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Inflation Cools Slightly in Latest CPI Report

Inflation was running higher than expected during the first three months of 2024, indicating that the trend in late 2023 of declining inflation had been interrupted. At the beginning of the year, many economists and analysts had expected that the Federal Reserve’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) would begin cutting its target for the federal funds rate sometime in the middle of the year. But with inflation persisting above the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target, it has become likely that the FOMC will wait until later in the year to start cutting its target and might decide to leave the target unchanged through the remainder of 2024.

Accordingly, economists and policymakers were intently awaiting the report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on the consumer price index (CPI) for April. The report released this morning showed a slight decrease in inflation, although the inflation rate remains well above the Fed’s 2 percent target. (Note that, as we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.5), the Fed uses the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, rather than the CPI in evaluating whether it is hitting its 2 percent inflation target.)

The inflation rate for April measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous month—headline inflation—was 3.4 percent—about the same as economists had expected—down from 3.5 percent in March. As the following figure shows, core inflation—which excludes the prices of food and energy—was 3.6 percent in April, down from 3.8 percent in March.

If we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year—the declines in the inflation rate are larger. Headline inflation declined from 4.6 percent in March to 3.8 percent in April. Core inflation declined from 4.4 percent in March to 3.6 percent in April. Note that the value for core inflation is the same whether we measure over 12 months or over 1 month. Overall, we can say that inflation seems to have cooled in April, but it still remains well above the Fed’s 2 percent target.

As has been true in recent months, the path of inflation in the prices of services has been concerning. As we’ve noted in earlier posts, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has emphasized that as supply chain problems have gradually been resolved, inflation in the prices of goods has been rapidly declining. But inflaion in services hasn’t declined nearly as much. Powell has been particularly concernd about how slowly the price of housing has been declining, a point he made again in the press conference that followed the most recent FOMC meeting.

The following figure shows the 1-month inflation rate in service prices and in service prices not included including housing rent. The figure shows that inflation in all service prices has been above 4 percent in every month since July 2023, but inflation in service prices slowed markedly from 6.6 percent in March to 4.4 percent in April. Inflation in service prices not including housing rent declined more than 50 percent, from 8.9 percent in March to 3.4 percent in April. But, again, even though inflation in service prices declined in April, as the figure shows, the 1-month inflation in services is volatile and even these smaller increases aren’t yet consistent with the Fed meeting its 2 percent inflation target.

Finally, in order to get a better estimate of the underlying trend in inflation, some economists look at median inflation, which is calculated by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Ohio State University. If we listed the inflation rate in each individual good or service in the CPI, median inflation is the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates. As the following figure shows, at 4.3 percent, median inflation in April was unchanged from its value in March.

Today’s report was good news for the Fed in its attempts to reduce the inflation rate to its 2 percent target without pushing the U.S. economy into a recession. But Fed Chair Jerome Powell and other members of the FOMC have made clear that they are unlikely to begin cutting the target for the federal funds rate until they receive several months worth of data indicating that inflation has clearly resumed the downward path it was on during the last months of 2023. The unexpectedly high inflation data for the first three months of 2024 has clearly had a significant effect on Fed policy. Powell was quoted yesterday as noting that: “We did not expect this to be a smooth road, but these [inflation readings] were higher than I think anybody expected,”

How Has Inflation Affected People at Different Income Levels?

Photo courtesy of Lena Buonanno

In the new 9^th edition of Macroeconomics, in Chapter 9, Section 9.7 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.7 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 13, Section 13.7), we have an Apply the Concept feature that looks at research conducted by economists at the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics into the effects of inflation on households at different income levels. That research involved looking at the differences between the mix of goods that households at different income levels consume and at differences in increases in the wages they earn. The following figure, reproduced from this feature shows that as a percentage of their total consumption expenditures households with low incomes spend more on housing and food, and less on transportation and recreation than do households with high incomes.

During the three-year period from March 2020 to April 2023, wages increased faster than did prices for households with low incomes, while wages increased at a slower than did prices for households with high incomes. We concluded from this research that: “during this period, workers with lower incomes were hurt less by the effects of inflation than were workers with higher incomes.”

