An Unexpectedly Strong October Jobs Report

Image created by ChatGPT

This morning (November 6), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Employment Situation” report (often called the “jobs report”) for October. Following September’s disappointing report, October brought better news: Payroll employment increased by 165,000, well above the 65,000 increase economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal had forecast. The unemployment rate edged down from 4.2 percent to 4.1 percent. Revisions to earlier months also made recent job growth look stronger than previously reported.

The jobs report draws on two surveys. The establishment survey counts jobs on employers’ payrolls, while the household survey counts employed people and provides the unemployment rate. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1), the surveys cover somewhat different groups. The payroll survey generally provides a less volatile measure of monthly employment changes. The household survey supplies information about workers that payroll records cannot provide.

The BLS revised August’s payroll employment increase from 133,000 to 186,000 and September’s increase from 29,000 to 60,000. Together, those revisions added 84,000 jobs to the previously reported totals. ((The BLS notes that: “Monthly revisions result from additional reports received from businesses and government agencies since the last published estimates and from the recalculation of seasonal factors.”) With the revisions, job growth averaged 137,000 per month from August through October, compared with just 28,000 from May through July. Through October, payroll employment growth has averaged about 86,000 per month this year, compared with 10,000 per month in 2025 and 122,000 in 2024. Employment is growing faster than last year, but the average pace remains below that of 2024. The following figure from the jobs report shows the substantial monthly fluctuations in employment, as well as the stronger job growth over the past three months.

The professional and business services employment category led October’s job gains, adding 70,000. Health care added about 42,000 jobs, transportation and warehousing added about 25,000, and manufacturing added 19,000. These four groups accounted for about 94 percent of the net increase in employment. The leisure and hospitality and wholesale trade categories lost jobs. Of the overall 165,000 increase in jobs, 159,000 were in the private sector and 6,000 were in government. The following figure shows the contributions of the four leading groups and all other industries combined.

The unemployment rate, which is calculated from data in the household survey, was 4.1 percent in October, down slightly from 4.2 percent in September. The estimated size of the labor force and the number of workers employed increased in October, while the number of workers unemployed fell. The following figure shows that the unemployment rate has been remarkably stable over the past year and a half, staying between 4.0 percent and 4.4 percent in each month since June 2024. The Federal Open Market Committee’s most recent estimate of the natural rate of unemployment—the normal rate of unemployment over the long run—is 4.2 percent. So, currently the unemployment rate is slightly below that estimate of the natural rate. (We discuss the natural rate of unemployment in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9 and Economics, Chapter 19.)

As the following figure shows, the monthly net change in jobs from the household survey moves much more erratically than does the net change in jobs from the establishment survey. As measured by the household survey, there was a net increase of 463,000 jobs in October, far larger than the net increase in employment shown in the establishment survey. Since January, the household survey has shown a net increase in jobs in only four months, with a total net decrease of 377,000 jobs over the period. In contrast, the establishment survey has shown a net increase of 861,000 jobs over the same period. (Note that because of last year’s shutdown of the federal government, there are no data for October or November.)

The household survey has another important labor market indicator: the employment-population ratio for prime age workers—those workers aged 25 to 54. In October, the ratio was 80.7 percent, unchanged from September. The prime-age population ratio can show volatility from month to month but has remained above 80 percent every month since December 2022.

The establishment survey also includes data on average hourly earnings (AHE) measure of wages and salaries. The following figure shows the percentage change in AHE from the same month in the previous year. AHE increased 3.1 percent in October, down from 3.2 percent in September. That was the smallest increase since May 2021. The rate of increase in AHE has been below 4.0 percent each month since August 2025, indicating that cost pressure from wage increases has not been a significant source of price inflation during the past year. Over this same period, wage increases have struggled to keep up with price increases, resulting in a decline in real wages.

Will the strong October jobs report matter for Federal Reserve policy? At its October 27–28 meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) left its target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at 3.75 percent to 4.00 percent. Inflation remains a concern: The personal consumption expenditures price index in September was up 3.6 percent from September 2025, well over the Fed’s 2 percent annual target. Today’s jobs report indicates strength in labor market, which may make Fed policymakers more willing to focus on inflation. That would increase the likelihood that the committee will raise the target for the federal funds rate at its next meeting on December 8–9.

Trading in the federal funds futures market this afternoon indicates that investors believe that the committee will increase its federal funds rate target at its December meeting. Yesterday, trading in the federal funds futures market indicated that investors assigned a 66.9 percent probably to a rate increase at the December meeting, while this afternoon the probability had increased to 79.1 percent.

Solved Problem: Anthropic Is Losing Money So How Can It Be Worth $1.5 Trillion?

Supports: Microeconomics, Chapter 8, Macroeconomics, Chapter 6, and Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 6

Image created by ChatGPT

A firm’s initial public offering (IPO) is the first time it sell stock to the public. The total value of a firm’s outstanding shares of stock is called the firm’s market capitalization, or market cap. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, the AI firm Anthropic was expecting that the price of the stock in its IPO would result in the firm having a market cap of $1.5 trillion. Before a firm can undertake an IPO it must file an S1 form with the Securities and Exchange Commission, disclosing all the information that would be relevant to investors who are considering buying the firm’s stock. In its S1, Anthropic noted that, although in the previous quarter it had revenue of $17.0 billion, it had suffered a net loss of $23.3 billion.

Explain how a firm that is losing billions of dollars can have a market cap of $1.5 trillion.

Solving the Problem

Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about how investors value a firm’s stock, so you may want to review Microeconomics, Chapter 8, “The Fluctuating Stock Market,” (Macroeconomics, Chapter 6) or the more complete discussion in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 6, “The Fundamental Value of Stock.”

Step 2: Answer the question by explaining how investors value a firm’s stock. Ownership of a firm’s stock represents a claim on the firm’s profits. So we would expect that the larger a firm’s profits are, the higher the firm’s stock price (and market cap) will be. But a key point is that investors’ demand for a firm’s stock is based less on the current profitability of a firm than on the firm’s expected future profitability. If you own a stock in a profitable firm, the firm will pay you dividends. Therefore, the fundamental value of a share of stock is equal to the present value of the dividends to be received from owning that share. (We show the arithmetic of valuing stocks in Chapter 6 of Money, Banking, and the Financial System.)

Anthropic was expecting to be able to price its IPO to give the firm a market cap of $1.5 trillion despite currently experiencing billions of dollars in losses. We can conclude that investors must be expecting the firm to earn enough profits in the future to justify that high valuation. Of course, investors’ expectations could be wrong (they frequently are!) and Anthropic may never earn profits high enough to justify its IPO price.

