Jackson Hole Fed Symposium – HubbardOBrienEconomics.com Blog

Fed Chair Warsh Takes a More Hawkish Stand in Address at Jackson Hole

Federal Reserve Chair Kevin Warsh (Photo from federalreserve.com)

Each year since 1982, the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City has sponsored an economic policy symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. (The site was supposedly first chosen in the hopes that Fed Chair Paul Volcker would attend because of the opportunities for fly fishing in the local area.)

In most years since 1989, the Fed chair has given the keynote address at the symposium. The address gives the Fed chair a chance to provide his or her assessment of the state of the U.S. economy and the outlook for inflation and employment—the two parts of the dual mandate Congress has given to the Fed.

Image created by ChatGPT

This year’s address by Fed Chair Kevin Warsh was highly anticipated. In his press conference following the last meeting of the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), Warsh reiterated his determination to bring inflation back to the Fed’s 2 percent annual target. But he faced a number of questions from reporters as to why, with inflation running well above 2 percent, he wasn’t advocating an increase in the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate. Warsh has stated that he wantesto steer the committee from using forward guidance to affect interest rates. Accordingly he was reluctant to state explicitly what direction Fed policy might take.

Investors in the bond market appear to have interpreted Warsh’s statements as “dovish”; that is, they believed that his reluctance to support rate increases indicated that inflation might remain above the Fed’s target for longer. As we discussed in earlier blog posts, when investors believe that inflation will be higher they require that bond yields rise enough to compensate them for the additional purchasing power. (As we discuss in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 4, economists refer to the increase in nominal interest rates following an increase in the expected inflation rate as the Fisher effect.) The rise in the yield on the 30-year Treasury bond in the days following Warsh’s press conference likely reflected bond investors expecting somewhat higher inflation than they had previously.

In today’s address, Warsh attempted to counter the conclusion that he is reluctant to increase interest rates to slow the rate of inflation. First, though, he repeated his opposition to Fed chairs routinely engaging in forward guidance: “Oversharing policy deliberations and overcommitting to future decisions can lead markets, businesses, and households astray. And I believe when policymakers make quasi-commitments on interest rates through the cycle, we inhibit our own freedom to make the right calls when it’s time to decide.”

He again stated forcefully his commitment to the Fed’s inflation target: “The Fed’s price-stability objective of 2 percent, as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, is a firm, fixed target. … It is the Fed’s job to deliver stable prices.” He noted that all measures of inflation “tell a similar story: Inflation is running above our 2 percent target. So the Fed’s predominant focus right now should be on prices.”

Warsh also observed that “progress over the past two years [toward the 2 percent target] has been modest.” He concluded that: “There is one signal nobody can miss: The responsibility for 65 months of sustained, elevated inflation sits squarely with the central bank. And that is where it belongs.”

The following figure from the Wall Street Journal reflects the bond market’s immediate reaction when the text of Warsh’s address was released.

The two-year Treasury note is directly affected by investors’ expectations of the future path of the federal funds rate. (We discuss this link in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 5.) Investors interpreted Warsh’s address as indicating he would take a more “hawkish” view of the need to raise the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate than he had appeared to take in his earlier press conference.

Investors in the federal funds future market also quickly revised their expectations of the likelihood of the FOMC raising its target for the federal funds rate. Trading in the futures marker resulted in the probability increasing from 35.4 percent yesterday to 57.5 percent this afternoon of the committee raising its target range for the federal funds by 0.25 percentage points (25 basis points) at its next meeting on September 15–16. The probability that after the meeting on October 27–28, the committee will have raised its target range by at least 25 basis points increased from 52.6 percent yesterday to 70.7 percent this afternoon.

New BEA Releases Show Steady Inflation and Higher Output Growth

Image created by ChatGPT

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released two reports this morning (August 26): “GDP (Second Estimate) and Corporate Profits, 2nd Quarter 2026” and “Personal Income and Outlays, July 2026.” The BEA’s second estimate is that real GDP grew at annual rate of 1.5 percent in second quarter of 2026, which is unchanged from the BEA’s initial estimate released last month and is equal to the forecast of economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal.

