Who Will President Trump Nominate to Be Fed Chair?

Kevin Hassett, director of the National Economic Council (photo from the AP via the Wall Street Journal)

Jerome Powell’s second term as chair of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governor ends on May 15,2026. (Although his term as a member of the Board of Governors doesn’t end until January 31, 2028, Fed chairs have typically resigned their seats on the Board at the time that their term as chair ends.) President Trump has been clear that he won’t renominate Powell to a third term. Who will he nominate?

Polymarket is a site on which people can bet on political outcomes, including who President Trump will choose to nominate as Fed chair. The different amounts wagered on each candidate determine the probabilities bettors assign to that candidate being nominated. The following table shows each candidate with a probability of least 1 percent of being nominated as of 5 pm eastern time on October 27.

Kevin Hassett, who is currently the director of the National Economic Council, has the highest probability at 36 percent. Fed Governor Christopher Waller, who was nominated to the Board by President Trump in 2020, is second with a 23 percent probability. Kevin Warsh, who served on the Board from 2006 to 2011, and was important in formulating monetary policy during the financial crisis of 2007–2009, is third with a probability of 16 percent. Rick Reider, an executive at the investment company Black Rock, is unusual among the candidates in not having served in government. Bettors on Polymarket assign him a 10 percent probability of being nominated. Stephen Miran and Michelle Bowman are current members of the Board who were nominated by President Trump.

Scott Bessent is the current Treasury secretary and has indicated that he doesn’t wish to be nominated. James Bullard served as president of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis from 2008 to 2023. David Zervos is an executive at the Jeffries investment bank and in 2009 served as an adviser to the Board of Governors. Lorie Logan is president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas and Philip Jefferson is currently vice chair of the Board of Governors.

Today, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent indicated that the list of candidates had been reduced to five—although bettors on Polymarket indicate that they believe these five are likely to be the first five candidates listed in the chart above, it appears that Bowman, rather than Miran, is the fifth candidate on Bessent’s lists. Bessent indicated that President Trump will likely make a decision on who he will nominate by the end of the year.

Are Stablecoins about to Become an Important Part of the U.S. Financial System?

Image illustrating stablecoins generated by ChatGTP4-o

Recently, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent testified before Congress that the value of stablecoins could reach $2 trillion. In a post on X (formerly Twitter) he stated that “that stablecoins could grow into a $3.7 trillion market by the end of the decade.” Those amounts are far above the $250 billion estimated value of stablecoins in June 2025, yet still small relative to the value of M2—currently $21.9 trillion. But if the value of stablecoins were to rise to $2 trillion, that would be large enough to have a noticeable effect on the U.S. financial system.

As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 24 and in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 2, stablecoins are a type of cryptocurrency—bitcoin is the best-known cryptocurrency—that can be bought and sold for a constant number of units of a currency, usually U.S. dollars. Typically, one stablecoin can be exchanged for one dollar. 

Tether CEO Paolo Ardoino (photo from Bloomberg news via the Wall Street Journal)

Firms that issue stablecoins will redeem them in the underlying currency, which—as already noted—is nearly always the U.S. dollar. To make the promise to redeem stablecoins in dollars credible, firms that issue stablecoins hold reserve assets that are safe and highly liquid, such as U.S. Treasury bills or U.S. dollar bank deposits. Tether, which is headquartered in El Salvador, is the largest issuer of stablecoins, with about two-thirds of the market. As with bitcoins and other cryptocurrencies, stablecoins are stored and traded on public blockchains, which are decentralized networks of ledgers that record transactions. This system avoids the use of financial intermediaries—such as banks—which advocates for cryptocurrencies see as a key advantage because it eliminates the possibility that the intermediary might reject the transaction. But it also increases the appeal of stablecoins to people engaged in illegal activities.  

