Tag: Looking through a supply shock

A Double Dose of Bad Inflation News

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This morning, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its report on the consumer price index (CPI) for March. Yesterday,  the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released monthly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index for February as part of its “Personal Income and Outlays” report.  Both reports showed that the inflation has worsened. Note that data for the PCE were collected before the beginning of the conflict with Iran.

CPI Inflation jumped to a level well above the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent annual inflation target. The following figure compares headline CPI inflation (the blue line) and core CPI inflation (the red line). Because of the effects of the federal government shutdown, the BLS didn’t report inflation rates for October or November, so both lines show gaps for those months.  

  • The headline inflation rate, which is measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous year, was 3.3 percent in March, up from 2.4 percent in February. 
  • The core inflation rate, which excludes the prices of food and energy, was 2.6 percent in March, up only slightly from 2.5 percent in February. 

Headline inflation was equal to the forecast of economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal but well below the 3.7 percent rate forecast by economists surveyed by FactSet. Core inflation was slightly below the forecast of 2.7 percent in both surveys. Higher energy prices drove the jump in CPI inflation.

In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, headline inflation (the blue line) was 10.9 percent in March, up from 3.2 percent in February. Core inflation (the red line) actually decreased to 2.4 in March from 2.6 percent in February.

The following figure emphasizes the role paid by energy prices in causing the jump in inflation. The blue line shows the 1-month inflation rate in all energy prices included in the CPI. The red line shows the 1-month inflation rate in gasoline prices—which was an astounding 907.4 percent.

Did the jump in energy prices pass through to increases in food prices, which are a key concern for many consumers? The following figure shows 1-month inflation in the CPI category “food at home” (the blue bar)—primarily food purchased at grocery stores—and the category “food away from home” (the red bar)—primarily food purchased at restaurants. Inflation in both measures fell in March, indicating that they hadn’t (yet?) been affected by rising energy prices. Food at home actually decreased by 1.9 percent in March after increasing by 5.4 percent in February. Food away from home increased 2.9 percent in March, down from 3.9 percent in February.

Turning now to PCE inflation for February. The following figure shows headline PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. Headline PCE inflation was 2.8 percent in February, unchanged from January. Core PCE inflation was 3.0 percent in February, down slight from 3.1 percent in January . Headline inflation was slightly higher and core inflation was equal to the forecast of economists surveyed by FactSet.

The following figure shows 1-month headline PCE inflation and core PCE. Measured this way, headline PCE inflation increased from 3.7 percent in January to 4.6 percent in February. Core PCE inflation declined from 4.8 percent in January to 4.5 percent in February. So, even before the effects of the escalation in energy prices, both 1-month and 12-month PCE inflation are telling the same story of inflation above the Fed’s target—well above in the case of 1-month inflation. These numbers raise significant concern about whether inflation was making progress toward the Fed’s 2 percent target even before the effects of the rise in energy prices.

Fed Chair Jerome Powell has frequently mentioned that inflation in non-market services can skew PCE inflation. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices rise, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also rise. Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.” The following figure shows 12-month headline inflation (the blue line) and 12-month core inflation (the red line) for market-based PCE. (The BEA explains the market-based PCE measure here.)

Headline market-based PCE inflation was 2.7 percent in February, up slightly from 2.6 percent in January. Core market-based PCE inflation was 2.9 percent in February, up slightly from 2.8 percent in January. So, both market-based measures show inflation as stable but well above the Fed’s 2 percent target.

In the following figure, we look at 1-month inflation using these measures. One-month headline market-based inflation increased to 2.1 percent in November from 1.3 percent in October. One-month core market-based inflation fell to 1.3 percent in November from 2.0 percent in October. So, in November, 1-month market-based inflation was at or below the Fed’s annual inflation target. As the figure shows, the 1-month inflation rates are more volatile than the 12-month rates, which is why the Fed relies on the 12-month rates when gauging how close it is coming to hitting its target inflation rate.