Are Worker Income Gains Being Eaten Up by Medical Expenses?

Image created by ChatGPT

The real incomes of U.S. workers can fluctuate in the short run, but over the long run, incomes have steadily increased. We usually think of income as the wages and salaries that people receive, but as we discuss in Microeconomics, Chapter 7, Section 7.4, when workers choose among jobs, they take into account not just the wages they will receive but also other compensation, such as employer contributions to retirement accounts and employer-provided health insurance.

The following figure shows total compensation paid by employers as presented in the National Income and Product Accounts, corrected for inflation using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. (The result using the consumer price index (CPI) rather than the PCE is very similar.)

The BEA also compiles data on “supplements to wages and salaries,” which is the part of employee compensation comprised of “employer contributions for employee pension and insurance funds and of employer contributions for government social insurance.” These supplements are sometimes called fringe benefits, although the BEA includes some benefits, such as paid holidays, vacations, sick leave, in wages and salaries. Employer contributions for government social insurance are payments firms make on behalf of employees to mandatory government programs, the most important of which are Social Security and Medicare.

As the following figure shows, supplements to wages and salaries increased as percentage of compensation from 1949 to 1993, rising from 6 percent of total compensation in 1949 to over 19 percent in 1993. There were several factors causing this increase, including: 1. The increase in the Social Security tax rate that employers pay on behalf of employees from 1.5 percent of wages and salaries in 1950 to 6.2 percent in 1990; 2. the imposition beginning in 1966 of an employer-paid tax of 1.45 percent of wages and salaries to fund the Medicare system; 3. the increase in employer contributions to worker pension plans; and 4. the increase in employer contributions to employee health insurance from 0.51 percent of wages and salaries in 1950 to 6.14 percent in 1993.

The growth in employer contributions to health insurance plans for their employees was facilitated by a decision by the U.S. Treasury in 1943 during World War II. That ruling excluded the payments firms made to health insurance plans from the taxable income of employees. At that time, the federal government had put a legal ceiling on wages, which caused employers to search for an alternative way to increase employee compensation. In 1956, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to ratify the Treasury’s earlier decision. As a result, the total tax that employees pay on their compensation is reduced when the compensation takes the form of non-taxable employer contributions to health insurance plans. That fact helps explain why the majority of people in the United States with private health insurance receive the insurance through their employers.

The above figure shows that fringe benefits as percentage of total compensation fluctuated between 1993 and 2013 and have trended gradually down in the years since. The gradual decrease since 2013 has been mainly due to small decreases in employer contributions to employee pension and health insurance plans.

Image created by ChatGPT

As employer contributions to employee health insurance plans have declined somewhat, the amount that employees have to contribute to those plans and the amount of medical expenses that they have to pay for themselves, so-called out-of-pocket spending, have increased. Has this increased spending on health care offset the increases in wages and salaries employees receive from firms? The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) provide data for the period from 1987 to 2024 on spending by households on employer-provided health insurance and household out-of-pocket medical spending. The following figure shows the BEA measure of supplements (or fringe benefits) to wages and salaries (the blue line) and supplements plus the CMS measure of household health spending (the brown line) as percentages of the compensation of employees.

During the period from 1987 to 2024, real employee compensation increased about 130 percent. Employer supplements increased only from 17.1 percent of compensation in 1987 to 17.4 percent in 2024, while supplements plus household health spending increased from 22.1 percent of compensation to 23.7 percent.

Medical expenses haven’t increased as a percentage of employee compensation. So in that sense, employees’ significant real income gains weren’t eaten up by increasing medical expenses. It’s important to note, however, that this observation does not mean that there aren’t reforms that would increase the efficiency of the U.S. health care system. We discuss the debate over health care reforms in Microeconomics, Chapter 7.

How Should We Measure the Underlying Inflation Rate?

Photo of a meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee earlier this year from federalreserve.gov

What’s inflation? The answer seems easy: Inflation means that prices are rising …. but there are complications. When we experience inflation, does every price rise? If not, does it matter which prices or how many prices are rising? If a price rises one month and falls the next, is that still inflation?

We answer these questions in Macroeconomics, Chapter 19. As we discuss in that chapter, we measure inflation as the increase in the price level from one year to the next. We focus on the price level rather than on the prices of any particular goods or services because we want to know what is happening to a measure of average prices. Because we are looking at an average of prices, we would expect that when the economy experiences inflation, some prices will rise, but other prices may fall, and some prices may be unchanged.

Put another way, when we measure inflation, we are asking a macroeconomic question: Are there forces in the economy that are making an average of prices increase, and if so, by how much? When we look at individual prices, we are typically asking microeconomic questions: How much will an outbreak of avian flu increase the price of eggs? How much will a surge in constructing data centers increase the price of computer chips? Microeconomic developments do sometimes affect our inflation measures. For example, if conflict in the Middle East disrupts the flow of oil, raising oil prices, the effect may be large enough to increase the price level.

Image created by ChatGPT of oil tankers passing through the Strait of Hormuz

The two most closely watched measures of the price level are the consumer price index (CPI), which is compiled monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, which is compiled monthly by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Economists and Federal Reserve policymakers prefer the PCE measure of the price level because it includes more goods and services than does the CPI.  Each month’s release of CPI and PCE data can help answer three questions:

  1. How much inflation are consumers experiencing?
  2. How well is the Federal Reserve meeting its mandate from Congress to achieve price stability?
  3. How likely is inflation to persist?

The public’s strongly negative reaction to the Covid-era surge in inflation that began in the spring of 2021 made it clear that high inflation rates were an important political issue. The persistence of inflation rates above the Fed’s 2 percent annual target caused “affordability” to be an important issue in the 2026 midterm elections in the United States.

The CPI is designed to answer question 1. Although the inflation any individual household experiences will depend on the particular mix of goods and services consumed, the percentage change in the CPI provides a good measure of the inflation experienced by the typical household. The Fed answers question 2. using the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. Fed policymakers have met the Congressional mandate for stable prices if the annual inflation rate as measured by the PCE is 2 percent or less. (Note that there is some debate whether 2 percent inflation represents “price stability” in the way Congress intended.)

Question 3. is the most difficult to answer. Future inflation rates depend partly on macroeconomic policy, particularly monetary policy, and on geopolitical developments, such as the likelihood that conflict in the Middle East will be resolved or will accelerate. But the details of how particular prices have been changing can also provide clues as to how persistent inflation is likely to be. Federal statistical agencies, economists, and policymakers make adjustments to the CPI and PCE with the aim of better identifying the underlying rate of inflation—that is, the movement in average prices after eliminating prices that may be increasing or decreasing for short-run, microeconomic reasons.

