Category: Ch27: Inflation, Unemployment, and Federal Reserve Policy

Very Strong GDP Report

Photo from Lena Buonanno

This morning the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of GDP for the third quarter of 2023. (The report can be found here.) The BEA estimates that real GDP increased by 4.9 percent at an annual rate in the third quarter—July through September. That was more than double the 2.1 percent increase in real GDP in the second quarter, and slightly higher than the 4.7 percent that economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal last week had expected. The following figure shows the rates of GDP growth each quarter beginning in 2021.

Note that the BEA’s most recent estimates of real GDP during the first two quarters of 2022 still show a decline. The Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee only switched from a strongly expansionary monetary policy, with a target for the federal funds of effectively zero, to a contractionary monetary policy following its March 16, 2022 meeting. That real GDP was declining even before the Fed had pivoted to a contractionary monetary policy helps explain why, despite strong increases employment during this period, most economists were expecting that the U.S. economy would experience a recession at some point during 2022 or 2023. This expectation was reinforced when inflation soared during the summer of 2022 and it became clear that the FOMC would have to substantially raise its target for the federal funds rate.

Clearly, today’s data on real GDP growth, along with the strong September employment report (which we discuss in this blog post), indicates that the chances of the U.S. economy avoiding a recession in the future have increased and are much better than they seemed at this time last year.

Consumer spending was the largest contributor to third quarter GDP growth. The following figure shows growth rates of real personal consumption expenditures and the subcategories of expenditures on durable goods, nondurable goods, and services. There was strong growth in each component of consumption spending. The 7.6 percent increase in expenditures on durables was particularly strong, particularly given that spending on durables had fallen by 0.3 percent in the second quarter.

Investment spending and its components were a more mixed bag, as shown in the following figure. Overall, gross private domestic investment increased at a very strong rate of 8.4 percent—the highest rate since the fourth quarter of 2021. Residential investment increased 3.9 percent, which was particularly notable following nine consecutive quarters of decline and during a period of soaring mortgage interest rates. But business fixed investment was noticeably weak, falling by 0.1 percent. Spending on structures—such as factories and office buildings—increased by only 1.6 percent, while spending on equipment fell by 3.8 percent.

Today’s real GDP report also contained data on the private consumption expenditure (PCE) price index, which the FOMC uses tp determine whether it is achieving its goal of a 2 percent inflation rate. The following figure shows inflation as measured using the PCE and the core PCE—which excludes food and energy prices—since the beginning of 2015. (Note that these inflation rates are measured using quarterly data and as compound annual rates of change.) Despite the strong growth in real GDP and employment, inflation as measured by PCE increased only from 2.5 percent in the second quarter to 2.9 percent in the third quarter. Core PCE, which may be a better indicator of the likely course of inflation in the future, continued the long decline that began in first quarter of 2022 by failling from 3.7 percent to 2.9 percent.

The combination of strong growth in real GDP and declining inflation indicates that the Fed appears well on its way to a soft landing—achieving  a return to its 2 percent inflation target without pushing the economy into a recession. There are reasons to be cautious, however.

GDP, inflation, and employment data are all subject to—possibly substantial—revisions. So growth may have been significantly slower than today’s advance estimate of real GDP indicates. Even if the estimate of real GDP growth of 4.9 percent proves in the long run to have been accurate, there are reasons to doubt whether output growth can be maintained at near that level. Since 2000, annual growth in real GDP has average only 2.1 percent. For GDP to begin increasing at a rate substantially higher than that would require a significant expansion in the labor force and an increase in productivity. While either or both of those changes may occur, they don’t seem likely as of now.

In addition, the largest contributor to GDP growth in the third quarter was from consumption expenditures. As households continue to draw down the savings they built up as a result of the federal government’s response to the Covid recession of 2020, it seems unlikely that the current pace of consumer spending can be maintained. Finally, the lagged effects of monetary policy—particularly the effects of the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note having risen to nearly 5 percent (which we discuss in our most recent podcast)—may substantially reduce growth in real GDP and employment in future quarters.

