Supports:Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.1, Economics, Chapter 24, Section 24.1, and Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 2, Section 2.1.
Image created by ChatGPT
A rare book dealer who often posts to YouTube made the following observation in one of his videos:
“… thousands of years ago, they had the barter system where you could literally exchange wheat for barley and barley for wheat directly. And the idea behind that was to … have a quick solution for [a] transaction, but over time they invented a monetary unit—coinage and money—and they thought that that would inject some efficiency into economic transactions. And in some ways it’s done the complete opposite. There’s a lot of inefficiency because now unfortunately I cannot go right into Bloomingdale’s and take a nice black suit off the shelf and exchange it for a Geneva Bible. I actually have to sell the Bible first … then go buy the suit. So that gives me a lot of extra work, so I’d rather go back to bartering ….”
The dealer may not have been entirely serious, but assuming that he was, is he correct that transacting using barter is more efficient than transacting using money? In your answer, be sure to define “efficient” in this context.
Solving the Problem Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the efficiency of using money to purchase goods rather than engaging in barter, so you may want to review Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.1, “What Is Money and Why Do We Need It?”
Step 2: Answer the problem by explaining why using money is more efficient than engaging in barter. The book dealer is correct that thousands of years ago, most societies used barter rather than money. Societies transitioned from barter to money because of the inefficiencies of barter. A key inefficiency of barter is the need for a double coincidence of wants. For a barter transaction to take place, each person must want what the other person has. It’s not enough for the book dealer to want a black suit from the Bloomingdale’s department store; Bloomingdale’s must be willing to trade the suit for a copy of the Geneva Bible—which is unlikely.
To use a copy of the Geneva Bible to obtain a suit using barter, the book dealer might have to make—possibly many—additional trades until he obtains some good that Bloomingdale’s would accept in exchange for the suit. In practice, it might be difficult to find such a good and doing so would likely involve substantial search costs.
We can conclude that money has replaced barter in most transaction because it is more efficient in the sense that it allows transactions to be completed at a lower cost.
The Wealth of Nations offers a useful lens for understanding why US President Donald Trump’s mercantilist agenda has fallen short of its own stated goals. It also points to a better path, combining competitive markets with policies that help workers and communities build skills and keep pace with economic change.
November’s midterm elections pose a serious challenge for US President Donald Trump. Key components of his economic agenda, especially its protectionist measures, have raised concerns about the rising cost of living, prompted a rare rebuke from the Supreme Court, and cast doubt on the legal basis for his tariffs. Fortunately for Trump and the Republicans, they still have time to pivot to a pro-growth agenda that better addresses voter anxieties before the midterms.
Trump’s agenda is rooted in voter concerns about economic disruption driven by technological change and globalization. Breaking with the bipartisan embrace of market-friendly policies, his administration has sought to shield US producers from competition. While Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has hinted that a pivot to a pro-growth strategy is in the works, reconciling it with the administration’s mercantilist approach will be difficult.
There is, however, an alternative path that better aligns with Trump’s stated goal of helping people and communities buffeted by economic change. For guidance, it is worth turning to Adam Smith. The Wealth of Nations, published 250 years ago, grappled with many of the same tensions and pointed to a pragmatic middle ground.
At first glance, Smith may seem at odds with Trump’s approach. After all, The Wealth of Nations centers on Smith’s critique of the mercantilist order of his day. Mercantilism prizes trade surpluses and the accumulation of national wealth in the hands of the state. To work, it requires extensive government intervention in commerce, trade, and labor markets. But that expansive role invites rent-seeking and excessive control, a key concern for Smith.
Smith’s treatise turned this system on its head by posing a radical question: Where does national wealth come from? For Smith, the answer stood in contrast to mercantilism. A competitive economy, with limited government intervention, would be accompanied by openness and specialization, in turn raising living standards.
While Smith did not develop a formal theory of growth, his intuition about the importance of openness to markets and innovation is consistent with modern growth models and stands in contrast to Trump-era policymaking. As Nobel laureate economist Joel Mokyr has noted, science, practical knowledge, and openness to change are key drivers of long-term prosperity.
But Trump has also identified an important tension. Modern growth models are like a coin. The “heads” side is growth and its benefits for living standards; the “tails” side is disruption—the upending of existing investments, firms, jobs, and even communities. It is here that Trump’s mercantilism, with its focus on minimizing the effects of disruption on voters’ lives, gains political traction.
Smith challenges this perspective in two ways. First, he reminds us of the limits mercantilism places on living standards. Second, in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which he considered his finest work, he emphasizes empathy and what my Columbia colleague Edmund S. Phelps calls “mass flourishing,” which aims to ensure that everyone benefits from economic progress, including those disrupted by its forward march.
Here, then, is the policy alternative to both Trumpian mercantilism and market orthodoxy: augmenting Smith’s concept of “competition” with the “ability to compete.” Such an agenda would center on preparation and reconnection, both vital for participation in—and support for—an open economy.
One place to begin is workforce development. In the United States, community colleges are well positioned to serve as training grounds for skill development and career transitions, often working closely with local employers to create quality jobs. While support for community colleges has declined in many states, a federal block grant focused on completion and skill development would significantly enhance their impact.
