Category: Macroeconomics

Solved Problem: Is a Weak Yen Good or Bad for the Japanese Economy?

Supports: Macroeconomics, Chapter 18, Economics, Chapter 28, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 19.

In a recent post, economics blogger Noah Smith discussed the effects on the Japanese economy of a “weaker yen”: “A weaker yen is making Japanese people feel suddenly poorer ….” But “let’s remember that a ‘weaker’ exchange rate isn’t always a bad thing.”  

  1. When the yen becomes weaker, does one yen exchange for more or fewer U.S. dollars?
  2. Why might a weaker yen make Japanese people feel poorer?
  3. Are there any ways that a weaker yen might help the Japanese economy? Briefly explain.
  4. Considering your answers to parts b. and c., can you determine whether a weak yen is good or bad for the Japanese economy? Briefly explain.

Solving the Problem

Step 1:  Review the chapter material. This problem is about the effect of changes in a country’s exchange rate on the country’s economy, so you may want to review Macroeconomics, Chapter 18, Section 18.2, “The Foreign Exchange Market and Exchange Rates,” (Economics, Chapter 28, Section 18.2, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.6.

Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining what a “weaker” yen means. A weaker yen will exchange for fewer U.S. dollars (or other currencies), or, equivalently, more yen will be required in exchange for a U.S. dollar. (This situation is illustrated in the figure at the top of this post, which shows the substantial weakening of yen against the dollar in the period since the end of the 2020 recession.)

Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining why a weaker yen might make people in Japan feel poorer. A weaker yen raises the yen price of imported goods. For example at an exchange rate of ¥100 = $1, a $1 Hershey candy bar imported from the United States will sell in Japan for ¥100. But if the yen becomes weaker and the exchange rate moves to ¥120 = $1, then the imported candy bar will have increased in price to ¥120. (Note that this discussion is simplified because a change in the exchange rate won’t necessarily be fully passed through to the prices of imported goods, particularly in the short run. But we would still expect that a weaker yen will result in higher yen prices of imports.)  A weaker yen will require people in Japan to pay more for imports, leaving them with less to spend on other goods. Because they will be able to consume less, people in Japan will feel poorer. (As we note in Section 18.3, many goods traded internally are priced in U.S. dollars—oil being an important example. Because Japan imports nearly all of its oil and more than half of its food, a decline in the value of the yen in exchange for the dollar will increase the yen price of key consumer goods.)

Step 4: Answer part c. by explaining how a weaker yen might help the Japanese economy. A weaker yen increases the yen price of Japanese imports but it also decreases the foreign currency price of Japanese exports. This effect would be the main way in which a weaker yen might help the Japanese economy but we can also note that Japanese businesses that compete with foreign imports will also be helped by the increase in import prices.

Step 5: Answer part d. by explaining that a weaker yen isn’t all bad or all good for the Japanese economy. As the answers to parts b. and c. indicate, a weaker yen creates both winners and losers in the Japanese economy. Japanese consumers lose as a result of a weaker yen but Japanese firms that export or that compete against foreign imports will be helped.  

Latest Monthly Report on PCE Inflation Confirms Inflation Remains Stubbornly High

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell (Photo from federalreserve.gov)

In a post yesterday, we noted that the quarterly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index in the latest GDP report released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) indicated that inflation was running higher than expected. Today (April 26), the BEA released its “Personal Income and Outlays” report for March, which includes monthly data on the PCE. The monthly data are consistent with the quarterly data in showing that PCE inflation remains higher than the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent annual inflation target. (A reminder that PCE inflation is particularly important because it’s the inflation measure the Fed uses to gauge whether it’s hitting its inflation target.)

The following figure shows PCE inflation (blue line) and core PCE inflation (red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. Many economists believe that core inflation gives a better gauge of the underlying inflation rate. Measured this way, PCE inflation increased from 2.5 percent in February to 2.7 percent in March. Core PCE inflation remained unchanged at 2.8 percent.

The following figure shows PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation, while this figure shows 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, PCE inflation declined from 4.1 percent in February to 3.9 percent in March. Core PCE inflation increased from 3.2 percent in February to 3.9 in March. So, March was another month in which both PCE inflation and core PCE inflation remained well above the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target.

