The cover of Steven King’s novel The Stand. (Image from amazon.com)
In Microeconomics, Chapter 10, we have a section on “Pitfalls in Decision Making.” One of those pitfalls is the failure to ignore sunk costs. A sunk cost is one that has already been paid and cannot be recovered.
In his book On Writing: A Memoir of the Craft, King discusses his writing of The Stand (a book he describes as “the one my longtime readers still seem to like the best.”) At one point he had had trouble finishing the manuscript and was considering whether to stop working on the novel:
“If I’d had two or even three hundred pages of single-spaced manuscript instead of more than five hundred, I think I would have abandoned The Stand and gone on to something else—God knows I had done it before. But five hundred pages was too great an investment, both in time and in creative energy; I found it impossible to let go.”
King seems to have committed the error of ignoring sunk costs. The time and creative energy he had put into writing the 500 pages were sunk—whether he abandoned the manuscript or continued writing until the book was finished, he couldn’t get back the time and energy he had expanded on writing the first five hundred pages. That he had already written 300 pages or 500 pages wasn’t relevant to his decision because if a cost is sunk it doesn’t matter for decision making whether the cost is large or small.
Is it relevant in assessing King’s decision that in the end he did finish The Stand, the novel sold well—earning King substantial royalties—and his fans greatly admire the novel? Not directly because only with hindsight do we know that The Stand was successful. In deciding whether to finish the manuscript, King shouldn’t have worried about the cost of the time and energy he had already spent writing it. Instead, King should have compared the expected marginal cost of finishing the manuscript with the expected marginal benefit from completing the book. Note that the expected marginal benefit could include not only the royalty earnings from sales of the books, but also the additional appreciation he received from his fans for writing what turned out to be their favorite novel.
When King paused working on the manuscript after having written 500 pages, the marginal cost of finishing was the opportunity cost of not being able to spend those hours and creative energy writing a different book. Given the success of The Stand, the marginal benefit to King from completing the manuscript was almost certainly greater than the marginal cost. So, completing the manuscript was the correct decision, even if he made it for the wrong reason!
Fire damage in the Pacific Palisades. (Photo from Reuters via the Wall Street Journal)
As of January 15, the series of devastating wildfires in Southern California have killed at least 25 people and destroyed billions of dollars’ worth of homes and businesses. Adding to the tragedy is the fact that many homeowners aren’t fully insured against the damage. As a result, they lack the necessary funds to rebuild their homes. Unfortunately for these people, the market for fire insurance in California hasn’t been working well.
In the United States, regulation of property and casualty insurance occurs at the state level with regulations differing substantially across states. In California, insurance companies face an unusually long regulatory process to receive permission to increase the premiums they charge. The delays in raising premiums have contributed to companies not renewing property insurance policies in some areas, such as those prone to wildfires. In these areas, the payouts the companies expect to make have been higher than the premiums that California regulators have allowed companies to charge policyholders.
The wildfires have ravaged the Pacific Palisades neighborhood of Los Angeles . Although housing prices in the neighborhood are among the highest in the country, an analysis by the Reuters news agency showed that: “Measured against home values, insurance costs are cheaper in the Palisades than in 97% of U.S. postal codes …” For example, the median insurance premium in the Pacific Palisades was “less than residents paid in Glencoe, Illinois, an upscale suburb of Chicago where homes are two-thirds cheaper and the risk of wildfire is minimal.”
Catastrophe modeling is a way of statistically forecasting the probability of events—such as floods or wildfires—occurring that would sharply increase claims by policyholders. Regulations had barred insurance companies from using catastrophe modeling to justify increases in premiums. (State regulators lifted the prohibition on the use of catastrophe modeling shortly before the fires.) These restrictions made it more difficult for companies to charge risk-based premiums, which are based on the probability that a policyholder will file a claim.
Insurance markets can experience adverse selection problems because the people most eager to buy insurance are those with highest probability of requiring an insurance payout. Insurance companies attempt to reduce adverse selection problems by, among other things, charging risk-based premiums. Limiting the ability of insurance companies to charge risk-based premiums increased the adverse selection problems the companies face. To cope with the problem of companies not renewing policies, regulators began requiring companies to renew policies in some Zip codes, particularly those that were in or near areas that had experienced wildfires. This policy further increased adverse selection.
By 2023, some insurers, including State Farm and Allstate—which are two of the largest property insurers in the United States—had decided that they were unlikely to be able cover their costs from offering property insurance policies in California and stopped writing policies in the state. Policyholders who are unable to obtain a policy from a private insurance company typically buy a policy offered through the Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) Plan. The FAIR Plan is sponsored by the state government, although operated by private insurance companies. The premiums charged for a FAIR Plan policy are significantly higher than the premiums charged for a traditional policy. Despite the higher premiums, the number of FAIR Plan policies doubled between 2020 and 2025, reaching nearly 500,000.
The FAIR Plan lacks sufficient funds to pay the claims from policyholders who had lost their homes or businesses in the Southern California wildfires. To cover the deficit, the FAIR Plan will assess private insurance companies, who, in turn, will raise premiums charged to their other policyholders. In this way, some of the costs from the wildfires will be borne by all property insurance policyholders in California, even if they live far from the areas affected by the wildfires.
