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Will the United States Experience a Sustained Boom in the Growth Rate of Labor Productivity?

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Recent articles in the business press have discussed the possibility that the U.S. economy is entering a period of higher growth in labor productivity:

“Fed’s Goolsbee Says Strong Hiring Hints at Productivity Growth Burst” (link)

“US Productivity Is on the Upswing Again. Will AI Supercharge It?” (link)

“Can America Turn a Productivity Boomlet Into a Boom?” (link)

In Macroeconomics, Chapter 16, Section 16.7 (Economics, Chapter 26, Section 26.7), we highlighted the role of growth in labor productivity in explaining the growth rate of real GDP using the following equations. First, an identity:

Real GDP = Number of hours worked x (Real GDP/Number of hours worked),

where (Real GDP/Number of hours worked) is labor productivity.

And because an equation in which variables are multiplied together is equal to an equation in which the growth rates of these variables are added together, we have:

Growth rate of real GDP = Growth rate of hours worked + Growth rate of labor productivity

From 1950 to 2023, real GDP grew at annual average rate of 3.1 percent. In recent years, real GDP has been growing more slowly. For example, it grew at a rate of only 2.0 percent from 2000 to 2023. In February 2024, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecasts that real GDP would grow at 2.0 percent from 2024 to 2034. Although the difference between a growth rate of 3.1 percent and a growth rate of 2.0 percent may seem small, if real GDP were to return to growing at 3.1 percent per year, it would be $3.3 trillion larger in 2034 than if it grows at 2.0 percent per year. The additional $3.3 trillion in real GDP would result in higher incomes for U.S. residents and would make it easier for the federal government to reduce the size of the federal budget deficit and to better fund programs such as Social Security and Medicare. (We discuss the issues concerning the federal government’s budget deficit in this earlier blog post.)

Why has growth in real GDP slowed from a 3.1 percent rate to a 2.0 percent rate? The two expressions on the right-hand side of the equation for growth in real GDP—the growth in hours worked and the growth in labor productivity—have both slowed. Slowing population growth and a decline in the average number of hours worked per worker have resulted in the growth rate of hours worked to slow substantially from a rate of 2.0 percent per year from 1950 to 2023 to a forecast rate of only 0.4 percent per year from 2024 to 2034.

Falling birthrates explains most of the decline in population growth. Although lower birthrates have been partially offset by higher levels of immigration in recent years, it seems unlikely that birthrates will increase much even in the long run and levels of immigration also seem unlikely to increase substantially in the future. Therefore, for the growth rate of real GDP to increase significantly requires increases in the rate of growth of labor productivity.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) publishes quarterly data on labor productivity. (Note that the BLS series is for labor productivity in the nonfarm business sector rather than for the whole economy. Output of the nonfarm business sector excludes output by government, nonprofit businesses, and households. Over long periods, growth in real GDP per hour worked and growth in real output of the nonfarm business sector per hour worked have similar trends.) The following figure is taken from the BLS report “Productivty and Costs,” which was released on February 1, 2024.

Note that the growth in labor productivity increased during the last three quarters of 2023, whether we measure the growth rate as the percentage change from the same quarter in the previous year or as growth in a particular quarter expressed as anual rate. It’s this increase in labor productivity during 2023 that has led to speculation that labor productivity might be entering a period of higher growth. The following figure shows labor productivity growth, measured as the percentage change from the same quarter in the previous year for the whole period from 1950 to 2023.

The figure indicates that labor productivity has fluctuated substantially over this period. We can note, in particular, productivity growth during two periods: First, from 2011 to 2018, labor productivity grew at the very slow rate of 0.9 percent per year. Some of this slowdown reflected the slow recovery of the U.S. economy from the Great Recession of 2007-2009, but the slowdown persisted long enough to cause concern that the U.S. economy might be entering a period of stagnation or very slow growth.

Second, from 2019 through 2023, labor productivity went through very large swings. Labor productivity experienced strong growth during 2019, then, as the Covid-19 pandemic began affecting the U.S. economy, labor productivity soared through the first half of 2021 before declining for five consecutive quarters from the first quarter of 2022 through the first quarter of 2023—the first time productivity had fallen for that long a period since the BLS first began collecting the data. Although these swings were particularly large, the figure shows that during and in the immediate aftermath of recessions labor productivity typically fluctuates dramatically. The reason for the fluctuations is that firms can be slow to lay workers off at the beginning of a recession—which causes labor productivity to fall—and slow to hire workers back during the beginning of an economy recovery—which causes labor productivity to rise.