 

The following figure shows other ways of gauging inflation by including the 12-month inflation rate in the PCE (the same as shown in the figure above—although note that PCE inflation is now the red line rather than the blue line), inflation as measured using only the prices of the services included in the PCE (the green line), and the rate of inflation (the blue line) excluding the prices of housing, food, and energy. Fed Chair Jerome Powell has said that he is particularly concerned by elevated rates of inflation in services. Some economists believe that the price of housing isn’t accurately measured in the PCE, which makes it interesting to see if excluding the price of housing makes much difference in calculating the inflation rate. All three measures of inflation increased from February to March, with inflation in services remaining well above overall inflation and inflation excluding the prices of housing, food, and energy being somewhat lower than overall inflation.

The following figure uses the same three inflation measures as the figure above, but shows the 1-month inflation rate rather than the 12-month inflation rate. Measured this way, inflation in services increased sharply from 3.2 percent in February to 5.0 percent in March. Inflation excluding the prices of housing, food, and energy doubled from 2.0 percent in February to 4.1 percent in March.

Overall, the data in this report indicate that the decline in inflation during the second half of 2023 hasn’t continued in the first three months of 2024. In fact, the inflation rate may be slightly increasing. As a result, it no longer seems clear that the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will cut its target for the federal funds rate this year. (We discuss the possibility that the FOMC will keep its target unchanged through the end of the year in this blog post.) At the press conference following the FOMC’s next meeting on April 30-May 1, Fed Chair Jerome Powell may explain what effect the most recent data have had on the FOMC’s planned actions during the remainder of the year.

Does the Latest GDP Report Indicate the U.S. Economy Is Entering a Period of Stagflation?

Arthur Burns was Fed chair during the stagflation of the 1970s. (Photo from the Wall Street Journal)

This morning, Thursday April 25, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of real GDP growth during the first quarter of 2024. The two most striking points in the report are, first, that real GDP increased in the first quarter at an annual rate of only 1.6 percent—well below the 2.5 percent increase expected in a survey of economists and the 2.7 percent increase indicated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s GDPNow forecast. As the following figure shows, the growth rate of real GDP has declined in each of the last two quarters from the very strong growth rate of 4.9 percent during the third quarter of 2023.  

The second striking point in the report was an unexpected increase in inflation, as measured using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. As the following figure shows, PCE inflation (the red line), measured as a compound annual rate of change, increased from 1.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 3.4 percent in the first quarter of 2024. Core PCE inflation (the blue line), which excludes food and energy prices, increased from 2.0 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 3.7 percent in the first quarter of 2024. These data indicate that inflation in the first quarter of 2024 was running well above the Federal Reserve’s 2.0 percent target.

A combination of weak economic growth and above-target inflation poses a policy dilemma for the Fed. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 13, Section 13.3 (Economics, Chapter 23, Section 23.3), the combination of slow growth and inflation is called stagflation. During the 1970s, when the U.S. economy suffered from stagflation, Fed Chair Arthur Burns (whose photo appears at the beginning of this post) was heavily criticized by members of Congress for his inability to deal with the problem. Stagflation poses a dilemma for the Fed because using an expansionary monetary policy to deal with slow economic growth may cause the inflation rate to rise. Using a contractionary monetary policy to deal with high inflation can cause growth to slow further, possibly pushing the economy into a recession.

Is Fed Chair Jerome Powell in as difficult a situation as Arthur Burns was in the 1970s? Not yet, at least. First, Burns faced a period of recession—declining real GDP and rising unemployment—whereas currently, although economic growth seems to be slowing, real GDP is still rising and the unemployment rate is still below 4 percent. In addition, the inflation rate in these data are below 4 percent, far less than the 10 percent inflation rates during the 1970s.

Second, it’s always hazardous to draw conclusions on the basis of a single quarter’s data. The BEA’s real GDP estimates are revised several times, so that the value for the first quarter of 2024 may well be revised significantly higher (or lower) in coming months.