But those points shouldn’t distract from the fact that today’s GDP report was good news for the economy.

10/21/23 Podcast – Authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien reflect on the Fed’s efforts to execute the soft-landing.

Join authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien as they reflect on the Fed’s efforts to execute the soft landing, ponder if the effect will stick, and wonder if future economies will be tethered to an anchor point above two percent.

Another Mixed Inflation Report

Fed Chair Jerome Powell and Fed Vice-Chair Philip Jefferson this summer at the Fed conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. (Photo from the AP via the Washington Post.)

This morning, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its report on the consumer price index (CPI) for September. (The full report can be found here.) The report was consistent with other recent data showing that inflation has declined markedly from its summer 2022 highs, but appears, at least for now, to be stuck in the 3 percent to 4 percent range—well above the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target. 

The report indicated that the CPI rose by 0.4 percent in September, which was down from 0.6 percent in August. Measured by the percentage change from the same month in the previous year, the inflation rate was 3.7 percent, the same as in August. Core CPI, which excludes the prices of food and energy, increased by 4.1 percent in September, down from 4.4 percent in August. The following figure shows inflation since 2015 measured by CPI and core CPI.

Reporters Gabriel Rubin and Nick Timiraos, writing in the Wall Street Journal summarized the prevailing interpretation of this report:

“The latest inflation data highlight the risk that without a further slowdown in the economy, inflation might settle around 3%—well below the alarming rates that prompted a series of rapid Federal Reserve rate increases last year but still above the 2% inflation rate that the central bank has set as its target.”

As we discuss in this blog post, some economists and policymakers have argued that the Fed should now declare victory over the high inflation rates of 2022 and accept a 3 percent inflation rate as consistent with Congress’s mandate that the Fed achieve price stability. It seems unlikely that the Fed will follow that course, however. Fed Chair Jerome Powell ruled it out in a speech in August: “It is the Fed’s job to bring inflation down to our 2 percent goal, and we will do so.”

To achieve its goal of bringing inflation back to its 2 percent targer, it seems likely that economic growth in the United States will have to slow, thereby reducing upward pressure on wages and prices. Will this slowing require another increase in the Federal Open Market Committe’s target range for the federal funds rate, which is currently 5.25 to 5.50 percent? The following figure shows changes in the upper bound for the FOMC’s target range since 2015.

Several members of the FOMC have raised the possibility that financial markets may have already effectively achieved the same degree of policy tightening that would result from raising the target for the federal funds rate. The interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note has been steadily increasing as shown in the following figure. The 10-year Treasury note plays an important role in the financial system, influencing interest rates on mortgages and corporate bonds. In fact, the main way in which monetary policy works is for the FOMC’s increases or decreases in its target for the federal funds rate to result in increases or decreases in long-run interest rates. Higher long-run interest rates typically result in a decline in spending by consumrs on new housing and by businesses on new equipment, factories computers, and software.

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Lorie Logan, who serves on the FOMC, noted in a speech that “If long-term interest rates remain elevated … there may be less need to raise the fed funds rate.” Similarly, Fed Vice-Chair Philip Jefferson stated in a speech that: “I will remain cognizant of the tightening in financial conditions through higher bond yields and will keep that in mind as I assess the future path of policy.”

The FOMC has two more meetings scheduled for 2023: One on October 31-November 1 and one on December 12-13. The following figure from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta shows financial market expectations of the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate in December. According to this estimate, financial markets assign a 35 percent probability to the FOMC raising its target for the federal funds rate by 0.25 or more. Following the release of the CPI report, that probability declined from about 38 percent. That change reflects the general expectation that the report didn’t substantially affect the likelihood of the FOMC raising its target for the federal funds rate again by the end of the year.

Surprisingly Strong Jobs Report

Photo from Lena Buonanno

When the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employment Situation report is released on the first Friday of each month economists and policymakers—notably including the members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)—focus on the change in total nonfarm payroll employment as recorded in the establishment, or payroll, survey. That number gives what is generally considered to be the best indicator of the current state of the labor market. The most recent report showed a surprisingly strong net increase of 336,000 jobs during September. (The report can be found here.)

