AI Analyzes an Economic Puzzle

Image generated by ChatGPT

People have collected sports cards for decades. For many years, the most sought-after and highest-priced example was a baseball card featuring Pittsburgh Pirates shortstop Honus Wagner. In the early twentieth century, baseball cards were often included in packs of cigarettes. In 1909, each pack of Sweet Caporal Cigarettes included a baseball card from what collectors call the T206 set. Although Wagner was a major star, relatively few of his cards were issued. That may have been because he was opposed to tobacco use and didn’t want his card to help sell cigarettes or because the tobacco company declined to pay him the fee he required. 

There are probably only 50 to 60 Wagner cards in existence. In August 2022, the Wagner card shown below sold at auction for $7.25 million, which was at the time a record.   

Image from goldin.co

This record was broken a few days later when the Topps rookie card for New York Yankees outfielder Mickey Mantle sold for $12.6 million.

Image from ha.com

A new record as the highest-priced sports card was set in August 2025, when a card featuring basketball stars Michael Jordan and Kobe Bryant sold for $12.932 million.

Image from ha.com

In recent years, collecting cards from trading card games (TCG) such as Magic: The Gathering, Yu-Gi-Oh!, and, especially, Pokémon has become increasingly popular. Collectors pay higher prices for cards that are in nicer condition. Accordingly, many collectors and dealers submit cards to grading companies that assign the cards a numerical grade, with 10 being the highest grade. The leading card grading company is Professional Sports Authenticator (PSA). Despite its name, PSA now grades more TCG cards than sports card. In 2025, PSA graded 11.5 million TCG cards and 7.7 million sports cards.

In February of this year, a rare PSA-graded 1998 Japanese Pikachu Illustrator Pokémon card with a perfect grade of 10 sold for $16.492 million.

Image from goldin.co

The increasing popularity of collecting TCG cards and the publicity from media reports of the high sales prices of some cards has led to a surge in submissions to card grading companies. PSA is the largest card grading company, grading nearly four times as many cards as its closest competitor. Card grading fees increase with the market value of the card being graded. PSA charges significantly higher prices than its competitors. Collectors are apparently willing to pay the higher prices because PSA-graded cards often sell for higher prices than do cards graded by competitors.

On May 28, PSA surprised many card collectors by announcing that its backlog of cards collectors had submitted but that the company had not yet graded had reached 10 million. As a result, the company stated it was no longer accepting new submissions of lower priced cards. (Cards submitted to its Value Bulk, Value, Value Plus, and Value Max tiers.) The company described the policy as a “temporary pause” that would remain in place until its backlog of ungraded cards had declined to 5 million. PSA estimated that it would take four months to reach that target.

Why did PSA allow its backlog of ungraded cards to grow to 10 million? The backlog is an indication that at the prices it was charging, the quantity of its grading services demanded was much greater than the quantity of grading services it could supply with its existing workforce and grading equipment. Why, then, didn’t it raise its prices to reduce the quantity of its grading services demanded?

In Microeconomics, Chapter 10, Section 10.3, we describe several examples of firms being a situation similar to the one PSA finds itself in. In these situations, firms choose not to raise their prices even though doing so would seem to increase their profits. As we discuss in that chapter, the key reason firms don’t raise prices is they believe their customers might see the price increases as being unfair.

We thought it would be interesting to ask ChatGPT to analyze why PSA didn’t raise its prices when faced with a rapidly expanding backlog of ungraded cards. Here’s ChatGPT’s—lengthy!—answer to this economic puzzle:

 Image generated by ChatGPT

They probably could have raised price enough to slow submissions, but that would not have solved the whole problem PSA was trying to solve.
In the current 2026 pause, PSA said Value Bulk, Value, Value Plus, and Value Max submissions were being paused because a surge added 1.6 million cards and pushed the active backlog toward 10 million; PSA’s stated goal is to reduce that backlog to 5 million before reopening those tiers. In other words, the target was not “new submissions = grading capacity.” The target was new submissions well below capacity so the existing queue could shrink.