Third, the slow rate of growth of real GDP in the first quarter is accounted for largely by a surge in imports—which are subtracted from GDP—and a sharp decline in inventory investment. Key components of aggregate demand remained strong: Consumption expenditures increased at annual rate of 2.5 per cent and business investment increased at an annual rate of 3.2 percent. Residential investment was particularly strong, growing at an annual rate 0f 13.2 percent—despite the effects of rising mortgage interest rates. One way to strip out the effects of net exports, inventory investment, and government purchases—which can also be volatile—is to look at final sales to domestic purchasers, which includes only spending by U.S. households and firms on domestic production. As the following figure shows, real final sales to domestic purchasers declined only modertately from 3.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 3.1 percent in the first quarter of 2024.

Looking at these details of the GDP report indicate that growth may have slowed less during the first quarter than the growth rate of real GDP seems to indicate. Investors on Wall Street may have come to this same conclusion. As shown by this figure from the Wall Street Journal, shows that stock prices fell sharply when trading opened at 9:30 am, but by 2 pm has recovered some of their losses as investors considered further the implications of the GDP report. (As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 6, Section 6.2 and Economics, Chapter 8, Section 8.2, movements in stock price indexes can provide some insight into investors’ expectations of future movements in corporate profits, which, in turn, depend in part on future movements in economic growth.)

Finally, we may get more insight into the rate of inflation tomorrow morning when the BEA releases its report on “Personal Income and Outlays,” which will include data on PCE inflation during March. The monthly PCE data provide more current information than do the quarterly data in the GDP report.

In short, today’s report wasn’t good news, but may not have been as bad as it appeared at first glance. We are far from being able to conclude that the U.S. economy is entering into a period of stagflation.

Where Did Dark Age English Kings Obtain the Metal for Their Coins?

Silver pennies used in England during the 600s. (Image from Jane Kershaw, et al.)

As economies move from subsistence agriculture towards specialization and trade, the inefficiency of barter exchange pushes them toward developing money. Any commodity that is widely accepted in payment for goods and services—that is, any commodity that can function as a medium of exchange—can be used as money. As we discuss in a recent blog post, in frontier America animal hides were used as money. In a World War II German prisoner of war camp, the British prisoners used cigarettes as money.  Most economies made a transition from using commodities like animal skins to using coins made of precious metals, such as copper, silver, and gold. (We discuss the development of money in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.1, Economics, Chapter 24, Section 24.1, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 16, Section 16.1.)

Coins were typically minted by kings, local warlords, bishops, or other people with control over a sufficient sized territory to make minting coins worthwhile. Where did they get the metal needed to mint coins? During the height of the gold standard in the 1800s and early 1900s, governments could rely on supplies of precious metals from domestic mines or from trade with other countries. In earlier periods, access to sufficient supplies of precious metals could be more difficult.

A recent academic paper by Jane Kershaw, of the University of Oxford; Stephen W. Merkel and Paolo D’Imporzano, of Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; and Rory Naismith the University of Cambridge, examined the case of coins minted by kings of England during the year 660 to 820. During the time from the year 43 to the year 409, most of modern England and Wales was part of the Roman Empire. (A non-technical summary of the paper, with a video, is here. A timeline of Roman Britain is here.) During that time, the Roman province of Britannia used the same gold, silver, and copper coins used throughout the empire. After the withdrawal of the last Roman legions, England experienced waves of invasions from Saxons, Angles, and other Germanic tribes that destroyed most of Roman civilization on the island. Very few written records have survived from 409 through the end of the 500s. But it’s likely that few, if any, coins were minted during this period.

As trade within England began to revive in the second half of the 600s, the demand for coins increased. Given the inefficiency of barter, the absence of a sufficient supply of coins would have hobbled the growth of trade. With more than 200 years having passed since the end of Roman rule, Roman coins were no longer available in significant quantities. The increased demand for coins was met by silver pennies, like those shown in the photo at the top of this post.

Where did the rulers of the various English kingdoms get the silver to mint pennies, given that there were no known silver mines operating during this period? Searching for clues, Jane Kershaw and her colleagues analyzed the composition of the silver used in the pennies. Surprisingly, the silver turned out to have the same composition as silver used in the Byzantine Empire in the eastern Mediterranean. Because in this period there was little to no trade between England and the Byzantine Empire, Kershaw and colleagues believe that the silver was likely obtained from melting silver objects, like the plate shown above, obtained from trade with the Byzantine Empire in earlier periods.