Advocates for stablecoins believe that they can become a digital medium of exchange, which is a role that initially bitcoin was intended to play. The swings in the value of bitcoin turned out to be much larger than most people expected and made that crypto currency unsuitable for use as a medium of exchange. Stablecoins avoid this problem by keeping the value of the stablecoins fixed at one dollar. To this point, though, stablecoins have been primarily used to buy and sell bitcoin and other crypto currencies. As Federal Reserve Governor Christopher Waller put it in a speech earlier this year: “By their tie to the dollar, stablecoins are the medium of exchange and unit of account in the crypto ecosystem.” According to Waller, more than 80 percent of trading in cryptocurrencies is conducted using stablecoins.

One drawback to stablecoins is that firms that issue them charge a fee to redeem them. For instance, Tether requires that a minimum of $100,000 of stablecoins be redeemed and charges a fee of 0.1 percent of the amount redeemed with a minimum charge of $1,000. The redemption fee would be less important if stablecoins are used in large dollar transactions, such as occur in international trade. Advocates for stablecoins believe that they are particularly well suited for use in cross-border transactions because they don’t involve banks, as typically is necessary when firms buy or sell goods or services in foreign countries. The fees stablecoin issuers charge are generally lower than the fees banks charge for foreign exchange transactions.

The main source of profit for firms issuing stablecoins is the interest they earn on the assets they use to back the stablecoins they issue. Note, though, that firms issuing stablecoins have an incentive to buy riskier assets in order to increase the return on the stablecoins they issue. The incentives are similar to those banks face in investing depositors’ funds in assets that are riskier than the depositors would prefer. However, the risk that commercial banks take on is limited by bank regulations, which don’t yet apply to firms issuing stablecoins, although they may soon.

On June 17, the U.S. Senate moved to provide a regulatory framework for stablecoins by passing the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (Genius Act). The act requires that firms issuing stablecoins in the United States back them 100 percent with a limited number of reserve assets: dollar deposits in banks, Treasury securities that mature in 93 days or less, repurchase agreements backed by Treasuries (we discuss repurchase agreements in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15; Economics, Chapter 25; and Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 10), and money market funds that invest in eligible Treasury securities and repurchase agreements. Issuers of stablecoins will be subject to audits by U.S. federal regulators. To become law, the Genius Act must also be passed by the U.S. House and signed by President Trump.

Passage of the Genius Act would potentially provide a regulatory framework that would reassure users that the stablecoins they hold can be readily redeemed for dollars. Passage is also expected to lead some large retail firms, such as Walmart and Amazon, to issue stablecoins that could be used to make purchases on their sites. If enough consumers are willing to use stablecoins, these large retailers could save the fees they currently pay to credit card companies. In addition, stablecoin transactions can be cleared instantly, as opposed to the several days it can take for credit card payments to clear. Why would a consumer want to use stablecoin rather than a credit card to pay for something? Apart from the familiarity of using credit cards, the cards often provide rewards, such as points that can be redeemed for airline tickets or hotel stays. To attract consumers, stablecoin issuers would likely have to offer similar rewards to consumers who use stablecoins to make purchases.

As Waller notes, it will likely take years before consumers and firms routinely use stablecoins for day-to-day transactions. Today, very few retail firms are equipped to accept stablecoins and very few consumers own stablecoins.

Passage of the Genius Act would pose potential problems for Tether. Tether has held a wide range of reserve assets to back its stablecoins, including bitcoin and precious metals. It has also not been willing to be fully audited. Either Tether would have to change its business model to fit the requirements of the Genius Act or it would have to issue a separate stablecoin that would be used only in the United States and would meet the Genius Act requirements.

We noted earlier that Treasury Secretary Bessent believes that over the next few years, the value of stablecoins could increase to several trillions dollars. If that happens, the demand for Treasury securities would increase substantially as firms issuing stablecoins accumulated reserve assets. The result could be higher prices on Treasury securities and lower interest rates, which would eventually reduce the interest payments the Treasury makes on the federal government’s debt.

Finally, as we note in the text, Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley as been a notable skeptic of stablecoins. As he wrote back in 2018, when the idea of stablecoins was just beginning to be widely discussed, when someone exchanges a dollar for a stablecoin, “one of us then will have traded a perfectly liquid dollar, supported by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, for a cryptocurrency with questionable backing that is awkward to use. This exchange may be attractive to money launderers and tax evaders, but not to others.”