The best-known adjustments to the CPI and PCE are the core measures that exclude the prices of food and energy. The BLS began issuing a monthly measure of core CPI in 1977 and the BEA began issuing a monthly measure of core PCE in 2000, although it had been compiling a similar measure since 1974.

Image created by ChatGPT

The BLS explains why it began issuing data on core CPI:

“Food and especially energy have been more volatile in recent years than almost everything else in the CPI, and their sharp short-term movements up and down can dominate the movement of the All items [CPI] index, obscuring longer term underlying trends or important changes in other categories. … Inflation due largely to higher food or energy prices might have different policy implications than broader inflation.”

Fed policymakers have looked at a number of other ways to adjust the PCE to gauge the underlying inflation rate. For example, as we discuss in a recent blog post, Fed policymakers believe that inflation in non-market services can skew PCE inflation. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices rise, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also rise. Former Fed Chair Jerome Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.”

Image created by ChatGPT of Kevin Warsh testifying before the Senate Banking Committee

At his confirmation hearing before the Senate Banking Committee, Fed Chair Kevin Warsh, addressed the issue of determining the underlying inflation rate:

“What I’m most interested in is, what’s the underlying inflation rate? Not what’s the one time change in prices because of a change in geopolitics or a change in beef, but what’s the underlying generalized change in prices in the economy? … The measures I prefer are looking at things that are called trimmed averages, where we take out all of the tail risks, all of the one-off items, and we ask ourselves whether the generalized change in prices is having second order effects on the economy. … Some in the economics profession are increasingly looking to these median type measures ….”

As we’ve discussed in previous blog posts, two widely available measures of the type Warsh is referring to are:

  1. Trimmed-mean PCE inflation, which drops the 31 percent of goods and services with the highest inflation rates and the 24 percent of goods and services with the lowest inflation rates, and
  2. Median PCE inflation, which is calculated by listing the inflation rate in each individual good or service included in the PCE and identifying the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates.

The following figure, from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland shows the relationship of headline PCE inflation (the green line), core PCE inflation (the blue line), and median PCE inflation (the brown line). Since March 2026, median inflation has been below both headline and core inflation, which may indicate that it is a better indicator of underlying inflation in the months since the conflict in the Middle East intensified.

In an address in August at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s economic policy symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Warsh discussed a less familiar indicator of underlying inflation: “To try to gauge underlying inflation, I find it instructive to disaggregate the 199 individual components of the PCE price measure. Over the past 12 months, 54 percent of goods and services in the PCE basket showed price increases above 3 percent. This is well below the post-pandemic highs of about 77 percent, but it remains well above the level of 32 percent in the two decades that preceded the pandemic.”

Image created by ChatGPT

The following figure shows for each month from January 2018 through September 2026, the fraction of PCE components that experienced price increases of greater than 3 percent. For instance, prices included in the PCE component “Personal computers/tablets and peripheral equipment” increased 9.7 percent from September 2025 to September 2026, while prices in the PCE component “Telephone and related communication equipment” decreased by 12.7 percent over the same period. The figure confirms Warsh’s statement: During 2018 and 2019, when headline PCE inflation was less than 2 percent in most months, 25.7 percent of PCE components experienced price increases of more than 3 percent, while in September 2026, 47.5 percent did.

As the following figure shows, we get a similar result if we plot the same indicator for the CPI.

So, we have a number of ways of attempting to measure the underlying inflation rate. The reason, once again, why Fed policymakers are concerned about the underlying inflation rate rather than just the headline inflation rate is that monetary policy is better equipped to respond to movements in the underlying inflation rate than it is to respond to blips in the headline inflation rate that may be caused by transitory factors such as a sharp increase or decrease in energy prices.

Which measure of underlying inflation might be best? Here is ChatGPT’s (very long!) analysis.

ChatGPT on measures of underlying inflation

The three approaches answer different questions. A trimmed mean or median estimates a central rate of price increase after limiting the influence of unusually large increases and decreases. The percentage of categories rising more than 3% measures how widespread relatively rapid price increases are. My preference would be to use a trimmed mean and a median to assess the underlying inflation rate, and breadth to assess how generalized the pressure is.

The distinction matters because these measures can move in different directions without either being incorrectly calculated.

1. What each measure is trying to tell us

It helps to distinguish the measured change in the overall price index from indicators intended to extract a more persistent signal.

MeasureMain question it answersPrincipal strengthPrincipal limitation
Headline inflationHow much did the full price index increase?Includes the entire consumption basketLarge movements in a few components can obscure the broader trend
Conventional core inflationHow much did prices excluding food and energy increase?Simple, familiar, and consistently definedExcludes some informative movements while retaining large movements elsewhere
Trimmed meanWhat is the average increase among components in the middle of the price-change distribution?Reduces sensitivity to extremes while preserving information about the size of central price changesResults depend on trimming choices; excluded movements can contain useful information
MedianWhat price increase lies at the expenditure-weighted midpoint?Strong protection against unusually large increases and decreasesDiscards most information about the rest of the distribution
Share above 3%How much of the basket—or how many categories—has inflation above a chosen threshold?Makes the breadth of faster price increases easy to seeDoes not measure how far above or below the threshold prices are rising

The first conceptual caution is that an outlying price increase is not necessarily an error or a temporary disturbance. It can be a genuine, persistent change in a relative price. Removing its influence may help estimate the common inflation trend, but it also removes part of what consumers are paying.

A simple illustration

Suppose a hypothetical fixed-weight basket contains ten equally weighted categories. For illustration, calculate a trimmed mean by dropping the highest and lowest observations. All changes refer to the same period.

Category price changesFull-basket averageTrimmed meanMedianShare above 3%
All ten rise 2%2%2%2%0%
Nine rise 2%; one rises 22%4%2%2%10%
Nine rise 4%; one falls 16%2%4%4%90%

These are hypothetical calculations, not the precise construction of any published index.

The second row captures the usual argument for robust inflation measures: one exceptionally large increase raises the average even though most categories are rising moderately.

The third row is equally important. One exceptionally large decline can hold down headline inflation while most prices rise rapidly. Median and trimmed mean measures can therefore indicate more inflation pressure than the headline measure. Their purpose is to reduce the influence of both tails, rather than systematically produce a lower number.

2. Trimmed mean: a useful compromise between robustness and information

A trimmed mean ranks component price changes and removes a specified portion from each end of the distribution. It averages the remaining changes using their expenditure weights.

