Flipping Hyped Pairs of Dunks, Jordans, and Yeezys,” businessinsider.com, May 3, 2022; Teresa Rivas, “A Strong Sneaker-Resale Market Is Another Boon for Nike,” barrons.com, May 24, 2022; Curtis Bunn, “Sneakers Are So Hot, Resellers Are Making a Living Off of Coveted Models,” nbcnews.com, October 23, 2021; Daisuke Wakabayashi, “The Fight for Sneakers,” New York Times, October 15, 2021; and Joshua Hunt, “Sneakerheads Have Turned Jordans and Yeezys Into a Bona Fide Asset Class,” bloomberg.com, February 15, 2021.
Photo of Russian President Vladimir Putin from the Wall Street Journal.
On February 24, when Russian President Vladimir Putin launched an assault on Ukraine he apparently expected within a few days to achieve his main objectives, including occupying the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv and replacing the Ukrainian government. After three weeks, the fierce resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces have resulted in his failing to achieve these objectives. Although the Russian military had expected to experience few casualties or losses of equipment, in fact Russia has already lost more military personnel killed than the United States has since 2001 in Afghanistan and Iraq combined, as well as experiencing the destruction of many tanks, planes, and other equipment.
The United States, the European Union, and other countries have imposed economic sanctions on Russia that have reduced the country’s ability to import or export most goods, other than oil and natural gas. The sanctions have the potential to reduce the standard of living of the average Russian citizen.
Most importantly, the war has killed thousands of Ukrainians and inflicted horrendous damage on many Ukrainian cities.
Despite all this, is Putin’s persistence in the invasion rational or if he were acting rationally would he instead withdraw his troops or accept a political comprise (at this writing, negotiations between representatives of Russia and Ukraine are continuing)? First, recall the economic definition of rationality: People are rational when they take actions that are appropriate to achieve their goals given the information available to them. (We discuss rationality in Microeconomics, Chapter 10, Section 10.4, and in Economics, Chapter 10, Section 10.4.) Note that rationality does not deal with whether a person’s goals are good or bad. In this discussion, we are considering whether Putin is acting rationally in attempting to achieve the—immoral—goal of subjugating a foreign country.
Peter Coy, a columnist for the New York Times, discusses three reasons Putin may continue his attack on Ukraine even though, “The bloody invasion of Ukraine has been a disaster” for Putin. The first reason, Coy recognizes, involves an economic concept. His other two reasons can also be understood within the economic framework we employ in Microeconomics.
First, Coy argues that Putin may have fallen into one of the pitfalls to decision making we discuss in Chapter 10: A failure to ignore sunk costs. Coy notes that Putin may want to continue the attack to justify the death and destruction that has already occurred. However, those costs are sunk because no subsequent action Putin takes can reduce them. If Putin is continuing the attack for this reason, then Coy is correct that Putin is not acting rationally because he is failing to ignore sunk costs in making his decision.
There is a subtle point, though, that Coy may be overlooking: Putin is effectively a dictator, but he may still believe he needs to avoid Russian public opinion turning too sharply against him. In that case, even if recognizes that he should ignore sunk costs he may believe that the Russian public may not be willing to ignore the costs of the death and destruction that has already occurred. In that case, his refusal to ignore this sunk cost be rational.
Coy’s second reason why Putin may continue the attack is that he may believe “just another few weeks of fighting will be enough to subdue Ukraine.” Although Coy doesn’t discuss the point in these terms, it would be rational for Putin to continue the attack if he believes that the marginal benefit of doing so exceeds the marginal cost. (We discuss this point directly in Chapter 1, Section 1.1 “Optimal Decisions Are Made at the Margin,” and provided many examples throughout the text.) The marginal cost includes the additional Russian military casualties and losses of equipment from prolonging the war and the cost of economic sanctions to the Russian economy. (It seems unlikely that Putin is taking into account the additional loss of life among Ukrainians and the additional devastation to Ukrainian cities from prolonging the war.)
The marginal benefit from continuing the attack would be either winning the war or obtaining a more favorable peace settlement in negotiations with the Ukrainian government. If Putin believes that the marginal benefit is greater than the marginal cost, he is acting rationally in continuing to attack.