According to a survey by the Wall Street Journal, economists had been expecting an net increase in jobs of only 170,000. The larger than expected increase indicated that the economy might be expanding more rapidly than had been thought, raising the possibility that the FOMC might increase its target for the federal funds rate at least once more before the end of the year.

To meet increases in the growth of the U.S. working-age population, the economy needs to increase the total jobs available by approximately 80,000 jobs per month. A net increase of more than four times that amount may be an indication of an overheated job market. As always, one difficulty with drawing that conclusion is determing how many more people might be pulled into the labor market by a strong demand for workers. An increase in labor supply can potentially satisify an increase in labor demand without leading to an acceleration in wage growth and price inflation.

The following figure shows the employment-to-population ratio for workers ages 25 to 54—so-called prime-age workers—for the period since 1985. In September 2023, the ratio was 80.8 perccent, down slightly from 80.9 percent in August, but above the levels reached in early 2020 just before the effects of the Covid–19 pandemic were felt in the United States. The ratio was still below the record high of 81.9 percent reached in April 2000. The population of prime-age workers is about 128 million. So, if the employment-population ratio were to return to its 2000 peak, potentially another 1.3 million prime-age workers might enter the labor market. The likelihood of that happening, however, is difficult to gauge.

A couple of other points about the September employment report. First, it’s worth keeping in mind that the results from the establishment survey are subject to often substantial revisisons. The figure below shows the revisions the BLS has released as of October to their preliminary estimates for each month of 2023. In three of these eight months the revisions so far have been greater than 100,000 jobs. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 13, Section 13.1), the revisions that the BLS makes to its employment estimates are likely to be particularly large when the economy is about to enter a period of significantly lower or higher growth. So, the large revisions to the preliminary employment estimates in most months of 2023 may indicate that the surprisingly large preliminary estimate of a 336,000 increase in net employment will be revised lower in coming months.

Finally, data in the employment report provides some evidence of a slowing in wage growth, despite the sharp increase in employment. The following figure shows wage inflation as measured by the percentage increase in average hourly earnings (AHE) from the same month in the previous year. The increase in September was 4.2 percent, continuing a generally downward trend since March 2022, although still somewhat above wage inflation during the pre-2020 period.

As the following figure shows, September growth in average hourly earnings measured as a compound annual growth rate was 2.5 percent, which—if sustained—would be consistent with a rate of price inflation in the range of the Fed’s 2 percent target.  (The figure shows only the months since January 2021 to avoid obscuring the values for recent months by including the very large monthly increases and decrease during 2020.)

As we note in this blog post, the employment cost index (ECI), published quarterly by the BLS, measures the cost to employers per employee hour worked and can be a better measure than AHE of the labor costs employers face. The first figure shows the percentage change in ECI from the same quarter in the previous year. The second figure shows the compound annual growth rate of the ECI. Both measures show a general downward trend in the growth of labor costs, although the measures are somewhat dated because the most recent values are for the second quarter of 2023.

Ultimately, the key question is one we’ve considered in previous blog posts (most recently here) and podcasts (most recently here): Will the Fed be able to achieve a soft landing by bringing inflation down to its 2 percent target without triggering a recession? The September jobs report can be interpreted as increasing the probability of a soft landing if the slowing in wage growth is emphasized but decreasing the probability if the Fed decides that the strong employment growth is real—that is, the September increase is not likely to be revised sharply lower in coming months—and requires additional increases in the target for the federal funds rate. It’s worth mentioning, of course, that factors over which the Fed has no control, such as a federal government shutdown, rising oil prices, or uncertainty resulting from the attack on Israel by Hamas, will also affect the likelihood of a soft landing.

The Fed Throws Wall Street a Curveball

A trader on the New York Stock Exchange listtening to Fed Chair Jerome Powell (from Reuters via the New York Times)

Accounting for movements in the market prices of stocks and bonds is not an exact exercise. Accounts in the Wall Street Journal and on other business web sites often attribute movements in stock and bond prices to the Fed having acted in a way that investors didn’t expect. 