Does the recent increase in labor productivity growth represent a trend? Labor productivity, measured as the percentage change since the same quarter in the previous year, was 2.7 percent during the fourth quarter of 2023—higher than in any quarter since the first quarter of 2021. Measured as the percentage change from the previous quarter at an annual rate, labor productivity grew at a very high average rate of 3.9 during the last three quarters of 2023. It’s this high rate that some observers are pointing to when they wonder whether growth in labor productivity is on an upward trend.

As with any other economic data, you should use caution in interpreting changes in labor productivity over a short period. The productivity data may be subject to large revisions as the two underlying series—real output and hours worked—are revised in coming months. In addition, it’s not clear why the growth rate of labor productivity would be increasing in the long run. The most common reasons advanced are: 1) the productivity gains from the increase in the number of people working from home since the pandemic, 2) businesses’ increased use of artificial intelligence (AI), and 3) potential efficiencies that businesses discovered as they were forced to operate with a shortage of workers during and after the pandemic.

To this point it’s difficult to evaluate the long-run effects of any of these factors. Wconomists and business managers haven’t yet reached a consensus on whether working from home increases or decreases productivity. (The debate is summarized in this National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, written by Jose Maria Barrero of Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico, and Steven Davis and Nicholas Bloom of Stanford. You may need to access the paper through your university library.)

Many economists believe that AI is a general purpose technology (GPT), which means that it may have broad effects throughout the economy. But to this point, AI hasn’t been adopted widely enough to be a plausible cause of an increase in labor productivity. In addition, as Erik Brynjolfsson and Daniel Rock of MIT and Chad Syverson of the University of Chicago argue in this paper, the introduction of a GPT may initially cause productivity to fall as firms attempt to use an unfamiliar technology. The third reason—efficiency gains resulting from the pandemic—is to this point mainly anecdotal. There are many cases of businesses that discovered efficiencies during and immediately after Covid as they struggled to operate with a smaller workforce, but we don’t yet know whether these cases are sufficiently common to have had a noticeable effect on labor productivity.

So, we’re left with the conclusion that if the high labor productivity growth rates of 2023 can be maintained, the growth rate of real GDP will correspondingly increase more than most economists are expecting. But it’s too early to know whether recent high rates of labor productivty growth are sustainable.

Glenn, Harry Holzer, and Michael Strain Analyze the Effect of Changes in Unemployment Benefits during the Pandemic

A job fair in Jackson, Mississippi (photo from the Associated Press)

As part of the Social Security Act of 1935,Congress created the unemployment insurance program to make payments to unemployed workers. The program run jointly by the federal government and the state governments. It’s financed primarily by state and federal taxes on employers. States are allowed to determine which workers are eligible, the dollar amount of the unemployment benefit workers will receive, and for how long workers will receive the benefit.

What’s the purpose of the unemployment insurance program? A document published the U.S. Department of Labor explains that: “Unemployment compensation is a social insurance program. It is designed to provide benefits to most individuals out of work, generally through no fault of their own, for periods between jobs…. [Unemployment compensation] ensures that a significant proportion of the necessities of life can be met on a week-to-week basis while a search for work takes place.”

But the same document also notes that unemployment compensation “maintains [unemployed workers’] purchasing power which also acts as an economic stabilizer in times of economic downturn.” By “economic stabilizer,” the Department of Labor is noting that unemployment compensation is what in Macroeconomics, Chapter 16, Section 16.1 (Economics, Chapter 26, Section 26.1) we call an automatic stabilizer. An automatic stabilizer is a government spending or taxing program that automatically increases or decreases along with the business cycle.

As shown in the following figure, when the economy enters a recession, the total amount of unemployment compensation payments increases without the federal government or the state governments having to take any action because eligibility for the payments is already defined in existing law. So, during a recession, the unemployment insurance program helps to keep aggregate demand higher than it would otherwise be, which can lessen the severity of the recession.

As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.3 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.3), the unemployment insurance program can have an unintended effect. The higher the unemployment insurance payment a worker receives and the longer the worker receives it, the more likely the worker is to delay searching for another job. In other words, by reducing the opportunity cost of being unemployed, unemployment insurance benefits may unintentionally increase the length of unemployment spells—the amount of time the typical worker is unemployed.