Coy’s final reason why Putin may continue the attack is that “he has little to lose by fighting on.” Although Coy doesn’t discuss the point in these terms, Russia may be suffering from a principal-agent problem. As we discuss in Microeconomics, Chapter 8, Section 8.1 (also Economics, Chapter 8, Section 8.1 and Macroeconomics, Chapter 6, Section 6.1) the principal-agent problem arises when an agent pursues the agent’s interst rather than the interests of the principal in whose behalf the agent is supposed to act. In this case, Putin is the agent and the Russian people are the principal. Putin’s own interest may be in prolonging the war indefinitely in the hopes of ultimately winning, despite the additional Russian soldiers who will be wounded or killed and despite the economic suffering of the Russian people resulting from the sanctions.
Although as president of Russia, Putin should be acting in the best interests of the Russian people, as a dictator, he can largely disregard their interests. Unlike his soldiers, Putin isn’t exposed to the personal dangers of being in battle. And unlike the average Russian, Putin will not suffer a decline in his standard of living because of economic sanctions.
Appalling as the consequences will be, Putin’s continuing his attack on Ukraine may be rational.
Sources: Peter Coy, “Here Are Three Reasons Putin Might Fight On,” New York Times, March 14, 2022; Alan Cullison, “Talks to End Ukraine War Pause as Russia’s Offensive Intensifies,” Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2022; and Thomas Grove, “Russia’s Military Chief Promised Quick Victory in Ukraine, but Now Faces a Potential Quagmire,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2022.
Inflation as measured by the percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI) from the same month in the previous year was 7.9 percent in February 2022, the highest rate since January 1982—near the end of the Great Inflation that began in the late 1960s. The following figure shows inflation in the new motor vehicle component of the CPI. The 12.4 percent increase in new car prices was the largest since April 1975.
The increase in new car prices was being driven partly by increases in aggregate demand resulting from the highly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies enacted in response to the economic disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, and partly from shortages of semiconductors and some other car components, which reduced the supply of new cars.
As the following figure shows, inflation in used car prices was even greater. With the exception of June and July of 2021, the 41.2 percent increase in used car prices in February 2022 was the largest since the Bureau of Labor Statistics began publishing these data in 1954.
Because used cars are a substitute of new cars, rising prices of new cars caused an increase in demand for used cars. In addition, the supply of used cars was reduced because car rental firms, such as Enterprise and Hertz, had purchased fewer new cars during the worst of the pandemic and so had fewer used cars to sell to used car dealers. Increased demand and reduced supply resulted in the sharp increase in the price of used cars.
Another factor increasing the prices consumers were paying for cars was a reduction in bargaining—or haggling—over car prices. Traditionally, most goods and services are sold at a fixed price. For example, some buying a refrigerator usually pays the posted price charged by Best Buy, Lowes, or another retailer. But houses and cars have been an exception, with buyers often negotiating prices that are lower than the seller was asking.
In the case of automobiles, by federal law, the price of a new car has to be posted on the car’s window. The posted price is called the Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP), often referred to as the sticker price. Typically, the sticker price represents a ceiling on what a consumer is likely to pay, with many—but not all—buyers negotiating for a lower price. Some people dislike the idea of bargaining over the price of a car, particularly if they get drawn into long negotiations at a car dealership. These buyers are likely to pay the sticker price or something very close to it.
As a result, car dealers have an opportunity to practice price discrimination: They charge buyers whose demand for cars is more price elastic lower prices and buyers whose demand is less price elastic higher prices. The car dealers are able to separate the two groups on the basis of the buyers willingness to haggle over the price of a car. (We discuss price discrimination in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5.) Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, the ability of car dealers to practice this form of price discrimination had been eroded by the availability of online car buying services, such as Consumer Reports’ “Build & Buy Service,” which allow buyers to compare competing price offers from local car dealers. There aren’t sufficient data to determine whether using an online buying service results in prices as low as those obtained by buyers willing to haggle over price face-to-face with salespeople in dealerships.
In any event, in 2022 most car buyers were faced with a different situation: Rather than serving as a ceiling on the price, the MSRP, had become a floor. That is, many buyers found that given the reduced supply of new cars, they had to pay more than the MSRP. As one buyer quoted in a Wall Street Journal article put it: “The rules have changed so dramatically…. [T]he dealer’s position is ‘This is kind of a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.’” According to the website Edmunds.com, in January 2021, only about 3 percent of cars were sold in the United States for prices above MSRP, but in January 2022, 82 percent were.