Similarly, a more generous Earned Income Tax Credit could boost labor-force participation and attachment. Increased funding for basic research, alongside support for applied research centers across the country, could raise productivity by bringing cutting-edge tools to businesses, much as land-grant colleges have historically done in agriculture and manufacturing.
To reconnect displaced workers, personal re-employment accounts—combining funds for training with re-employment bonuses—could help reduce the duration of joblessness. For communities affected by structural economic change, more effective place-based aid could support productivity-enhancing business services in lower-income areas with higher unemployment.
Such measures, along with a growth-oriented agenda, could reshape the electoral landscape. Investments in AI and electricity generation could be accelerated through regulatory reform, particularly by easing permitting rules under the National Environmental Policy Act. To increase the housing supply, a prerequisite for mobility and growth, the administration could propose incentives for state and local governments to scale back restrictive construction regulations.
Going further, the administration would need to abandon its nativist immigration policies. Increasing the number of high-skilled immigrants, particularly in STEM fields, would boost growth, as immigrants have been shown to drive technological innovation, leading to more patents, higher productivity, and rising incomes.
Likewise, expanding federal support for research and development would yield high returns. Some estimates suggest that the returns are so large that the net cost to taxpayers may be zero or even negative, as higher productivity generates enough additional tax revenue to offset the cost. Combined with a stable macroeconomic environment and pro-investment policies of the kind Trump has championed, these changes could significantly accelerate growth.
A more constructive approach to economic disruption would shift away from broad tariffs and protectionism, which tend to raise consumer prices and erode the competitiveness of US manufacturing by increasing input costs. The Supreme Court’s recent reversal of many tariffs imposed by Trump under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act has created an opportunity—and underscored the need—for a course correction.
Trump has rightly raised questions about the economic consequences of technological change and globalization. Two and a half centuries after its publication, The Wealth of Nations points toward a necessary pivot away from mercantilism and toward a more balanced, pro-growth framework.
The Marriner S. Eccles building, headquarters of the Federal Reserve in Washington, DC. Image from federalreserve.gov.
The following opinion column appeared in the Financial Times.
What Warsh Should Do at the Fed
Donald Trump’s nomination of Kevin Warsh as chair of the Federal Reserve comes at a pivotal time for the American economy and for the US central bank. A pall has been cast by the administration’s unforced error of trumped-up charges against Jay Powell, the current Fed chair, and the president’s renewed threats to fire him if he does not leave by the end of his term. But the nominee’s credentials and experience ought to ensure a smooth confirmation. The question now should be what happens next.
The Fed faces three challenges. In the short term, the potential impact of the Iran war on employment calls for a careful assessment of the direction of the US economy. In the medium term, inflation continuing to run above the 2 per cent target will limit the central bank’s room for maneuver, and also call its credibility into question. In the longer term, questions remain about the effectiveness of quantitative easing, the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, errors made in the aftermath of the Covid pandemic, and the central bank’s forays into areas better left to fiscal or regulatory policy.
All of which means that when Warsh eventually takes up the post, he should launch an evaluation of the purpose, strategy and structure of the Fed straight away.
First, purpose. The Federal Reserve was established as a lender of last resort designed to mitigate financial crises. After it struggled to discharge that role during the Great Depression, it turned to managing aggregate demand and inflation. In 1978, Congress used the Humphrey-Hawkins Act to codify its focus on inflation and employment, while giving the Fed leeway on how to achieve those objectives. It also required the Fed chair to report to Congress on its outcomes and outlook.
Warsh should now offer justifications for each of these objectives, set out clearly what trade-offs they entail and how progress will be communicated. This clarity focuses markets and elected officials on the importance of low and steady inflation for US economic performance. And the advent of a new chair provides an opportunity to make the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort decision-making clearer. Such explanations would be helpful in the present environment of economic and public policy uncertainty.
Next comes strategy. This is about choosing a set of activities that deliver objectives consistently. For the Fed, independence in monetary policy and the ability to flex its balance sheet enable it to keep inflation low and manage financial turmoil. Political assaults on its independence, of the type we have recently seen, or restrictions on its balance sheet as a lender of last resort put these strategic advantages at risk.
To deliver on purpose and strategy, the incoming chair should optimize the Fed’s structure. The arrangement of a board of governors in Washington, district banks led by district presidents, a Federal Open Market Committee of the board and (a rotation of) five district presidents is set by law. But there are three practical steps Warsh could take to improve the effectiveness of this setup.
First, the central bank should cast a wider net to gather insights from economists, business leaders and financial market participants, with Fed conferences reopened to members of these communities. Second, decisions and direction should be communicated to financial markets and the public consistently by the chair and by other officials.
Third, replace the notorious “dot plots”, which map FOMC members’ projections for the federal funds rate, with scenarios. Dot plots can be misinterpreted as signals about the future path of interest rates. By contrast, scenario analysis models how policy would respond to important changes, such as shifts in AI investment, supply constraints, the natural rate of unemployment, and medium-run effects on inflation, the dollar and US economic activity from the conflict in Iran.