As we’ve discussed in previous blog posts, to better gauge the state of the economy, Federal Reserve policymakers often prefer to strip out the effects of imports, inventory investment, and government expenditures—which can be volatile—by looking at real final sales to private domestic purchasers, which includes only spending by U.S. households and firms on domestic production. As the following figure shows, real final sales to domestic purchasers increased at an annual rate of 4.2 percent in the second quarter, up from 3.9 percent in last month’s initial estimate. The growth rate in real final sales to domestic purchasers was more than twice the rate of growth of real GDP, as well as far above the U.S. economy’s expected long-run annual real growth rate of 1.8 percent. So growth in real final sales to domestic purchasers indicates that the U.S. economy is expanding rapidly, as opposed to the much weaker growth shown by real GDP data. Typically, growth in real final sales to domestic purchasers is steadier than growth in real GDP and is likely a better indicator of the underlying growth rate in the economy.

The BEA’s “Personal Income and Outlays” report this morning included monthly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. The Fed relies on annual changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target. As we noted in a recent blog post, Fed Chair Kevin Warsh indicated in his press conference following the July meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) that the committee intended to continue using the PCE price index as its gauge of inflation, although that decision would be revisited early next year. Warsh may have intended this statement to reassure financial markets that there would be continuity in the Fed’s measure of inflation. However, some investors appear to have interpreted Warsh’s statement that the decision would be revisited next year as an indication that he favored moving to a measure that would show lower rates of inflation than those shown by the PCE.

In other words, some investors believe that in the future the FOMC might be willing to accept higher levels of PCE inflation. Perhaps in response to this interpretation, the yield on the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond increased in the days following Warsh’s press conference. Higher expected inflation can lead to lower bond prices and higher bond yields. (We discuss this point in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 5, which is now available in a new edition.) Warsh is scheduled to speak on Friday at the Kansas City Fed’s annual Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium. His speech will cover his views on the current state of the economy and may give clues as to the future monetary policy actions he may support.

Image created by ChatGPT

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2019, with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. In July, headline PCE inflation was 3.7 percent, unchanged from June. Core PCE inflation in July was 3.3 percent, also unchanged from June. Headline PCE inflation was slightly higher than forecast by economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal, while core PCE was equal to the forecast. Both headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation remain well above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (Often referred to as 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, headline PCE inflation increased from –1.3 in June to 1.9 percent in July. Core PCE inflation increased from 1.8 percent in June to 3.0 percent in July. Headline inflation was very low in June—prices actually fell during the month—largely because of falling gasoline prices. Today’s data show here was a noticeable acceleration in inflation during July. Of course, it’s important not to overinterpret the data from a single month.

Fed policymakers believe that inflation in non-market services can skew PCE inflation. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices rise, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also rise. Former Fed Chair Jerome Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.” The following figure shows 12-month headline inflation (the blue line) and 12-month core inflation (the red line) for market-based PCE. (The BEA explains the market-based PCE measure here.)

Headline market-based PCE inflation was 3.5 percent in July, unchanged from June. Core market-based PCE inflation was 3.0 percent in July, also unchanged from June. So, both market-based measures show inflation in July remaining well above the Fed’s 2 percent target.

Fed Chair Kevin Warsh argued in testimony at his confirmation hearing before the Senate that the Fed should stop relying on headline PCE inflation: “The measures [of inflation] I prefer are looking at things that are called trimmed averages. We take out all of the tail-risks, all of the one-off items, and we ask ourselves whether the generalized change in prices is having second-order effects on the economy.”

Trimmed-mean PCE inflation drops the 31 percent of goods and services with the highest inflation rates and the 24 percent of goods and services with the lowest inflation rates. A closely related measure, median PCE inflation, is calculated by listing the inflation rate in each individual good or service included in the PCE and identifying the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation the (red line), core PCE inflation (the brown line) and trimmed-mean PCE inflation (the blue line). Trimmed-mean PCE inflation in July was 2.3 percent, well below both headline and core PCE inflation.