The work of these researchers has provided insight into an historical example of governments supplying the money needed to facilitate the transition away from barter.

Glenn’s Op-Ed on the Need for Pro-Growth Policies

(Photo from the New York Times.)

This op-ed orginally appeared in the Wall Street Journal.

Put Growth Back on the Political Agenda

In a campaign season dominated by the past, a central economic topic is missing: growth. Rapid productivity growth raises living standards and incomes. Resources from those higher incomes can boost support for public goods such as national defense and education, or can reconfigure supply chains or shore up social insurance programs. A society without growth requires someone to be worse off for you to be better off. Growth breaks that zero-sum link, making it a political big deal.

So why is the emphasis on growth fading? More than economics is at play. While progress from technological advances and trade generally is popular, the disruption that inevitably accompanies growth and hits individuals, firms and communities has many politicians wary. Such concerns can lead to excessive meddling via industrial policy.

As we approach the next election, the stakes for growth are high. Regaining the faster productivity that prevailed before the global financial crisis requires action. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates  potential gross domestic product growth of 1.8% over the coming decade, and somewhat lower after that. Those figures are roughly 1 percentage point lower than the growth rate over the three decades before the pandemic. Many economists believe productivity gains from generative artificial intelligence can raise growth in coming decades. But achieving those gains requires an openness to change that is rare in a political climate stuck in past grievances about disruption—the perennial partner of growth.

Traditionally, economic policy toward growth emphasized support for innovation through basic research. Growth also was fostered by reducing tax burdens on investment, streamlining regulation (which has proliferated during the Biden administration) and expanding markets. These important actions have flagged in recent years. But such attention, while valuable, masks inattention to adverse effects on some individuals and communities, raising concerns about whether open markets advance broad prosperity.

This opened a lane for backward-looking protectionism and industrial policy from Democrats and Republicans alike. Absent strong national-defense arguments (which wouldn’t include tariffs on Canadian steel or objections to Japanese ownership of a U.S. steel company), protectionism limits growth. According to polls by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, roughly three-fourths of Americans say international trade is good for the economy. Finally, protectionism belies ways in which gains from openness may be preserved, such as by simultaneously offering support for training and work for communities of individuals buffeted by trade and technological change.

On industrial policy, it is true that markets can’t solve every allocation problem. But such concerns underpin arguments for greater federal support of research for new technologies in defense, climate-change mitigation, and private activity, not micromanaged subsidies to firms and industries. If a specific defense activity merits assistance, it could be subsidized. These alternatives mitigate the problems in conventional industrial policy of “winner picking” and, just as important, the failure to abandon losers. It is policymakers’ hyperattention to those buffeted by change that hampers policy effectiveness and, worse, invites rent-seeking behavior and costly regulatory micromanagement.

Examples abound. Appending child-care requirements to the Chips Act and the inaptly named Inflation Reduction Act has little to do with those laws’ industrial policy purpose. The Biden administration’s opposition to Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel raises questions amid the current wave of industrial policy. How is a strong American ally’s efficient operation of an American steel company with U.S. workers an industrial-policy problem? Flip-flops on banning TikTok fuel uncertainty about business operations in the name of industrial policy.

The wrongly focused hyperattention is supposedly grounded in putting American workers first. But it raises three problems. First, the interventions raise the cost of investments, and the jobs they are to create or protect, by using mandates and generating policy uncertainty. Second, they contradict the economic freedom in market economies of voluntary transactions. Absent a strong national-security foundation, why is public policy directing investment in or ownership of assets? Such policies threaten the nation’s long-term prosperity by discouraging investment and invite rent-seeking in a way that voluntary market transactions don’t. Both problems hamstring growth. 

Third, and perhaps most important, such micromanagement misses the economic and political mark of actually helping individuals and communities disrupted by growth-enhancing openness. A more serious agenda would focus on training suited to current markets (through, for example, more assistance to community colleges), on work (through expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit), and on aid to communities hit by prolonged employment loss (through services that enhance business formation and job creation). The federal government could also establish research centers around the country to disseminate ideas for businesses. 