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has just released a new study that uses different data to arrive at a similar conclusion. The CBO divided households into five equal groups, or quintiles, from the 20 percent with the lowest incomes to the 20 percent with the highest incomes. The following table shows how income quintiles divide their consumption across different broad categories of goods and services. For example, compared with households in the highest income quintile, households in the lowest income quintile spend a much larger fraction of their budget on rent and a significantly larger fraction on food eaten at home. Households in the lowest quintile spent significantly less on “other services,” which include spending on hotels and on car maintenance and repair.

The CBO study measures the effect of inflation over the past four years on different income quintiles by comparing the change in the fraction of their incomes households needed to buy the same bundle of goods and services in 2024 that they bought in 2019. The first figure below shows the result when household income includes only market income—primarily wages and salaries. The second figure shows that result when transfer payments—such as Social Security benefits received by retired workers and unemployment benefits received by unemployed workers—are added to market income. (The values along the vertical axis are percentage points.)

The fact that, in both figures, the fraction of each quintiles’ income required to buy the same bundle of goods and services is negative means that between 2019 and 2023 income increased faster than prices for all income quintiles. Looking at the bottom figure, households in the highest income quintile could spend 6.3 percentage points less of their income in 2024 to buy the same bundle of goods and services they had bought in 2019. Households in the lowest income quintile could spend 2.0 percentage points less. Households in the middle income quintile had the smallest reduction—0.3 percentage point—of their income to buy the same bundle of goods and services.

It’s worth keeping mind that the CBO data represent averages within each quintile. There were certainly many households, particularly in the lower income quintiles, that needed to spend a larger precentage of their income in 2024 to buy the same bundle of goods and services that they had bought in 2019, even though, as a group, the quintile they were in needed a smaller percentage.

Solved Problem: The Price Elasticity of Demand for iPhones in China

Supports: Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 6, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 7.

Photo from from Reuters via the Wall Street Journal.

An article on bloomberg.com noted that in China after Apple cut by 10 percent the price of its iPhone 15 Pro Max—the most expensive iPhone model—sales of this model increased by 12 percent.

a. Based on this information, is the demand in China for this model iPhone price elastic or price inelastic? Briefly explain.

b. Do you have enough information to be confident in your answer to part a.? Briefly explain.

c. Assuming that the price elasticity you calculated in part a. is accurate, should managers at Apple be confident that if they cut the price of this iPhone model by an additional 10 percent they would sell 12 percent more? Briefly explain.

Solving the Problem

Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the price elasticity of demand, so you may want to review Microeconomics (and Economics), Chapter 6, Sections 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 (Essentials of Economics, Chapter 7, Sections 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7)

Step 2: Answer part a. by using the information provided to determine whether the demand for this iPhone model in China is price elastic or price inelastic. In Section 6.1, we define the price elasticity of demand as being equal to (Percentage change in quantity demanded)/(Percentage change in price). From the information given, the price elasticity of demand for this iPhone model in China equals 12%/–10% = –1.2. Because this value is greater than 1 in absolute value, we can conclude that demand for this iPhone model in China is price elastic.

Step 3: Answer part b. by discussing whether you have enough information to be confident in your answer to part a. If we have values for the change in price and the change in the quantity demanded, we can calculate the price elasticity of demand provided that nothing that would affect the willingness of consumers to buy the good—other than the price of the good—has changed. In this case, if other factors that are relevant to consumers in making their decision about buying that iPhone model have changed, then the demand curve will have shifted and the 12 percent increase in iPhones sold will be a mixture of the effect of the price having decreased and the effects of other factors having changed. For example, if the prices of smartphones sold by Vivo and Huawei—two Chinese firms whose smartphones compete with the iPhone—had increased, then the demand curve for the iPhone 15 Pro Max will have shifted to the right and our calculation in part a. will not give us an accurate value for the price elasticity of demand for the iPhone 15 Pro Max.