The following figure from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland shows headline PCE inflation (the green line), core PCE inflation (the blue line), and median PCE inflation (the brown line). In July, median PCE inflation was 2.7 percent, which was unchanged from June. So Warsh has a point that these two measures of inflation, which are less affected by particularly high or low rates of inflation in some goods and services, indicate that inflation has been running below the Fed’s currently preferred measure. But these measures also show inflation still running well above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target.

Today’s macro data releases appear to have had little effect on the views of investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. These investors believe that the FOMC will likely not raise its target for the federal funds rate at its meeting on September 15–16 as some analysts have speculated. The probability that the committee will leave its target range unchanged at 3.50 percent to 3.75 percent declined only slightly from 60.4 percent yesterday to 59.9 percent this afternoon. Investors assign a probability of 54.7 percent to the FOMC raising its target range by o.25 percentage points (25 basis points) at its meeting on October 27–28.

In Jackson Hole Speech, Fed Chair Powell Signals a Rate Cut and Introduces the Fed’s Revised Monetary Policy Framework

Photo from federalreserve.gov

Federal Reserve chairs often take the opportunity of the Kansas City Fed’s annual monetary policy symposium held in Jackson Hole, Wyoming to provide a summary of their views on monetary policy and on the state of the economy. In these speeches, Fed chairs are careful not to preempt decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) by stating that policy changes will occur that the committee hasn’t yet agreed to. In his speech at Jackson Hole today (August 22), Powell came about as close as Fed chairs ever do to announcing a policy change in a speech. In addition, Powell announced changes to the Fed’s monetary policy framework that had been in place since 2020.

Congress has given the Federal Reserve a dual mandate to achieve price stability and maximum employment. To reach its goal of price stability, the Fed has set an inflation target of 2 percent, with inflation being measured by the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. In the statement that the FOMC releases after each meeting, it generally indicates the current “balance of risks” to meeting its two goals. In a press conference on July 30 following the last meeting of the FOMC, Powell stated that while the labor market appeared to be in balance at close to maximum employment, inflation was still running above the Fed’s 2 percent annual target.

In today’s speech, Powell stated that “the balance of risks appears to be shifting” and “that downside risks to employment are rising. And if those risks materialize, they can do so quickly in the form of sharply higher layoffs and rising unemployment.” These statements seem to signal that he expects that at its next meeting on September 16–17 the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate from its current range of 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent.

One indication of expectations of future changes in the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate comes from investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) Yesterday, investors assigned a 75.0 percent probability to the committee cutting its target by 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) to a range of 4.00 percent to 4.25 percent at its September meeting. After Powell’s speech at 10 a.m. eastern time, the probability of a 25 basis point cut increased to 85.3 percent. As the following figure from the Wall Street Journa shows, the stock market also jumped, with the S&P 500 stock index having increased about 1.5 percent at 2:00 p.m. Investors were presumably expecting that by cutting its federal funds rate target, the FOMC would help to offset some of the current weakness in the labor market. (We discussed the weakness in the latest jobs report in this blog post.)

Powell also announced that the Fed had revised its monetary policy framework, which had been in place since 2020. The previous framework was called flexible average-inflation targeting (FAIT). The policy was intended to automatically make monetary policy expansionary during recessions and contractionary during periods of unexpectedly high inflation. If households and firms accept that the Fed is following this policy, then during a recession when the inflation rate falls below the target, they would expect that the Fed would take action to increase the inflation rate. If a higher inflation rate results in a lower real interest rate, there will be an expansionary effect on the economy. Similarly, if the inflation rate were above the target, households and firms would expect future inflation rates to be lower, raising the real interest rate, which would have a contractionary effect on the economy.

An important point to note is that with a FAIT policy, after a period in which inflation is below 2%, the Fed would aim to keep inflation above 2% for a time to “make up” for the period of low inflation. But the converse would not be true—if inflation runs above 2%, the Fed would attempt to bring the inflation back to 2%, but would not push inflation below 2% for a time to make up for the period of low inflation. The result is that, on average, the economy would run “hotter,” lowering the average unemployment rate over time. Many policymakers at the Fed believed that, in the years before 2019, the unemployment could have been lower without causing the inflation rate to be persistently above the Fed’s target.