Could issuers of stablecoins be subject to runs like the one that led to the failure of Silicon Valley Bank in the spring of 2023?

In a recent opinion column in the New York Times, Eichengreen wrote that he is concerned about the possibility of runs on stablecoins. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, and in Money, Banking, and the Financial Systems, Chapter 10, a commercial bank can be subject to a run if the bank’s depositors believe that the value of the bank’s assets are no longer sufficient to pay off the bank’s depositors. As we discuss in this blog post, Silocon Valley Bank experienced a run in the spring of 2023 that affected several other banks. Runs on commercial banks are unusual in the United States because of deposit insurance and the willingness of the Federal Reserve to act as lender of last resort to banks suffering liquidity problems. Eichengreen raises the question of whether stablecoins could experience runs if holders of the stablecoins come to doubt that the value of issuers’ reserve assets is sufficient to redeem all the coins.

Although the Genius Act provides for regulation of stablecoin issuers, Eichengreen believes that if enough firms begin issuing stablecoins, it’s likely that at some point one of them will experience a decline in the value of its reserve assets, which will cause a run. If the run spreads from one issuer to many in a process called contagion, stablecoin issuers will have to sell reserve assets, including Treasury securities. The result could be a sharp fall in the prices of those asset and an increase in interest rates. It’s possible that the outcome could be a wider financial panic and a deep recession. To head off that possibility, the Federal Reserve might feel obliged to intervene to save some, possibly many, stablecoin issuers from failing. The result could be that taxpayer dollars would flow to firms issuing stablecoins, which would likely cause a significant political backlash.

Many people see stablecoins as an exciting development in the financial system. But, as we’ve noted, there still remain some substantial roadblocks in the way of stablecoins becoming an important means of transacting business in the U.S. economy.

A Disagreement between Fed Chair Powell and Fed Governor Waller over Monetary Policy, and Can President Trump Replace Powell?

In this photo of a Federal Open Market Committee meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell is on the far left and Fed Governor Christopher Waller is the third person to Powell’s left. (Photo from federalreserve.gov)

This post discusses two developments this week that involve the Federal Reserve. First, we discuss the apparent disagreement between Fed Chair Jerome Powell and Fed Governor Christopher Waller over the best way to respond to the Trump Administration’s tariff increases. As we discuss in this blog post and in this podcast, in terms of the aggregate demand and aggregate supply model, a large unexpected increase in tariffs results in an aggregate supply shock to the economy, shifting the short-run aggregate supply curve (SRAS) to the left. The following is Figure 13.7 from Macroeconomics (Figure 23.7 from Economics) and illustrates the effects of an aggregate supply shock on short-run macroeconomic equilibrium.

Although the figure shows the effects of an aggregate supply shock that results from an unexpected increase in oil prices, using this model, the result is the same for an aggregate supply shock caused by an unexpected increase in tariffs. Two-thirds of U.S. imports are raw materials, intermediate goods, or capital goods, all of which are used as inputs by U.S. firms. So, in both the case of an increase in oil prices and in the case of an increase in tariffs, the result of the supply shock is an increase in U.S. firms’ production costs. This increase in costs reduces the quantity of goods firms will supply at every price level, shifting the SRAS curve to the left, as shown in panel (a) of the figure. In the new macroeconomic equilibrium, point B in panel (a), the price level increases and the level of real GDP declines. The decline in real GDP will likely result in an increase in the unemployment rate.

An aggregate supply shock poses a policy dilemma for the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). If the FOMC responds to the decline n real GDP and the increase in the unemployment rate with an expansionary monetary policy of lowering the target for the federal funds rate, the result is likely to be a further increase in the price level. Using a contractionary monetary policy of increasing the target for the federla funds rate to deal with the rising price level can cause real GDP to fall further, possibly pushing the economy into a recession. One way to avoid the policy dilemma from an aggregate supply shock caused by an increase in tariffs is for the FOMC to “look through”—that is, not respond—to the increase in tariffs. As panel (b) in the figure shows, if the FOMC looks through the tariff increase, the effect of the aggregate supply shock can be transitory as the economy absorbs the one-time increase in the price level. In time, real GDP will return to equilibrium at potential real GDP and the unemployment rate will fall back to the natural rate of unemployment.