Step 4: Answer part c. by explaining whether, assuming that the price elasiticity you calculated in part a. is accurate, Apple’s managers can be confident that if they if they cut the price of this iPhone model by an additional 10 percent they would sell 12 percent more of this model. The first price cut for this iPhone model caused a movement down the demand curve. For Apple’s managers to be confident that that the same percentage price cut would result in the same percentage increase in the quantity sold, the price elasticity would have to be constant along the demand curve for this model. As we show explicitly for a linear demand curve in Section 6.3, the price elasticity of demand is unlikely to be constant along the demand curve (although in an unusual case it would be). In general, we expect that in moving further down the demand curve the price elasticity of demand will decline in absolute value. If that result holds in this case, then an additional 10 percent cut in price is likely to result in less than a 12 percent increase in the quantity demanded.

Is Sugar All You Need?

Dylan’s Candy Bar in New York City (Photo from the New York Times)

Can prices of one type of good track inflation accurately? As we’ve discussed in a number of blog posts (for instance, here, here, and here), there is a debate among economists about which of the data series on the price level does the best job of tracking the underlying rate of inflation.

The most familiar data series on the price level is the consumer price index (CPI). Core CPI excludes the—typically volatile—food and energy prices. In gauging whether it is achieving its goal of 2 percent annual inflation, the Federal Reserve uses the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. The PCE price index includes the prices of all the goods and services included in the consumption category of GDP, which makes it a broader measure of inflation than the CPI. To understand the underlying rate of inflation, the Fed often focuses on movements in core PCE.

With the increase in inflation that started in the spring of 2021, some economists noted that the prices of particular goods and services—such as new and used cars and housing—were increasing much more rapidly than other prices. So some economists concentrated on calculating inflation rates that excluded these or other prices from either the CPI or the PCE.

For example, the following figure shows the inflation rate measured by the percentage change from the same month in the previous year using the median CPI and using the trimmed mean PCE. If we list the inflation rate in each individual good or service in the CPI, median inflation is the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates. The trimmed mean measure of PCE inflation is compiled by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas by dropping from the PCE the goods and services that have the highest and lowest rates of inflation. During the period when the inflation rate was increasing rapidly during 2021 and 2022, CPI inflation increased more and was more volatile than PCE inflation. That difference between movements in the two price level series is heightened when comparing median inflation in the CPI with trimmed mean inflation in the PCE. In particular, using trimmed mean PCE, the inflation of late 2021 and 2022 seems significantly milder than it does using median CPI.

The United States last experienced high inflation rates in the 1970s, when few people used personal computers and easily downloading macroeconomic data from the internet wasn’t yet possible. Today, it’s comparatively easy to download data on the CPI and PCE and manipulate them to investigate how the inflation rate would be affected by dropping the prices of various goods and services. It’s not clear, though, that this approach is always helpful in determining the underlying inflation rate. In a market system, the prices of many goods and services will be affected in a given month by shifts in demand and supply that aren’t related to general macroeconomic conditions.

In a recent blog post, economists B. Ravikumar and Amy Smaldone of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis note that there is a strong correlation between movements in the prices of the “Sugar and Sweets” component of the CPI and movements in the overall CPI. Their post includes the following two figures. The first shows the price level since 1947 calculated using the prices of all the goods and services in the CPI (blue line) and the price level calculated just using the prices of goods included in the “Sugar and Sweets” category (red line). The data are adjusted to an index where the value for each series in January 1990 equals 100. The second figure shows the percentage change from the previous month for both series for the months since January 2000.

The two figures show an interesting—and perhaps surprising—correlation between sugar and sweets prices and all prices included in the CPI. The St. Louis Fed economists note that although the CPI is only published once per month, prices on sugar and sweets are available weekly. Does that mean that we could use prices on sugar and sweets to predict the CPI? That seems unlikely. First, consider that the sugar and sweets category of the CPI consists of three sub-categories:

White, brown, and raw sugar and natural and artificial sweetners
Chocolate and other types of candy, fruit flavored rolls, chewing gum and breath mints
Other sweets, including jelly and jams, honey, pancake syrup, marshmallows, and chocolate syrup

Taken together these products are less than 3 percent of the products included in the CPI. In addition, the prices of the goods in this category can be heavily dependent on movements in sugar and cocoa prices, which are determined in world wide markets. For instance, the following figure shows the world price of raw cocoa, which soared in 2024 due to bad weather in West Africa, where most cocoa is grown. There’s no particular reason to think that factors affecting the markets for sugar and cocoa will also affect the markets in the United States for automobiles, gasoline, furniture, or most other products.