Growth matters—for individual livelihoods, business opportunities and public finances. Pro-growth policies that account for disruption’s effects while encouraging innovation, saving, capital formation, skill development and limited regulation must return to the economic agenda. A shift to prospective, visionary thinking would reorient the bipartisan, backward-looking protectionism and industrial policy that weaken growth and fail to address disruption.

Will the Fed Not Cut Rates at All this Year?

Federal Reserve Vice Chair Philip Jefferson (photo from the Federal Reserve)

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell (photo from the Federal Reserve)

At the beginning of 2024, investors were expecting that during the year the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) would cut its target range for the federal funds rate six or seven times. At its meeting on March 19-20 the economic projections of the members of the FOMC indicated that they were expecting to cut the target range three times from its current 5.25 percent to 5.50 percent. But, as we noted in this recent post and in this podcast, macroeconomic data during the first three months of this year indicated that the U.S. economy was growing more rapidly than the Fed had expected and the reductions in inflation that occurred during the second half of 2023 had not persisted into the beginning of 2024.

The unexpected strength of the economy and the persistence of inflation above the Fed’s 2 percent target have raised the issue of whether the FOMC will cut its target range for the federal funds rate at all this year. Earlier this month, Neel Kashkari, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis raised the possibility that the FOMC would not cut its target range this year.

Today (April 16) both Fed Vice Chair Philip Jefferson and Fed Chair Jerome Powell addressed the issue of monetary policy. They gave what appeared to be somewhat different signals about the likely path of the federal funds target during the remainder of this year—bearing in mind that Fed officials never commit to any specific policy when making a speech. Adressing the International Research Forum on Monetary Policy, Vice Chair Jefferson stated that:

“My baseline outlook continues to be that inflation will decline further, with the policy rate held steady at its current level, and that the labor market will remain strong, with labor demand and supply continuing to rebalance. Of course, the outlook is still quite uncertain, and if incoming data suggest that inflation is more persistent than I currently expect it to be, it will be appropriate to hold in place the current restrictive stance of policy for longer.”

One interpretation of his point here is that he is still expecting that the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate sometime this year unless inflation remains persistently higher than the Fed’s target—which he doesn’t expect.

Chair Powell, speaking at a panel discussion at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., seemed to indicate that he believed it was less likely that the FOMC would reduce its federal funds rate target in the near future. The Wall Street Journal summarized his remarks this way:

“Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said firm inflation during the first quarter had introduced new uncertainty over whether the central bank would be able to lower interest rates this year without signs of an economic slowdown. His remarks indicated a clear shift in the Fed’s outlook following a third consecutive month of stronger-than-anticipated inflation readings ….”

An article on bloomberg.com had a similar interpretation of Powell’s remarks: “Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell signaled policymakers will wait longer than previously anticipated to cut interest rates following a series of surprisingly high inflation readings.”

Politics may also play a role in the FOMC’s decisions. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 17, Section 17.4 (Economics, Chapter 27, Section 27.4), the Federal Reserve Act, which Congress passed in 1913 and has amended several times since, puts the Federal Reserve in an unusal position in the federal government. Although the members of the Board of Governors are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, the Fed was intended to act independently of Congress and the president. Over the years, Fed Chairs have protected that independence by, for the most part, avoiding taking actions beyond the narrow responsibilites Congress has given to the Fed by Congress and by avoiding actions that could be interpreted as political.

This year is, of course, a presidential election year. The following table from the Fed’s web site lists the FOMC meetings this year. The presidential election will occur on November 5. There are four scheduled FOMC meetings before then. Given that inflation has been running well above the Fed’s target during the first three months of the year, it would likely take at least two months of lower inflation data—or a weakening of the economy as indicated by a rising unemployment rate—before the FOMC would consider lowering its federal funds rate target. If so, the meeting on July 30-31 might be the first meeting at which a rate reduction would occur. If the FOMC doesn’t act at its July meeting, it might be reluctant to cut its target at the September 17-18 meeting because acting close to the election might be interpreted as an attempt to aid President Joe Biden’s reelection.

Although we don’t know whether avoiding the appearance of intervening in politics is an important consideration for the members of the FOMC, some discussion in the business press raises the possibility. For instance, a recent article in the Wall Street Journal noted that:

“The longer that officials wait, the less likely there will be cuts this year, some analysts said. That is because officials will likely resist starting to lower rates in the midst of this year’s presidential election campaign to avoid political entanglements.”

