Tag: Monetary Policy

Economists vs. the Market in Predicting the First Cut in the Federal Funds Rate

The meeting room of the FOMC in the Federal Reserve building in Washington, DC.

As we’ve noted in several recent posts, the inflation rate has fallen significantly from its peak in mid-2022, as U.S. economic growth has been slowing and the labor market appears to be less tight, slowing the growth of wages. Some economists and policymakers now believe that by early 2024, inflation will approach the Fed Reserve’s 2 percent inflation target. At that point, the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) is likely to turn its attention from inflation to making sure that the U.S. economy doesn’t slip into a recession.

Accordingly, both economists and financial market participants have begun to anticipate the point at which the FOMC will begin to cut its target for the federal funds rate. (One note of caution: Fed Chair Jerome Powell has made clear that the FOMC stands ready to further increase its target for the federal funds rate if the inflation rate shows signs of increasing. He made this point most recently on December 1 in a speech at Spelman College in Atlanta.)  There is currently an interesting disagreement between economists and investors over when the FOMC is likely to cut interest rates and by how much. We can see the views of investors reflected in the futures market for federal funds.

Futures markets allow investors to buy and sell futures contracts on commodities–such as wheat and oil–and on financial assets. Investors can use futures contracts both to hedge against risk—such as a sudden increase in oil prices or in interest rates—and to speculate by, in effect, betting on whether the price of a commodity or financial asset is likely to rise or fall. (We discuss the mechanics of futures markets in Chapter 7, Section 7.3 of Money, Banking, and the Financial System.) The CME Group was formed from several futures markets, including the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and allows investors to trade federal funds futures contracts. The data that result from trading on the CME indicate what investors in financial markets expect future values of the federal funds rate to be. The following chart from the CME’s FedWatch Tool shows values after trading of federal funds futures on December 5, 2023.

The probabilities in the chart reflects investors’ predictions of what the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate will be after the committee’s meeting on March 20, 2024. This meeting is the first after which investors currently expect that the target is likely to be lowered. The target range is currently 5.25 percent to 5.50 percent. The chart indicates that investors assign a probability of 60.2 percent to the FOMC making at least a 0.25 percentage cut in the target rate at the March meeting. 

Looking at the values for federal funds futures after the FOMC’s December 18, 2024 meeting, investors assign a 66.3 percent probability of the committee having reduced its target for the federal funds rate to 4.00 to 4.25 percent of lower. In other words, investors expect that during 2024, the FOMC will have cut its target for the federal funds rate by at least 1.25 percentage points.

Interesingly, according to a survey by the Financial Times, economists disagree with investors’ forecasts of the federal funds rate. According to the survey, which was conducted between December 1 and December 4, nearly two-thirds of economists believe that the FOMC won’t cut its target for the federal funds rate until July 2024 or later. Three-quarters of the economists surveyed believe that the FOMC will cut its target by 0.5 percent point or less during 2024. Fewer than 10 percent of the economists surveyed believe that during 2024 the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate by 1.25 percent or more. (The Financial Times article describing the results of the survey can be found here. A subscription may be requred to read the article.)

So, at least among the economists surveyed by the Financial Times, the consensus is that the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate later and by less than financial markets are indicating. What explains the discrepancy? The main explanation is that economists see inflation being persistently above the Fed’s 2 percent target for longer than do financial market participants. The economists surveyed are also more optimistic that the U.S. economy will avoid a recession in 2024. If a recession occurs, the FOMC is more likely to significantly cut its target than if the economy during 2024 experiences moderate growth in real GDP and the unemployment rate remains low.

One other indication from financial markets that investors expect that the U.S. economy is likely to slow during 2024 is given by movements in the interest rate on the 10-year U.S. Treasury note. As shown in the following figure, from August to October of this year, the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note rose from less than 4 percent to nearly 5  percent—an unusually large change in such a short period of time. Since then, most of that increase has been reversed with the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note having fallen below 4.2 percent in early December

The movements in the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note typically reflect investors’ expectations of future short-term interest rates. (We discuss the relationship between short-term and long-term interests rates—which economists call the term structure of interest rates—in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 5, Section 5.2.) The increase in the 10-year interest rate between August and October reflected investors’ expectation that short-term interest rates were likely to remain persistently high for a considerable period—perhaps several years or more. The decline in the 10-year rate from late October to early December reflects investors changing their expectations toward future short-term interest rates being lower than they had previously thought. Again, as in the data on federal funds rate futures, investors seem to be expecting either slower economic growth or slower inflation than do economists.