The precise implementation matters:

  • The Dallas Fed trimmed mean PCE removes 24% of expenditure weight from the lower tail and 31% from the upper tail, retaining the middle 45%.
  • The Cleveland Fed 16% trimmed mean CPI removes 8% of expenditure weight from each tail, retaining the middle 84%.

These are percentages of expenditure weight, not percentages of the number of category names. They are also quite different degrees of trimming, so “the trimmed mean” does not identify a unique estimator. Sources: Dallas methodologyand Cleveland methodology.

Advantages

It adapts to where the unusual movements occur. Conventional core inflation always excludes food and energy. A trimmed mean instead excludes whichever components have the most extreme changes that month. Food or energy can remain in the calculation when their changes are near the middle; a large movement elsewhere can be removed.

That is attractive because the economic reason for discounting a price movement is generally its usefulness as a signal of continuing inflation, rather than its membership in a permanently excluded category.

It retains information about the magnitude of many price changes. If numerous components in the retained middle rise from 2% to 4%, the trimmed mean responds to the size of those increases. It uses more of the distribution than a median and substantially more information about magnitude than a threshold count.

It limits offsetting distortions from the two tails. It can help identify whether low headline inflation reflects broadly moderate increases or a combination of substantial increases and a few very large declines.

Disadvantages

The trimming rule requires judgment. How much should be trimmed? Should the upper and lower tails be treated symmetrically? The answers depend partly on the distribution of relative-price changes and the statistical objective being pursued.

The Dallas proportions were selected using historical data. That provides an empirical foundation, but it does not guarantee that the same proportions will remain optimal in every subsequent inflation regime. Its asymmetric trimming also illustrates that a simple symmetric distribution of price changes cannot be taken for granted. Dallas methodology

It can remove economically important signals. An extreme increase may be the first sign of pressure that will spread to other categories. Alternatively, a sector may experience sustained inflation for several years. The trimming procedure classifies observations by their position in the distribution; it does not know whether the underlying cause is temporary, persistent, supply driven, or demand driven.

It cannot remove a shock merely because the shock is temporary. If a temporary common disturbance moves most prices, it moves the middle of the distribution too. A trimmed mean is robust to sufficiently concentrated extremes, not to every disturbance that policymakers might wish to look through.

My assessment is that a trimmed mean offers an appealing balance: it reduces the influence of exceptional observations while retaining meaningful information about the size of price changes across a substantial portion of spending.

3. Median inflation: greater resistance to extremes, greater loss of information

The published Cleveland Fed median measures are expenditure weighted. The components are ranked by their monthly price changes, and the median is the change at the 50th percentile of expenditure weight. It is not the inflation rate of the middle category in a list where every category receives one vote. See the median CPI and median PCE descriptions.

Advantages

The median is highly resistant to the size of extreme observations. If a component already in the upper tail rises 30% instead of 10%, that change generally has no effect on the median. The same applies to exceptionally large declines.

It provides a clear indication of movement in the center of the distribution. An increase in the median suggests that the distribution’s midpoint has shifted. It is less vulnerable to the interpretation that a rise in the average reflects only one or two extreme observations.

It avoids having to choose particular trimming percentages. Within the family of measures that focus on the middle of the distribution, the median has a transparent definition. That does not eliminate every methodological choice—component definitions, weights, and seasonal adjustment still matter—but it removes the choice between, say, an 8% and a 15% trim.

Disadvantages

A large amount of inflation pressure can occur away from the midpoint. Suppose 51% of expenditure weight has inflation of 2%, while the remaining 49% has inflation of 8%. In a simple fixed-weight calculation:

  • Average inflation is 4.94%.
  • Median inflation is 2%.

The median accurately describes the midpoint, but a policymaker would lose important information by looking only at that number.

It can also change abruptly. Reverse the weights to 49% at 2% and 51% at 8%, and the median jumps from 2% to 8%, even though average inflation rises only from 4.94% to 5.06%. Real data are more complicated, but the example shows why the median is not always a smooth measure of changes in the whole distribution.

Large expenditure categories can have considerable influence over which observation becomes the median. A large category occupies a wide interval of cumulative expenditure weight. Housing is particularly relevant. Cleveland revised its CPI methodology by dividing owners’ equivalent rent into four regional components to reduce the distortion that a single large OER component could create. This is a concrete example of how the level of aggregation affects a median. Cleveland methodology revision

The median need not have the same long-run average as headline inflation. Persistent relative-price trends and asymmetry in the distribution can create a systematic gap between the median and the mean. A Cleveland study found such a positive gap for median PCE in its historical sample. Consequently, a median reading of 2% is not automatically equivalent to aggregate PCE inflation being at the Fed’s 2% objective. Carroll and Verbrugge, 2019

I would use the median as a valuable check on whether the center is moving, while continuing to examine what is happening on either side of it.

4. The share above 3%: particularly useful for breadth, limited as an estimate of the inflation rate

For the unweighted version we have been considering, the calculation is:\[ \text{Breadth}_t = 100\times \frac{\text{number of categories with inflation above 3%}} {\text{number of categories observed}}. \]

An expenditure-weighted version instead adds up the spending shares of the categories above 3%. Those two calculations answer different questions.

Advantages

It directly addresses whether inflation is concentrated or widespread. An aggregate rate can be high because of a few exceptional increases or because of moderate increases across many categories. Breadth helps distinguish those situations.

Extreme observations have bounded influence. In an unweighted count, a category rising 50% contributes exactly as much as a category rising 4%. Each category can change the numerator by at most one. This makes the measure well suited to the particular question of how widely elevated inflation is distributed.

It can reveal changes that the median misses. Suppose the share above 3% rises from 20% to 45%. The median can remain below 3% throughout, yet the growing upper portion of the distribution may be informative. Breadth shows that development directly.

An unweighted count can reveal generalization across sectors without being dominated by the largest spending categories. That can be useful when each category is being treated as a separate signal about price-setting behavior. Equal weighting has a coherent purpose, even though it sacrifices a direct interpretation in terms of household spending.

Disadvantages

It throws away information about magnitude

Consider two hypothetical changes:

  • Every category slows from 10% inflation to 4%. The share above 3% remains 100%, despite substantial disinflation.
  • Every category moves from 2.9% to 3.1%. The share jumps from 0% to 100%, despite an increase of only 0.2 percentage point in every category.

The first example shows how breadth can miss major progress. The second shows how a hard threshold can exaggerate the apparent importance of a small movement.

This is why I would examine several thresholds or inflation-rate ranges, rather than place too much weight on whether a single 3% line has been crossed.