In fact, as the first figure below shows, if we look at the inflation rate calculated as the percentage change from the same month in the previous year, movements in sugar and sweets prices don’t track very closely movements in the overall CPI. Beginning in the summer of 2022—an important period when the inflation that began in the spring of 2021 peaked—inflation in sugar and sweets was much higher than overall CPI inflation. Anyone using prices of sugar and sweets to forecast what was happening to overal CPI inflation would have made very poor predictions. We get the same conclusion from comparing inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year: Inflation in sugar and sweets prices is much more volatile than is overall CPI inflation. That conclusion is unsurprising given that food prices are generally more volatile than are the prices of most other goods.

It can be interesting to experiment with excluding various prices from the CPI or the PCE or with focusing on subcategories of these series. But it’s not clear at this point whether any of these adjustments to the CPI and the PCE, apart from excluding all food and energy prices, gives an improved estimate of the underlying rate of inflation.

What Can We Conclude from a Weaker than Expected Employment Report?

This morning (May 3), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Employment Situation” report for April. The report has two estimates of the change in employment during the month: one estimate from the establishment survey, often referred to as the payroll survey, and one from the household survey. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1), many economists and policymakers at the Federal Reserve believe that employment data from the establishment survey provides a more accurate indicator of the state of the labor market than do either the employment data or the unemployment data from the household survey. (The groups included in the employment estimates from the two surveys are somewhat different, as we discuss in this post.)

According to the establishment survey, there was a net increase of 175,000 jobs during April. This increase was well below the increase of 240,000 that economists had forecast in a survey by the Wall Street Journal and well below the net increase of 315,000 during March. The following figure, taken from the BLS report, shows the monthly net changes in employment for each month during the past to years.

As the following figure shows, the net change in jobs from the household survey moves much more erratically than does the net change in jobs in the establishment survey. The net increase in jobs as measured by the household survey fell from 498,000 in March to 25,000 in April.

The unemployment rate, which is also reported in the household survey, ticked up slightly from 3.8 percent to 3.9 percent. It has been below 4 percent every month since February 2022.

The establishment survey also includes data on average hourly earnings (AHE). As we note in this recent post, many economists and policymakers believe the employment cost index (ECI) is a better measure of wage pressures in the economy than is the AHE. The AHE does have the important advantage that it is available monthly, whereas the ECI is only available quarterly. The following figure show the percentage change in the AHE from the same month in the previous year. The 3.9 percent value for April continues a downward trend that began in February.

The following figure shows wage inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month wage inflation, whereas this figure shows 1-month wage inflation.) One-month wage inflation is much more volatile than 12-month inflation—note the very large swings in 1-month wage inflation in April and May 2020 during the business closures caused by the Covid pandemic.

The 1-month rate of wage inflation of 2.4 percent in April is a significant decrease from the 4.2 percent rate in March, although it’s unclear whether the decline was a sign that the labor market is weakening or reflected the greater volatility in wage inflation when calculated this way.

The macrodata released during the first three months of the year had, by and large, indicated strong economic growth, with the pace of employment increases being particularly rapid. Wages were also increasing at a pace above that during the pre-Covid period. Inflation appeared to be stuck in the range of 3 percent to 3.5 percent, above the Fed’s target inflation rate of 2 percent.

Today’s “Employment Situation” report may be a first indication that growth is slowing sufficiently to allow the inflation rate to fall back to 2 percent. This is the outcome that Fed Chair Jerome Powell indicated in his press conference on Wednesday that he expected to occur at some point during 2024. Financial markets reacted favorably to the release of the report with stock prices jumping and the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note falling. Many economists and Wall Street analysts had concluded that the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was likely to keep its target for the federal funds rate unchanged until late in the year and might not institute a cut in the target at all this year. Today’s report caused some Wall Street analysts to conclude, as the headline of an article in the Wall Street Journal put it, “Jobs Data Boost Hopes of a Late-Summer Rate Cut.”

This reaction may be premature. Data on employment from the establishment survey can be subject to very large revisions, which reinforces the general caution against putting too great a weight one month’s data. Its most likely that the FOMC would need to see several months of data indicating a slowing in economic growth and in the inflation rate before reconsidering whether to cut the target for the federal funds rate earlier than had been expected.