What effect are these troubling inflation reports likely to have on the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) at its next meeting on April 28–29—likely Jerome Powell’s last meeting as Fed chair? Economists generally recommend that central banks “look through”—that is, take no action—in response to a supply shock. A supply shock ordinarily results in a one-time increase in the price level, rather than a long-lasting increase in inflation. Fed policymakers, though, are aware that inflation has been running above their 2 percent target for more than five years. The possibility that even a temporary spike in inflation might result in a significant increase in the inflation rate that households and firms expect is a concern. At this point, investors in the federal funds futures market assign only a very small probability to the FOMC raising or lowering its target for the federal funds rate at the next several meetings. Following the next meeting, Powell will give his thoughts on these and other issues at a press conference.

A Disagreement between Fed Chair Powell and Fed Governor Waller over Monetary Policy, and Can President Trump Replace Powell?

In this photo of a Federal Open Market Committee meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell is on the far left and Fed Governor Christopher Waller is the third person to Powell’s left. (Photo from federalreserve.gov)

This post discusses two developments this week that involve the Federal Reserve. First, we discuss the apparent disagreement between Fed Chair Jerome Powell and Fed Governor Christopher Waller over the best way to respond to the Trump Administration’s tariff increases. As we discuss in this blog post and in this podcast, in terms of the aggregate demand and aggregate supply model, a large unexpected increase in tariffs results in an aggregate supply shock to the economy, shifting the short-run aggregate supply curve (SRAS) to the left. The following is Figure 13.7 from Macroeconomics (Figure 23.7 from Economics) and illustrates the effects of an aggregate supply shock on short-run macroeconomic equilibrium.

Although the figure shows the effects of an aggregate supply shock that results from an unexpected increase in oil prices, using this model, the result is the same for an aggregate supply shock caused by an unexpected increase in tariffs. Two-thirds of U.S. imports are raw materials, intermediate goods, or capital goods, all of which are used as inputs by U.S. firms. So, in both the case of an increase in oil prices and in the case of an increase in tariffs, the result of the supply shock is an increase in U.S. firms’ production costs. This increase in costs reduces the quantity of goods firms will supply at every price level, shifting the SRAS curve to the left, as shown in panel (a) of the figure. In the new macroeconomic equilibrium, point B in panel (a), the price level increases and the level of real GDP declines. The decline in real GDP will likely result in an increase in the unemployment rate.

An aggregate supply shock poses a policy dilemma for the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). If the FOMC responds to the decline n real GDP and the increase in the unemployment rate with an expansionary monetary policy of lowering the target for the federal funds rate, the result is likely to be a further increase in the price level. Using a contractionary monetary policy of increasing the target for the federla funds rate to deal with the rising price level can cause real GDP to fall further, possibly pushing the economy into a recession. One way to avoid the policy dilemma from an aggregate supply shock caused by an increase in tariffs is for the FOMC to “look through”—that is, not respond—to the increase in tariffs. As panel (b) in the figure shows, if the FOMC looks through the tariff increase, the effect of the aggregate supply shock can be transitory as the economy absorbs the one-time increase in the price level. In time, real GDP will return to equilibrium at potential real GDP and the unemployment rate will fall back to the natural rate of unemployment.

On Monday (April 14), Fed Governor Christopher Waller in a speech to the Certified Financial Analysts Society of St. Louis made the argument for either looking through the macroeconomic effects of the tariff increase—even if the tariff increase turns out to be large, which at this time is unclear—or responding to the negative effects of the tariffs increases on real GDP and unemployment:

“I am saying that I expect that elevated inflation would be temporary, and ‘temporary’ is another word for ‘transitory.’ Despite the fact that the last surge of inflation beginning in 2021 lasted longer than I and other policymakers initially expected, my best judgment is that higher inflation from tariffs will be temporary…. While I expect the inflationary effects of higher tariffs to be temporary, their effects on output and employment could be longer-lasting and an important factor in determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy. If the slowdown is significant and even threatens a recession, then I would expect to favor cutting the FOMC’s policy rate sooner, and to a greater extent than I had previously thought.”