Weighting changes the economic interpretation

Suppose six small categories each account for 5% of spending and have inflation of 4%, while four larger categories each account for 17.5% of spending and have inflation of 1%.

Then:

StatisticResult
Percentage of categories above 3%60%
Percentage of expenditure weight above 3%30%
Expenditure-weighted median1%
Simple expenditure-weighted average1.9%

The unweighted measure correctly reports that most categories have relatively rapid increases. It does not establish that most consumer spending is experiencing those increases.

Both versions are useful, provided their interpretation is explicit. For example, the Federal Reserve’s 2026 research on inflation breadth uses weighted shares of the CPI basket, as specified in its accessible figures. Those shares should not be compared directly with unweighted counts. Federal Reserve, Figures 2–3

The category classification can materially change the answer

If a category with inflation above 3% is divided into ten subcategories, each with the same inflation rate, its influence on an unweighted count increases even though nothing economic has changed.

A count therefore requires a consistent set of mutually exclusive categories at a reasonably stable level of detail. Counting both a broad category and its subcategories would effectively give some prices multiple votes.

Expenditure weighting avoids the particular problem of splitting an otherwise identical category: its total spending weight remains unchanged. But aggregation can still matter when subcategories have different inflation rates.

There is no universal “normal” share implied by the 2% target

The Fed’s objective concerns aggregate PCE inflation, not the inflation rate of every individual component.

For example, five equally weighted categories with inflation rates of:\[ -1\%,\quad 1\%,\quad 2\%,\quad 4\%,\quad 4\% \]

have average inflation of 2%, median inflation of 2%, and 40% of categories above 3%.

A substantial share above 3% can therefore coexist with aggregate inflation at target. What matters is how the share compares with an appropriate historical benchmark calculated in the same way. Warsh’s comparison with the prepandemic 32% is informative for that reason. But the historical average is an empirical benchmark, not an additional policy target.

5. Time horizon creates an especially important difference

There are two separate issues here.

Annual breadth can remain elevated after current price increases have stopped

Suppose many prices rise 4% once and then remain unchanged. Their year-over-year inflation rates will continue to exceed 3% for roughly a year after the increase.

A persistently high annual breadth measure could therefore reflect the continued presence of a past price-level adjustment in the calculation. It does not necessarily mean that comparable increases are continuing each month.

Shorter horizons help. Six-month annualized inflation responds more quickly than twelve-month inflation, while three-month inflation responds more quickly still. The tradeoff is greater sensitivity to short-run fluctuations and seasonal-adjustment issues.

Warsh’s 49% six-month share, compared with 54% over twelve months, is consistent with less widespread rapid increases in the more recent window. It does not, by itself, establish how much the aggregate inflation rate has slowed or where it will go next.

Published annual median inflation is not the median of annual component inflation

This is easy to overlook.

The published median and trimmed mean measures are constructed from monthly component price changes. Their longer-horizon rates accumulate those monthly robust changes. Taking the median across components first and then accumulating through time can produce a different answer from calculating annual inflation for every component first and then taking the median. Cleveland median PCE methodology; Dallas calculation code

A hypothetical example makes the difference clear:

  • There are three equally weighted categories.
  • Category A rises 4% in January and is otherwise unchanged.
  • Category B is unchanged throughout the year.
  • Category C rises 4% in July and is otherwise unchanged.

Every month, at least two categories have zero inflation. The monthly median is therefore always zero, and an index built by compounding those medians has zero annual inflation.

Yet at year-end, two of the three categories have risen 4%. The median of their annual inflation rates is 4%, and annual breadth above 3% is 66.7%.

This is one reason an annual breadth measure and a published annual median series can give different signals.

There is a useful mathematical connection when the weights, categories, and horizon are identical: if more than half the weight has inflation above 3%, the corresponding weighted median exceeds 3%. If Warsh’s 54% is an unweighted count, it implies that the unweighted median of those annual component changes exceeds 3%. It does not directly establish the value of the published expenditure-weighted median inflation series.

6. None of these measures identifies the cause or persistence of inflation by itself

The motivation for robust measures is strongest when unusually large component movements are mainly idiosyncratic disturbances around a more persistent common trend. But that is an economic interpretation of the distribution, rather than something established by trimming it.

A common supply shock can raise prices across many categories. Tariffs, for example, can affect final imported goods and domestic goods or services that use imported inputs. Federal Reserve research explicitly traces both channels across PCE categories. Minton and Somale, 2025

Consequently:

  • High breadth does not establish that excess aggregate demand is the cause.
  • A rise in the median does not establish that the shock will persist.
  • A concentrated increase does not establish that its effects will soon disappear.

Breadth does help assess the claim that high inflation is confined to a few unusual categories. But distinguishing an ongoing inflation process from a price-level adjustment requires additional evidence about subsequent price changes, quantities, expectations, and the propagation of the original shock.

The same caution applies to smoothness. A smoother series is easier to interpret, but smoothness alone does not establish that it is a better forecast of future inflation.

7. What does the empirical evidence say?

The research supports using robust measures, but it does not identify a universal winner across objectives, samples, and forecast horizons.

Dallas Fed research finds a useful distinction between filtering and forecasting. Dolmas and Koenig’s 2019 comparison concludes that trimmed mean PCE is helpful for filtering transitory variation and has advantages as an estimate of underlying inflation. However, it does not clearly dominate conventional core PCE in real-time forecasts of headline PCE inflation. Those are different tests of usefulness. “Two Measures of Core Inflation: A Comparison”

Cleveland research finds that many trimming choices perform similarly. Meyer and Venkatu find a broad range of trimmed mean estimators with statistically indistinguishable performance, including the median. Their results support the usefulness of focusing on the middle of the distribution, while providing less support for claiming that one finely chosen trim is uniquely best. “Trimmed-Mean Inflation Statistics: Just Hit the One in the Middle”

Relative performance can change across periods. Carroll and Verbrugge’s comparison of median PCE, trimmed mean PCE, and conventional core measures finds that the performance of the median measures changed after the Great Recession. Their analysis emphasizes the role of changes in the asymmetry of the component-price distribution. “Behavior of a New Median PCE Measure: A Tale of Tails”

For breadth, an additional distinction is necessary. A measure can correlate closely with inflation in the same periodwithout being an especially good predictor of future inflation. The Federal Reserve’s 2026 breadth study estimates contemporaneous relationships and examines how those relationships changed after the pandemic. It does not establish that a count above 3% forecasts future inflation better than median or trimmed mean measures. Federal Reserve breadth study

These studies also cover different historical samples. Their results provide reasons to use the measures and evaluate them carefully, rather than guarantees about their ranking in the current environment.