The FOMC Follows the Expected Course in Its Latest Meeting

Chair Jerome Powell at a meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (photo from federalreserve.gov)

At the beginning of the year, there was an expectation among some economists and policymakers that the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) would begin cutting its target range for the federal funds rate at the meeting that ended today (May 1). The Fed appeared to be bringing the U.S. economy in for a soft landing—inflation returning to the Fed’s 2 percent target without a recession occurring.

During the first quarter of 2024, production and employment have been expanding more rapidly than had been expected and inflation has been higher than expected. As a result, the nearly universal expectation prior to this meeting was that the FOMC would leave its target for the federal funds rate unchanged. Some economists and investment analysts have begun discussing the possiblity that the committee might not cut its target at all during 2024. The view that interest rates will be higher for longer than had been expected at the beginning of the year has contributed to increases in long-term interest rates, including the interest rates on the 10-year Treasury Note and on residential mortgage loans.

The statement that the FOMC issued after the meeting confirmed the consensus view:

“Recent indicators suggest that economic activity has continued to expand at a solid pace. Job gains have remained strong, and the unemployment rate has remained low. Inflation has eased over the past year but remains elevated. In recent months, there has been a lack of further progress toward the Committee’s 2 percent inflation objective.”

In his press conference after the meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell emphasized that the FOMC was unlikely to cut its target for the federal funds rate until data indicated that the inflation rate had resumed falling towards the Fed’s 2 percent target. At one point in the press conference Powell noted that although it was taking longer than expected for the inflation rate to decline he still expected that the pace of economic actitivity was likely to slow sufficiently to allow the decline to take place. He indicated that—contrary to what some economists and investment analysts had suggested—it was unlikely that the FOMC would raise its target for the federal funds rate at a future meeting. He noted that the possibility of raising the target was not discussed at this meeting.

Was there any news in the FOMC statement or in Powell’s remarks at the press conference? One way to judge whether the outcome of an FOMC meeting is consistent with the expectations of investors in financial markets prior to the meeting is to look at movements in stock prices during the time between the release of the FOMC statement at 2 pm and the conclusion of Powell’s press conference at about 3:15 pm. The following figure from the Wall Street Journal, shows movements in the three most widely followed stock indexes—the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the S&P 500, and the Nasdaq composite. (We discuss movements in stock market indexes in Macroeconomics and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 6, Section 6.2 and in Economics, Chapter 8, Section 8.2.)

If either the FOMC statement or the Powell’s remarks during his press conference had raised the possibility that the committee was considering raising its target for the federal funds rate, stock prices would likely have declined. The decline would reflect investors’ concern that higher interest rates would slow the economy, reducing future corporate profits. If, on the other hand, the statement and Powell’s remarks indicated that the committee would likely cut its target for the federal funds rate relatively soon, stock prices would likely have risen. The figure shows that stock prices began to rise after the 2 pm release of the FOMC statement. Prices rose further as Powell seemed to rule out an increase in the target at a future meeting and expressed confidence that inflation would resume declining toward the 2 percent target. But, as often happens in the market, this sentiment reversed towards the end of Powell’s press conference and two of the three stock indexes ended up lower at the close of trading at 4 pm. Presumably, investors decided that on reflection there was no news in the statement or press conference that would change the consensus on when the FOMC might begin lowering its target for the federal funds rate.

The next signficant release of macroeconomic data will come on Friday when the Bureau of Labor Statistics issues its employment report for April.

Latest Wage Data Another Indication of the Persistence of Inflation

Photo courtesy of Lena Buonanno.

The latest significant piece of macroeconomic data that will be available to the Federal Reserve’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) before it concludes its meeting tomorrow is the report on the Employment Cost Index (ECI), released this morning by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). As we’ve noted in earlier posts, as a measure of the rate of increase in labor costs, the FOMC prefers the ECI to average hourly earnings (AHE) .