One other complication about the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note should be mentioned. Some of the increase in the rate from August to October may also have represented concern among investors that large federal budget deficit would cause the Treasury to issue more Treasury notes than investors would be willing to buy without the Treasury increasing the interest rate investors would receive on the newly issued notes. This concern may have been reinforced by data showing that foreign investors, particularly in China and Japan, appeared to have slowed or stopped adding to their holdings of Treasury notes. Part of the recent decline in the interest rate on the Treasury note may reflect investors becoming less concerned about these two factors.

A Review of Recent Macro Data

Some interesting macro data were released during the past two weeks. On the key issues, the data indicate that inflation continues to run in the range of 3.0 percent to 3.5 percent, although depending on which series you focus on, you could conclude that inflation has dropped to a bit below 3 percent or that it is still in vicinity of 4 percent.  On balance, output and employment data seem to be indicating that the economy may be cooling in response to the contractionary monetary policy that the Federal Open Market Committee began implementing in March 2022.

We can summarize the key data releases.

Employment, Unemployment, and Wages

On Friday morning, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its Employment Situation report. (The full report can be found here.) Economists and policymakers—notably including the members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)—typically focus on the change in total nonfarm payroll employment as recorded in the establishment, or payroll, survey. That number gives what is generally considered to be the best indicator of the current state of the labor market.

The previous month’s report included a surprisingly strong net increase of 336,000 jobs during September. Economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal last week forecast that the net increase in jobs in October would decline to 170,000. The number came in at 150,000, slightly below that estimate. In addition, the BLS revised down the initial estimates of employment growth in August and September by a 101,000 jobs. The figure below shows the net gain in jobs for each  month of 2023.

Although there are substantial fluctuations, employment increases have slowed in the second half of the year. The average increase in employment from January to June was 256,667. From July to October the average increase declined to 212,000. In the household survey, the unemployment rate ticked up from 3.8 percent in September to 3.9 percent in October. The unemployment rate has now increased by 0.5 percentage points from its low of 3.4 percent in April of this year. 

Finally, data in the employment report provides some evidence of a slowing in wage growth. The following figure shows wage inflation as measured by the percentage increase in average hourly earnings (AHE) from the same month in the previous year. The increase in October was 4.1 percent, continuing a generally downward trend since March 2022, although still somewhat above wage inflation during the pre-2020 period.

As the following figure shows, September growth in average hourly earnings measured as a compound annual growth rate was 2.5 percent, which—if sustained—would be consistent with a rate of price inflation in the range of the Fed’s 2 percent target.  (The figure shows only the months since January 2021 to avoid obscuring the values for recent months by including the very large monthly increases and decreases during 2020.)

Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) 

On November 1, the BLS released its Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) report for September 2023. (The full report can be found here.) The report indicated that the number of unfilled job openings was 9.5 million, well below the peak of 11.8 million job openings in December 2021 but—as shown in the following figure—well above prepandemic levels.

The following figure shows the ratio of the number of job opening to the number of unemployed people. The figure shows that, after peaking at 2.0 job openings per unemployed person in in March 2022, the ratio has decline to 1.5 job opening per unemployed person in September 2022. While high, that ratio was much closer to the ratio of 1.2 that prevailed during the year before the pandemic. In other words, while the labor market still appears to be strong, it has weakened somewhat in recent months.

Employment Cost Index

As we note in this blog post, the employment cost index (ECI), published quarterly by the BLS, measures the cost to employers per employee hour worked and can be a better measure than AHE of the labor costs employers face. The BLS released its most recent report on October 31. (The report can be found here.) The first figure shows the percentage change in ECI from the same quarter in the previous year. The second figure shows the compound annual growth rate of the ECI. Both measures show a general downward trend in the growth of labor costs, although compound annual rate of change shows an uptick in the third quarter of 2023. (We look at wages and salaries rather than total compensation because non-wage and salary compensation can be subject to fluctuations unrelated to underlying trends in labor costs.)

The Federal Open Market Committee’s October 31-November 1 Meeting

As was widely expected from indications in recent statements by committee members, the Federal Open Market Committee voted at its most recent meeting to hold constant its targe range for the federal funds rate at 5.25 percent to 5.50 percent. (The FOMC’s statement can be found here.)

At a press conference following the meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell remarks made it seem unlikely that the FOMC would raise its target for the federal funds rate at its December 14-15 meeting—the last meeting of 2023. But Powell also noted that the committee was unlikely to reduce its target for the federal funds rate in the near future (as some economists and financial jounalists had speculated): “The fact is the Committee is not thinking about rate cuts right now at all. We’re not talking about rate cuts, we’re still very focused on the first question, which is: have we achieved a stance of monetary policy that’s sufficiently restrictive to bring inflation down to 2 percent over time, sustainably?” (The transcript of Powell’s press conference can be found here.)