These are clearly not the easiest times to be a Fed policymaker!

Solved Problem: Will Investors in Japan and Europe Buy the Increased Quantity of U.S. Treasury Bonds?

Supports: Macroeconomics, Chapter 18, Section 18.2;  Economics, Chapter 28, Section 28.2; and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.6.

As the figure above shows, federal government debt, sometimes called the national debt, has been increasing rapidly in the years since the 2020 Covid pandemic. (The figure show federal government debt held by the public, which excludes debt held by federal government trust funds, such as the Social Security trusts funds.) The debt grows each year the federal government runs a budget deficit—that is, whenever federal government expenditures exceed federal government revenues. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecasts large federal budget deficits over the next 30 years, so unless Congress and the president increase taxes or cut expenditures, the size of the federal debt will continue to increase rapidly. (The CBO’s latest forecast can be found here. We discuss the long-run deficit and debt situation in this earlier blog post.)

When the federal government runs a budget deficit, the U.S. Treasury must sell Treasury bills, notes, and bonds to raise the funds necessary to bridge the gap between revenues and expenditures. (Treasury bills have a maturity—the time until the debt is paid off by the Treasury—of 1 year or less; Treasury notes have a maturity of 2 years to 10 years; and Treasury bonds have a maturity of greater than 10 years. For convenience, we will refer to all of these securities as “bonds.”) A recent article in the Wall Street Journal discussed the concern among some investors about the ability of the bond market to easily absorb the large amounts of bonds that Treasury will have to sell. (The article can be found here. A subscription may be required.)

According to the article, one source of demand is likely to be European and Japanese investors.

“The euro and yen are both sinking relative to the dollar, in part because the Bank of Japan is still holding rates low and investors expect the European Central Bank to slash them soon. That could increase demand for U.S. debt, with Treasury yields remaining elevated relative to global alternatives.”

a. What does the article mean by “the euro and the yen are both sinking relative to the dollar”?

b. Why would the fact that U.S. interest rates are greater than interest rates in Europe and Japan cause the euro and the yen to sink relative to the dollar?

c. If you were a Japanese investor, would you rather be invested in U.S. Treasury bonds when the yen is sinking relative to the dollar or when it is rising? Briefly explain.

Solving the Problem

Step 1:  Review the chapter material. This problem is about the determinants of exchange rates, so you may want to review Macroeconomics, Chapter 18, Section 18.2, “The Foreign Exchange Market and Exchange Rates” (Economics, Chapter 28, Section 28.2; Essentials of Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.6.)

Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining what it means that the euro and the yen “sinking relative to the dollar.” Sinking relative to the dollar means that the exchange rates between the euro and the dollar and between the yen and the dollar are declining. In other words, a dollar will exchange for more yen and for more euros.

Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining how differences in interest rates between countries can affect the exchange between the countries’ currencies. Holding other factors that can affect the attractiveness of an investment in a country’s bonds constant, the demand foreign investors have for a country’s bonds will depend on the difference in interest rates between the two countries. For example, a Japanese investor will prefer to invest in U.S. Treasury bonds if the interest rate is higher on Treasury bonds than the interest rate on Japanese government bonds. So, if interest rates in Europe decline relative to interest rates in the United States, we would expect that European investors will increase their investments in U.S. Treasury bonds. To invest in U.S. Treasury bonds, European investors will need to exhange euros for dollars, causing the supply curve for euros in exchange for dollars to shift to the right, reducing the value of the euro.

Step 4: Answer part c. by discussing whether if you were a Japanese investor, you would you rather be invested in U.S. Treasury bonds when the yen is sinking relative to the dollar or when it is rising.  In answering this part, you should draw a distinction between the situation of a Japanese investor who already owns U.S. Treasury bonds and one who is considering buying U.S. Treasury bonds. A Japanese investor who already owns U.S. Treasury bonds would definitely prefer to own them when the value of the yen if falling against the dollar. In this situation, the investor will receive more yen for a given amount of dollars the investor earns from the Treasury bonds. A Japanese investor who doesn’t currently own U.S. bonds, but is thinking of buying them, would want the value of the yen to be increasing relative to the dollar because then the investor would have to pay fewer yen to buy a Treasury bond with a price in dollars, all other factors being equal. (The face value of a Treasury bond is $1,000, although at any given time the price in the bond market may not equal the face value of the bond.) If the interest rate difference between U.S. and Japanese bonds is increasing at the same time as the value of the yen is decreasing (as in the situation described in the article) a Japanese investor would have to weigh the gain from the higher interest rate against the higher price in yen the investor would have to pay to buy the Treasury bond.