8. How I would use them together

For assessing the inflation outlook relevant to Fed policy, I would give the measures distinct roles.

  1. Keep headline PCE as the outcome to explain and forecast. It is the index to which the Fed’s inflation objective applies. Conventional core PCE remains a useful, familiar comparison.
  2. Use trimmed mean PCE as a central estimate of underlying inflation, with median PCE as a check. My preference for the trimmed mean reflects its retention of more information about the magnitude of price changes. Agreement between it and the median increases confidence that the center of the distribution is moving. Disagreement is a reason to inspect the distribution.
  3. Use breadth to assess generalization. I would look at both category counts and expenditure-weighted shares, with consistent definitions and historical benchmarks. Examining several thresholds would reveal whether a change reflects a substantial distributional shift or many observations barely crossing 3%.
  4. Compare horizons and investigate the components driving disagreement. Twelve-month measures provide perspective; shorter-horizon measures help identify recent changes. The sector composition matters when deciding whether the signal reflects continuing pressure, an earlier adjustment, or an unusual pattern of offsetting increases and declines.

Applied to Warsh’s speech, the comparison of 54% with a prepandemic 32% is meaningful evidence that faster price growth was more widespread than in the benchmark period, assuming a consistent calculation. The fall from about 77% also documents a substantial reduction in breadth. Neither fact supplies a numerical estimate of the underlying inflation rate or determines its future persistence.

Breadth adds valuable distributional information to median and trimmed mean inflation. Its strongest role is as a complement: it tells us how far relatively rapid price increases extend across the basket, while the robust rate measures tell us more about the pace of price increases near the center.

New BEA Data Releases Show Higher GDP Growth and Higher Inflation

Image created by ChatGPT

This morning (October 29), the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released two reports that show economic growth increased in the third quarter of 2026 compared with the second quarter and that inflation in September as measured by the percentage increase in personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index also increased.

The BEA estimates that real GDP increased at an annual rate of 3.4 percent in the third quarter (July, August and September) of 2026, which is an increase from a 2.2 percent annual growth rate in the second quarter. As the following figure shows, real GDP grew at the fastest rate since the third quarter of 2025. Economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal had expected real GDP to grow at a slower 3.1 percent rate in the third quarter.

As we’ve discussed in previous blog posts, to better gauge the state of the economy, Federal Reserve policymakers often prefer to strip out the effects of imports, inventory investment, and government expenditures—which can be volatile—by looking at real final sales to private domestic purchasers, which includes only spending by U.S. households and firms on domestic production. As the following figure shows, real final sales to domestic purchasers increased at an annual rate of 4.9 percent in the third quarter, up from 4.6 percent in the second quarter. The growth rate in real final sales to domestic purchasers was well above the growth rate of real GDP, as well as more than twice the U.S. economy’s expected long-run annual real growth rate of 1.8 percent. So estimated growth in real final sales to domestic purchasers indicates that the U.S. economy is expanding more rapidly than is indicated by estimated growth in real GDP. Typically, growth in real final sales to domestic purchasers is steadier than growth in real GDP and is likely a better indicator of the underlying growth rate in the economy.

Today’s BEA “Personal Income and Outlays” report included monthly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. The Fed relies on annual changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target. As we noted in an earlier blog post, Fed Chair Kevin Warsh indicated in his press conference following the July meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) that the committee intended to continue using the PCE price index as its gauge of inflation, although that decision would be revisited early next year. Some analysts have interpreted Warsh’s statement as an indication that he favored moving to a measure that would show lower rates of inflation than those shown by the PCE.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2019, with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. In September, headline PCE inflation was 3.6 percent, up from 3.4 percent in August. Core PCE inflation in September was 3.1 percent, up form 3.0 percent in August. Headline PCE inflation was slightly below and core PCE inflation was equal to the forecast of economists surveyed by FactSet. Both headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation remain well above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (Often referred to as 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, headline PCE inflation increased 6.1 percent in September from 3.9 percent in August. Core PCE inflation increased to 3.9 percent in September from 3.2 percent in August. The very high 1-month headline PCE inflation rate reflects the sharp increase in energy prices, particularly gasoline prices, during September. One-month core inflation shows a smaller, although still substantial, acceleration in inflation during September.

Fed policymakers believe that inflation in non-market services can skew PCE inflation. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices rise, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also rise. Former Fed Chair Jerome Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.” The following figure shows 12-month headline inflation (the blue line) and 12-month core inflation (the red line) for market-based PCE. (The BEA explains the market-based PCE measure here.)

Headline market-based PCE inflation was 3.7 percent in September, up from 3.5 percent in August. Core market-based PCE inflation was 3.1 percent in September, up from 3.0 percent in August. So both market-based measures show inflation in September remaining well above the Fed’s 2 percent target.

Fed Chair Kevin Warsh argued in testimony at his confirmation hearing before the Senate that the Fed should stop relying on headline PCE inflation: “The measures [of inflation] I prefer are looking at things that are called trimmed averages. We take out all of the tail-risks, all of the one-off items, and we ask ourselves whether the generalized change in prices is having second-order effects on the economy.”

Trimmed-mean PCE inflation drops the 31 percent of goods and services with the highest inflation rates and the 24 percent of goods and services with the lowest inflation rates. A closely related measure, median PCE inflation, is calculated by listing the inflation rate in each individual good or service included in the PCE and identifying the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates.

The following figure shows 12-month headline PCE inflation the (blue line), core PCE inflation (the red line) and trimmed-mean PCE inflation (the green line). Trimmed-mean PCE inflation in September was 2.3 percent, well below both headline and core PCE inflation.

The following figure from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland shows headline PCE inflation (the green line), core PCE inflation (the blue line), and median PCE inflation (the brown line). In September, median PCE inflation was 2.7 percent, which was up from 2.6 percent in August. So Warsh has a point that these two measures of inflation, which are less affected by particularly high or low rates of inflation in some goods and services, indicate that inflation has been running below the Fed’s currently preferred measure of 12-month headline PCE inflation. But these measures also show inflation still running well above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target.

Today’s macro data releases appear to have caused investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts to believe that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is now somewhat less likely to raise its target for the federal funds rate at the committee’s next meeting on December 8–9. Trading on the federal funds futures market today implies that the probability of a target rate increase at that meeting is 74.9 percent, down from a probability of 84.2 percent yesterday.