Investors in the bond market reacted to Powell’s press conference by pushing down the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note, as shown in the following figure. (Note that the figure gives daily values with the gaps representing days on which the bond market was closed) The interest rate on the Treasury note reflects investors expectations of future short-term interest rates (as well as other factors). Investors interpreted Powell’s remarks as indicating that short-term rates may be somewhat lower than they had previously expected.

Real GDP and the Atlanta Fed’s Real GDPNow Estimate for the Fourth Quarter

On October 26, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of real GDP for the third quarter of 2023. (The full report can be found here.) We discussed the report in this recent blog post. Although, as we note in that post, the estimated increase in real GDP of 4.9 percent is quite strong, there are indications that real GDP may be growing significantly more slowly during the current (fourth) quarter.

The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta compiles a forecast of real GDP called GDPNow. The GDPNow forecast uses data that are released monthly on 13 components of GDP. This method allows economists at the Atlanta Fed to issue forecasts of real GDP well in advance of the BEA’s estimates. On November 1, the GDPNow forecast was that real GDP in the fourth quarter of 2023 would increase at a slow rate of 1.2 percent. If this preliminary estimate proves to be accurate, the growth rate of the U.S. economy will have sharply declined from the third to the fourth quarter.

Fed Chair Powell has indicated that economic growth will likely need to slow if the inflation rate is to fall back to the target rate of 2 percent. The hope, of course, is that contractionary monetary policy doesn’t cause aggregate demand growth to slow to the point that the economy slips into a recession.

Very Strong GDP Report

Photo from Lena Buonanno

This morning the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of GDP for the third quarter of 2023. (The report can be found here.) The BEA estimates that real GDP increased by 4.9 percent at an annual rate in the third quarter—July through September. That was more than double the 2.1 percent increase in real GDP in the second quarter, and slightly higher than the 4.7 percent that economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal last week had expected. The following figure shows the rates of GDP growth each quarter beginning in 2021.

Note that the BEA’s most recent estimates of real GDP during the first two quarters of 2022 still show a decline. The Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee only switched from a strongly expansionary monetary policy, with a target for the federal funds of effectively zero, to a contractionary monetary policy following its March 16, 2022 meeting. That real GDP was declining even before the Fed had pivoted to a contractionary monetary policy helps explain why, despite strong increases employment during this period, most economists were expecting that the U.S. economy would experience a recession at some point during 2022 or 2023. This expectation was reinforced when inflation soared during the summer of 2022 and it became clear that the FOMC would have to substantially raise its target for the federal funds rate.

Clearly, today’s data on real GDP growth, along with the strong September employment report (which we discuss in this blog post), indicates that the chances of the U.S. economy avoiding a recession in the future have increased and are much better than they seemed at this time last year.

Consumer spending was the largest contributor to third quarter GDP growth. The following figure shows growth rates of real personal consumption expenditures and the subcategories of expenditures on durable goods, nondurable goods, and services. There was strong growth in each component of consumption spending. The 7.6 percent increase in expenditures on durables was particularly strong, particularly given that spending on durables had fallen by 0.3 percent in the second quarter.

Investment spending and its components were a more mixed bag, as shown in the following figure. Overall, gross private domestic investment increased at a very strong rate of 8.4 percent—the highest rate since the fourth quarter of 2021. Residential investment increased 3.9 percent, which was particularly notable following nine consecutive quarters of decline and during a period of soaring mortgage interest rates. But business fixed investment was noticeably weak, falling by 0.1 percent. Spending on structures—such as factories and office buildings—increased by only 1.6 percent, while spending on equipment fell by 3.8 percent.

Today’s real GDP report also contained data on the private consumption expenditure (PCE) price index, which the FOMC uses tp determine whether it is achieving its goal of a 2 percent inflation rate. The following figure shows inflation as measured using the PCE and the core PCE—which excludes food and energy prices—since the beginning of 2015. (Note that these inflation rates are measured using quarterly data and as compound annual rates of change.) Despite the strong growth in real GDP and employment, inflation as measured by PCE increased only from 2.5 percent in the second quarter to 2.9 percent in the third quarter. Core PCE, which may be a better indicator of the likely course of inflation in the future, continued the long decline that began in first quarter of 2022 by failling from 3.7 percent to 2.9 percent.

The combination of strong growth in real GDP and declining inflation indicates that the Fed appears well on its way to a soft landing—achieving  a return to its 2 percent inflation target without pushing the economy into a recession. There are reasons to be cautious, however.