 

How Will the Fed React to Another High Inflation Report?

In a recent podcast we discussed what actions the Fed may take if inflation continues to run well above the Fed’s 2 percent target. We are likely a step closer to finding out with the release this morning (April 10) by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of data on the consumer price index (CPI) for March. The inflation rate measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous month—headline inflation—was 3.5 percent, slightly higher than expected (as indicated here and here). As the following figure shows, core inflation—which excludes the prices of food and energy—was 3.8 percent, the same as in January.

If we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year—the values seem to confirm that inflation, while still far below its peak in mid-2022, has been running somewhat higher than it did during the last months of 2023. Headline CPI inflation in March was 4.6 percent (down from 5.4 percent in February) and core CPI inflation was 4.4 percent (unchanged from February). It’s worth bearing in mind that the Fed’s inflation target is measured using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, not the CPI. But CPI inflation at these levels is not consistent with PCE inflation of only 2 percent.

As has been true in recent months, the path of inflation in the prices of services has been concerning. As we’ve noted in earlier posts, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has emphasized that as supply chain problems have gradually been resolved, inflation in the prices of goods has been rapidly declining. But inflaion in services hasn’t declined nearly as much. Last summer he stated the point this way:

“Part of the reason for the modest decline of nonhousing services inflation so far is that many of these services were less affected by global supply chain bottlenecks and are generally thought to be less interest sensitive than other sectors such as housing or durable goods. Production of these services is also relatively labor intensive, and the labor market remains tight. Given the size of this sector, some further progress here will be essential to restoring price stability.”

The following figure shows the 1-month inflation rate in services prices and in services prices not included including housing rent. Some economists believe that the rent component of the CPI isn’t well measured and can be volatile, so it’s worthwhile to look at inflation in service prices not including rent. The figure shows that inflation in all service prices has been above 4 percent in every month since July 2023. Inflation in service prices increased from 5.8 percent in February to 6.6 percent in March . Inflation in service prices not including housing rent was even higher, increasing from 7.5 percent in February to 8.9 percent in March. Such large increases in the prices of services, if they were to continue, wouldn’t be consistent with the Fed meeting its 2 percent inflation target.

Finally, some economists and policymakers look at median inflation to gain insight into the underlying trend in the inflation rate. If we listed the inflation rate in each individual good or service in the CPI, median inflation is the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates. As the following figure shows, although median inflation declined in March, it was still high at 4.3 percent. Median inflation is volatile, but the trend has been generally upward since July 2023.

Financial investors, who had been expecting that this CPI report would show inflation slowing, reacted strongly to the news that, in fact, inflation had ticked up. As of late morning, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had decline by nearly 500 points and the S&P 5o0 had declined by 59 points. (We discuss the stock market indexes in Macroeconomics, Chapter 6, Section 6.2 and in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 8, Section 8.2.) The following figure from the Wall Street Journal shows the sharp reaction in the bond market as the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note rose sharply following the release of the CPI report.

Lower stock prices and higher long-term interest rates reflect the fact that investors have changed their views concerning when the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will cut its target for the federal funds and how many rate cuts there may be this year. At the start of 2024, the consensus among investors was for six or seven rate cuts, starting as early as the FOMC’s meeting on March 19-20. But with inflation remaining persistently high, investors had recently been expecting only two or three rate cuts, with the first cut occurring at the FOMC’s meeting on June 11-12. Two days ago, Neel Kashkari, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis raised the possibility that the FOMC might not cut its target for the federal funds rate during 2024. Some economists have even begun to speculate that the FOMC might feel obliged to increase its target in the coming months.

After the FOMC’s next meeting on April 30-May 1 first, Chair Powell may provide some additional information on the committee’s current thinking.

Another Surprisingly Strong Employment Report

Photo from Reuters via the Wall Street Journal.

