The following was the first sentence of an article yesterday on axios.com discussing the market for beef: “Beef sales are plunging, but processors continue to raise prices as a yearslong cattle shortage strains the industry.”
The sentence seems to be describing a paradox: Why would meat processors, such as Tyson, JBS, and Cargill, raise beef prices if their sales are falling? The key to resolving the apparent paradox is the reference to a “cattle shortage.” The number of cattle raised in the United States has been declining for several reasons, including severe drought in cattle-raising states—which has reduced the pasture that cattle forage on—and a reduction in beef imports from Mexico as the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) tries to limit the spread of screwworm.
In other words, using the model of demand and supply we develop in Chapter 3 of Microeconomics, the supply curve for beef in the United States has shifted to the left. The result is shown in the following figure:
When the supply curve shifts to the left from S1 to S2, the price of beef rises from P1 to P2 and the equilibrium quantity of beef falls from Q1 to Q2. In other words, when a market experiences a decline in supply, we would expect to observe both higher prices and falling sales. So, the situation described in the first sentence of the article is not a paradox, but instead reflects the normal working of demand and supply in a market. You can explain a lot just by knowing that demand curves slope downward!
The article also observes with respect to Tyson Foods that: “In its most recent quarter, ended June 27, beef volumes declined by 15.9% from a year ago, while prices Tyson charged grocery stores, restaurants and other customers rose 12.1%.” The USDA estimates that the retail price elasticity of demand for beef is about –1. If we assume that no other factors affecting the demand for Tyson’s beef changed during this three-month period, then the price elasticity of demand for Tyson’s beef is –15.9%/12.1% = –1.3. (Note that the USDA elasticity estimates are for beef sold in supermarkets and other retail venues. So the estimates may not directly apply to sales to restaurants and “other customers.”)
We would expect that the price elasticity of demand for Tyson’s beef would be larger (in absolute value) than the price elasticity of demand for beef as a good. As we discuss in Chapter 6 of Microeconomics, if the price of one brand of a good increases, consumers can switch to another brand. In this case, if the price of Tyson’s beef increases, some consumers will switch to Cargill’s or some other firm’s beef. But if the price of beef as a good increases, consumers would have to eat a different protein to avoid the price increase.
Image created by ChatGPT of Alan Greenspan as a maestro
Earlier this week, Alan Greenspan, former chair of the Federal Reserve passed away at the age of 100. Greenspan may have been the best-known Fed chair in history. People who follow the economics and business news know who Jerome Powell and Kevin Warsh are. But many people who don’t follow the news likely have never heard of them. During his term as Fed chair from 1987 to 2006, Greenspan achieved a level of celebrity that made him one of the best known public officials of the past 50 years.
Greenspan served as Fed chair for 18 years and 5 months, a term in office exceeded only by William McChesney Martin who served as chair for 5 months longer. The Federal Reserve Act requires that the president choose as chair a member of the Fed’s Board of Governors. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.4 (Economics, Chapter 24, Section 24.4, and Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 13, Section 13.1), after being nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, members of the Board of Governors serve 14-year, nonrenewable terms. The following figure, reproduced from Chapter 14, illustrates the structure of the Fed.
If members of the Board of Governs serve a single 14-year term, how did both Greenspan and Martin serve for more than 18 years? The answer is that, although a member of the Board of Governors cannot be nominated to a second term, someone who serves out the remainder of the term of a member who has left the board can be nominated by the president to a full term. In August 1987, Greenspan was nominated by President Ronald Reagan to fill the remainder of Paul Volcker’s term on the Board of Governors and to replace Volcker as chair. Volcker had been nominated by President Jimmy Carter in 1979 to the unexpired term of G. William Miller. When the Miller/Volcker/Greenspan term expired in 1992, President George H. W. Bush nominated Greenspan to a new 14-year term. Volcker stepped down from the Board of Governors in 1987 after deciding that he would not ask President Reagan to nominate him to a third term as chair. (In this oral history, Volcker discusses the somewhat ambiguous circumstances under which he came to his decision.)