During and immediately after the 2020 recession, the federal government increased the dollar amount of the unemployment insurance payments that workers received and extended the number of months workers could continue to receive these payments. Under the American Rescue Plan, a law which President Biden proposed and Congress passed in March 2021, workers receiving unemployment insurance benefits received an additional $300 weekly from March 2021 until September 6, 2021. Also, under the law, people, such as the self-employed and gig workers, would receive unemployment insurance benefits even though they had previously been ineligible to receive them. (Note the resulting spike during this period in the total dollar amount of unemployment insurance benefits as shown in the above figure.)

Some state governments were concerned that the extended benefits might cause some workers to delay taking jobs, thereby slowing the recovery of these states’ economies from the effects of the pandemic. Accordingly, 18 states stopped participating in the programs in June 2021, meaning that at that time unemployed workers would no longer receive the extra $300 per week and workers who prior to March 2021 hadn’t been eligible to receive unemployment benefits would again be ineligible.

Were unemployed workers in the states that ended the expanded unemployment insurance benefits in June more likely to become employed than were unemployed workers in states that continued the expanded benefits into September? On the one hand, ending the expanded benefits would increase the opportunity cost of not having a job. But, on the other hand, because government payments to workers would decline in these states, the result could be a decline in consumer spending that would decrease the demand for labor. Which of these effects was larger would determine whether employment increased or decreased in the states that ended expanded unemployment benefits early.

Glenn, along with Harry Holzer of Georgetown University and Michael Strain of the American Enterprise Institute, carried out an econometric analysis to explore the effects ending expanded unemployment benefits early had on the labor markets in those states. They find that:

Among unemployed workers ages 25 to 54 (“prime-age workers”), ending the expanded unemployment benefit program increased the number of workers in those states who moved from being unemployed to being employed by 14 percentage points.
Among prime-age workers, the employment-to-population ratio in those states increased by about 1 percentage point.
Among prime-age workers, the unemployment rate in those stated decreased by about 0.9 percentage point.

These estimates indicate that the effect of ending the expanded unemployment benefit program raised the opportunity cost of being unemployed more than it decreased the demand for labor by reducing the incomes of some household. But what about the larger question of whether households were made better or worse off as a result of ending the program early? The authors find that ending the program early decreased the share of households that had no difficulty meeting expenses. They, therefore, conclude that the effects on household well-being of ending the program early are ambiguous.

The paper presenting these results can be found here. Warning! The econometric analysis is quite technical.

Very Strong GDP Report

Photo from Lena Buonanno

This morning the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of GDP for the third quarter of 2023. (The report can be found here.) The BEA estimates that real GDP increased by 4.9 percent at an annual rate in the third quarter—July through September. That was more than double the 2.1 percent increase in real GDP in the second quarter, and slightly higher than the 4.7 percent that economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal last week had expected. The following figure shows the rates of GDP growth each quarter beginning in 2021.

Note that the BEA’s most recent estimates of real GDP during the first two quarters of 2022 still show a decline. The Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee only switched from a strongly expansionary monetary policy, with a target for the federal funds of effectively zero, to a contractionary monetary policy following its March 16, 2022 meeting. That real GDP was declining even before the Fed had pivoted to a contractionary monetary policy helps explain why, despite strong increases employment during this period, most economists were expecting that the U.S. economy would experience a recession at some point during 2022 or 2023. This expectation was reinforced when inflation soared during the summer of 2022 and it became clear that the FOMC would have to substantially raise its target for the federal funds rate.

Clearly, today’s data on real GDP growth, along with the strong September employment report (which we discuss in this blog post), indicates that the chances of the U.S. economy avoiding a recession in the future have increased and are much better than they seemed at this time last year.

Consumer spending was the largest contributor to third quarter GDP growth. The following figure shows growth rates of real personal consumption expenditures and the subcategories of expenditures on durable goods, nondurable goods, and services. There was strong growth in each component of consumption spending. The 7.6 percent increase in expenditures on durables was particularly strong, particularly given that spending on durables had fallen by 0.3 percent in the second quarter.