GDP, inflation, and employment data are all subject to—possibly substantial—revisions. So growth may have been significantly slower than today’s advance estimate of real GDP indicates. Even if the estimate of real GDP growth of 4.9 percent proves in the long run to have been accurate, there are reasons to doubt whether output growth can be maintained at near that level. Since 2000, annual growth in real GDP has average only 2.1 percent. For GDP to begin increasing at a rate substantially higher than that would require a significant expansion in the labor force and an increase in productivity. While either or both of those changes may occur, they don’t seem likely as of now.

In addition, the largest contributor to GDP growth in the third quarter was from consumption expenditures. As households continue to draw down the savings they built up as a result of the federal government’s response to the Covid recession of 2020, it seems unlikely that the current pace of consumer spending can be maintained. Finally, the lagged effects of monetary policy—particularly the effects of the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note having risen to nearly 5 percent (which we discuss in our most recent podcast)—may substantially reduce growth in real GDP and employment in future quarters.

But those points shouldn’t distract from the fact that today’s GDP report was good news for the economy.

10/21/23 Podcast – Authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien reflect on the Fed’s efforts to execute the soft-landing.

Join authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien as they reflect on the Fed’s efforts to execute the soft landing, ponder if the effect will stick, and wonder if future economies will be tethered to an anchor point above two percent.

Surprisingly Strong Jobs Report

Photo from Lena Buonanno

When the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employment Situation report is released on the first Friday of each month economists and policymakers—notably including the members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)—focus on the change in total nonfarm payroll employment as recorded in the establishment, or payroll, survey. That number gives what is generally considered to be the best indicator of the current state of the labor market. The most recent report showed a surprisingly strong net increase of 336,000 jobs during September. (The report can be found here.)

According to a survey by the Wall Street Journal, economists had been expecting an net increase in jobs of only 170,000. The larger than expected increase indicated that the economy might be expanding more rapidly than had been thought, raising the possibility that the FOMC might increase its target for the federal funds rate at least once more before the end of the year.

To meet increases in the growth of the U.S. working-age population, the economy needs to increase the total jobs available by approximately 80,000 jobs per month. A net increase of more than four times that amount may be an indication of an overheated job market. As always, one difficulty with drawing that conclusion is determing how many more people might be pulled into the labor market by a strong demand for workers. An increase in labor supply can potentially satisify an increase in labor demand without leading to an acceleration in wage growth and price inflation.

The following figure shows the employment-to-population ratio for workers ages 25 to 54—so-called prime-age workers—for the period since 1985. In September 2023, the ratio was 80.8 perccent, down slightly from 80.9 percent in August, but above the levels reached in early 2020 just before the effects of the Covid–19 pandemic were felt in the United States. The ratio was still below the record high of 81.9 percent reached in April 2000. The population of prime-age workers is about 128 million. So, if the employment-population ratio were to return to its 2000 peak, potentially another 1.3 million prime-age workers might enter the labor market. The likelihood of that happening, however, is difficult to gauge.

A couple of other points about the September employment report. First, it’s worth keeping in mind that the results from the establishment survey are subject to often substantial revisisons. The figure below shows the revisions the BLS has released as of October to their preliminary estimates for each month of 2023. In three of these eight months the revisions so far have been greater than 100,000 jobs. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 13, Section 13.1), the revisions that the BLS makes to its employment estimates are likely to be particularly large when the economy is about to enter a period of significantly lower or higher growth. So, the large revisions to the preliminary employment estimates in most months of 2023 may indicate that the surprisingly large preliminary estimate of a 336,000 increase in net employment will be revised lower in coming months.

Finally, data in the employment report provides some evidence of a slowing in wage growth, despite the sharp increase in employment. The following figure shows wage inflation as measured by the percentage increase in average hourly earnings (AHE) from the same month in the previous year. The increase in September was 4.2 percent, continuing a generally downward trend since March 2022, although still somewhat above wage inflation during the pre-2020 period.

As the following figure shows, September growth in average hourly earnings measured as a compound annual growth rate was 2.5 percent, which—if sustained—would be consistent with a rate of price inflation in the range of the Fed’s 2 percent target.  (The figure shows only the months since January 2021 to avoid obscuring the values for recent months by including the very large monthly increases and decrease during 2020.)

As we note in this blog post, the employment cost index (ECI), published quarterly by the BLS, measures the cost to employers per employee hour worked and can be a better measure than AHE of the labor costs employers face. The first figure shows the percentage change in ECI from the same quarter in the previous year. The second figure shows the compound annual growth rate of the ECI. Both measures show a general downward trend in the growth of labor costs, although the measures are somewhat dated because the most recent values are for the second quarter of 2023.