Greenspan served out the 4 years and 5 months that remained in the Miller/Volcker term and then served the 14 years of his own term. When his term expired in January 2006, President George W. Bush nominated Ben Bernanke to take Greenspan’s place as chair. One other institutional note: It’s sometimes written that the chair of the Board of Governors is automatically the chair of the Federal Open Market Committee. In fact, under the Federal Reserve Act, the FOMC chooses its own chair. In practice, though, the chair of the Board of Governors has always been elected chair by the members of the FOMC, as happened in May when Warsh began his term of chair of the Board of Governors and was voted chair by the members of the FOMC.
Photo of Paul Volcker from federalreserve.gov
During his time as chair, economists, Fed watchers on Wall Street, and members of Congress generally commended Greenspan’s performance. In particular, Greenspan received praise for his handling of the 1987 stock market crash, the failure of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund in 1997, and the foreign debt crises in the 1990s and early 2000s involving Mexico, several Asian countries, Russia, and Argentina. In July 1995, Greenspan began the modern procedure of explicitly stating the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate after each meeting. Prior to that time, financial analysts and economists tried to determine the target federal funds rate by observing the size of the Fed’s New York Trading Desk transactions with primary dealers and by determining how much banks were charging each other for short-term loans in the federal funds market. In 2001, journalist Bob Woodward wrote a very favorable account of Greenspan’s role as Fed chair in the book Maestro: Greenspan’s Fed and the American Boom.
Photo from Amazon.com
Greenspan’s reputation was dimmed by the severity of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, which began nearly two years after his term of office. Greenspan was criticized for having kept the target for the federal funds rate too low in the years following the 2001 recession. Critics argue that low borrowing costs increased the amount of speculation in financial markets. Greenspan was also criticized for the Fed’s failure to use its legal authority to more closely regulate the mortgage market, which might have stopped mortgage lenders from weakening credit standards, thereby increasing the number of borrowers who would have difficulty making payments on their mortgages if housing prices declined. Greenspan also resisted increased regulation of financial derivatives, particularly those not traded on financial markets. During the financial crisis, the rapidly falling prices of some derivatives undermined the solvency of some financial firms. (In Money, Banking, and the Financial System, we discuss derivative markets in Chapter 7.)
A brief biography of Greenspan can be found here. A useful overview of Greenspan’s career is given in this article by Nick Timiraos in the Wall Street Journal. (A subscription may be required.)
When Kevin Warsh was sworn in as Fed chair, Greenspan was the only one of his predecessors that he mentioned by name, despite Warsh having served several years on the Board of Governors when Ben Bernanke was Fed chair. On several occasions, Warsh has praised Greenspan for resisting pressure during the 1990s to raise the target for the federal funds rate. During that period, Greenspan believed, correctly, that the information revolution resulting from the spread of personal computers and the greater use of the internet meant that real GDP and employment could increase rapidly without leading to an increase in inflation. Warsh believes that the AI revolution has put the Fed in a similar situation today. According to an article in the Financial Times, “Warsh predicts the AI boom will upend the world of work quickly, with the best companies doing ‘things that are unimaginable’ within a year.”
Warsh argues that rising productivity from the spread of AI will allow the Fed to keep the target for the federal funds rate lower without risking rising inflation in a way similar to Greenspan’s policy in the 1990s. The following figure shows productivity growth, as measured by the annual rate of change of output per hour worked for the nonfarm business sector, during the period from the first quarter of 2000 through the first quarter of 2026. Productivity has grown at an annual rate of 2.6 percent since the first quarter of 2023 as opposed to a rate of 2.0 percent for the whole period since 2000.
Productivity moves erratically over short periods, so it’s not yet clear whether AI, in fact, will cause a sustained increase in output per hour worked. Many economists argue that over the short run, AI may be increasing demand more than it is increasing supply. The most important effect of AI to this point might be the surge in demand for data centers, which accounts for more than a third of new capital investment. In addition, Warsh’s remarks at his press conference following the last FOMC meeting made it clear that his top priority is to bring inflation back to the Fed’s 2 percent target. Investors trading in the federal funds futures market now assign a 60 percent probability to the FOMC raising its target for the federal funds rate at its September meeting.
If Warsh intends to follow Greenspan’s strategy of keeping interest rates low to facilitate rapid economic growth during a surge in productivity, he likely won’t begin doing so until well into 2027.
The Wealth of Nations offers a useful lens for understanding why US President Donald Trump’s mercantilist agenda has fallen short of its own stated goals. It also points to a better path, combining competitive markets with policies that help workers and communities build skills and keep pace with economic change.