Investment spending and its components were a more mixed bag, as shown in the following figure. Overall, gross private domestic investment increased at a very strong rate of 8.4 percent—the highest rate since the fourth quarter of 2021. Residential investment increased 3.9 percent, which was particularly notable following nine consecutive quarters of decline and during a period of soaring mortgage interest rates. But business fixed investment was noticeably weak, falling by 0.1 percent. Spending on structures—such as factories and office buildings—increased by only 1.6 percent, while spending on equipment fell by 3.8 percent.

Today’s real GDP report also contained data on the private consumption expenditure (PCE) price index, which the FOMC uses tp determine whether it is achieving its goal of a 2 percent inflation rate. The following figure shows inflation as measured using the PCE and the core PCE—which excludes food and energy prices—since the beginning of 2015. (Note that these inflation rates are measured using quarterly data and as compound annual rates of change.) Despite the strong growth in real GDP and employment, inflation as measured by PCE increased only from 2.5 percent in the second quarter to 2.9 percent in the third quarter. Core PCE, which may be a better indicator of the likely course of inflation in the future, continued the long decline that began in first quarter of 2022 by failling from 3.7 percent to 2.9 percent.

The combination of strong growth in real GDP and declining inflation indicates that the Fed appears well on its way to a soft landing—achieving a return to its 2 percent inflation target without pushing the economy into a recession. There are reasons to be cautious, however.

GDP, inflation, and employment data are all subject to—possibly substantial—revisions. So growth may have been significantly slower than today’s advance estimate of real GDP indicates. Even if the estimate of real GDP growth of 4.9 percent proves in the long run to have been accurate, there are reasons to doubt whether output growth can be maintained at near that level. Since 2000, annual growth in real GDP has average only 2.1 percent. For GDP to begin increasing at a rate substantially higher than that would require a significant expansion in the labor force and an increase in productivity. While either or both of those changes may occur, they don’t seem likely as of now.

In addition, the largest contributor to GDP growth in the third quarter was from consumption expenditures. As households continue to draw down the savings they built up as a result of the federal government’s response to the Covid recession of 2020, it seems unlikely that the current pace of consumer spending can be maintained. Finally, the lagged effects of monetary policy—particularly the effects of the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note having risen to nearly 5 percent (which we discuss in our most recent podcast)—may substantially reduce growth in real GDP and employment in future quarters.

But those points shouldn’t distract from the fact that today’s GDP report was good news for the economy.

What Explains the Surprising Surge in the Federal Budget Deficit?

Figure from CBO’s monthly budget report.

During 2023, GDP and employment have continued to expand. Between the second quarter of 2022 and the second quarter of 2023, nominal GDP increased by 6.1 percent. From July 2022 to July 2023, total employment increased by 3.3 million as measured by the establishment (or payroll) survey and by 3.0 as measured by the household survey. (In this post, we discuss the differences between the employment measures in the two surveys.)

We would expect that with an expanding economy, federal tax revenues would rise and federal expenditures on unemployment insurance and other transfer programs would decline, reducing the federal budget deficit. (We discuss the effects of the business cycle on the federal budget deficit in Macroeconomics, Chapter 16, Section 16.6, Economics, Chapter 26, Section 26.6, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 18, Section 18.6.) In fact, though, as the figure from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) at the top of this post shows, the federal budget deficit actually increased substantially during 2023 in comparison with 2022. The federal budget deficit from the beginning of government’s fiscal year on October 1, 2022 through July 2023 was $1,617 billion, more than double the $726 billion deficit during the same period in fiscal 2022.

The following figure from an article in the Washington Post uses data from the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget to illustrate changes in the federal budget deficit in recent years. The figure shows the sharp decline in the federal budget deficit in 2022 as the economic recovery from the Covid–19 pandemic increased federal tax receipts and reduced federal expenditures as emergency spending programs ended. Given the continuing economic recovery, the surge in the deficit during 2023 was unexpected.

As the following figure shows, using CBO data, federal receipts—mainly taxes—are 10 percent lower this year than last year, and federal outlays—including transfer payments—are 11 percent higher. For receipts to fall and outlays to increase during an economic expansion is very unusual. As an article in the Wall Street Journal put it: “Something strange is happening with the federal budget this year.”

Note: The values on the vertical axis are in billions of dollars.