The decision by the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) at its meeting on September 20-21, 2023 to hold its target for the federal funds rate constant at a range of 5.25 percent to 5.50 percent wasn’t a surprise. Fed Chair Jerome Powell had signaled during his press conference on July 26 following the FOMC’s previous meeting that the FOMC was likely to pause further increases in the federal funds rate target. (A transcript of Powell’s July 26 press conference can be found here.)

In advance of the September meeting, some other members of the FOMC had also signaled that the committee was unlikely to increase its target. For instance, an article in the Wall Street Journal quoted Susan Collins, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, as stating that: “The risk of inflation staying higher for longer must now be weighed against the risk that an overly restrictive stance of monetary policy will lead to a greater slowdown than is needed to restore price stability.” And in a speech in August, Raphael Bostic, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, explained his position on future rate increases: “Based on current dynamics in the macroeconomy, I feel policy is appropriately restrictive. I think we should be cautious and patient and let the restrictive policy continue to influence the economy, lest we risk tightening too much and inflicting unnecessary economic pain.”

Although it wasn’t a surprise that the FOMCdecided to hold its target for the federal funds rate constant, after the decision was announced, stock and bond prices declined. The following figure shows the S&P 500 index of stock prices. The index declined 2.8 percent from September 19—the day before the FOMC meeting—to September 22—two days after the meeting. (We discuss indexes of stock prices in Macroeconomics, Chapter 6, Section 6.2; Economics, Chapter 8, Section 8.2; and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 8, Section 8.2.)

We see a similar pattern in the bond market. Recall that when the price of bonds declines in the bond market, the interest rates—or yields—on the bonds increase. As the following figure shows, the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note rose from 4.37 percent on September 19 to 4.49 percent on September 21. The 10-year Treasury note plays an important role in the financial system, influencing interest rates on mortgages and corporate bonds. So, the yield on the 10-year Treasury note increasing from 3.3 percent in the spring of 2023 to 4.5 percent following the FOMC meeting has the effect of increasing long-term interest rates throughout the U.S. economy.

What explains the movements in the prices of stocks and bonds following the September FOMC meeting? Investors seem to have been surprised by: 1) what Chair Powell had to say in his news conference following the meeting; and 2) the committee members’ Summary of Economic Projections (SEP), which was released after the meeting.

Powell’s remarks were interpreted as indicating that the FOMC was likely to increase its target for the federal funds rate at least once more in 2023 and was unlikely to cut its target before late 2024. For instance, in response to a question Powell said: “We need policy to be restrictive so that we can get inflation down to target. Okay. And we’re going to need that to remain to be the case for some time.” Investors often disagree in their interpretations of what a Fed chair says. Fed chairs don’t act unilaterally because the 12 voting members of the FOMC decide on the target for the federal funds rate. So chairs tend to speak cautiously about future policy. Still, their seemed to be a consensus among investors that Powell was indicating that Fed policy would be more restrictive (or contractionary) than had been anticipated prior to the meeting.

The FOMC releases the SEP four times per year. The most recent SEP before the September meeting was from the June meeting. The table below shows the median of the projections, or forecasts, of key economic variables made by the members of the FOMC at the June meeting. Note the second row from the bottom, which shows members’ median forecast of the federal funds rate.

The following table shows the median values of members’ forecast at the September meeting. Look again at the next to last row. The members’ forecast of the federal funds rate at the end of 2023 was unchanged. But their forecasts for the federal funds rate at the end of 2024 and 2025 were both 0.50 percent higher.

Why were members of the FOMC signaling that they expected to hold their target for the federal funds rate higher for a longer period? The other economic projections in the tables provide a clue. In September, the members expected that real GDP growth would be higher and the unemployment rate would be lower than they had expected in June. Stronger economic growth and a tighter labor market seemed likely to require them to maintain a contractionary monetary policy for a longer period if the inflation rate was to return to their 2.0 percent target. Note that the members didn’t expect that the inflation rate would return to their target until 2026.

9/16/23 Podcast – Authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien discuss inflation, the current status of a soft-landing, and the green economy.