FOMC Votes with Two Dissents to Keep Its Target for the Federal Funds Rate Unchanged

Photo of Fed Chair Kevin Warsh from federalreserve.gov

Today, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) met expectations by keeping its target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at 3.75 percent to 4.00 percent. As of yesterday, trading in the federal funds rate futures market had implied a 93.4 percent probability that the target range would be unchanged. Fed Governor Lisa Cook and Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland President Beth Hammack dissented from the vote, preferring that the target range be increased by 0.25 percentage points (25 basis points). Hammack had also dissented at the July FOMC meeting in favor of a target range increase. Cook had not previously dissented from the majority at any meeting.

At his press conference following the meeting, Fed Chair Kevin Warsh said that political considerations did not play a role in the FOMC’s decision to leave the target range unchanged. As we noted in this earlier blog post, some analysts believe that the committee was reluctant to raise the target range so close to Tuesday’s midterm elections.

The following figure shows for the period since 2001, the upper bound (the blue line) and the lower bound (the green line) for the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate, as well as the actual values for the federal funds rate (the red line). Before December 2008, the Fed announced a single numerical target for the federal funds rate, rather than a target range. Note that the Fed has been successful in keeping the value of the federal funds rate in its target range. (We discuss the monetary policy tools the FOMC uses to maintain the federal funds rate within its target range in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.2).)

As with the policy statements issued following Warsh’s previous three FOMC meetings, today’s policy statement was short and did not include any discussion of the specific circumstances under which further target range increases might occur—so-called forward guidance. We discuss forward guidance in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15 (Economics, Chapter 25).

At his press conference following the meeting, as he typically does, Warsh resisted attempts by reporters to get him to expand on the circumstances under which the committee might implement further increases in the target range. He reiterated his belief that the Fed was currently meeting its Congressional mandate for maximum employment but had not yet met its mandate for price stability by bringing inflation back to an annual rate of 2 percent.

He did note that the period between now and the next FOMC meeting on December 8–9 would be “information rich,” presumably because there will be additional data releases on inflation and unemployment during that time. In addition, the committee might have greater clarity about what Warsh referred to as “geopolitical factors,” such as the conflict in the Middle East.

Warsh also announced at the press conference that, beginning in fall 2027, the FOMC will devote one of its eight annual meetings to discussing monetary policy strategy. In 2028, the FOMC may devote two of its eight meetings to discussing monetary policy strategy. There would be no vote on the federal funds rate target range at these meetings, and he expected that the committee would not release a policy statement. It was unclear whether he intends to hold a press conference following these meetings. If implemented, this plan would result in longer periods during which the public would not be receiving formal updates on monetary policy.

Is Video Streaming Going Back to the Future?

Image created by ChatGPT

By the early 1950s, a majority of American households owned television sets.  For many years, the only way you could view an episode of a series or a movie was to watch it at the time it was broadcast. Television networks typically broadcast only one episode of a series per week and broadcast new episodes only during the prime-time hours from 7:30 pm to 11:00 pm. (There were a few exceptions, such as the Batman series that the ABC network broadcast twice per week 1960s and the Who Wants to Be a Millionaire quiz show that ABC broadcast multiple times per week in the early 2000s.)

Image created by ChatGPT

In the late 1970s, first Sony and then other firms began selling videocassette recorders (VCRs), which for the first time allowed people to both buy prerecorded movies and to record TV shows that they could play back whenever they chose to. In the late 1990s, first Toshiba, followed by Panasonic and Sony began to selling DVD players in the United States. The release of entire seasons of TV series on DVDs made it possible to binge watch by viewing multiple episodes in one sitting.

Image created by ChatGPT of a 1980s VCR

As we discuss in Microeconomics, Chapter 14, in 1997, Reed Hastings and Marc Randolph founded Netflix. For a subscription fee of $15.95 per month, a customer could rent four DVDs at a time, receiving and returning them through the mail. There was no limit on how long a customer could keep a DVD. This was an important contrast with Blockbuster and other bricks-and-mortar video rental stores, which charged a significant late fee if a video wasn’t returned within the three-day rental window.

In 2007, the spread of high-speed home Wi-Fi led Hastings to begin offering streaming as well as DVDs. By 2010, Netflix’s main subscription plan was streaming only and the company stopped renting DVDs in 2023. Netflix also pioneered in creating its own series, beginning in 2012 with Lilyhammer, a comedy drama about mobsters. Over the next few years, Netflix typically released an entire season’s worth of episodes at the same time, thereby facilitating binge viewing. As Hulu, HBO Max, Disney+, Apple TV+, and other streaming services entered the market, most followed the Netflix model of having no paid advertising and releasing a entire season’s worth of episodes at the same time. As more streaming services became available, sales of DVDs declined sharply. Between 2005 and 2018, DVD sales declined by 86 percent.

Photo of Netflix’s headquarters in Los Gatos, California in 2018 from Wikipedia.

Over time, though, the Netflix model has run into two problems. First, originally Netflix’s streaming plan, which included no advertising, was priced at $7.99 per month. Currently, Netflix charges $19.99 per month or $26.99 per month if you want to stream programs in 4K and on multiple devices. Other streaming services were charging similar prices. There are some consumers who are unwilling to pay those fees in addition to what they may paying for cable television or for other subscription services.

Second, releasing a season’s worth of episodes at one time increased the likelihood that some consumers would sign up for a service, watch all the episodes of that series, cancel their subscription, and then resubscribe only when another series they were interested in was released.

In June 2021, HBO Max was the first paid streaming service to offer an ad-supported tier at a lower subscription price. At that time, its ad-free plan had a price of $14.99 per month and its plan with ads had a price of $9.99 per month. In 2022, Netflix and Disney+ also began offering lower-priced plans with ads. Today, all the major streaming services other than Apple TV offer lower-priced plans with ads. Most streaming services now have a variety of plans. Because Disney also owns Hulu and ESPN, as the following chart shows, it may have the largest number of plans.

Table from disney+.com

Streaming services have also moved away from releasing all of a season’s episodes at once—binge releases—in favor of releasing one episode per week. The following chart from an article on axios.com shows a dramatic shift towards weekly releases and away from binge releases. In addition to reducing the number of people who subscribe for only a month, some industry analysts argue that weekly releases enhance the social aspect to watching streaming series. Many people like to talk with friends and family or online about a new series. Those interactions are improved if everyone involved has seen the same number of episodes rather than some people having binged the series while others are watching episodes over a longer period of time.

Graph from axios.com

Note that as firms offering video streaming have begun offering plans that include advertising and as they have moved away from binge releasing episodes, they have moved much closer to the approach that television networks have used since the early days of broadcast television. This development may be unsurprising because watching programing the traditional way remains popular with many consumers. According to data from the Nielsen company, broadcast television and cable television currently have about a 36 percent share of viewers and produce more than 60 percent of all new programs.