The following figure shows a breakdown of the decline in federal receipts. While corporate taxes and payroll taxes (primarily used to fund the Social Security and Medicare systems) increased, personal income tax receipts fell by 20 percent, and “other receipts” fell by 37 percent. The decline in other receipts is largely the result of a decline in payments from the Federal Reserve to the U.S. Treasury from $99 billion in 2022 to $1 billion in 2023. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 17, Section 17.4 (Economics, Chapter 27, Section 27.4), Congress intended the Federal Reserve to be independent of the rest of the government. Unlike other federal agencies and departments, the Fed is self-financing rather than being financed by Congressional appropriations. Typically, the Fed makes a profit because the interest it earns on its holdings of Treasury securities is more than the interest it pays banks on their reserve deposits. After paying its operating costs, the Fed pays the rest of its profit to the Treasury. But as the Fed increased its target for the federal funds rate beginning in March 2022, it also increased the interest rate it pays banks on their reserve deposits. Because most of the securities it holds pay low interest rates, the Fed has begun running a deficit, reducing the payments it makes to the Treasury.

Note: The values on the vertical axis are in billions of dollars.

The reasons for the sharp decline in individual income taxes are less clear. The decline was in the “nonwithheld category” of individual income taxes; federal income taxes withheld from worker paychecks increased. People who are self-employed or who receive substantial income from sources such as capital gains from selling stocks, make quarterly estimated income tax payments. It’s these types of personal income taxes that have been unexpectedly low. Accordingly, smaller capital gains may be one explanation for the shortfall in federal revenues, but a more complete explanation won’t be possible until more data become available later in the year.

The following figure shows the categories of federal outlays that have increased the most from 2022 to 2023. The largest increase is in spending on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, with spending on Social Security alone increasing by $111 billion. This increase is due partly to an increase in the number of retired workers receiving benefits and partly to the sharp rise in inflation, because Social Security is indexed to changes in the consumer price index (CPI). Spending on Medicare increased by $66 billion or a surprisingly large 18 percent. Interest payments on the public debt (also called the federal government debt or the national debt) increased by $146 billion or 34 percent because interest rates on newly issued Treasury securities rose as nominal interest rates adjusted to the increase in inflation and because the public debt had increased significantly as a result of the large budget deficits of 2020 and 2021. The increase in spending by the Department of Education reflects the effects of the changes the Biden administration made to student loans eligible for the income-driven repayment plan. (We discuss the income-driven repayment plan for student loans in this blog post.)

Note: The values on the vertical axis are in billions of dollars.

The surge in federal government outlays occurred despite a $120 billion decline in refundable tax credits, largely due to the expiration of the expansion of the child tax credit Congress enacted during the pandemic, a $98 billion decline in Treasury payments to state and local governments to help offset the financial effects of the pandemic, and $59 billion decline in federal payments to hospitals and other medical facilities to offset increased costs due to the pandemic.

In this blog post from February, we discussed the challenges posed to Congress and the president by the CBO’s forecasts of rising federal budget deficits and corresponding increases in the federal government’s debt. The unexpected expansion in the size of the federal budget deficit for the current fiscal year significantly adds to the task of putting the federal government’s finances on a sound basis.

Harvard Professor Edward Glaeser on the Importance of Working on Site

Recently Tunku Varadarajan of the Wall Street Journal interviewed Edward Glaeser on whether the increases in working remotely due to the pandemic are likely to persist.

Glaeser notes that compared with the period before the pandemic, office attendance is still down 19% nationwide. In some large cities, it’s down considerably more, including being down more than 50% in San Francisco and 32% in New York and Boston.

Glaeser believes that a decline in working on site can be a particular problem for young workers:

“Cities—and face-to-face contact at work—have ‘this essential learning component that is valuable and crucial for workers who are young,’ [Glaeser] says. The acquisition of experience and improvement in productivity, ‘month by month, year by year,’ ensures that individual earnings are higher in cities than elsewhere.”

According to Glaeser, people who work remotely face a 50% reduction in the probably of being promoted.

Glaeser is not a fan of remote teaching:

“Delivering a lecture to 100 students on Zoom, he says, is ‘just a bad movie, a really bad movie. None of the magic that comes from live lecturing and live interaction with students is there when you’re doing it via Zoom.'”

There is much more in the article, which is well worth reading. It can be found here (a subscription may be required).