Join authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien as they discuss the economic landscape of inflation, soft-landings, and the green economy. This conversation occurred on Saturday, 9/16/23, prior to the FOMC meeting on September 19th-20th.

What Explains the Surprising Surge in the Federal Budget Deficit?

Figure from CBO’s monthly budget report.

During 2023, GDP and employment have continued to expand. Between the second quarter of 2022 and the second quarter of 2023, nominal GDP increased by 6.1 percent. From July 2022 to July 2023, total employment increased by 3.3 million as measured by the establishment (or payroll) survey and by 3.0 as measured by the household survey. (In this post, we discuss the differences between the employment measures in the two surveys.)

We would expect that with an expanding economy, federal tax revenues would rise and federal expenditures on unemployment insurance and other transfer programs would decline, reducing the federal budget deficit. (We discuss the effects of the business cycle on the federal budget deficit in Macroeconomics, Chapter 16, Section 16.6, Economics, Chapter 26, Section 26.6, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 18, Section 18.6.) In fact, though, as the figure from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) at the top of this post shows, the federal budget deficit actually increased substantially during 2023 in comparison with 2022. The federal budget deficit from the beginning of government’s fiscal year on October 1, 2022 through July 2023 was $1,617 billion, more than double the $726 billion deficit during the same period in fiscal 2022.

The following figure from an article in the Washington Post uses data from the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget to illustrate changes in the federal budget deficit in recent years. The figure shows the sharp decline in the federal budget deficit in 2022 as the economic recovery from the Covid–19 pandemic increased federal tax receipts and reduced federal expenditures as emergency spending programs ended. Given the continuing economic recovery, the surge in the deficit during 2023 was unexpected.

As the following figure shows, using CBO data, federal receipts—mainly taxes—are 10 percent lower this year than last year, and federal outlays—including transfer payments—are 11 percent higher. For receipts to fall and outlays to increase during an economic expansion is very unusual. As an article in the Wall Street Journal put it: “Something strange is happening with the federal budget this year.”

Note: The values on the vertical axis are in billions of dollars.

The following figure shows a breakdown of the decline in federal receipts. While corporate taxes and payroll taxes (primarily used to fund the Social Security and Medicare systems) increased, personal income tax receipts fell by 20 percent, and “other receipts” fell by 37 percent. The decline in other receipts is largely the result of a decline in payments from the Federal Reserve to the U.S. Treasury from $99 billion in 2022 to $1 billion in 2023. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 17, Section 17.4 (Economics, Chapter 27, Section 27.4), Congress intended the Federal Reserve to be independent of the rest of the government. Unlike other federal agencies and departments, the Fed is self-financing rather than being financed by Congressional appropriations. Typically, the Fed makes a profit because the interest it earns on its holdings of Treasury securities is more than the interest it pays banks on their reserve deposits. After paying its operating costs, the Fed pays the rest of its profit to the Treasury. But as the Fed increased its target for the federal funds rate beginning in March 2022, it also increased the interest rate it pays banks on their reserve deposits. Because most of the securities it holds pay low interest rates, the Fed has begun running a deficit, reducing the payments it makes to the Treasury.

Note: The values on the vertical axis are in billions of dollars.

The reasons for the sharp decline in individual income taxes are less clear. The decline was in the “nonwithheld category” of individual income taxes; federal income taxes withheld from worker paychecks increased. People who are self-employed or who receive substantial income from sources such as capital gains from selling stocks, make quarterly estimated income tax payments. It’s these types of personal income taxes that have been unexpectedly low. Accordingly, smaller capital gains may be one explanation for the shortfall in federal revenues, but a more complete explanation won’t be possible until more data become available later in the year.