The AHE is calculated by adding all of the wages and salaries workers are paid—including overtime and bonus pay—and dividing by the total number of hours worked. As a measure of how wages are increasing or decreasing during a particular period, AHE can suffer from composition effects because AHE data aren’t adjusted for changes in the mix of occupations workers are employed in. For example, during a period in which there is a decline in the number of people working in occupations with higher-than-average wages, perhaps because of a downturn in some technology industries, AHE may show wages falling even though the wages of workers who are still employed have risen. In contrast, the ECI holds constant the mix of occupations in which people are employed. The ECI does have the drawback, that it is only available quarterly whereas the AHE is available monthly.

The data released this morning indicate that labor costs continue to increase at a rate that is higher than the rate that is likely needed for the Fed to hit its 2 percent price inflation target. The following figure shows the percentage change in the employment cost index for all civilian workers from the same quarter in 2023. The blue line looks only at wages and salaries while the red line is for total compensation, including non-wage benefits like employer contributions to health insurance. The rate of increase in the wage and salary measure decreased slightly from 4.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 4.3 percent in the first quarter of 2024. The rate of increase in compensation was unchanged at 4.2 percent in both quarters.

If we look at the compound annual growth rate of the ECI—the annual rate of increase assuming that the rate of growth in the quarter continued for an entire year—we find that the rate of increase in wages and salaries increased from 4.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 4.5 percent in the first quarter of 2024. Similarly, the rate of increase in compensation increased from 3.8 percent in the third quarter of 2023 to 4.5 percent in the first quarter of 2024.

Some economists and policymakers prefer to look at the rate of increase in ECI for private industry workers rather than for all civilian workers because the wages of government workers are less likely to respond to inflationary pressure in the labor market. The first of the following figures shows the rate of increase of wages and salaries and in total compensation for private industry workers measured as the percentage increase from the same quarter in the previous year. The second figure shows the rate of increase calculated as a compound growth rate.

The first figure shows a slight decrease in the rate of growth of labor costs from the fourth quarter of 2023 to the first quarter of 2024, while the second figure shows a fairly sharp increase in the rate of growth.

Taken together, these four figures indicate that there is little sign that the rate of increase in employment costs is falling to a level consistent with a 2 percent inflation rate. At his press conference tomorrow afternoon, following the conclusion of the FOMC’s meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell will give his thoughts on the implications for future monetary policy 0f recent macroeconomic data.

Solved Problem: Is a Weak Yen Good or Bad for the Japanese Economy?

Supports: Macroeconomics, Chapter 18, Economics, Chapter 28, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 19.

In a recent post, economics blogger Noah Smith discussed the effects on the Japanese economy of a “weaker yen”: “A weaker yen is making Japanese people feel suddenly poorer ….” But “let’s remember that a ‘weaker’ exchange rate isn’t always a bad thing.”

When the yen becomes weaker, does one yen exchange for more or fewer U.S. dollars?
Why might a weaker yen make Japanese people feel poorer?
Are there any ways that a weaker yen might help the Japanese economy? Briefly explain.
Considering your answers to parts b. and c., can you determine whether a weak yen is good or bad for the Japanese economy? Briefly explain.

Solving the Problem

Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the effect of changes in a country’s exchange rate on the country’s economy, so you may want to review Macroeconomics, Chapter 18, Section 18.2, “The Foreign Exchange Market and Exchange Rates,” (Economics, Chapter 28, Section 18.2, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.6.

Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining what a “weaker” yen means. A weaker yen will exchange for fewer U.S. dollars (or other currencies), or, equivalently, more yen will be required in exchange for a U.S. dollar. (This situation is illustrated in the figure at the top of this post, which shows the substantial weakening of yen against the dollar in the period since the end of the 2020 recession.)

Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining why a weaker yen might make people in Japan feel poorer. A weaker yen raises the yen price of imported goods. For example at an exchange rate of ¥100 = $1, a $1 Hershey candy bar imported from the United States will sell in Japan for ¥100. But if the yen becomes weaker and the exchange rate moves to ¥120 = $1, then the imported candy bar will have increased in price to ¥120. (Note that this discussion is simplified because a change in the exchange rate won’t necessarily be fully passed through to the prices of imported goods, particularly in the short run. But we would still expect that a weaker yen will result in higher yen prices of imports.) A weaker yen will require people in Japan to pay more for imports, leaving them with less to spend on other goods. Because they will be able to consume less, people in Japan will feel poorer. (As we note in Section 18.3, many goods traded internally are priced in U.S. dollars—oil being an important example. Because Japan imports nearly all of its oil and more than half of its food, a decline in the value of the yen in exchange for the dollar will increase the yen price of key consumer goods.)