November’s midterm elections pose a serious challenge for US President Donald Trump. Key components of his economic agenda, especially its protectionist measures, have raised concerns about the rising cost of living, prompted a rare rebuke from the Supreme Court, and cast doubt on the legal basis for his tariffs. Fortunately for Trump and the Republicans, they still have time to pivot to a pro-growth agenda that better addresses voter anxieties before the midterms.
Trump’s agenda is rooted in voter concerns about economic disruption driven by technological change and globalization. Breaking with the bipartisan embrace of market-friendly policies, his administration has sought to shield US producers from competition. While Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has hinted that a pivot to a pro-growth strategy is in the works, reconciling it with the administration’s mercantilist approach will be difficult.
There is, however, an alternative path that better aligns with Trump’s stated goal of helping people and communities buffeted by economic change. For guidance, it is worth turning to Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations, published 250 years ago, grappled with many of the same tensions and pointed to a pragmatic middle ground.
At first glance, Smith may seem at odds with Trump’s approach. After all, The Wealth of Nations centers on Smith’s critique of the mercantilist order of his day. Mercantilism prizes trade surpluses and the accumulation of national wealth in the hands of the state. To work, it requires extensive government intervention in commerce, trade, and labor markets. But that expansive role invites rent-seeking and excessive control, a key concern for Smith.
Smith’s treatise turned this system on its head by posing a radical question: Where does national wealth come from? For Smith, the answer stood in contrast to mercantilism. A competitive economy, with limited government intervention, would be accompanied by openness and specialization, in turn raising living standards.
While Smith did not develop a formal theory of growth, his intuition about the importance of openness to markets and innovation is consistent with modern growth models and stands in contrast to Trump-era policymaking. As Nobel laureate economist Joel Mokyr has noted, science, practical knowledge, and openness to change are key drivers of long-term prosperity.
But Trump has also identified an important tension. Modern growth models are like a coin. The “heads” side is growth and its benefits for living standards; the “tails” side is disruption—the upending of existing investments, firms, jobs, and even communities. It is here that Trump’s mercantilism, with its focus on minimizing the effects of disruption on voters’ lives, gains political traction.
Smith challenges this perspective in two ways. First, he reminds us of the limits mercantilism places on living standards. Second, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which he considered his finest work, he emphasizes empathy and what my Columbia colleague Edmund S. Phelps calls “mass flourishing,” which aims to ensure that everyone benefits from economic progress, including those disrupted by its forward march.
Here, then, is the policy alternative to both Trumpian mercantilism and market orthodoxy: augmenting Smith’s concept of “competition” with the “ability to compete.” Such an agenda would center on preparation and reconnection, both vital for participation in—and support for—an open economy.
One place to begin is workforce development. In the United States, community colleges are well positioned to serve as training grounds for skill development and career transitions, often working closely with local employers to create quality jobs. While support for community colleges has declined in many states, a federal block grant focused on completion and skill development would significantly enhance their impact.
Similarly, a more generous Earned Income Tax Credit could boost labor-force participation and attachment. Increased funding for basic research, alongside support for applied research centers across the country, could raise productivity by bringing cutting-edge tools to businesses, much as land-grant colleges have historically done in agriculture and manufacturing.
To reconnect displaced workers, personal re-employment accounts—combining funds for training with re-employment bonuses—could help reduce the duration of joblessness. For communities affected by structural economic change, more effective place-based aid could support productivity-enhancing business services in lower-income areas with higher unemployment.
Such measures, along with a growth-oriented agenda, could reshape the electoral landscape. Investments in AI and electricity generation could be accelerated through regulatory reform, particularly by easing permitting rules under the National Environmental Policy Act. To increase the housing supply, a prerequisite for mobility and growth, the administration could propose incentives for state and local governments to scale back restrictive construction regulations.
Going further, the administration would need to abandon its nativist immigration policies. Increasing the number of high-skilled immigrants, particularly in STEM fields, would boost growth, as immigrants have been shown to drive technological innovation, leading to more patents, higher productivity, and rising incomes.
Likewise, expanding federal support for research and development would yield high returns. Some estimates suggest that the returns are so large that the net cost to taxpayers may be zero or even negative, as higher productivity generates enough additional tax revenue to offset the cost. Combined with a stable macroeconomic environment and pro-investment policies of the kind Trump has championed, these changes could significantly accelerate growth.