The following figure shows the categories of federal outlays that have increased the most from 2022 to 2023. The largest increase is in spending on Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, with spending on Social Security alone increasing by $111 billion. This increase is due partly to an increase in the number of retired workers receiving benefits and partly to the sharp rise in inflation, because Social Security is indexed to changes in the consumer price index (CPI). Spending on Medicare increased by $66 billion or a surprisingly large 18 percent. Interest payments on the public debt (also called the federal government debt or the national debt) increased by $146 billion or 34 percent because interest rates on newly issued Treasury securities rose as nominal interest rates adjusted to the increase in inflation and because the public debt had increased significantly as a result of the large budget deficits of 2020 and 2021. The increase in spending by the Department of Education reflects the effects of the changes the Biden administration made to student loans eligible for the income-driven repayment plan. (We discuss the income-driven repayment plan for student loans in this blog post.)

Note: The values on the vertical axis are in billions of dollars.

The surge in federal government outlays occurred despite a $120 billion decline in refundable tax credits, largely due to the expiration of the expansion of the child tax credit Congress enacted during the pandemic, a $98 billion decline in Treasury payments to state and local governments to help offset the financial effects of the pandemic, and $59 billion decline in federal payments to hospitals and other medical facilities to offset increased costs due to the pandemic.

In this blog post from February, we discussed the challenges posed to Congress and the president by the CBO’s forecasts of rising federal budget deficits and corresponding increases in the federal government’s debt. The unexpected expansion in the size of the federal budget deficit for the current fiscal year significantly adds to the task of putting the federal government’s finances on a sound basis.

Powell at Jackson Hole: No Change to Fed’s Inflation Target

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 2023 (Photo from the Associated Press.)

Congress has given the Federal Reserve a dual mandate to achieve price stability and high employment. To reach its goal of price stability, the Fed has set an inflation target of 2 percent, with inflation being measured by the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index.

It’s reasonable to ask whether “price stability” is achieved only when the price level is constant—that is, at a zero inflation rate. In practice, Congress has given the Fed wide latitude in deciding when price stability and high employment has been achieved.  The Fed didn’t announce a formal inflation target of 2 percent until 2012. But the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had agreed to set a 2 percent inflation target much earlier—in 1996—although they didn’t publicly announce it at the time. (The transcript of the FOMC’s July 2-3, 1996 meeting includes a discussion of the FOMC’s decision to adopt an inflation target.) Implicitly, the FOMC had been acting as if it had a 2 percent target since at least the mid–1980s.

But why did the Fed decide on an inflation target of 2 percent rather than 0 percent, 1 percent, 3 percent, or some other rate? There are three key reasons:

  1. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.4 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 29.4 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 13, Section 13.4), price indexes overstate the actual inflation rate by 0.5 percentage point to 1 percentage point. So, a measured inflation of 2 percent corresponds to an actual inflation rate of 1 to 1.5 percent.
  2. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.5), the FOMC has a target for the long-run real federal funds rate. Although the target has been as high as 2 percent, in recent years it has been 0.5 percent.  With an inflation target of 2 percent, the long-run nominal federal funds rate target is 2.5 percent. (The FOMC’s long-run target federall funds target can be found in the Summary of Economic Projections here.) As the Fed notes, with an inflation target of less than 2 percent “there would be less room to cut interest rates to boost employment during an economic downturn.”
  3. An inflation target of less than 2 percent would make it more likely that during recessions, the U.S. economy might experience deflation, or a period during which the price level is falling.  Deflation can be damaging if falling prices cause consumers to postpone purchases in the hope of being able to buy goods and services at lower prices in the future. The resulting decline in aggregate demand can make a recession worse. In addition, deflation increases the real interest rate associated with a given nominal interest rate, imposing costs on borrowers, particularly if the deflation is unexpected.

The following figure shows that for most of the period from late 2008 until the spring of 2021, the inflation rate as measured by the PCE was below the Fed’s 2 percent target. Beginning in the spring of 2021, inflation soared, reaching a peak of 7.0 percent in June 2022. Inflation declined over the following year, falling to 3.0 in June 2023. 

On August 25, at the Fed’s annual monetary policy symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Fed Chair Jerome Powell made clear that the Fed intended to continue a restrictive monetary policy until the inflation rate had returned to 2 percent: “It is the Fed’s job to bring inflation down to our 2 percent goal, and we will do so.” (The text of Powell’s speech can be found here.) Some economists have been arguing that once the Fed had succeeded in pushing the inflation rate back to 2 percent it should, in the future, consider raising its inflation target to 3 percent. At Jackson Hole, Powell appeared to rule out this possibility: “Two percent is and will remain our inflation target.”