Car manufacturers are opposed to dealers charging prices higher than the MSRP, fearing that doing so will damage the car’s brand. But car manufacturers don’t own the dealerships that sell their cars. The dealerships are independently owned businesses, a situation that dates back to the beginning of the car industry in the early 1900s. Early automobile manufacturers, such as Henry Ford, couldn’t raise sufficient funds to buy and operate a nationwide network of car dealerships. The manufacturers often even had trouble financing the working capital—or the funds used to finance the daily operations of the firm—to buy components from suppliers, pay workers, and cover the other costs of manufacturing automobiles.
The manufacturers solved both problems by relying on a network of independent dealerships that would be given franchises to be the exclusive sellers of a manufacturer’s brand of cars in a given area. The local businesspeople who owned the dealerships raised funds locally, often from commercial banks. Manufacturers generally paid their suppliers 30 to 90 days after receiving shipments of components, while requiring their dealers to pay a deposit on the cars they ordered and to pay the balance due at the time the cars were delivered to the dealers. One historian of the automobile industry described the process:
The great demand for automobiles and the large profits available for [dealers], in the early days of the industry … enabled the producers to exact substantial advance deposits of cash for all orders and to require cash payment upon delivery of the vehicles …. The suppliers of parts and materials, on the other hand, extended book-account credit of thirty to ninety days. Thus the automobile producer had a month or more in which to assemble and sell his vehicles before the bills from suppliers became due; and much of his labor costs could be paid from dealers’ deposits.
The franchise system had some drawbacks for car manufacturers, however. A car dealership benefits from the reputation of the manufacturer whose cars it sells, but it has an incentive to free ride on that reputation. That is, if a local dealer can take an action—such as selling cars above the MSRP—that raises its profit, it has an incentive to do so even if the action damages the reputation of Ford, General Motors, or whichever firm’s cars the dealer is selling. Car manufacturers have long been aware of the problem of car dealers free riding on the manufacturer’s reputation. For instance, in the 1920s, Ford sent so-called road men to inspect Ford dealers to check that they had clean, well-lighted showrooms and competent repair shops in order to make sure the dealerships weren’t damaging Ford’s brand.
As we discuss in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 10, Section 10.3, consumers often believe it’s unfair of a firm to raise prices—such as a hardware store raising the prices of shovels after a snowstorm—when the increases aren’t the result of increases in the firm’s costs. Knowing that many consumers have this view, car manufacturers in 2022 wanted their dealers not to sell cars for prices above the MSRP. As an article in the Wall Street Journal put it: “Historically, car companies have said they disapprove of their dealers charging above MSRP, saying it can reflect poorly on the brand and alienate customers.”
But the car manufacturers ran into another consequence of the franchise system. Using a franchise system rather than selling cars through manufacturer owned dealerships means that there are thousands of independent car dealers in the United States. The number of dealers makes them an effective lobbying force with state governments. As a result, most states have passed state franchise laws that limit the ability of car manufacturers to control the actions of their dealers and sometimes prohibit car manufacturers from selling cars directly to consumers. Although Tesla has attained the right in some states to sell directly to consumers without using franchised dealers, Ford, General Motors, and other manufacturers still rely exclusively on dealers. The result is that car manufacturers can’t legally set the prices that their dealerships charge.
Will the situation of most people paying the sticker price—or more—for cars persist after the current supply chain problems are resolved? AutoNation is the largest chain of car dealerships in the United States. Recently, Mike Manley, the firm’s CEO, argued that the substantial discounts from the sticker price that were common before the pandemic are a thing of the past. He argued that car manufacturers were likely to keep production of new cars more closely in balance with consumer demand, reducing the number of cars dealers keep in inventory on their lots: “We will not return to excessively high inventory levels that depress new-vehicle margins.”
Only time will tell whether the situation facing car buyers in 2022 of having to pay prices above the MSRP will persist.
Sources: Mike Colias and Nora Eckert, “A New Brand of Sticker Shock Hits the Car Market,” Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2022; Nora Eckert and Mike Colias, “Ford and GM Warn Dealers to Stop Charging So Much for New Cars,” Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2022; Gabrielle Coppola, “Car Discounts Aren’t Coming Back After Pandemic, AutoNation Says,” bloomberg.com, February 9, 2022; cr.org/buildandbuy; Lawrence H. Seltzer, A Financial History of the American Automobile Industry, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1928; and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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