Inflation, Supply Chain Disruptions, and the Peculiar Process of Purchasing a Car

Inflation as measured by the percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI) from the same month in the previous year was 7.9 percent in February 2022, the highest rate since January 1982—near the end of the Great Inflation that began in the late 1960s. The following figure shows inflation in the new motor vehicle component of the CPI. The 12.4 percent increase in new car prices was the largest since April 1975.

The increase in new car prices was being driven partly by increases in aggregate demand resulting from the highly expansionary monetary and fiscal policies enacted in response to the economic disruptions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, and partly from shortages of semiconductors and some other car components, which reduced the supply of new cars.

As the following figure shows, inflation in used car prices was even greater. With the exception of June and July of 2021, the 41.2 percent increase in used car prices in February 2022 was the largest since the Bureau of Labor Statistics began publishing these data in 1954.

Because used cars are a substitute of new cars, rising prices of new cars caused an increase in demand for used cars. In addition, the supply of used cars was reduced because car rental firms, such as Enterprise and Hertz, had purchased fewer new cars during the worst of the pandemic and so had fewer used cars to sell to used car dealers. Increased demand and reduced supply resulted in the sharp increase in the price of used cars.

Another factor increasing the prices consumers were paying for cars was a reduction in bargaining—or haggling—over car prices. Traditionally, most goods and services are sold at a fixed price. For example, some buying a refrigerator usually pays the posted price charged by Best Buy, Lowes, or another retailer. But houses and cars have been an exception, with buyers often negotiating prices that are lower than the seller was asking.

In the case of automobiles, by federal law, the price of a new car has to be posted on the car’s window. The posted price is called the Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price (MSRP), often referred to as the sticker price. Typically, the sticker price represents a ceiling on what a consumer is likely to pay, with many—but not all—buyers negotiating for a lower price. Some people dislike the idea of bargaining over the price of a car, particularly if they get drawn into long negotiations at a car dealership. These buyers are likely to pay the sticker price or something very close to it.

As a result, car dealers have an opportunity to practice price discrimination: They charge buyers whose demand for cars is more price elastic lower prices and buyers whose demand is less price elastic higher prices. The car dealers are able to separate the two groups on the basis of the buyers willingness to haggle over the price of a car. (We discuss price discrimination in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5.) Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, the ability of car dealers to practice this form of price discrimination had been eroded by the availability of online car buying services, such as Consumer Reports’ “Build & Buy Service,” which allow buyers to compare competing price offers from local car dealers. There aren’t sufficient data to determine whether using an online buying service results in prices as low as those obtained by buyers willing to haggle over price face-to-face with salespeople in dealerships.

In any event, in 2022 most car buyers were faced with a different situation: Rather than serving as a ceiling on the price, the MSRP, had become a floor. That is, many buyers found that given the reduced supply of new cars, they had to pay more than the MSRP. As one buyer quoted in a Wall Street Journal article put it: “The rules have changed so dramatically…. [T]he dealer’s position is ‘This is kind of a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.’” According to the website Edmunds.com, in January 2021, only about 3 percent of cars were sold in the United States for prices above MSRP, but in January 2022, 82 percent were.

Car manufacturers are opposed to dealers charging prices higher than the MSRP, fearing that doing so will damage the car’s brand. But car manufacturers don’t own the dealerships that sell their cars. The dealerships are independently owned businesses, a situation that dates back to the beginning of the car industry in the early 1900s. Early automobile manufacturers, such as Henry Ford, couldn’t raise sufficient funds to buy and operate a nationwide network of car dealerships. The manufacturers often even had trouble financing the working capital—or the funds used to finance the daily operations of the firm—to buy components from suppliers, pay workers, and cover the other costs of manufacturing automobiles.

The manufacturers solved both problems by relying on a network of independent dealerships that would be given franchises to be the exclusive sellers of a manufacturer’s brand of cars in a given area. The local businesspeople who owned the dealerships raised funds locally, often from commercial banks. Manufacturers generally paid their suppliers 30 to 90 days after receiving shipments of components, while requiring their dealers to pay a deposit on the cars they ordered and to pay the balance due at the time the cars were delivered to the dealers. One historian of the automobile industry described the process:

The great demand for automobiles and the large profits available for [dealers], in the early days of the industry … enabled the producers to exact substantial advance deposits of cash for all orders and to require cash payment upon delivery of the vehicles …. The suppliers of parts and materials, on the other hand, extended book-account credit of thirty to ninety days. Thus the automobile producer had a month or more in which to assemble and sell his vehicles before the bills from suppliers became due; and much of his labor costs could be paid from dealers’ deposits.