On Monday (April 14), Fed Governor Christopher Waller in a speech to the Certified Financial Analysts Society of St. Louis made the argument for either looking through the macroeconomic effects of the tariff increase—even if the tariff increase turns out to be large, which at this time is unclear—or responding to the negative effects of the tariffs increases on real GDP and unemployment:

“I am saying that I expect that elevated inflation would be temporary, and ‘temporary’ is another word for ‘transitory.’ Despite the fact that the last surge of inflation beginning in 2021 lasted longer than I and other policymakers initially expected, my best judgment is that higher inflation from tariffs will be temporary…. While I expect the inflationary effects of higher tariffs to be temporary, their effects on output and employment could be longer-lasting and an important factor in determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy. If the slowdown is significant and even threatens a recession, then I would expect to favor cutting the FOMC’s policy rate sooner, and to a greater extent than I had previously thought.”

In a press conference after the last FOMC meeting on March 19, Fed Chair Jerome Powell took a similar position, arguing that: “If there’s an inflation that’s going to go away on its own, it’s not the correct response to tighten policy.” But in a speech yesterday (April 16) at the Economic Club of Chicago, Powell indicated that looking through the increase in the price level resulting from a tariff increase might be a mistake:

“The level of the tariff increases announced so far is significantly larger than anticipated. The same is likely to be true of the economic effects, which will include higher inflation and slower growth. Both survey- and market-based measures of near-term inflation expectations have moved up significantly, with survey participants pointing to tariffs…. Tariffs are highly likely to generate at least a temporary rise in inflation. The inflationary effects could also be more persistent…. Our obligation is to keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored and to make certain that a one-time increase in the price level does not become an ongoing inflation problem.”

In a discussion following his speech, Powell argued that tariff increases may disrupt global supply chains for some U.S. industries, such as automobiles, in way that could be similar to the disruptions caused by the Covid pandemic of 2020. As a result: “When you think about supply disruptions, that is the kind of thing that can take time to resolve and it can lead what would’ve been a one-time inflation shock to be extended, perhaps more persistent.” Whereas Waller seemed to indicate that as a result of the tariff increases the FOMC might be led to cut its target for the federal funds sooner or to larger extent in order to meet the maximum employment part of its dual mandate, Powell seemed to indicate that the FOMC might keep its target unchanged longer in order to meet the price stability part of the dual mandate.

Powell’s speech caught the notice of President Donald Trump who has been pushing the FOMC to cut its target for the federal funds rate sooner. An article in the Wall Street Journal, quoted Trump as posting to social media that: “Powell’s termination cannot come fast enough!” Powell’s term as Fed chair is scheduled to end in May 2026. Does Trump have the legal authority to replace Powell earlier than that? As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 27 (Economics Chapter 17), according to the Federal Reserve Act, once a Fed chair is notimated to a four-year term by the president (President Trump first nominated Powell to be chair in 2017 and Powell took office in 2018) and confirmed by the Senate, the president cannot remove the Fed chair except “for cause.” Most legal scholars argue that a president cannot remove a Fed chair due to a disagreement over monetary policy.

Article I, Section II of the Constitution of the United States states that: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” The ability of Congress to limit the president’s power to appoint and remove heads of commissions, agencies, and other bodies in the executive branch of government—such as the Federal Reserve—is not clearly specified in the Constitution. In 1935, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled in the case of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States that President Franklin Roosevelt couldn’t remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) because in creating the FTC, Congress specified that members could only be removed for cause. Legal scholars have presumed that the ruling in this case would also bar attempts by a president to remove members of the Fed’s Board of Governors because of a disagreement over monetary policy.