With hindsight, some economists and policymakers argue that FAIT was implemented at just the wrong time. The policy was designed to address the problem of inflation running below the 2% target for most of the period between 2012 and 2019, resulting in unemployment being higher than was consistent with the Fed’s mandate for maximum employment. But, in fact, as the following figure shows, in 2020 the U.S. economy was about to enter a period with the highest inflation rates since the early 1980s.

In his speech today, Powell noted that:

“The economic conditions that brought the policy rate to the ELB [effective lower bound to the federal funds rate, 0 percent to 0.25 percent] and drove the 2020 framework changes were thought to be rooted in slow-moving global factors that would persist for an extended period—and might well have done so, if not for the pandemic. … In the event, rather than low inflation and the ELB, the post-pandemic reopening brought the highest inflation in 40 years to economies around the world.”

Powell outlined the key changes in the policy framework:

“First, we removed language indicating that the ELB was a defining feature of the economic landscape. Instead, we noted that our ‘monetary policy strategy is designed to promote maximum employment and stable prices across a broad range of economic conditions.'”

“Second, we returned to a framework of flexible inflation targeting and eliminated the ‘makeup’ strategy. As it turned out, the idea of an intentional, moderate inflation overshoot [after a period when inflation had been below the 2 percent annual target] had proved irrelevant. … Our revised statement emphasizes our commitment to act forcefully to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored, to the benefit of both sides of our dual mandate. It also notes that ‘price stability is essential for a sound and stable economy and supports the well-being of all Americans.’ “

“Third, our 2020 statement said that we would mitigate ‘shortfalls,’ rather than ‘deviations,’ from maximum employment. … [T]he use of ‘shortfalls’ was not intended as a commitment to permanently forswear preemption or to ignore labor market tightness. Accordingly, we removed ‘shortfalls’ from our statement. Instead, the revised document now states more precisely that ‘the Committee recognizes that employment may at times run above real-time assessments of maximum employment without necessarily creating risks to price stability.’ … [But] preemptive action would likely be warranted if tightness in the labor market or other factors pose risks to price stability.”

“Fourth, consistent with the removal of ‘shortfalls,’ we made changes to clarify our approach in periods when our employment and inflation objectives are not complementary. In those circumstances, we will follow a balanced approach in promoting them.”

“Finally, the revised consensus statement retained our commitment to conduct a public review roughly every five years.”

To summarize, the two key changes in the framework are: 1) The FOMC will no longer attempt to push inflation beyond its 2 percent goal if inflation has been below that goal for a period, and 2) The FOMC may still attempt to preempt an increase in inflation if labor market conditions or other data make it appear likely that inflation will accelerate, but it won’t necessarily do so just because the unemployment rate is currently lower than what had been considered consistent with maximum employment.

Fed Chair Powell Indicates that Rate Cuts Will Begin Soon

Photo of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell from federalreserve.gov

Federal Reserve chairs often take the opportunity of the Kansas City Fed’s annual monetary policy symposium held in Jackson Hole, Wyoming to provide a summary of their views on monetary policy and on the state of the economy. In speeches, Fed chairs are careful not to preempt decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) by stating that policy changes will occur that the committee hasn’t yet agreed to. In his speech at Jackson Hole on Friday (August 23), Powell came about as close as Fed chairs ever do to announcing a policy change in a speech.

In the speech, Powell indicated that: “The time has come for policy to adjust. The direction of travel is clear, and the timing and pace of rate cuts will depend on incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks.” The statement is effectively an announcement that the FOMC will reduce its target for the federal funds rate at its next meeting on September 17-18. By referring to “the timing and pace of rate cuts,” Powell was indicating that the FOMC was likely to eventually reduce its target for the federal funds rate well below its current 5.25 percent to 5.50 percent, although the reductions will be spread out over a number of meetings.

The minutes of the FOMC’s last meeting on July 30-31 were released on August 21. The minutes stated that: “The vast majority [of committee members] observed that, if the data continued to come in about as expected, it would likely be appropriate to ease policy at the next meeting.” The apparent consensus at the July meeting that the target for the federal funds rate should be reduced at the September meeting was likely the key reason why Powell was so forthright in his speech.