The franchise system had some drawbacks for car manufacturers, however. A car dealership benefits from the reputation of the manufacturer whose cars it sells, but it has an incentive to free ride on that reputation. That is, if a local dealer can take an action—such as selling cars above the MSRP—that raises its profit, it has an incentive to do so even if the action damages the reputation of Ford, General Motors, or whichever firm’s cars the dealer is selling. Car manufacturers have long been aware of the problem of car dealers free riding on the manufacturer’s reputation. For instance, in the 1920s, Ford sent so-called road men to inspect Ford dealers to check that they had clean, well-lighted showrooms and competent repair shops in order to make sure the dealerships weren’t damaging Ford’s brand.

As we discuss in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 10, Section 10.3, consumers often believe it’s unfair of a firm to raise prices—such as a hardware store raising the prices of shovels after a snowstorm—when the increases aren’t the result of increases in the firm’s costs. Knowing that many consumers have this view, car manufacturers in 2022 wanted their dealers not to sell cars for prices above the MSRP. As an article in the Wall Street Journal put it: “Historically, car companies have said they disapprove of their dealers charging above MSRP, saying it can reflect poorly on the brand and alienate customers.”

But the car manufacturers ran into another consequence of the franchise system. Using a franchise system rather than selling cars through manufacturer owned dealerships means that there are thousands of independent car dealers in the United States. The number of dealers makes them an effective lobbying force with state governments. As a result, most states have passed state franchise laws that limit the ability of car manufacturers to control the actions of their dealers and sometimes prohibit car manufacturers from selling cars directly to consumers. Although Tesla has attained the right in some states to sell directly to consumers without using franchised dealers, Ford, General Motors, and other manufacturers still rely exclusively on dealers. The result is that car manufacturers can’t legally set the prices that their dealerships charge.

Will the situation of most people paying the sticker price—or more—for cars persist after the current supply chain problems are resolved? AutoNation is the largest chain of car dealerships in the United States. Recently, Mike Manley, the firm’s CEO, argued that the substantial discounts from the sticker price that were common before the pandemic are a thing of the past. He argued that car manufacturers were likely to keep production of new cars more closely in balance with consumer demand, reducing the number of cars dealers keep in inventory on their lots: “We will not return to excessively high inventory levels that depress new-vehicle margins.”

Only time will tell whether the situation facing car buyers in 2022 of having to pay prices above the MSRP will persist.

Sources: Mike Colias and Nora Eckert, “A New Brand of Sticker Shock Hits the Car Market,” Wall Street Journal, February 26, 2022; Nora Eckert and Mike Colias, “Ford and GM Warn Dealers to Stop Charging So Much for New Cars,” Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2022; Gabrielle Coppola, “Car Discounts Aren’t Coming Back After Pandemic, AutoNation Says,” bloomberg.com, February 9, 2022; cr.org/buildandbuy; Lawrence H. Seltzer, A Financial History of the American Automobile Industry, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1928; and Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

WELCOME BACK! New 08/20/21 Podcast – Authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien return to discuss delta variant & inflation!

Join authors Glenn Hubbard and Tony O’Brien as they return for a new academic year! The issues have evolved but the importance of these issues has not waned. We discuss the impact of closures related to the delta variant has on the economy. The discussion extends to the active fiscal and monetary policy that has reintroduced inflation as a topic facing our economy. Many students have little or no experience with inflation so it is a learning opportunity. Check back regularly where Glenn & Tony will continue to wrestle with these important economic concepts and relate them to the classroom!

Solved Problem: Why Is Starbucks Closing Stores in New York City?

Supports: Econ Chapter 12, Section 12.4, “Deciding Whether to Produce or Shut Down in the Short Run,” and Section 12.5, “‘If Everyone Can Do It, You Can’t Make Money at It’: The Entry and Exit of Firms in the Long Run”; and Essentials: Chapter 9, Section 9.4 and Section 9.5.

Solved Problem: Why Is Starbucks Closing Stores in New York City?

