Tag: finance

Glenn’s Advice for Kevin Warsh

The Marriner S. Eccles building, headquarters of the Federal Reserve in Washington, DC. Image from federalreserve.gov.

The following opinion column appeared in the Financial Times.

What Warsh Should Do at the Fed

Donald Trump’s nomination of Kevin Warsh as chair of the Federal Reserve comes at a pivotal time for the American economy and for the US central bank. A pall has been cast by the administration’s unforced error of trumped-up charges against Jay Powell, the current Fed chair, and the president’s renewed threats to fire him if he does not leave by the end of his term. But the nominee’s credentials and experience ought to ensure a smooth confirmation. The question now should be what happens next.

The Fed faces three challenges. In the short term, the potential impact of the Iran war on employment calls for a careful assessment of the direction of the US economy. In the medium term, inflation continuing to run above the 2 per
cent target will limit the central bank’s room for maneuver, and also call its
credibility into question. In the longer term, questions remain about the
effectiveness of quantitative easing, the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, errors
made in the aftermath of the Covid pandemic, and the central bank’s forays
into areas better left to fiscal or regulatory policy.

All of which means that when Warsh eventually takes up the post, he should
launch an evaluation of the purpose, strategy and structure of the Fed straight
away.

First, purpose. The Federal Reserve was established as a lender of last resort
designed to mitigate financial crises. After it struggled to discharge that role
during the Great Depression, it turned to managing aggregate demand and
inflation. In 1978, Congress used the Humphrey-Hawkins Act to codify its
focus on inflation and employment, while giving the Fed leeway on how to
achieve those objectives. It also required the Fed chair to report to Congress on
its outcomes and outlook.

Warsh should now offer justifications for each of these objectives, set out
clearly what trade-offs they entail and how progress will be communicated.
This clarity focuses markets and elected officials on the importance of low and
steady inflation for US economic performance. And the advent of a new chair
provides an opportunity to make the Fed’s lender-of-last-resort decision-making clearer. Such explanations would be helpful in the present
environment of economic and public policy uncertainty.

Next comes strategy. This is about choosing a set of activities that deliver
objectives consistently. For the Fed, independence in monetary policy and the
ability to flex its balance sheet enable it to keep inflation low and manage
financial turmoil. Political assaults on its independence, of the type we have
recently seen, or restrictions on its balance sheet as a lender of last resort put
these strategic advantages at risk.

To deliver on purpose and strategy, the incoming chair should optimize the
Fed’s structure. The arrangement of a board of governors in Washington,
district banks led by district presidents, a Federal Open Market Committee of
the board and (a rotation of) five district presidents is set by law. But there are
three practical steps Warsh could take to improve the effectiveness of this setup.

First, the central bank should cast a wider net to gather insights from
economists, business leaders and financial market participants, with Fed
conferences reopened to members of these communities. Second, decisions
and direction should be communicated to financial markets and the public
consistently by the chair and by other officials.

Third, replace the notorious “dot plots”, which map FOMC members’
projections for the federal funds rate, with scenarios. Dot plots can be
misinterpreted as signals about the future path of interest rates. By contrast,
scenario analysis models how policy would respond to important changes, such
as shifts in AI investment, supply constraints, the natural rate of
unemployment, and medium-run effects on inflation, the dollar and US
economic activity from the conflict in Iran.

Such a comprehensive evaluation of purpose, strategy and structure would give
Warsh and the Fed both renewed organizational cohesion—and, more
importantly, a game plan.

On the perennial question of interest rates, the US economy’s near-term
momentum and elevated inflation are likely to tilt the balance of risks against
further cuts, despite Trump’s enthusiasm for an immediate cut. And while
Warsh is right to point out that the Fed should learn more about the economic
effects of AI, over the medium run a high-productivity-growth economy is
associated with a higher, not lower, real rate of interest.

Over this crucial period, the ability of the new chair to communicate clearly to
the public the value of low and steady inflation will be vital. The rules
governing the Fed’s role as lender of last resort should also be made clearer.
Finally, Warsh is correct that the Fed should take care to avoid engaging in the
kind of backdoor fiscal policy it has practiced in recent years.