A more constructive approach to economic disruption would shift away from broad tariffs and protectionism, which tend to raise consumer prices and erode the competitiveness of US manufacturing by increasing input costs. The Supreme Court’s recent reversal of many tariffs imposed by Trump under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act has created an opportunity—and underscored the need—for a course correction.
Trump has rightly raised questions about the economic consequences of technological change and globalization. Two and a half centuries after its publication, The Wealth of Nations points toward a necessary pivot away from mercantilism and toward a more balanced, pro-growth framework.
Supports:Macroeconomics Chapter 4, Section 4.3, and Chapter 14, Section 14.3 and Economics, Chapter 4, Section 4.3, and Chapter 24, Section 24.3.
Image created by ChatGPT
Credit cards provide two main services: 1) They are more convenient to use than cash and are more widely accepted than are personal checks, and 2) they are a source of short-term credit. People who pay their balances off at the end of each month get (very short-term) credit for free. People who don’t pay their balances off have to pay interest on the unpaid balance. Credit cards are the leading source of short-term credit to small businesses. We can think of the interest rate on credit card balances as the price of credit card services, although people who pay off their balances each month avoid paying this price. (Note that banks and other credit card issuers also earn fees from merchants who accept credit cards. These processing fees are usually between 1.5 percent and 3.5 percent of the price of the transaction.)
President Trump announced that he intends to cap the interest rate on credit cards at 10 percent. (Imposing such a cap is usually thought to require Congressional approval.) Currently, the average interest rate on credit cards is about 21 percent, although interest rates vary across cards due to differences in the awards the cards give to card holders and the credit history of the card holders.
In this problem, we look at the effect of capping credit card interest rates on the market for credit card services. An interest rate cap is effectively a price ceiling, so we can use the analysis in Chapter 4, Section 4.4, “Government Intervention in the Market: Price Floors and Price Ceilings” to analyze the effect of the interest rate cap on the market for credit card services. We briefly discuss the effects of a cap on credit card interest rates in the Apply the Concept “Help for Young Borrowers: Fintech or Ceilings on Interest Rates?” in Chapter 14, Section 14.3.
Use a demand and supply graph to illustrate the effect of a cap on credit card interest rates on the market for credit card services. Be sure that your graph shows the equilibrium price (interest rate) and quantity of credit card services before and after the imposition of the cap. Briefly explain why you would expect the demand curve for credit card services to be downward sloping and the supply curve for credit card services to be upward sloping.
Which groups would you expect to be most affected and which would you expect to be least affected by the imposition of a cap on credit card interest rates?
Solving the Problem Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the effect of an interest rate cap on the market for credit card services, so you may want to review Chapter 4, Section 4.4, “Government Intervention in the Market: Price Floors and Price Ceilings” and the Apply the Concept “Help for Young Borrowers: Fintech or Ceilings on Interest Rates?” in Chapter 14, Section 14.3.
Step 2: Answer part a. by drawing a demand and supply graph of the market for credit card services that illustrates the effect of an interest rate cap. The following figure is simlar to Chapter 4, Figure 4.10, which shows the effect of rent control on the market for rental apartments. We can show the interest rate cap as a horizontal line at an interest rate of 10%. The inital equilibrium, before the imposition of a cap, is at an interest rate of 20 percent and a quantity of credit card services, Q1, where the demand curve for credit card services crosses the supply curve for credit card services. After imposition of the interest rate ceiling, the equilibrium interest falls to 10 percent and the equilibrium quantity of credit card services falls from Q1 to Q2.
We would expect that the higher the interest rate on credit card balances, the fewer the quantity of credit card services consumers will demand. Therefore, the demand curve for credit card services should be downward sloping. We would also expect that the higher the interest rate on credit card balances, the great the quantity of credit card services that banks and other credit card issuers will supply. Therefore, the supply curve for credit card services should be upward sloping.