The evolution of the market for video steaming illustrates several points that we discuss in the text.

  1. As an industry evolves, firms learn more about their customers. As we saw in Microeconomics, Chapter 6, Tesla and other sellers of electric vehicles (EVs) were initially uncertain about how price elastic the demand for EVs is. In a similar way, streaming firms have discovered that they could reduce the number of series they binge release, thereby reducing the number of people who subscribe only for one or two months, without losing significant numbers of long-term subscribers.
  2. As we saw in Microeconomics, Chapter 15, firms attempt to price discriminate by segmenting the market for their products in order to charge higher prices to consumers who have a lower price elasticity of demand. The multiple plans that streaming firms offer are a type of price discrimination.
  3. As we saw in Microeconomics, Chapters 13 and 14, to succeed, firms have to differentiate their products from those sold by competing firms. Netflix pioneered in streaming video and had an initial advantage over competitors by having a large base of consumers who were already familiar with the firm from using their DVD rental service. But over time multiple competitors have entered the market for streaming video, which has slowed Netflix’s growth. The company responded by expanding its offerings beyond movies and series to include video games, live sports, and podcasts. But recently, Ted Sarandos, the firm’s co-CEO, announced layoffs to reduce costs and replaced the executive responsible for streaming content. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, Sarandos has “emphasized that the streaming giant is mainly focused on its ‘core’ offerings—TV shows and movies—to grow its business.”

Glenn Signs Letter to Congress Backing Legislation on Permitting Reform

Image created by ChatGPT

As we discuss, in Macroeconomics, Chapter 16 (Economics, Chapter 26), fiscal policy actions that increase aggregate supply will both expand output and reduce upward pressure on the price level. A key problem that faces attempts to expand infrastructure, particularly by increasing energy production and transmission, is the difficulty of obtaining government permits and meeting government regulations. These regulatory hurdles can delay projects for years, greatly raising the cost of constructing them.

Glenn joined officials from both Democratic and Republican administrations to urge Congress to pass the Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act, which is intended to lower the regulatory barriers to constructing new energy infrastructure projects.

Below are some extracts from the letter. The full text of the letter can be found here. An article in the Wall Street Journal discusses the letter and the issues involved in permitting reform.

“Critical industries across our economy—from semiconductors to critical minerals to artificial intelligence—are built in the physical world and powered by energy infrastructure that must be built as well. Unfortunately, we are not building this infrastructure fast enough to remain globally competitive.”

“While American infrastructure development—and the economic growth it enables—flounders, our competitors invest and build. China, our principal strategic competitor, has made energy infrastructure central to its industrial strategy. China has built more high-voltage transmission in the last fifteen years than the U.S. has built in all of its history. China’s abundant, affordable energy has enabled its strategic industries from critical minerals processing to automobile manufacturing.”

“Consider the Cardinal-Hickory Creek transmission line: the 102-mile project was approved by the regional grid operator as part of a larger transmission buildout in 2011 but did not become fully operational until September 2024.
Along the way, it faced years of federal review and litigation, including two federal court injunctions, even as 160 generation projects representing over 24 gigawatts were waiting for its completion.”

“These delays are especially concerning given the growth of artificial intelligence. Artificial intelligence is a transformational technology, but it must be developed in a manner beneficial for all Americans. Our current permitting structure makes that impossible. To avoid long lead times in connecting to the grid, U.S. hyperscalers [firms such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft that are building large data centers and related infrastructure] have turned to on-site power generation solutions. By generating power ‘behind the meter,’ they can bypass strained grid infrastructure and the years-long interconnection queue.”

Image created by ChatGPT

“With a more rational permitting process, hyperscalers would invest in new energy infrastructure that could connect speedily to the grid, which, together with sound regulatory policies, would increase electricity supply for all
consumers and ultimately reduce residential bills. Alleviating our permitting
bottlenecks can help ensure that America retains its competitive edge in a critical technology while delivering benefits to the American people.”

“The Bipartisan American Affordability and Jobs Act is the most significant
bipartisan legislative effort that Congress has undertaken in decades to tackle
these challenges. It addresses key constraints stifling American industry by
requiring interregional transmission planning, strengthening the federal backstop for nationally significant transmission lines, and creating a faster, more predictable process for connecting new generation to the grid. It also makes permits more durable by imposing tighter timelines for litigation and limiting frivolous lawsuits that can halt projects indefinitely, while preserving community input and judicial review of substantive agency decisions. Among many other important reforms, the Act also requires data centers to pay for the new transmission built to serve them, as well as their fair share of existing system costs, which would reduce costs for other customers.”

The Federal Government Runs Another Large Budget Deficit in Fiscal Year 2026

Image created by ChatGPT

The federal government’s fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has released its estimate of the deficit for the 2026 fiscal year, which ended September 30, 2026. The deficit increased to $1,993 billion in 2026 from $1,775 billion in 2025. As the following figure shows, in the context of the period since 1960, the budget deficit in 2026 remains very large, particularly at a time when the U.S. economy is at or very close to full employment. The budget deficit in 2026 is well below the record deficit of $3,096 billion in 2020.

Economists typically focus more on the size of the budget deficit relative to the size of the economy, as measured by GDP. The following figure shows the federal budget deficit as a percentage of GDP was largest during and after the Great Recession of 2007–2009, and in 2020–2021, during and immediately after the Covid recession. In both those periods, federal tax revenues declined as production and employment fell. In addition, Congress passed legislation increasing government purchases and transfer payments. Although during the past few years the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP has declined from a high of 14.5 percent in 2020 (which was the largest deficit since World War II ended in 1945), it still remains very high for a period of close to full employment.

The following table from the CBO report shows that in 2026 federal receipts increased less than federal outlays, leading to a larger budget deficit.

The next table shows the changes in the major categories of federal receipts. Individual income and payroll taxes—which fund the Social Security and Medicare programs, as well as the federal government’s contributions to state unemployment insurance plans—both increased, while corporate income tax receipts fell. Customs duties declined as the federal government refunded tariffs collected under higher tariff rates imposed by the Trump administration beginning in April 2025. The Supreme Court ruled in February 2026 that some of the tariff increases were not authorized by federal law.

The next table shows the changes in the major categories of federal outlays. Spending on the Social Security, Medicare (health insurance for older people), and Medicaid (health insurance for lower-income people) programs continue to steadily increase. Spending on Medicare is now more than $150 billion greater than spending on defense. Interest on the public debt continues to increase as the debt grows and interest rates remain well above their pre-2021 levels.