In May 2021, many businesses in the United States began fully reopening as local governments eased restrictions on capacity imposed to contain the spread of Covid-19. An article on crainsnewyork.com discussed the decisions Starbucks was making with respect to its stores in New York City. Starbucks intended to keep some stores open, some stores would be permanently closed, and “about 20 others that are currently in business will shutter when their leases end in the next year.” Analyze the relationship between cost and revenue for each of these three categories of Starbucks stores: 1) the stores that will remain permanently open; 2) the stores that will not reopen; and 3) the stores that will remain open only until their leases expire. In particularly, be sure to explain why Starbucks didn’t close the stores in category 3) immediately rather than waiting until the their leases expire.

Source: Cara Eisenpress, “Starbucks Closing Some City Locations as It Moves to a Smaller, Pickup Model,” crainsnewyork.com, May 19, 2021.

Solving the Problem

Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the break-even price for a firm in the short run and in the long run, so you may want to review Chapter 12, Section 12.4, “Deciding Whether to Produce or to Shut Down in the Short Run,” and Section 12.5, “‘If Everyone Can Do It, You Can’t Make Money at It’: The Entry and Exit of Firms in the Long Run.”

Step 2: Explain why stores in category 1) will remain permanently open. We know that firms will continue to operate a store if the revenue from the store is greater than or equal to all of the store’s costs—both its fixed costs and its variable costs. So, Starbucks must expect this relationship between revenue and cost to hold for the stores that it will keep permanently open.

Step 3: Explain why Starbucks will not reopen stores in category 2). Firms will close a store in the short run if the loss from operating the store is greater than the store’s fixed costs. Put another way, the firm won’t be willing to lose more than the store’s fixed costs. We can conclude that Starbucks believes that if it reopens stores in category 2) its loss from operating those stores will be greater than the stores’ fixed costs.

Step 4: Explain why Starbucks will operate some stores only until their leases expire and then will shut them down. If a firm’s revenue from operating a store is greater than the store’s variable costs, the firm will operate the store even though it is incurring an economic loss. If it closed the store, it would still have to pay the fixed costs of the store, the most important of which in this case is the rent it has to pay the owner of the building the store is in. By operating the store, Starbucks will incur a smaller loss than by immediately closing the store. But recall that there are no fixed costs in the long run. The stores’ leases will eventually expire, eliminating that fixed cost. So, in the long run, a firm will close a store that is incurring a loss. Because Starbucks doesn’t believe that in the long run it can cover all the costs of operating stores in category 3, it intends to operate them until their leases expire and then shut them down.

Congress Agrees on a New Covid-19 Aid Package

In March 2020, as the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on the U.S. economy became clear, Congress passed and President Donald Trump signed the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (Cares) Act, which authorized more than $2 trillion in new spending. This fiscal policy action helped to cushion the effects on businesses and households of the job losses and reduced spending resulting directly from the pandemic and from the actions state and local governments took to contain the spread of the coronavirus, including restrictions on the operations of many businesses.

After a long debate over whether additional government aid would be required, in December 21, 2020, as hospitalizations and deaths from Covid-19 hit new highs in the United States, Congress agreed to a second fiscal policy action, totaling about $900 billion. On December 27, President Donald Trump signed the legislation. The components of the new spending are shown in the following pie chart, which is adapted from an article in the Wall Street Journal that can be found HERE. Note that the dollar values in the pie chart are in billions.

The largest component of the package is aid to small businesses, most of which takes the form of providing additional funds for the Paycheck Protection Plan. (We discuss the Paycheck Protection Plan in an earlier blog post that you can read HERE. An analysis by economists at the U.S. Department of the Treasury of the effectiveness of the original round of spending under the Paycheck Protection Plan can be found HERE.) The second largest component of the program involves direct payments of $600 per adult and $600 per child. The payments phase out for individuals with incomes over $75,000 and for couples with incomes over $150,000. The next largest component of the package is expanded unemployment benefits, followed by aid to schools, and increased spending on vaccines, testing, and contact tracing.

An article from the Associated Press describing the plan can be found HERE.

Statement from the Economic Strategy Group Urging Congress to Provide Additional Spending in Response to the Covid-19 Pandemic

The Economic Strategy Group (ESG) is a program for discussing economic policy issues. On November 19, 2020, the ESG released a statement urging Congress to provide additional funding to deal with the Covid-19 pandemic. Glenn Hubbard joined economists from both political parties in signing the statement. You can read the statement HERE.