Step 2: Answer part b. by discussing which groups you would expect to be most affected and which you would expect to be least affected by the imposition of a cap on credit card interest rates. The figure shows that after the imposition of an interest rate ceiling there is a shortage of credit card services equal to the quantity Q3 – Q2. Because Q2 is less than Q1, we know that some people who would have credit cards prior to the imposition of the interest rate ceiling will no longer be able to qualify for them. These people will be affected most by the interest rate cap. We would expect that people who have a higher risk of defaulting on their credit card balances would be most likely to be unable to obtain credit cards following the imposition of the interest rate cap because credit card issuers won’t be able to charge them an interest rate high enough to compensate the issuers for the higher risk of default. In addition, those people who are still able to receive credit cards and who typically don’t pay off their balance each month will benefit from the decline in the interest rate on unpaid balances from 20 percent to 10 percent.
The people who pay off their balances each month will be least affected because they weren’t paying interest. There are some complications, however. Credit card issuers may respond to the interest rate cap by reducing the rewards—such as cash back on their purchases or points toward buying airline tickets or hotel stays—that card holders receive for using their cards. Reducing rewards would affect even those people who pay off their balances each month.
Extra credit: There has been a debate over how many people would be affected by the imposition of a cap on credit card interest rates. For example, Brian Shearer of Vanderbilt University argues that credit card issuers will only modestly reduce the number of people with weak credit histories who they will no longer be willing to issue credit cards to. Paul Calem and Alexander Kim of the Bank Policy Institute, a banking industry trade group, argue that up to two-thirds of people who currently fail to pay off their credit card balances each month are likely to no longer qualify for credit cards or will qualify for credit cards will lower dollar limits following the imposition of a credit card cap.
Photo of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell from federalreserve.gov
Today’s meeting of the Federal Reserve’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) occurred against a backdrop of a shutdown of the federal government that has delayed release of most government economic data. (We discuss the government shutdown here, here, and here.)
As most observers had expected, the committee decided today to lower its target for the federal funds rate from a range of 4.00 percent to 4.25 percent to a range of 3.75 percent to 4.oo percent—a cut of 0.25 percentage point, or 25 basis points. The members of the committee voted 10 to 2 for the 25 basis point cut with Governor Stephen Miran dissenting because he preferred a 50 basis point cut and Jeffrey Schmid, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, dissenting because he preferred that the target range be left unchanged at this meeting.
The following figure shows, for the period since January 2010, the upper bound (the blue line) and the lower bound (the green line) for the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate, as well as the actual values of the federal funds rate (the red line). Note that the Fed has been successful in keeping the value of the federal funds rate in its target range. (We discuss the monetary policy tools the FOMC uses to maintain the federal funds rate in its target range in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.2).)
During his press conference following the meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell made news by stating that a further cut in the target rate at the FOMC’s meeting on December 9–10 is not a foregone conclusion. This statement came as a surprise to investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) As of yesterday, investors has assigned a probability of 90.5 percent to the committee cutting its target range by another 25 basis points at the December meeting. Today that probability dropped to zero. Instead investors now assign a probability of 67.8 percent to the target remaining unchanged at that meeting, and a probability of 32.2 percent of the committee raising its target by 25 basis points.
Powell also indicated that he believes that the recent increase in inflation was largely due to the effects of the increase in tariff rates that the Trump administration began implementing in April. (We discuss the recent data on inflation in this post.) Powell indicated that committee members expect that the tariff increases will cause a one-time increase in the price level, rather than a long-term increase in the inflation rate. As a result, he said that the shift in the “balance of risks” caused the committee to believe that cutting the target for the federal funds rate was warranted to avoid the possibility of a significant rise in the unemployment rate.
In discussing inflation, Powell highlighted three aspects of the recent CPI report: inflation in goods, inflation in shelter, and inflation in services not including shelter. (The BLS explains is measurement of shelter here.) The following figure shows inflation in each of those categories, measured as the percentage increase from the same month in the previous year. Inflation in goods (the blue line) has been trending up, reflecting the effect of increased tariffs rates. Inlation in shelter (the red line) and in services minus shelter (the green line) have generally been trending downward. Powell noted that the decline in inflation in shelter has been slower than most members of the committee had expected.
Still, Powell argued that with the downward trend in services, once the temporary inflation in goods due to the effects of tariffs had passed through the economy, inflation was likely to be close the Fed’s 2 percent annual target. He thought this was particularly likely to be true because even after today’s cut, the federal funds rate was “restrictive” because it remained above its long-run nominal and real values. A restrictive monetary policy will slow spending and inflation.