The Trump Administration recently fired a member of the National Labor Relations Board and a member of the Merit Systems Protection Board. The members sued and the Supreme Court is considering the case. The Trump Adminstration is asking the Court to overturn the Humphrey’s Executor decision as having been wrongly decided because the decision infringed on the executive power given to the president by the Constitution. If the Court agrees with the administration and overturns the precdent established by Humphrey’s Executor, would President Trump be free to fire Chair Powell before Powell’s term ends? (An overview of the issues involved in this Court case can be found in this article from the Associated Press.)

The answer isn’t clear because, as we’ve noted in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.4, Congress gave the Fed an unusual hybrid public-private structure and the ability to fund its own operations without needing appropriations from Congress. It’s possible that the Court would rule that in overturning Humphrey’s Executor—if the Court should decide to do that—it wasn’t authorizing the president to replace the Fed chair at will. In response to a question following his speech yesterday, Powell seemed to indicate that the Fed’s unique structure might shield it from the effects of the Court’s decision.

If the Court were to overturn its ruling in Humphrey’s Executor and indicate that the ruling did authorize the president to remove the Fed chair, the Fed’s ability to conduce monetary policy independently of the president would be seriously undermined. In Macroeconomics, Chapter 17, Section 17.4 we review the arguments for and against Fed independence. It’s unclear at this point when the Court might rule on the case.

Upward Revision of 2023 Fourth Quarter Real GDP Growth May Add to Fed’s Hesitancy to Raise Fed Funds Target

(Photo courtesy of Lena Buonanno)

The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has issued its third estimate of real GDP for the fourth quarter of 2023. The BEA now estimates that real GDP increased in the fourth quarter of 2023 at an annual rate of 3.4 percent, an increase from the BEA’s second estimate of 3.2 percent. The BEA noted that: “The update primarily reflected upward revisions to consumer spending and nonresidential fixed investment that were partly offset by a downward revision to private inventory investment.”

As the blue line in the following figure shows, despite the upward revision, fourth quarter growth in real GDP decline significantly from the very high growth rate of 4.9 percent in the third quarter. In addition, two widely followed “nowcast” estimates of real GDP growth in the first quarter of 2024 show a futher slowdown. The nowcast from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta estimates that real GDP will have grown at an annualized rate of 2.1 percent in the first quarter and the nowcast from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimates a growth rate of 1.9 percent. (The Atlanta Fed describes its nowcast as “a running estimate of real GDP growth based on available economic data for the current measured quarter.” The New York Fed explains: “Our model reads the flow of information from a wide range of macroeconomic data as they become available, evaluating their implications for current economic conditions; the result is a ‘nowcast’ of GDP growth ….”)

Data on growth in real gross domestic income (GDI), on the other hand, show an upward trend, as indicated by the red line in the figure. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 8, Section 8.4 (Economics, Chapter 18, Section 18.4), gross domestic product measures the economy’s output from the production side, while gross domestic income does so from the income side. The two measures are designed to be equal, but they can differ because each measure uses different data series and the errors in data on production can differ from the errors in data on income. Economists differ on whether data on growth in real GDP or data on growth in real GDI do a better job of forecasting future changes in the economy. Accordingly, economists and policymakers will differ on how much weight to put on the fact that while the growth in real GDI had been well below growth in real GDP from the fourth quarter of 2022 to the fourth quarter of 2023, during the fourth quarter of 2023, growth in real GDI was 1.5 percentage points higher than growth in real GDP.

On balance, it seems likely that these data will reinforce the views of those members of the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) who were cautious about reducing the target for the federal funds rate until the macroeconomic data indicate more clearly that the economy is slowing sufficiently to ensure that inflation is returning to the Fed’s 2 percent target. In a speech on March 27 (before the latest GDP revisions became available), Fed Governor Christopher Waller reviewed the most recent macro data and concluded that:

“Adding this new data to what we saw earlier in the year reinforces my view that there is no rush to cut the [federal funds] rate. Indeed, it tells me that it is prudent to hold this rate at its current restrictive stance perhaps for longer than previously thought to help keep inflation on a sustainable trajectory toward 2 percent.”