Ultimately, the key question is one we’ve considered in previous blog posts (most recently here) and podcasts (most recently here): Will the Fed be able to achieve a soft landing by bringing inflation down to its 2 percent target without triggering a recession? The September jobs report can be interpreted as increasing the probability of a soft landing if the slowing in wage growth is emphasized but decreasing the probability if the Fed decides that the strong employment growth is real—that is, the September increase is not likely to be revised sharply lower in coming months—and requires additional increases in the target for the federal funds rate. It’s worth mentioning, of course, that factors over which the Fed has no control, such as a federal government shutdown, rising oil prices, or uncertainty resulting from the attack on Israel by Hamas, will also affect the likelihood of a soft landing.

9/16/23 Podcast – Authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien discuss inflation, the current status of a soft-landing, and the green economy.

Join authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien as they discuss the economic landscape of inflation, soft-landings, and the green economy. This conversation occurred on Saturday, 9/16/23, prior to the FOMC meeting on September 19th-20th.

Powell at Jackson Hole: No Change to Fed’s Inflation Target

Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 2023 (Photo from the Associated Press.)

Congress has given the Federal Reserve a dual mandate to achieve price stability and high employment. To reach its goal of price stability, the Fed has set an inflation target of 2 percent, with inflation being measured by the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index.

It’s reasonable to ask whether “price stability” is achieved only when the price level is constant—that is, at a zero inflation rate. In practice, Congress has given the Fed wide latitude in deciding when price stability and high employment has been achieved.  The Fed didn’t announce a formal inflation target of 2 percent until 2012. But the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had agreed to set a 2 percent inflation target much earlier—in 1996—although they didn’t publicly announce it at the time. (The transcript of the FOMC’s July 2-3, 1996 meeting includes a discussion of the FOMC’s decision to adopt an inflation target.) Implicitly, the FOMC had been acting as if it had a 2 percent target since at least the mid–1980s.

But why did the Fed decide on an inflation target of 2 percent rather than 0 percent, 1 percent, 3 percent, or some other rate? There are three key reasons:

  1. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.4 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 29.4 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 13, Section 13.4), price indexes overstate the actual inflation rate by 0.5 percentage point to 1 percentage point. So, a measured inflation of 2 percent corresponds to an actual inflation rate of 1 to 1.5 percent.
  2. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.5), the FOMC has a target for the long-run real federal funds rate. Although the target has been as high as 2 percent, in recent years it has been 0.5 percent.  With an inflation target of 2 percent, the long-run nominal federal funds rate target is 2.5 percent. (The FOMC’s long-run target federall funds target can be found in the Summary of Economic Projections here.) As the Fed notes, with an inflation target of less than 2 percent “there would be less room to cut interest rates to boost employment during an economic downturn.”
  3. An inflation target of less than 2 percent would make it more likely that during recessions, the U.S. economy might experience deflation, or a period during which the price level is falling.  Deflation can be damaging if falling prices cause consumers to postpone purchases in the hope of being able to buy goods and services at lower prices in the future. The resulting decline in aggregate demand can make a recession worse. In addition, deflation increases the real interest rate associated with a given nominal interest rate, imposing costs on borrowers, particularly if the deflation is unexpected.

The following figure shows that for most of the period from late 2008 until the spring of 2021, the inflation rate as measured by the PCE was below the Fed’s 2 percent target. Beginning in the spring of 2021, inflation soared, reaching a peak of 7.0 percent in June 2022. Inflation declined over the following year, falling to 3.0 in June 2023. 

On August 25, at the Fed’s annual monetary policy symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, Fed Chair Jerome Powell made clear that the Fed intended to continue a restrictive monetary policy until the inflation rate had returned to 2 percent: “It is the Fed’s job to bring inflation down to our 2 percent goal, and we will do so.” (The text of Powell’s speech can be found here.) Some economists have been arguing that once the Fed had succeeded in pushing the inflation rate back to 2 percent it should, in the future, consider raising its inflation target to 3 percent. At Jackson Hole, Powell appeared to rule out this possibility: “Two percent is and will remain our inflation target.”