In his speech, Powell summarized his views on the reasons that inflation accelerated in 2021 and why it has slowly declined since reaching a peak in the summer of 2022:

“[The analysis of events that Powell supports] attributes much of the increase in inflation to an extraordinary collision between overheated and temporarily distorted demand and constrained supply. While researchers differ in their approaches and, to some extent, in their conclusions, a consensus seems to be emerging, which I see as attributing most of the rise in inflation to this collision. All told, the healing from pandemic distortions, our efforts to moderate aggregate demand, and the anchoring of expectations have worked together to put inflation on what increasingly appears to be a sustainable path to our 2 percent objective.”

As he has over the past three years, Powell emphasized the importance of expectations having remained “anchored,” meaning that households and firms continued to expect that the annual inflation rate would return to 2 percent, even when the current inflation rose far above that rate. We discuss how expectations of inflation affect the current inflation rate in Macroeconomics, Chapter 17 (Economics, Chapter 27).

Where Did 818,000 Jobs Go?

Image of “people attending a job fair” generated by GTP-4o

On Wednesday, August 21, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) issued revised estimates of the increase in employment, as measured by the establishment survey, over the period from April 2023 through March 2024. The BLS had initially estimated that on average during that period net employment had increased by 242,000 jobs per month. The revision lowered this estimate by 28 percent to an average of only 174,000 net new jobs created per month. The difference between those two monthly averages means that the U.S. economy had generated a total of 818,000 fewer jobs during that period.

Why does the BLS have to revise its employment estimates? As we discuss in Macroeonomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1) the initial estimates that the BLS issues each month in its “Employment Situation” reports are based on a sample of 300,000 establishments. The monthly data also rely on estimates of the number of employees at establishments that opened or closed during the month and on employment changes at establishments that failed to respond to the survey. In August of each year, the BLS issues revised employment estimates based on state unemployment insurance tax records, which are much more comprehensive than the original sample of establishments because nearly all employers are included.

Although this year’s revision is particularly large in absolute terms—the largest since 2009—it still represents only about 0.5 percent of the more than 158 million people employed in the U.S. economy. How will this revision affect the decision by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) at its next meeting on September 17-18 to cut or maintain its target for the federal funds rate? The members of the committee were probably not surprised by the downward revision in the employment estimates, although they may have anticipated that the revision would be smaller. In five of the past six years, the BLS has revised its estimates of payroll employment downward in its annual benchmark revision.

In his press conference following the June 12 FOMC meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell observed that “you have payroll jobs still coming in strong, even though, you know, there’s an argument that they may be a bit overstated.” (Note that FOMC members don’t receive the data in BLS reports until the reports are publicly released.) As we noted in this recent post, even before the BLS revised its employment estimates downward, recent monthly increases were below the level likely needed to keep up with population growth—so-called breakeven employment growth. There was already a high likelihood that the FOMC intended to cut its target for the federal funds rate at its September meeting. The substantial downward revision in the employment data makes a cut nearly a certainty.

Chair Powell is scheduled to give a speech on Friday morning at the Kansas City Fed’s annual monetary policy symposium held in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. During that speech, he’s likely to give his reaction to the revised employment data—and the state of the labor market more generally.

Data Indicate Continued Labor Market Easing

A job fair in Albuquerque, New Mexico earlier this year. (Photo from Zuma Press via the Wall Street Journal.)

In his speech at the Kansas City Fed’s Jackson Hole, Wyoming symposium, Fed Chair Jerome Powell noted that: “Getting inflation back down to 2 percent is expected to require a period of below-trend economic growth as well as some softening in labor market conditions.” To this point, there isn’t much indication that the U.S. economy is experiencing slower economic growth. The Atlanta Fed’s widely followed GDPNow forecast has real GDP increasing at a rapid 5.3 percent during the third quarter of 2023.

But the labor market does appear to be softening. The most familiar measure of the state of the labor market is the unemployment rate. As the following figure shows, the unemployment rate remains very low.