Warsh is smart, informed, experienced in crisis management and an excellent
communicator. If the president allows him a free hand as chair, the American
economy should reap the benefits. Stay tuned.

Want a Raise? Get a New Job

Image generated by GTP-4o of someone searching online for a job

It’s become clear during the past few years that most people really, really, really don’t like inflation. Dating as far back as the 1930s, when very high unemployment rates persisted for years, many economists have assumed that unemployment is viewed by most people as a bigger economic problem than inflation. Bu the economic pain from unemployment is concentrated among those people who lose their jobs—and their families—although some people also have their hours reduced by their employers and in severe recessions even people who retain their jobs can be afraid of being laid off.

Although nearly everyone is affected by an increase in the inflation rate, the economic losses are lower than those suffered by people who lose their jobs during a period in which it may difficult to find another one. In addition, as we note in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.7 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.7), that:

“An expected inflation rate of 10 percent will raise the average price of goods and services by 10 percent, but it will also raise average incomes by 10 percent. Goods and services will be as affordable to an average consumer as they would be if there were no inflation.”

In other words, inflation affects nominal variables, but over the long run inflation won’t affect real variables such as the real wage, employment, or the real value of output. The following figure shows movements in real wages from January 2010 through September 2024. Real wages are calculated as nominal average hourly earnings deflated by the consumer price index, with the value for February 2020—the last month before the effects of the Covid pandemic began affecting the United States—set equal to 100. Measured this way, real wages were 2 percent higher in September 2024 than in February 2020. (Although note that real wages were below where they would have been if the trend from 2013 to 2020 had continued.)

Although increases in wages do keep up with increases in prices, many people doubt this point. In Chapter 17, Section 17.1, we discuss a survey Nobel Laurete Rober Shiller of Yale conducted of the general public’s views on inflation. He asked in the survey how “the effect of general inflation on wages or salary relates to your own experience or your own job.” The most populat response was: “The price increase will create extra profifs for my employer, who can now sell output for more; there will be no increase in my pay. My employer will see no reason to raise my pay.”

Recently, Stefanie Stantcheva of Harvard conducted a survey similar to Schiller’s and received similar responses:

“If there is a single and simple answer to the question ‘Why do we dislike inflation,’ it is because many individuals feel that it systematically erodes their purchasing power. Many people do not perceive their wage increases sufficiently to keep up with inflation rates, and they often believe that wages tend to rise at a much slower rate compared to prices.”

A recent working paper by Joao Guerreiro of UCLA, Jonathon Hazell of the London School of Economics, Chen Lian of UC Berkeley, and Christina Patterson of the University of Chicago throws additional light on the reasons that people are skeptical that once the market adjusts, their wages will keep up with inflation. Economists typically think of the real wage as adjusting to clear the labor market. If inflation temporarily reduces the real wage, the nominal wage will increase to restore the market-clearing value of the real wage.

But the authors of thei paper note that, in practice, to receive an increase in your nominal wage you need to either 1)ask your employer to increase your wage, or 2) find another job that pays a higher nominal wage. They note that both of these approachs result in “conflict”: “We argue that workers must take costly actions (‘conflict’) to have nominal wages catch up with inflation, meaning there are welfare costs even if real wages do not fall as inflation rises.” The results of a survey they undertook revealed that:

“A significant portion of workers say they took costly actions—that is, they engaged in conflict—to achieve higher wage growth than their employer offered. These actions include having tough conversations with employers about pay, partaking in union activity, or soliciting job offers.”

Their result is consistent with data showing that workers who switch jobs receive larger wage increases than do workers who remain in their jobs. The following figure is from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and shows the increase in the median nominal hourly wage over the previous year for workers who stayed in their job over that period (brown line) and for workers who switched jobs (gray line).

Job switchers consistently earn larger wage increases than do job stayers with the difference being particularly large during the high inflation period of 2022 and 2023. For instance, in July 2022, job switchers earned average wage increases of 8.5 percent compared with average increases of 5.9 percent for job stayers.

The fact that to keep up with inflation workers have to either change jobs or have a potentially contentious negotiation with their employer provides another reason why the recent period of high inflation led to widespread discontent with the state of the U.S. economy.