Why might a 3 percent inflation target be preferrable to a 2 percent inflation target? Proponents of the change point to two key advantages:

  1. Reducing the likelihood of monetary policy being constrained by the zero lower bound. Because the federal funds rate can’t be negative, zero provides a lower bound on how much the FOMC can cut its federal funds rate target in a recession. Monetary policy was constrained by the zero lower bound during both the Great Recession of 2007–2009 and the Covid recession of 2020. Because an inflation target of 3 percent could likely be achieved with a federal funds rate that is higher than the FOMC’s current long-run target of 2.5 percent, the FOMC should have more room to cut its target during a recession.
  2. During a recession, firms attempting to reduce costs can do so by cutting workers’ nominal wages. But, as we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 13, Section 13.2 (Economics, Chapter 23, Section 23.2 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2), most workers dislike wage cuts. Some workers will quit rather than accept a wage cut and the productivity of workers who remain may decline. As a result, firms often use a policy of freezing wages rather than cutting them. Freezing nominal wages when inflation is occurring results in cuts to real wages.  The higher the inflation rate, the greater the decline in real wages and the more firms can reduce their labor costs without laying off workers.

Why would Powell rule out increasing the Fed’s target for the inflation rate? Although he didn’t spell out the reasons in his Jackson Hole speech, these are two main points usually raised by those who favor keeping the target at 2 percent:

  1. A target rate above 2 percent would be inconsistent with the price stability component of the Fed’s dual mandate. During the years between 2008 and 2021 when the inflation rate was usually at or below 2 percent, most consumers, workers, and firms found the inflation rate to be low enough that it could be safely ignored. A rate of 3 percent, though, causes money to lose its purchasing power more quickly and makes it less likely that people will ignore it. To reduce the effects of inflation people are likely to spend resources in ways such as firms reprinting menus or price lists more frequently or labor unions negotiating for higher wages in multiyear wage contracts. The resources devoted to avoiding the negative effects of inflation represent an efficiency loss to the economy.
  2. Raising the target for the inflation rate might undermine the Fed’s credibility in fighting inflation. One of the reasons that the Fed was able to bring down the inflation rate without causing a recession—at least through August 2023—was that the expectations of workers, firms, and investors remained firmly anchored. That is, there was a general expectation that the Fed would ultimately succeed in bringing the inflation back down to 2 percent. If expectations of inflation become unanchored, fighting inflation becomes harder because workers, firms, and investors are more likely to take actions that contribute to inflation. For instance, lenders won’t assume that inflation will be 2 percent in the future and so will require higher nominal interest rates on loans. Workers will press for higher nominal wages to protect themselves from the effects of higher inflation, thereby raising firms’ costs. Raising its inflation target to 3 percent may also cause workers, firms, and investors to question whether during a future period of high inflation the Fed will raise its target to an even higher rate. If that happens, inflation may be more persistent than it was during 2022 and 2023.

It seems unlikely that the Fed will raise its target for the inflation rate in the near future. But the Fed is scheduled to review its current monetary policy strategy in 2025. It’s possible that as part of that review, the Fed may revisit the issue of its inflation target.  

The Surprising Effect of Weight-Loss Drugs on Monetary Policy in Denmark

Novo Nordisk production facility in Denmark (Photo from Bloomberg News via the Wall Street Journal.)

Like most other small European countries, imports and exports are more important in the Danish economy than in the U.S. economy.  In 2022, imports were 59 percent of Danish GDP and exports were 70 percent. In contrast, in 2022 imports were only 16 percent of U.S. GDP and exports were only 12 percent.

The Danish company Novo Nordisk makes the weight-loss prescription injections Ozempic and Wegovy. Because these and related pharmaceuticals are the first to result in significant weight loss among patients, demand for them has been very strong. (Note that some researchers believe that is not yet clear whether long-term use of these drugs might have side effects.) Demand has been so strong that Novo Nordisk’s market cap—the total value of its outstanding shares of stock—is now larger than Denmark’s GDP. According to the Wall Street Journal, Novo Nordisk now has the second largest market cap in Europe, behind only luxury good manufacturer LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton

Most of Novo Nordisk’s customers are outside of Denmark, so to buy Ozempic or Wegovy, these customers much exchange their domestic currency—for example, euros, U.S. dollars, pounds, or yen—for Danish kroner. This increase in demand, increases the value of kroner relative to dollars, euros, and other currencies. (We discuss the effects of changes in demand and supply of a currency relative other currencies in Macroeconomics, Chapter 18, Section 18.2, Economics, Chapter 28, Section 28.2, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.6.)

Denmark has been a member of the European Union (EU), since the EU’s formation in 1991. But it is one of two EU countries (Sweden is the other) that has retained its own currency rather than using the euro. Because most of Denmark’s trade has traditionally been with other countries in the EU, the Danmarks Nationalbank, Denmark’s central bank, has pegged the value of the krone to the euro. Pegging makes it easier for Danish firms to plan because they know the prices their goods and services will sell for in eurozone countries. In addition, Danish firms that borrow in euros know how much in interest they will be paying in kroner. Finally, if the krone rises in value against other currencies, prices of imported goods and services will increase, raising the Danish inflation rate. (We discuss currency pegs in Macroeconomics, Chapter 18, Section 18.3, and Economics, Chapter 28, Section 28.3.) Inflation is a significant concern in Denmark because, as the following figure shows, the inflation rate reached 10.1 percent in October 2022. Although by July 2023, the inflation rate had decline to 3.1 percent, that rate was still above the Nationalbank’s inflation target of 2 percent.