Most other members of the FOMC appear to share Waller’s view.

Has the Federal Reserve Achieved a Soft Landing?

The Federal Reserve building in Washington, DC. (Photo from the New York Times.)

Since inflation began to increase rapidly in the late spring of 2021, the key macroeconomic question has been whether the Fed would be able to achieve a soft landing—pushing inflation back to its 2 percent target without causing a recession. The majority of the members of the Fed’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) believed that increases in inflation during 2021 were largely caused by problems with supply chains resulting from the effects of the Covid–19 pandemic. 

These committee members believed that once supply chains returned to normal, the increase in he inflation rate would prove to have been transitory—meaning that the inflation rate would decline without the need for the FOMC to pursue a contractionary monetary by substantially raising its target range for the federal funds rate. Accordingly, the FOMC left its target range unchanged at 0 to 0.25 percent until March 2022. As the following figure shows, by that time the inflation rate had increased to 6.9 percent, the highest it had been since January 1982. (Note that the figure shows inflation as measured by the percentage change from the same month in the previous year in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. Inflation as measured by the PCE is the gauge the Fed uses to determine whether it is achieving its goal of 2 percent inflation.)

By the time inflation reached its peak in mid-2022, many economists believed that the FOMC’s decision to delay increasing the federal funds rate until March 2022 had made it unlikely that the Fed could return inflation to 2 percent without causing a recession.  But the latest macroeconomic data indicate that—contrary to that expectation—the Fed does appear to have come very close to achieving a soft landing.  On January 26, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released data on the PCE for December 2023. The following figure shows for the period since 2015, inflation as measured by the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year (the blue line) and as measured by the percentage change in the core PCE, which excludes the prices of food and energy (the red line).  

The figure shows that PCE inflation continued its decline, falling slightly in December to 2.6 percent. Core PCE inflation also declined in December to 2.9 percent from 3.2 percent in November. Note that both measures remained somewhat above the Fed’s inflation target of 2 percent.

If we look at the 1-month inflation rate—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year—inflation is closer to Fed’s target, as the following figure shows. The 1-month PCE inflation rate has moved somewhat erratically, but has generally trended down since mid-2022. In December, PCE inflation increased from from –0.8 percent in November (which acutally indicates that deflation occurred that month) to 2.0 percent in December. The 1-month core PCE inflation rate has moved less erratically, also trending down since mid-2022. In December, the 1-month core PCE inflation increased from 0.8 percent in November to 2.1 percent in December. In other words, the December reading on inflation indicates that inflation is very close to the Fed’s target.

The following figure shows for each quarter since the beginning of 2015, the growth rate of real GDP measured as the percentage change from the same quarter in the previous year. The figure indicates that although real GDP growth dropped to below 1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2022, the growth rate rose during each quarter of 2023. The growth rate of 3.1 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 remained well above the FOMC’s 1.8 percent estimate of long-run economic growth. (The average of the members of the FOMC’s estimates of the long-run growth rate of real GDP can be found here.) To this point, there is no indication from the GDP data that the U.S. economy is in danger of experiencing a recession in the near future.

The labor market also shows few signs of a recession, as indicated by the following figure, which shows the unemployment rate in the months since January 2015. The unemployment rate has remained below 4 percent in each month since December 2021. The unemployment rate was 3.7 percent in December 2023, below the FOMC’s projection of a long-run unemployment rate of 4.1 percent.

The FOMC’s next meeting is on Tuesday and Wednesday of this week (February 1-2). Should we expect that at that meeting Fed Chair Jerome Powell will declare that the Fed has succeeded in achieving a soft landing? That seems unlikely. Powell and the other members of the committee have made clear that they will be cautious in interpreting the most recent macroeconomic data. With the growth rate of real GDP remaining above its long run trend and the unemployment rate remaining below most estimates of the natural rate of unemployment, there is still the potential that aggregate demand will increase at a rate that might cause the inflation rate to once again rise.