In a press conference after the last FOMC meeting on March 19, Fed Chair Jerome Powell took a similar position, arguing that: “If there’s an inflation that’s going to go away on its own, it’s not the correct response to tighten policy.” But in a speech yesterday (April 16) at the Economic Club of Chicago, Powell indicated that looking through the increase in the price level resulting from a tariff increase might be a mistake:

“The level of the tariff increases announced so far is significantly larger than anticipated. The same is likely to be true of the economic effects, which will include higher inflation and slower growth. Both survey- and market-based measures of near-term inflation expectations have moved up significantly, with survey participants pointing to tariffs…. Tariffs are highly likely to generate at least a temporary rise in inflation. The inflationary effects could also be more persistent…. Our obligation is to keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored and to make certain that a one-time increase in the price level does not become an ongoing inflation problem.”

In a discussion following his speech, Powell argued that tariff increases may disrupt global supply chains for some U.S. industries, such as automobiles, in way that could be similar to the disruptions caused by the Covid pandemic of 2020. As a result: “When you think about supply disruptions, that is the kind of thing that can take time to resolve and it can lead what would’ve been a one-time inflation shock to be extended, perhaps more persistent.” Whereas Waller seemed to indicate that as a result of the tariff increases the FOMC might be led to cut its target for the federal funds sooner or to larger extent in order to meet the maximum employment part of its dual mandate, Powell seemed to indicate that the FOMC might keep its target unchanged longer in order to meet the price stability part of the dual mandate.

Powell’s speech caught the notice of President Donald Trump who has been pushing the FOMC to cut its target for the federal funds rate sooner. An article in the Wall Street Journal, quoted Trump as posting to social media that: “Powell’s termination cannot come fast enough!” Powell’s term as Fed chair is scheduled to end in May 2026. Does Trump have the legal authority to replace Powell earlier than that? As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 27 (Economics Chapter 17), according to the Federal Reserve Act, once a Fed chair is notimated to a four-year term by the president (President Trump first nominated Powell to be chair in 2017 and Powell took office in 2018) and confirmed by the Senate, the president cannot remove the Fed chair except “for cause.” Most legal scholars argue that a president cannot remove a Fed chair due to a disagreement over monetary policy.

Article I, Section II of the Constitution of the United States states that: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” The ability of Congress to limit the president’s power to appoint and remove heads of commissions, agencies, and other bodies in the executive branch of government—such as the Federal Reserve—is not clearly specified in the Constitution. In 1935, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled in the case of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States that President Franklin Roosevelt couldn’t remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) because in creating the FTC, Congress specified that members could only be removed for cause. Legal scholars have presumed that the ruling in this case would also bar attempts by a president to remove members of the Fed’s Board of Governors because of a disagreement over monetary policy.

The Trump Administration recently fired a member of the National Labor Relations Board and a member of the Merit Systems Protection Board. The members sued and the Supreme Court is considering the case. The Trump Adminstration is asking the Court to overturn the Humphrey’s Executor decision as having been wrongly decided because the decision infringed on the executive power given to the president by the Constitution. If the Court agrees with the administration and overturns the precdent established by Humphrey’s Executor, would President Trump be free to fire Chair Powell before Powell’s term ends? (An overview of the issues involved in this Court case can be found in this article from the Associated Press.)

The answer isn’t clear because, as we’ve noted in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.4, Congress gave the Fed an unusual hybrid public-private structure and the ability to fund its own operations without needing appropriations from Congress. It’s possible that the Court would rule that in overturning Humphrey’s Executor—if the Court should decide to do that—it wasn’t authorizing the president to replace the Fed chair at will. In response to a question following his speech yesterday, Powell seemed to indicate that the Fed’s unique structure might shield it from the effects of the Court’s decision.

If the Court were to overturn its ruling in Humphrey’s Executor and indicate that the ruling did authorize the president to remove the Fed chair, the Fed’s ability to conduce monetary policy independently of the president would be seriously undermined. In Macroeconomics, Chapter 17, Section 17.4 we review the arguments for and against Fed independence. It’s unclear at this point when the Court might rule on the case.