In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rates—that is, the annual inflation rates calculated by compounding the current month’s rates over an entire year—for the same three categories. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, goods inflation (the blue line) was running at a very high 6.6 percent in September. inflation in shelter (the red line) had declined to 2.5 per cent in September. Inflation in services minus shelter rose slightly in September to 2.1 percent.
Assuming that the shutdown of the federal government ends within the next few weeks, members of the FOMC will have a great deal of data on inflation, real GDP growth, and employment to consider before their next meeting in December.
This opinion column originally ran at Project Syndicate.
While recent media coverage of the US Federal Reserve has tended to focus on when, and by how much, interest rates will be cut, larger issues loom. The selection of a new Fed chair to succeed Jerome Powell, whose term ends next May, should focus not on short-term market considerations, but on policies and processes that could improve the Fed’s overall performance and accountability.
By demanding that the Fed cut the federal funds rate sharply to boost economic activity and lower the government’s borrowing costs, US President Donald Trump risks pushing the central bank toward an overly inflationary monetary policy. And that, in turn, risks increasing the term premium in the ten-year Treasury yield—the very financial indicator that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has emphasized. A higher premium would raise, not lower, borrowing costs for the federal government, households, and businesses alike. Moreover, concerns about the Fed’s independence in setting monetary policy could undermine confidence in US financial markets and further weaken the dollar’s exchange rate.
But this does not imply that Trump should simply seek continuity at the Fed. The Fed, under Powell, has indeed made mistakes, leading to higher inflation, sometimes inept and uncoordinated communications, and an unclear strategy for monetary policy.
I do not share the opinion of Trump and his advisers that the Fed has acted from political or partisan motives. Even when I have disagreed with Fed officials or Powell on matters of policy, I have not doubted their integrity. However, given their mistakes, I do believe that some institutional introspection is warranted. The next chair—along with the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee—will have many policy questions to address beyond the near-term path for the federal funds rate.
Three issues are particularly important. The first is the Fed’s dual mandate: to ensure stable prices and maximum employment. Many economists (including me) have been critical of the Fed for exhibiting an inflationary bias in 2021 and 2022. The highest inflation rate in 40 years raised pressing questions about whether the Fed has assigned the right weights to inflation and employment.
Clearly, the strategy of pursuing a flexible average inflation target (implying that inflation can be permitted to rise above 2% if it had previously been below 2%) has not been successful. What new approach should the Fed adopt to hit its inflation target? And how can the Fed be held more accountable to Congress and the public? Should it issue a regular inflation report?
The second issue concerns the size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, the Fed has had a much larger balance sheet and has evolved toward an “ample reserves model” (implying a perpetually high level of reserves). But how large must the balance sheet be to conduct monetary policy, and how important should long-term Treasury debt and mortgage-backed securities be, relative to the rest of the balance sheet? If such assets are to play a central role, how can the Fed best separate the conduct of monetary policy from that of fiscal policy?
The third issue is financial regulation. What regulatory changes does the Fed believe are needed to avoid the kind of costly stresses in the Treasury market we have witnessed in recent years? How can bank supervision be improved? Given that regulation is an inherently political subject, how can the Fed best separate these activities from its monetary policymaking (where independence is critical)?
Addressing these policy questions requires a rethink of process, too. The Fed would be more effective in dealing with a changing economic environment if it acknowledged and debated more diverse viewpoints about the roles of monetary policy and financial regulation in how the economy works.
The Fed’s inflation mistakes, overconfidence in financial regulation, and other errors partly reflect the “groupthink” to which all organizations are prone. Regional Fed presidents’ views traditionally have reflected their own backgrounds and local conditions, but that doesn’t translate easily into a diversity of economic views. Instead of choosing Fed officials based on how they are likely to vote at the next rate-setting meeting, Trump should put more weight on intellectual and experiential diversity. Equally, the Fed itself could more actively seek and listen to dissenting views from academic and business leaders.
Raising questions about policy and process offers guidance about the characteristics that the next Fed chair will need to succeed. These obviously include knowledge of monetary policy and financial regulation and mature, independent judgment; but they also include diverse leadership experience and an openness to new ideas and perspectives that might enhance the institution’s performance and accountability. One hopes that Trump’s selection of the next Fed chair, and the Senate’s confirmation process, will emphasize these attributes.
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