In a speech at the Brookings Institution on January 16, Fed Governor Christopher Waller echoed what appear to be the views of most members of the FOMC:

“Time will tell whether inflation can be sustained on its recent path and allow us to conclude that we have achieved the FOMC’s price-stability goal. Time will tell if this can happen while the labor market still performs above expectations. The data we have received the last few months is allowing the Committee to consider cutting the policy rate in 2024. However, concerns about the sustainability of these data trends requires changes in the path of policy to be carefully calibrated and not rushed. In the end, I am feeling more confident that the economy can continue along its current trajectory.”

At his press conference on February 1, following the FOMC meeting, Chair Powell will likely provide more insight into the committee’s current thinking.

Fed Governor Christopher Waller Gives an Optimistic Speech

Federal Reserve Governor Christopher J. Waller (photo from the Associated Press via the Wall Street Journal)

Fed Governor Christopher Waller has a reputation for being a policy hawk, which means that since the spring of 2022 he has been a forceful advocate of multiple increases in the target for the federal funds rate as the Fed attempts to slow the economy and bring inflation back to the Fed’s 2 percent target. (Waller’s biography on the Fed’s web site can be found here.)

So, it was notable that in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) on November 28, he said that “I am increasingly confident that policy is currently well positioned to slow the economy and get inflation back to 2 percent.” Although he also stressed that “there is still significant uncertainty about the pace of future activity, and so I cannot say for sure whether the [Federal Open Market Committee] FOMC has done enough to achieve price stability” his remarks were interpreted as reinforcing the growing view among non-Fed economists and investors that the FOMC is unlikely to increase its target for the federal funds rate further and is likely to reduce the target at some point during 2024. The text of Waller’s speech can be found here.

AEI economist Michael Strain interviewed Waller following his speech. In the interview (which can be found here), Strain made the case for believing that the Fed’s ability to achieve a soft landing—returning inflation to the 2 percent target without pushing the economy into a recession—would be more difficult than Waller seems to believe. Included in the interview are discussions of whether expecting a soft landing is consistent with the historical record, what guidance the Taylor rule can give to monetary policymakers (we discuss the Taylor rule in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5, Economics, Chapter 25, Section 15.5, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 17, Section 17.5), the significance of rising labor force participation rates among prime-age workers, and the implications large federal budget deficits have for monetary policy.

Christopher Waller Confirmed by Senate as Federal Reserve Governor

Christopher Waller

On Thursday, December 3, Christopher Waller, executive vice president and research director at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, was confirmed by the Senate as a member of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors.  The Board of Governors has seven members and, under the Federal Reserve Act, is responsible for the monetary policy of the United States and for overseeing the operation of the Federal Reserve System.

Board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate to 14-year nonrenewable terms. The terms are staggered so that one expires every other January 31. Members frequently leave the Board before their terms expire to return to their previous occupations or to accept other positions in the government. The following table shows the current Board members, when their terms will expire, and which president appointed them.  Note that one seat on the Board is vacant. President Trump nominated Judy Shelton to fill this seat but it appears unlikely that she will be confirmed by the Senate before the change in administration takes place on January 20.

NameYear Term EndsAppointed to the Board by
Jerome Powell, ChairAs Chair: 2022
As Board member: 2028
As Chair: President Trump
As Board member: President Obama
Richard Clarida, Vice ChairAs Vice Chair and as Board member: 2022President Trump
Randal Quarles, Vice Chair for SupervisionAs Vice Chair for Supervision: 2021; As Board member: 2032President Trump
Michelle Bowman2034President Trump
Lael Brainard2026President Obama
Christopher Waller2030President Trump
Vacant

Information on the history and structure of the Board of Governors and on the backgrounds of current members can be found HERE on the Fed’s website.  An announcement of Waller’s confirmation can be found HERE on the website of the St. Louis Fed. A news story discussing Waller’s confirmation and the likely outcome of Shelton’s nomination, as well as some of the politics involved with current Fed nominations can be found HERE (those with a subscription to the Wall Street Journal may also want to read the article HERE).