But, as we noted in this earlier post, an alternative way of gauging the strength of the labor market is to look at the ratio of the number of job openings to the number of unemployed workers. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines a job opening as a full-time or part-time job that a firm is advertising and that will start within 30 days. The higher the ratio of job openings to unemployed workers, the more difficulty firms have in filling jobs, and the tighter the labor market is. As indicated by the earlier quote from Powell, the Fed is concerned that in a very tight labor market, wages will increase more rapidly, which will likely lead firms to increase prices. The following figure shows that in July the ratio of job openings to unemployed workers has declined from the very high level of around 2.0 that was reached in several months between March 2022 and December 2022. The July 2023 value of 1.5, though, was still well above the level of 1.2 that prevailed from mid-2018 to February 2022, just before the beginning of the Covid–19 pandemic. These data indicate that labor market conditions continue to ease, although they remain tighter than they were just before the pandemic.

The following figure shows movements in the quit rate. The BLS calculates job quit rates by dividing the number of people quitting jobs by total employment. When the labor market is tight and competition among firms for workers is high, workers are more likely to quit to take another job that may be offering higher wages. The quit rate in July 2023 had fallen to 2.3 percent of total employment from a high of 3.0 percent, reached in both November 2021 and April 2022. The quit rate was back to its value just before the pandemic. The quit rate data are consistent with easing conditions in the labor market. (The data on job openings and quits are from the BLS report Job Openings and Labor Turnover—July 2023—the JOLTS report—released on August 29. The report can be found here.)

In his Jackson Hole speech, Powell noted that: “Labor supply has improved, driven by stronger participation among workers aged 25 to 54 and by an increase in immigration back toward pre-pandemic levels.” The following figure shows the employment-population ratio for people aged 25 to to 54—so-called prime-age workers. In July 2023, 80.9 percent of people in this age group were employed, actually above the ratio of 80.5 percent just before the pandemic. This increase in labor supply is another indication that the labor market disruptions caused by the pandemic has continued to ease, allowing for an increase in labor supply.

Taken together, these data indicate that labor market conditions are easing, likely reducing upward pressure on wages, and aiding the continuing decline in the inflation rate towards the Fed’s 2 percent target. Unless the data for August show an acceleration in inflation or a tightening of labor market conditions—which is certainly possible given what appears to be a strong expansion of real GDP during the third quarter—at its September meeting the Federal Open Market Committee is likely to keep its target for the federal funds rate unchanged.

Powell at Jackson Hole: No Change to Fed’s Inflation Target

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 2023 (Photo from the Associated Press.)

Congress has given the Federal Reserve a dual mandate to achieve price stability and high employment. To reach its goal of price stability, the Fed has set an inflation target of 2 percent, with inflation being measured by the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index.

It’s reasonable to ask whether “price stability” is achieved only when the price level is constant—that is, at a zero inflation rate. In practice, Congress has given the Fed wide latitude in deciding when price stability and high employment has been achieved. The Fed didn’t announce a formal inflation target of 2 percent until 2012. But the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had agreed to set a 2 percent inflation target much earlier—in 1996—although they didn’t publicly announce it at the time. (The transcript of the FOMC’s July 2-3, 1996 meeting includes a discussion of the FOMC’s decision to adopt an inflation target.) Implicitly, the FOMC had been acting as if it had a 2 percent target since at least the mid–1980s.

But why did the Fed decide on an inflation target of 2 percent rather than 0 percent, 1 percent, 3 percent, or some other rate? There are three key reasons:

As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.4 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 29.4 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 13, Section 13.4), price indexes overstate the actual inflation rate by 0.5 percentage point to 1 percentage point. So, a measured inflation of 2 percent corresponds to an actual inflation rate of 1 to 1.5 percent.
As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.5), the FOMC has a target for the long-run real federal funds rate. Although the target has been as high as 2 percent, in recent years it has been 0.5 percent. With an inflation target of 2 percent, the long-run nominal federal funds rate target is 2.5 percent. (The FOMC’s long-run target federall funds target can be found in the Summary of Economic Projections here.) As the Fed notes, with an inflation target of less than 2 percent “there would be less room to cut interest rates to boost employment during an economic downturn.”
An inflation target of less than 2 percent would make it more likely that during recessions, the U.S. economy might experience deflation, or a period during which the price level is falling. Deflation can be damaging if falling prices cause consumers to postpone purchases in the hope of being able to buy goods and services at lower prices in the future. The resulting decline in aggregate demand can make a recession worse. In addition, deflation increases the real interest rate associated with a given nominal interest rate, imposing costs on borrowers, particularly if the deflation is unexpected.