Source: Statistics Denmark, dst.dk.

To keep the the krone pegged against the euro, the Nationalbank has to reduce the demand for the krone. The key tool that a central bank has to reduce demand for its country’s currency is interest rates. If the Nationalbank keeps interest rates in Denmark below interest rates in eurozone countries, investors will demand fewer kroner in exchange for euros. Accordingly, the Nationalbank as kept its key monetary policy rate below the corresponding rate set by the European Central Bank. In August the ECB’s policy rate was 3.75 percent, whereas the Nationalbank’s corresponding policy rate was 3.35 percent.

It’s unusual even for a small country that its central bank has to take steps to respond to a surge in demand for a single product. But that was the situation of the Danish central bank in 2023.

Sources: Joseph Walker, Dominic Chopping, and Sune Engel Rasmussen Wall Street Journal, August 17, 2023; Matthew Fox, “America’s Favorite Weight Loss Drugs Are Impacting Denmark’s Currency and Interest Rates,” finance.yahoo.com, August 18, 2023; Christian Weinberg, “Novo’s Value Surpasses Denmark GDP After Obesity Drug Boost,” bloomberg.com, August 9, 2023; Tom Fairless, “European Central Bank Raises Rates, Says Pausing Is an Option” Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2023; and “Official Interest Rates,” nationalbanken.dk.

Is the U.S. Economy Coming in for a Soft Landing?

The Federal Reserve building in Washington, DC. (Photo from Bloomberg News via the Wall Street Journal.)

The key macroeconomic question of the past two years is whether the Federal Reserve could bring down the high inflation rate without triggering a recession. In this blog post from back in February, we described the three likely macroeconomic outcomes as:

  1. A soft landing—inflation returns to the Fed’s 2 percent target without a recession occurring.
  2. A hard landing—inflation returns to the Fed’s 2 percent target with a recession occurring.
  3. No landing—inflation remains above the Fed’s 2 percent target but no recession occurs.

The following figure shows inflation measured as the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index and in the core PCE, which excludes food and energy prices. Recall that the Fed uses inflation as measured by the PCE to determine whether it is hitting its inflation target of 2 percent. Because food and energy prices tend to be volatile, many economists inside and outside of the Fed use the core PCE to better judge the underlying rate of inflation—in other words, the inflation rate likely to persist in at least the near future.

The figure shows that inflation first began to rise above the Fed’s target in March 2021. Most members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) believed that the inflation was caused by temporary disruptions to supply chains caused by the effects of the Covid–19 pandemic. Accordingly, the FOMC didn’t raise its target for the federal funds from 0 to 0.25 percent until March 2022. Since March 2022, the FOMC has raised its target for the federal funds rate in a series of steps until the target range reached 5.25 to 5.50 percent following the FOMC’s July 26, 2023 meeting.

PCE inflation peaked at 7.0 percent in June 2022 and had fallen to 2.9 percent in June 2023. Core PCE had a lower and earlier peak of 5.4 percent in February 2023, but had experienced a smaller decline—to 4.1 percent in June 2023. Inflation as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) followed a similar pattern, as shown in the following figure. Inflation measured by core CPI reached a lower peak than did inflation measured by the CPI and declined by less through June 2023.

As inflation has been falling since mid-2022, , the unemployment rate has remained low and the employment-population ratio for prime-age workers (workers aged 25 to 54) has risen above its 2019 pre-pandemic peak, as the following two figures show.

So, the Fed seems to be well on its way to achieving a soft landing. But in the press conference following the July 26 FOMC meeting Chair Jerome Powell was cautious in summarizing the inflation situation:

“Inflation has moderated somewhat since the middle of last year. Nonetheless, the process of getting inflation back down to 2 percent has a long way to go. Despite elevated inflation, longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored, as reflected in a broad range of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, as well as measures from financial markets.”

By “longer-term expectations appear to remain well anchored,” Powell was referring to the fact that households, firms, and investors appear to be expecting that the inflation rate will decline over the following year to the Fed’s 2 percent target.