On Friday, April 5—the first Friday of the month—the Bureau of labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Employment Situation” report with data on the state of the labor market in March. The BLS reported a net increase in employment during March of 303,000, which was well above the increase that economists had been expecting. The previous estimates of employment in January and February were revised upward by 22,000 jobs. (We also discuss the employment report in this podcast.)

Employment increases during the second half of 2023 had slowed compared with the first half of the year. But, as the following figure from the BLS report shows, since December 2023, employment has increased by more than 250,000 in each month. These increases are far above the estimated increases of 70,000 to 100,000 new jobs needed to keep up with population growth. (But note our later discussion of this point.)

The unemployment rate had been expected to stay steady at 3.9 percent, but declined slightly to 3.8 percent. As the following figure shows, the unemployment rate has been remarkably stable for more than two years and has been below 4.0 percent each month since December 2021. The members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) expect that the unemployment rate for 2024 will be 4.0 percent, a forcast that is beginning to seem too high.

The monthly employment number most commonly reported in media accounts is from the establishment survey (sometimes referred to as the payroll survey), whereas the unemployment rate is taken from the household survey. The results of both surveys are included in the BLS’s monthly “Employment Situation” report. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1), many economists and policymakers at the Federal Reserve believe that employment data from the establishment survey provides a more accurate indicator of the state of the labor market than do either the employment data or the unemployment data from the household survey.

As we noted in a previous post, whereas employment as measured by the establishment survey has been increasing each month, employment as measured by the household surve declined each month from December 2023 through February 2024. But, as the following figure shows, this trend was reversed in March, with employment as measured by the household survey increasing 498,000—far more than the 303,000 increase in employment in establishment survey. This reversal may be another indication of the underlying strength of the labor market.

As the following figure shows, despite the substantial increases in employment, wages, as measured by the percentage change in average hourly earnings from the same month in the previous year, have been trending down. The increase in average hourly earnings declined from 4.3 percent February in to 4.1 percent in March.

The following figure shows wage inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month wage inflation, whereas this figure shows 1-month wage inflation.) One-month wage inflation is much more volatile than 12-month inflation—note the very large swings in 1-month wage inflation in April and May 2020 during the business closures caused by the Covid pandemic.

Wages increased by 6.1 percent in January 2024, 2.1 percent in February, and 4.2 percent in March. So, the 1-month rate of wage inflation did show an increase in March, although it’s unclear whether the increase was a result of the strength of the labor market or reflected the greater volatility in wage inflation when calculated this way.

Some economists and policymakers are surprised that low levels of unemployment and large monthly increases in employment have not resulted in greater upward pressure on wages. One possibility is that the supply of labor has been increasing more rapidly than is indicated by census data. In a January report, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) argued that the Census Bureau’s estimate of the population of the United States is too low by about 6 million people. This undercount is attributable, according to the CBO, largely the Census Bureau having underestimated the amount of immigration that has occurred. If the CBO is correct, then the economy may need to generate about 200,000 net new jobs each month to accommodate the growth of the labor force, rather than the 80,000 to 100,000 we mentioned earlier in this post.

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell noted in a press conference following the most recent meeing of the FOMC that: “Strong job creation has been accompanied by an increase in the supply of workers, reflecting increases in participation among individuals aged 25 to 54 years and a continued strong pace of immigration.” As a result:

“what you would have is potentially kind of what you had last year, which is a bigger economy where inflationary pressures are not increasing. In fact, they were decreasing. So you can have that if you have a continued supply-side activity that we had last year with—both with supply chains and also with, with growth in the size of the labor force.”

If Powell is correct, in the coming months the U.S. economy may be able to sustain rapid increases in employment without those increases leading to an increase in the rate of inflation.

NEW! 4/5/24 Podcast – Authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien react to the newest Friday Jobs Report for March & discuss next steps for the Economy.

Join authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien as they react to the jobs report of over 300K jobs created which was way over expectations of about 200K. They consider the impact of this report as the Fed considers the next steps for the economy. Are we on a glide path for a soft landing at 2% inflation or will the Fed reconsider its long-standing target by adopting a higher 3% target? Glenn and Tony offer interesting viewpoints on where this is headed.