Such a comprehensive evaluation of purpose, strategy and structure would give Warsh and the Fed both renewed organizational cohesion—and, more importantly, a game plan.
On the perennial question of interest rates, the US economy’s near-term momentum and elevated inflation are likely to tilt the balance of risks against further cuts, despite Trump’s enthusiasm for an immediate cut. And while Warsh is right to point out that the Fed should learn more about the economic effects of AI, over the medium run a high-productivity-growth economy is associated with a higher, not lower, real rate of interest.
Over this crucial period, the ability of the new chair to communicate clearly to the public the value of low and steady inflation will be vital. The rules governing the Fed’s role as lender of last resort should also be made clearer. Finally, Warsh is correct that the Fed should take care to avoid engaging in the kind of backdoor fiscal policy it has practiced in recent years.
Warsh is smart, informed, experienced in crisis management and an excellent communicator. If the president allows him a free hand as chair, the American economy should reap the benefits. Stay tuned.
Image generated by GTP-4o of someone searching online for a job
It’s become clear during the past few years that most people really, really, really don’t like inflation. Dating as far back as the 1930s, when very high unemployment rates persisted for years, many economists have assumed that unemployment is viewed by most people as a bigger economic problem than inflation. Bu the economic pain from unemployment is concentrated among those people who lose their jobs—and their families—although some people also have their hours reduced by their employers and in severe recessions even people who retain their jobs can be afraid of being laid off.
Although nearly everyone is affected by an increase in the inflation rate, the economic losses are lower than those suffered by people who lose their jobs during a period in which it may difficult to find another one. In addition, as we note in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.7 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.7), that:
“An expected inflation rate of 10 percent will raise the average price of goods and services by 10 percent, but it will also raise average incomes by 10 percent. Goods and services will be as affordable to an average consumer as they would be if there were no inflation.”
In other words, inflation affects nominal variables, but over the long run inflation won’t affect real variables such as the real wage, employment, or the real value of output. The following figure shows movements in real wages from January 2010 through September 2024. Real wages are calculated as nominal average hourly earnings deflated by the consumer price index, with the value for February 2020—the last month before the effects of the Covid pandemic began affecting the United States—set equal to 100. Measured this way, real wages were 2 percent higher in September 2024 than in February 2020. (Although note that real wages were below where they would have been if the trend from 2013 to 2020 had continued.)
Although increases in wages do keep up with increases in prices, many people doubt this point. In Chapter 17, Section 17.1, we discuss a survey Nobel Laurete Rober Shiller of Yale conducted of the general public’s views on inflation. He asked in the survey how “the effect of general inflation on wages or salary relates to your own experience or your own job.” The most populat response was: “The price increase will create extra profifs for my employer, who can now sell output for more; there will be no increase in my pay. My employer will see no reason to raise my pay.”
Recently, Stefanie Stantcheva of Harvard conducted a survey similar to Schiller’s and received similar responses:
“If there is a single and simple answer to the question ‘Why do we dislike inflation,’ it is because many individuals feel that it systematically erodes their purchasing power. Many people do not perceive their wage increases sufficiently to keep up with inflation rates, and they often believe that wages tend to rise at a much slower rate compared to prices.”
A recent working paper by Joao Guerreiro of UCLA, Jonathon Hazell of the London School of Economics, Chen Lian of UC Berkeley, and Christina Patterson of the University of Chicago throws additional light on the reasons that people are skeptical that once the market adjusts, their wages will keep up with inflation. Economists typically think of the real wage as adjusting to clear the labor market. If inflation temporarily reduces the real wage, the nominal wage will increase to restore the market-clearing value of the real wage.
But the authors of thei paper note that, in practice, to receive an increase in your nominal wage you need to either 1)ask your employer to increase your wage, or 2) find another job that pays a higher nominal wage. They note that both of these approachs result in “conflict”: “We argue that workers must take costly actions (‘conflict’) to have nominal wages catch up with inflation, meaning there are welfare costs even if real wages do not fall as inflation rises.” The results of a survey they undertook revealed that:
“A significant portion of workers say they took costly actions—that is, they engaged in conflict—to achieve higher wage growth than their employer offered. These actions include having tough conversations with employers about pay, partaking in union activity, or soliciting job offers.”
Their result is consistent with data showing that workers who switch jobs receive larger wage increases than do workers who remain in their jobs. The following figure is from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and shows the increase in the median nominal hourly wage over the previous year for workers who stayed in their job over that period (brown line) and for workers who switched jobs (gray line).
Job switchers consistently earn larger wage increases than do job stayers with the difference being particularly large during the high inflation period of 2022 and 2023. For instance, in July 2022, job switchers earned average wage increases of 8.5 percent compared with average increases of 5.9 percent for job stayers.
The fact that to keep up with inflation workers have to either change jobs or have a potentially contentious negotiation with their employer provides another reason why the recent period of high inflation led to widespread discontent with the state of the U.S. economy.
HubbardOBrienEconomics.com Blog 