Why might a 3 percent inflation target be preferrable to a 2 percent inflation target? Proponents of the change point to two key advantages:

  1. Reducing the likelihood of monetary policy being constrained by the zero lower bound. Because the federal funds rate can’t be negative, zero provides a lower bound on how much the FOMC can cut its federal funds rate target in a recession. Monetary policy was constrained by the zero lower bound during both the Great Recession of 2007–2009 and the Covid recession of 2020. Because an inflation target of 3 percent could likely be achieved with a federal funds rate that is higher than the FOMC’s current long-run target of 2.5 percent, the FOMC should have more room to cut its target during a recession.
  2. During a recession, firms attempting to reduce costs can do so by cutting workers’ nominal wages. But, as we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 13, Section 13.2 (Economics, Chapter 23, Section 23.2 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2), most workers dislike wage cuts. Some workers will quit rather than accept a wage cut and the productivity of workers who remain may decline. As a result, firms often use a policy of freezing wages rather than cutting them. Freezing nominal wages when inflation is occurring results in cuts to real wages.  The higher the inflation rate, the greater the decline in real wages and the more firms can reduce their labor costs without laying off workers.

Why would Powell rule out increasing the Fed’s target for the inflation rate? Although he didn’t spell out the reasons in his Jackson Hole speech, these are two main points usually raised by those who favor keeping the target at 2 percent:

  1. A target rate above 2 percent would be inconsistent with the price stability component of the Fed’s dual mandate. During the years between 2008 and 2021 when the inflation rate was usually at or below 2 percent, most consumers, workers, and firms found the inflation rate to be low enough that it could be safely ignored. A rate of 3 percent, though, causes money to lose its purchasing power more quickly and makes it less likely that people will ignore it. To reduce the effects of inflation people are likely to spend resources in ways such as firms reprinting menus or price lists more frequently or labor unions negotiating for higher wages in multiyear wage contracts. The resources devoted to avoiding the negative effects of inflation represent an efficiency loss to the economy.
  2. Raising the target for the inflation rate might undermine the Fed’s credibility in fighting inflation. One of the reasons that the Fed was able to bring down the inflation rate without causing a recession—at least through August 2023—was that the expectations of workers, firms, and investors remained firmly anchored. That is, there was a general expectation that the Fed would ultimately succeed in bringing the inflation back down to 2 percent. If expectations of inflation become unanchored, fighting inflation becomes harder because workers, firms, and investors are more likely to take actions that contribute to inflation. For instance, lenders won’t assume that inflation will be 2 percent in the future and so will require higher nominal interest rates on loans. Workers will press for higher nominal wages to protect themselves from the effects of higher inflation, thereby raising firms’ costs. Raising its inflation target to 3 percent may also cause workers, firms, and investors to question whether during a future period of high inflation the Fed will raise its target to an even higher rate. If that happens, inflation may be more persistent than it was during 2022 and 2023.

It seems unlikely that the Fed will raise its target for the inflation rate in the near future. But the Fed is scheduled to review its current monetary policy strategy in 2025. It’s possible that as part of that review, the Fed may revisit the issue of its inflation target.  

Is the U.S. Economy Coming in for a Soft Landing?

The Federal Reserve building in Washington, DC. (Photo from Bloomberg News via the Wall Street Journal.)

The key macroeconomic question of the past two years is whether the Federal Reserve could bring down the high inflation rate without triggering a recession. In this blog post from back in February, we described the three likely macroeconomic outcomes as:

  1. A soft landing—inflation returns to the Fed’s 2 percent target without a recession occurring.
  2. A hard landing—inflation returns to the Fed’s 2 percent target with a recession occurring.
  3. No landing—inflation remains above the Fed’s 2 percent target but no recession occurs.