Those economists who still believe that there is a good chance of a recession occuring during the next year have tended to focus on the following three points:

1. As shown in the following two figures, the labor market remains tight, with wage increases remaining high—although slowing in recent months—and the ratio of job openings to the number of unemployed workers remaining at historic levels—although that ratio has also been declining in recent months. If the labor market remains very tight, wages may continue to rise at a rate that isn’t consistent with 2 percent inflation. In that case, the FOMC may have to persist in raising its target for the federal funds rate, increasing the chances for a recession.

2. The lagged effect of the Fed’s contractionary monetary policy over the past year—increases in the target for the federal funds rate and quantitative tightening (allowing the Fed’s holdings of Treasury securites and mortgage-backed securities to decline; a process of quantitative tightening (QT))—may have a significant negative effect on the growth of aggegate demand in the coming months. Economists disagree on the extent to which monetary policy has lagged effects on the economy. Some economists believe that lags in policy have been significantly reduced in recent years, while other economists believe the lags are still substantial. The lagged effects of monetary policy, if sufficiently large, may be enough to push the economy into a recession.

3. The economies of key trading partners, including the European Union, the United Kingdom, China, and Japan are either growing more slowly than in the previous year or are in recession. The result could be a decline in net exports, which have been contributing to the growth of aggregate demand since early 2021.

In summary, we can say that in early August 2023, the probability of the Fed bringing off a soft landing has increased compared with the situation in mid-2022 or even at the beginning of 2023. But problems can still arise before the plane is safely on the ground.

Unraveling the Mysteries of the May 2023 Employment Situation Report

(Photo from the Associated Press via the Wall Street Journal.)

During most periods, the “Employment Situation” report that the Bureau of Labor Statistics issues on the first Friday of each month includes the most closely watched macroeconomic data. Since the spring of 2021, high inflation rates have made the BLS’s “Consumer Price Index Summary” at least a close second in interest to the employment report. The data in the CPI report is usually more readily comprehensible than the data in the employment report. So, we think it’s worth class time to go into some of the details of the employment report, as we do in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1, Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 13, Section 13.1.

When the BLS released the May employment report, the Wall Street Journal noted that: “Employers added 339,000 jobs last month; unemployment rate rose to 3.7%.” Employment increased … but the unemployment rate also rose? How is that possible? One key to understanding media accounts of the report is to note that the report contains data from two separate surveys: 1) the household survey and 2) the employment or establishment survey. As in the statement just quoted from the Wall Street Journal, media accounts often mix data from the two surveys.  

The data showing an increase of 339,000 jobs in May are from the payroll survey, while the data showing that the unemployment rate rose are from the household survey. Below we reproduce part of the relevant table from the report showing some of the data from the household survey. Note that total employment in the household survey falls by 310,000, so there appears to be no contradiction to explain—the unemployment rate increased because the number of people employed fell and the number of people unemployed rose. But why, then, did employment rise in the payroll survey?

Employment can rise in one survey and fall in the other because: 1) the types of employment measured in the two series differ, 2) the periods during which the data are collected differ, and 3) because of measurement error. The household survey uses a broader measure of employment that includes several categories of workers who are not included in the payroll survey: agricultural workers, self-employed workers, unpaid workers in family businesses, workers employed in private households rather than in businsses, and workers on unpaid leave from their jobs. In addition, the payroll employment numbers are revised—sometimes substantially—as additional data are collected from firms, while the household employment numbers are subject to much smaller revisions because data in the household survey are collected during a single week. A detailed discussion of the differences between the employment measures in the two series can be found here.

Usefully, the BLS publishes a series labeled “Adjusted employment” that estimates what the value for household employment would be if the household survey was measuring the same categories of employment as the payroll survey. In this case, the adjusted employment series shows an increase in employment in May of 394,000—close to the payroll survey’s increase of 339,000.

To summarize, the May employment report indicates that payroll employment increased, while the non-payroll categories of household employment declined, and the unemployment rate rose. Note also in the table above that the number of people counted as not being in labor force rose slightly and the employment-population ratio fell slightly. Average weekly hours (not shown in the table above) decreased slightly from 34.4 hours per week to 34.3.

A reasonable conclusion from the report is that the labor market remains strong, although it may have weakened slightly. Prior to release of the report, there was much speculation in the business press about how the report might affect the deliberations of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committe (FOMC) at its next meeting to be held on June 13th and 14th. The report showed stronger employment growth than economists surveyed by Dow Jones had expected, indicating that the FOMC was likely to remain concerned that a tight labor market might continue to put upward pressure on wages, which firms could pass through to higher prices. Members of the FOMC had been signalling that they were likely to keep their target for the federal funds rate unchanged in June. The reported employment increase was likely not large enough to cause the FOMC to change course.