The clean economic answer is:

1. A market-clearing price would only stop the backlog from getting worse.
Suppose PSA can grade 90,000 cards per day, a capacity figure PSA itself recently gave for global output. If they priced submissions so exactly 90,000 new cards arrived per day, the backlog would not fall; it would stay stuck. To reduce a 10-million-card backlog to 5 million, they need throughput to exceed incoming volume by millions of cards over the pause period. That means they needed rationing that was stronger than ordinary price clearing.

2. They actually did use price rationing, just in a blunt tiered way.
PSA did not close everything. It paused the lower-priced value tiers and left Regular, Express, Super Express, Walk-Through, and premium services open. PSA’s own pricing page shows Regular at $79.99/card, Express at $149/card, Super Express at $349/card, Walk-Through at $599/card, and premium tiers much higher. Baseball America summarized the effect as PSA temporarily pausing all card grading tiers under $80. So one way to read the move is: PSA effectively raised the minimum direct price for new card grading to the Regular tier, while refusing to call the paused Value tiers “available at a surge price.”

3. The demand curve was probably unstable and hard to estimate.
A normal market-clearing price assumes the firm can predict how many units will arrive at each price. PSA’s demand was not behaving smoothly. In 2021, after a price increase, PSA still reported receiving more cards in three days than it had received in the prior three months. In 2026, PSA said updated turnaround/service announcements were followed by another rapid demand spike. In that environment, “raise the price until volume equals capacity” is not simple, because each price change can trigger a rush, panic submissions, dealer behavior, and speculation.

4. A huge price increase would damage the brand more than a pause.
If PSA had said, “Value Bulk is still open, but now it costs $80, $120, or $200 per card,” many collectors would view that as gouging, especially because value-tier grading is used for lower-value cards. A pause lets PSA say, “we are protecting turnaround times and existing customers,” rather than “we are monetizing a bottleneck.” PSA explicitly framed the 2026 pause as a way to avoid compromising existing orders and to focus on cards already in its care. 

5. Grading quality is part of the product.
PSA is not just selling a slot in a queue; it is selling trust in the grade. If a backlog forces rushed hiring, rushed training, overloaded receiving, or inconsistent review, the long-term asset — confidence in PSA 10, PSA 9, etc. — can be worth more than the short-term revenue from accepting every card at a higher price. PSA’s own statement tied the pause to protecting the “integrity of the PSA standard.” 

6. A pause is easier to reverse than a surge-price regime.
A temporary stop says: “These tiers are closed until backlog conditions improve.” A giant price hike creates other problems: customers anchor to the new price, dealers renegotiate, memberships lose value, submitters complain when prices later fall, and competitors can market PSA as exploitative. PSA instead extended Collectors Club memberships during the pause, which suggests they were trying to preserve customer goodwill while reducing intake. 

So the best answer is: because the bottleneck was a stock problem, not just a flow problem. Raising prices enough to make new submissions equal daily capacity would still leave the backlog in place. To drain the backlog, PSA needed submissions below capacity; pausing the cheapest/highest-volume tiers achieved that more predictably, while keeping high-value urgent tiers open and avoiding the optics of extreme surge pricing.

Solved Problem: Evaluating the Disney World Pricing Strategy

Photo from the New York Times.

Supports: Microeconomics, Chapter 6, Section 6.3 and Chapter 10, Section 10.3, Economics Chapter 6, Section 6.3 and Chapter 10, Section 10.3, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 7, Section 7.4 and Section 7.7. 

In August 2022, an article in the Wall Street Journal discussed the Disney Company increasing the prices it charges for admission to its Disneyland and Walt Disney World theme parks. As a result of the price increases, “For the quarter that ended July 2 [2022], the business unit that includes the theme parks … posted record revenue of $5.42 billion and record operating income of $1.65 billion.” The increase in revenue occurred even though “attendance at Disney’s U.S. parks fell by 17% compared with the previous year….”