Step 4: Answer part c. by explaining how a weaker yen might help the Japanese economy. A weaker yen increases the yen price of Japanese imports but it also decreases the foreign currency price of Japanese exports. This effect would be the main way in which a weaker yen might help the Japanese economy but we can also note that Japanese businesses that compete with foreign imports will also be helped by the increase in import prices.

Step 5: Answer part d. by explaining that a weaker yen isn’t all bad or all good for the Japanese economy. As the answers to parts b. and c. indicate, a weaker yen creates both winners and losers in the Japanese economy. Japanese consumers lose as a result of a weaker yen but Japanese firms that export or that compete against foreign imports will be helped.

Kooba Cola: The Worst Business Strategy Ever?

One of the key lessons of economics is that competition serves to push firms toward serving the interests of consumers. When existing firms in an industry are making an economic profit, new firms will enter the industry, which increases the quantity of the good produced and lowers the good’s price. Entry is the essential mechanism that drives a competitive market economy towards achieving allocative efficiency—with the mix of goods and services produced matching consumer preferences—and productive efficiency—with goods and services being produced at the lowest possible cost. (We discuss allocative efficiency and productive efficiency in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.)

For entry to occur requires the efforts of entrepreneurs, who constantly search for opportunities to make a profit. (We discuss the role of entrepreneurs in a market economy in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.) Although, not well remembered today, Victor S. Fox was one of the more flamboyant entrepreneurs in U.S. business history. Fox was born in England in 1893 and moved with his family to Massachusetts three years later. As a young man, he started a firm to manufacture women’s clothing. In 1917, with the entry of the United States into World War I, Fox’s firm switched to producing military uniforms. In 1920, after the end of the war, Fox founded Consolidated Maritime Lines to buy from the U.S. government confiscated German and Austrian cargo ships. Fox also purchased a coal mine in Virginia to provide fuel for the ships. This effort ended in bankruptcy.

In 1929, Fox founded Allied Capital Corporation to invest in the stock market. This firm also failed amid accusations that Fox had broken securities laws. (Most of the information on Fox’s early career is from this site, which relies primarily on mentions of Fox in newspapers.) In 1936, Fox founded Fox Feature Syndicate to produce magazines. At that point, very few comic books were being published. That changed in April 1938, when National Allied Publications released Action Comics, featuring Superman—generally considered the first superhero to appear in comic books. Sales of Superman comic books soared and Fox responded by entering the comic book industry, publishing a comic book starring Wonder Man. Wonder Man was an obvious copy of Superman, which led Superman’s publisher to file a lawsuit against Fox for copyright infringement. Fox agreed to stop publishing Wonder Man, but continued to publish comic books starring superheroes who weren’t such obvious copies of Superman.

As this summary of Fox’s career indicates, he was an entrepreneur who was willing to enter a new industry whenever he saw a profit opportunity, even if he lacked previous experience in the industry. In 1941, the continuing success of Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola led Fox to attempt to enter the cola industry in what was his most audacious entrepreneurial effort. The high sales of his comic books gave Fox a platform to advertise his new soft drink —Kooba cola. The following are some of Fox’s advertisements for Kooba cola.

Fox also advertised Kooba on a radio program featurning the Blue Beetle, one of his comic book superheroes. In the print advertisements for Kooba, Fox seems to have focused on two points in an attempt to differentiate his cola from existing colas, particularly Coke and Pepsi. (We discuss the role product differentiation plays in competition among firms in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 13.) First, to help overcome the belief among some consumers that colas were an unhealthy drink, Fox emphasized that Kooba cola would contain vitamin B1. In 1941, vitamin B1 had only recently become available and was the subject of newspaper stories. Second, at 12 ounces, bottles of Kooba were nearly twice as large as the standard 6.5 ounce Coke bottle but would sell for the same 5 cent price. One of the advertisements above notes that a six-pack of Kooba had a price of only 25 cents.