The following figure shows inflation measured as the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index and in the core PCE, which excludes food and energy prices. Recall that the Fed uses inflation as measured by the PCE to determine whether it is hitting its inflation target of 2 percent. Because food and energy prices tend to be volatile, many economists inside and outside of the Fed use the core PCE to better judge the underlying rate of inflation—in other words, the inflation rate likely to persist in at least the near future.

The figure shows that inflation first began to rise above the Fed’s target in March 2021. Most members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) believed that the inflation was caused by temporary disruptions to supply chains caused by the effects of the Covid–19 pandemic. Accordingly, the FOMC didn’t raise its target for the federal funds from 0 to 0.25 percent until March 2022. Since March 2022, the FOMC has raised its target for the federal funds rate in a series of steps until the target range reached 5.25 to 5.50 percent following the FOMC’s July 26, 2023 meeting.

PCE inflation peaked at 7.0 percent in June 2022 and had fallen to 2.9 percent in June 2023. Core PCE had a lower and earlier peak of 5.4 percent in February 2023, but had experienced a smaller decline—to 4.1 percent in June 2023. Inflation as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) followed a similar pattern, as shown in the following figure. Inflation measured by core CPI reached a lower peak than did inflation measured by the CPI and declined by less through June 2023.

As inflation has been falling since mid-2022, , the unemployment rate has remained low and the employment-population ratio for prime-age workers (workers aged 25 to 54) has risen above its 2019 pre-pandemic peak, as the following two figures show.

So, the Fed seems to be well on its way to achieving a soft landing. But in the press conference following the July 26 FOMC meeting Chair Jerome Powell was cautious in summarizing the inflation situation:

“Inflation has moderated somewhat since the middle of last year. Nonetheless, the process of getting inflation back down to 2 percent has a long way to go. Despite elevated inflation, longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored, as reflected in a broad range of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, as well as measures from financial markets.”

By “longer-term expectations appear to remain well anchored,” Powell was referring to the fact that households, firms, and investors appear to be expecting that the inflation rate will decline over the following year to the Fed’s 2 percent target.

Those economists who still believe that there is a good chance of a recession occuring during the next year have tended to focus on the following three points:

1. As shown in the following two figures, the labor market remains tight, with wage increases remaining high—although slowing in recent months—and the ratio of job openings to the number of unemployed workers remaining at historic levels—although that ratio has also been declining in recent months. If the labor market remains very tight, wages may continue to rise at a rate that isn’t consistent with 2 percent inflation. In that case, the FOMC may have to persist in raising its target for the federal funds rate, increasing the chances for a recession.

2. The lagged effect of the Fed’s contractionary monetary policy over the past year—increases in the target for the federal funds rate and quantitative tightening (allowing the Fed’s holdings of Treasury securites and mortgage-backed securities to decline; a process of quantitative tightening (QT))—may have a significant negative effect on the growth of aggegate demand in the coming months. Economists disagree on the extent to which monetary policy has lagged effects on the economy. Some economists believe that lags in policy have been significantly reduced in recent years, while other economists believe the lags are still substantial. The lagged effects of monetary policy, if sufficiently large, may be enough to push the economy into a recession.

3. The economies of key trading partners, including the European Union, the United Kingdom, China, and Japan are either growing more slowly than in the previous year or are in recession. The result could be a decline in net exports, which have been contributing to the growth of aggregate demand since early 2021.

In summary, we can say that in early August 2023, the probability of the Fed bringing off a soft landing has increased compared with the situation in mid-2022 or even at the beginning of 2023. But problems can still arise before the plane is safely on the ground.

4/29/23 Podcast – Authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien discuss a hard vs. soft landing, the debt ceiling, and an economics view of the CHIPS act passed in 2022.

Join authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien as they discuss the state of the landing the economy will achieve – hard vs. soft – or “no landing”. Also, they address the debt ceiling and the barriers it might present to a recovery. We also delve into the Chips Act and what economics has to say about the subsidy of a particular industry. Gain insights into today’s economy through our final podcast of the 2022-2023 academic year! Our discussion covers these points but you can also check for updates on our blog post that can be found HERE .