The article also contains the following observations about Disney’s ticket price increases: 

  1. “Disney’s theme-park pricing is determined by ‘pure supply and demand,’ said a company spokeswoman.” 
  2. “[T]he changes driving the increases in revenue and profit have drawn the ire of what Disney calls ‘legacy fans,’ or longtime parks loyalists.”
  1. Briefly explain what must be true of the demand for tickets to Disney’s theme parks if its revenue from ticket sales increased even though 17 percent fewer tickets were sold. [For the sake of simplicity, ignore any other sources of revenue Disney earns from its theme parks apart from ticket sales.]
  2. In Chapter 10, Section 10.3 the textbook discusses social influences on decision making, in particular, the business implications of fairness. Briefly discuss whether the analysis in that section is relevant as Disney determines the prices for tickets to its theme parks. 

Solving the Problem

Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the effects of price increases on firms’ revenues and on whether firms should pay attention the possibility that consumers might be concerned about fairness when making their consumption decisions, so you may want to review Chapter 6, Section 6.3, “The Relationship between Price Elasticity of Demand and Total Revenue” and Chapter 10, Section 10.3, “Social Influences on Decision Making,” particularly the topic “Business Implications of Fairness.” 

Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining what must be true of the demand for tickets to Disney’s theme parks if revenue from ticket sales increased even though Disney sold fewer tickets. Assuming that the demand curve for tickets to Disney’s theme parks is unchanged, a decline in the quantity of tickets sold will result in a move up along the demand curve for tickets, raising the price of tickets.  Only if the demand curve for theme park tickets is price inelastic will the revenue Disney receives from ticket sales increase when the price of tickets increases. Revenue increases in this situation because with an inelastic demand curve, the percentage increase in price is greater than the percentage decrease in quantity demanded. 

Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining whether the textbook’s discussion of the business implications of fairness is relevant as Disney as determines ticket prices.  Section 10.3 may be relevant to Disney’s decisions because the section discusses that firms sometimes take consumer perceptions of fairness into account when deciding what prices to charge. Note that ordinarily economists assume that the utility consumers receive from a good or service depends only on the attributes of the good or service and is not affected by the price of the good or service. Of course, in making decisions on which goods and services to buy with their available income, consumers take price into account. But consumers take price into account by comparing the marginal utilities of products realtive to their prices, with the marginal utilities assumed not to be affected by the prices.

In other words, a consumer considering buying a ticket to Disney World will compare the marginal utility of visiting Disney World relative to the price of the ticket to the marginal utility of other goods and services relative to their prices. The consumer’s marginal utility from spending a day in Disney World will not be affected by whether he or she considers the price of the ticket to be unfairly high.

The textbook gives examples, though, of cases where a business may fail to charge the price that would maximize short-run profit because the business believes consumers would see the price as unfair, which might cause them to be unwilling to buy the product in the future. For instance, restaurants frequently don’t increase their prices during a particularly busy night, even though doing so would increase the profit they earn on that night. They are afraid that if they do so, some customers will consider the restaurants to have acted unfairly and will stop eating in the restaurants. Similarly, the National Football League doesn’t charge a price that would cause the quantity of Super Bowl tickets demanded to be equal to the fixed supply of seats available at the game because it believes that football fans would consider it unfair to do so.

The Wall Street Journal article quotes a Disney spokeswomen as saying that the company sets the price of tickets according to demand and supply. That statement seems to indicate that Disney is charging the price that will maximize the short-run profit the company earns from selling theme park tickets. But the article also indicates that many of Disney’s long-time ticket buyers are apparently upset at the higher prices Disney has been charging. If these buyers consider Disney’s prices to be unfair, they may in the future stop buying tickets. 

In other words, it’s possible that Disney might find itself in a situation in which it has increased its profit in the short run at the expense of its profit in the long run. The managers at Disney might consider sacrificing some profit in the long run to increase profit in the short run an acceptable trade-off, particularly because it’s difficult for the company to know whether in fact many of its customers will in the future stop buying admission tickets because they believe current ticket prices to be unfairly high.  

Sources: Robbie Whelan and Jacob Passy, “Disney’s New Pricing Magic: More Profit From Fewer Park Visitors,” Wall Street Journal, August 27, 2022.