How was Fox able to sell his new cola for about half the price per ounce of Coke or Pepsi? That’s unclear because—amazingly—at the time Fox was running these advertisements, not only was Kooba not “available everywhere,” as the advertisements claimed, it wasn’t available anywhere. Fox was heavily advertising a product that didn’t actually exist.

How did Fox hope to earn a profit selling a nonexistent product? Fox’s strategy was apparently to begin by heavily advertising Kooba in the hopes of sparking a demand for it. He seems to have believed that if enough people were inspired by his advertisements to ask for the cola at grocery stores and newsstands, he could approach an existing soft drink company and offer to license the Kooba name. He seems never to have intended to actually manufacture the cola, relying instead on royalties paid by the soft drink company he hoped to license the name to.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Fox’s strategy failed. To capitalize on Fox’s advertising, a firm licensing the Kooba name would have had to find a way to make a profit despite selling the cola at a price about half the price charged by competitors. Because Fox had no experience in manufacturing colas, he presumably had no advice to give on how production costs could be reduced sufficiently to allow Kooba to be sold at a profit.

Fox engaged in other entrepreneurial efforts before passing away in 1957. Over the years, Fox pursued a number of business strategies, some of which were successful, at least for a time. But his attempt to make a profit by promoting a nonexistent cola ranks among the the most dubious strategies in U.S. business history. A strategy that likely left some consumers puzzled that a cola that appeared in advertisements was never available in store.

Latest Monthly Report on PCE Inflation Confirms Inflation Remains Stubbornly High

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell (Photo from federalreserve.gov)

In a post yesterday, we noted that the quarterly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index in the latest GDP report released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) indicated that inflation was running higher than expected. Today (April 26), the BEA released its “Personal Income and Outlays” report for March, which includes monthly data on the PCE. The monthly data are consistent with the quarterly data in showing that PCE inflation remains higher than the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent annual inflation target. (A reminder that PCE inflation is particularly important because it’s the inflation measure the Fed uses to gauge whether it’s hitting its inflation target.)

The following figure shows PCE inflation (blue line) and core PCE inflation (red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. Many economists believe that core inflation gives a better gauge of the underlying inflation rate. Measured this way, PCE inflation increased from 2.5 percent in February to 2.7 percent in March. Core PCE inflation remained unchanged at 2.8 percent.

The following figure shows PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation, while this figure shows 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, PCE inflation declined from 4.1 percent in February to 3.9 percent in March. Core PCE inflation increased from 3.2 percent in February to 3.9 in March. So, March was another month in which both PCE inflation and core PCE inflation remained well above the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target.

The following figure shows other ways of gauging inflation by including the 12-month inflation rate in the PCE (the same as shown in the figure above—although note that PCE inflation is now the red line rather than the blue line), inflation as measured using only the prices of the services included in the PCE (the green line), and the rate of inflation (the blue line) excluding the prices of housing, food, and energy. Fed Chair Jerome Powell has said that he is particularly concerned by elevated rates of inflation in services. Some economists believe that the price of housing isn’t accurately measured in the PCE, which makes it interesting to see if excluding the price of housing makes much difference in calculating the inflation rate. All three measures of inflation increased from February to March, with inflation in services remaining well above overall inflation and inflation excluding the prices of housing, food, and energy being somewhat lower than overall inflation.

The following figure uses the same three inflation measures as the figure above, but shows the 1-month inflation rate rather than the 12-month inflation rate. Measured this way, inflation in services increased sharply from 3.2 percent in February to 5.0 percent in March. Inflation excluding the prices of housing, food, and energy doubled from 2.0 percent in February to 4.1 percent in March.

Overall, the data in this report indicate that the decline in inflation during the second half of 2023 hasn’t continued in the first three months of 2024. In fact, the inflation rate may be slightly increasing. As a result, it no longer seems clear that the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will cut its target for the federal funds rate this year. (We discuss the possibility that the FOMC will keep its target unchanged through the end of the year in this blog post.) At the press conference following the FOMC’s next meeting on April 30-May 1, Fed Chair Jerome Powell may explain what effect the most recent data have had on the FOMC’s planned actions during the remainder of the year.