The following figure shows that for most of the period from late 2008 until the spring of 2021, the inflation rate as measured by the PCE was below the Fed’s 2 percent target. Beginning in the spring of 2021, inflation soared, reaching a peak of 7.0 percent in June 2022. Inflation declined over the following year, falling to 3.0 in June 2023.

On August 25, at the Fed’s annual monetary policy symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Fed Chair Jerome Powell made clear that the Fed intended to continue a restrictive monetary policy until the inflation rate had returned to 2 percent: “It is the Fed’s job to bring inflation down to our 2 percent goal, and we will do so.” (The text of Powell’s speech can be found here.) Some economists have been arguing that once the Fed had succeeded in pushing the inflation rate back to 2 percent it should, in the future, consider raising its inflation target to 3 percent. At Jackson Hole, Powell appeared to rule out this possibility: “Two percent is and will remain our inflation target.”

Why might a 3 percent inflation target be preferrable to a 2 percent inflation target? Proponents of the change point to two key advantages:

Reducing the likelihood of monetary policy being constrained by the zero lower bound. Because the federal funds rate can’t be negative, zero provides a lower bound on how much the FOMC can cut its federal funds rate target in a recession. Monetary policy was constrained by the zero lower bound during both the Great Recession of 2007–2009 and the Covid recession of 2020. Because an inflation target of 3 percent could likely be achieved with a federal funds rate that is higher than the FOMC’s current long-run target of 2.5 percent, the FOMC should have more room to cut its target during a recession.
During a recession, firms attempting to reduce costs can do so by cutting workers’ nominal wages. But, as we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 13, Section 13.2 (Economics, Chapter 23, Section 23.2 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2), most workers dislike wage cuts. Some workers will quit rather than accept a wage cut and the productivity of workers who remain may decline. As a result, firms often use a policy of freezing wages rather than cutting them. Freezing nominal wages when inflation is occurring results in cuts to real wages. The higher the inflation rate, the greater the decline in real wages and the more firms can reduce their labor costs without laying off workers.

Why would Powell rule out increasing the Fed’s target for the inflation rate? Although he didn’t spell out the reasons in his Jackson Hole speech, these are two main points usually raised by those who favor keeping the target at 2 percent:

A target rate above 2 percent would be inconsistent with the price stability component of the Fed’s dual mandate. During the years between 2008 and 2021 when the inflation rate was usually at or below 2 percent, most consumers, workers, and firms found the inflation rate to be low enough that it could be safely ignored. A rate of 3 percent, though, causes money to lose its purchasing power more quickly and makes it less likely that people will ignore it. To reduce the effects of inflation people are likely to spend resources in ways such as firms reprinting menus or price lists more frequently or labor unions negotiating for higher wages in multiyear wage contracts. The resources devoted to avoiding the negative effects of inflation represent an efficiency loss to the economy.
Raising the target for the inflation rate might undermine the Fed’s credibility in fighting inflation. One of the reasons that the Fed was able to bring down the inflation rate without causing a recession—at least through August 2023—was that the expectations of workers, firms, and investors remained firmly anchored. That is, there was a general expectation that the Fed would ultimately succeed in bringing the inflation back down to 2 percent. If expectations of inflation become unanchored, fighting inflation becomes harder because workers, firms, and investors are more likely to take actions that contribute to inflation. For instance, lenders won’t assume that inflation will be 2 percent in the future and so will require higher nominal interest rates on loans. Workers will press for higher nominal wages to protect themselves from the effects of higher inflation, thereby raising firms’ costs. Raising its inflation target to 3 percent may also cause workers, firms, and investors to question whether during a future period of high inflation the Fed will raise its target to an even higher rate. If that happens, inflation may be more persistent than it was during 2022 and 2023.

It seems unlikely that the Fed will raise its target for the inflation rate in the near future. But the Fed is scheduled to review its current monetary policy strategy in 2025. It’s possible that as part of that review, the Fed may revisit the issue of its inflation target.