We discuss moral hazard in insurance markets in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 7 (and in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 11). In general, moral hazard refers to actions people take after they have entered into a transaction that make the other party to the transaction worse off. Moral hazard in insurance markets occurs when people change their behavior after becoming insured. The way that the insurance market is regulated in California and, in particular, the way that the FAIR Plan is administered increases moral hazard because people who own homes or businesses in areas with a greater risk of damage from wildfires don’t pay premiums that fully reflect that greater risk. In other words, more people live in fire prone areas in California than would do so if the premiums on their insurance policies fully reflected the probability of their making a claim.
Whether, following the wildfires, the California legislature will change the regulations governing the insurance market is unclear at this point. As an insurance agent quoted by the Wall Street Journal put it: “We are in uncharted territory.”
On January 15, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its monthly report on the consumer price index (CPI). The following figure compares headline inflation (the blue line) and core inflation (the green line).
The headline inflation rate, which is measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous month, was 2.9 percent in December—up from 2.7 percent in November.
The core inflation rate,which excludes the prices of food and energy, was 3.2 percent in December—down from 3.3 percent in November.
Headline inflation was slightly above and core inflation was slightly below what economists surveyed had expected.
In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, headline inflation (the blue line) jumped from 3.8 percent in November to 4.8 percent in December. Core inflation (the green line) decreased from 3.8 percent in November to 2.7 percent in December.
Overall, considering 1-month and 12-month inflation together, the most favorable news is the low value of the 1-month core inflation rate. The most concerning news is a sharp increase in 1-month headline inflation, which brought that measure to its highest reading since February 2024. On balance, this month’s CPI report doesn’t do much to challenge the conclusion of other recent inflation reports that progress on lowering inflation has slowed or, possibly, stalled. So, the probability of a “no landing” outcome, with inflation remaining above the Fed’s target for an indefinite period, seems to have at least slightly increased.
Of course, it’s important not to overinterpret the data from a single month. The figure shows that 1-month inflation is particularly volatile. Also note that the Fed uses the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, rather than the CPI, to evaluate whether it is hitting its 2 percent annual inflation target.
As we’ve discussed in previous blog posts, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell and his colleagues on the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) have been closely following inflation in the price of shelter. The price of “shelter” in the CPI, as explained here, includes both rent paid for an apartment or a house and “owners’ equivalent rent of residences (OER),” which is an estimate of what a house (or apartment) would rent for if the owner were renting it out. OER is included in the CPI to account for the value of the services an owner receives from living in an apartment or house.
As the following figure shows, inflation in the price of shelter has been a significant contributor to headline inflation. The blue line shows 12-month inflation in shelter, and the red line shows 1-month inflation in shelter. Twelve-month inflation in shelter has been declining since the spring of 2023, but in December it was still high at 4.6 percent. One-month inflation in shelter—which is much more volatile than 12-month inflation in shelter—fell from 4.1 percent in November to 3.1 percent in December.
To better estimate of the underlying trend in inflation, some economists look at median inflation and trimmed mean inflation.
Median inflation is calculated by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Ohio State University. If we listed the inflation rate in each individual good or service in the CPI, median inflation is the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates.
Trimmed mean inflation drops the 8 percent of goods and services with the highest inflation rates and the 8 percent of goods and services with the lowest inflation rates.
The following figure shows that 12-month median inflation (the red line) declined slightly from 3.9 percent in November to 3.8 percent in December. Twelve-month trimmed mean inflation (the blue line) was unchanged at 3.2 percent for the fifth month in a row.
The following figure shows 1-month median and trimmed mean inflation. One-month median inflation rose from 2.8 percent in November to 3.6 percent in December. One-month trimmed mean inflation fell slightly from 3.3 percent in November to 3.2 percent in December. These data provide confirmation that (1) CPI inflation at this point is likely running higher than a rate that would be consistent with the Fed achieving its inflation target, and (2) that progress toward the target has slowed.
What are the implications of this CPI report for the actions the FOMC may take at its next meeting on January 28-29? The stock market rendered a quick verdict, as the following figure from the Wall Street Journal shows. As soon as the market opened on Wednesday morning, all three of the most widely followed stock market indexes jumped—as indicated by the vertical segments in the figure. Investors seem to be focusing on core CPI inflation being lower than expected, which should increase the probability that the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate at either its March or May meeting. Lower inflation and lower interest rates would be good news for stock prices.
Investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts still do not expect that the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate at its next meeting, as indicated by the following figure. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) Today, investors assign a probability of 93.7 percent to the FOMC leaving its target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent at its January 28-29 meeting, and a probability of only 2.7 percent to the committee cutting its target range by 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points).
Last September the Federal Reserve’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cut its target for the federal funds rate by 0.50 percentage point (50 basis points. Many economists and policymakers expected the FOMC to continue cutting its federal funds rate target at meetings through 2025. (We discussed the September target cut in this blog post.) The FOMC cut its target by 25 basis points at both its November and December 2024 meetings. But by the December meeting, it had become clear that the inflation rate was not falling as quickly to the Fed’s 2 percent target as the committee members had hoped. As FOMC’s staff economists put it, there had been “upward surprises” in inflation data. According to the minutes of the December meeting, several members of the committee believed that “upside risks to the inflation outlook had increased.”
As a result, it seemed likely that the FOMC would leave its target for the federal funds rate unchanged at its next meeting on January 28-29. This conclusion was reinforced this morning (January 10) when the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Employment Situation” report (often called the “jobs report”) for December. The report indicates that the labor market is stronger than expected.
Economists who had been surveyed by the Wall Street Journal had forecast that payroll employment, as reported in the establishment survey, would increase by 155,000. The BLS reported that payroll employment in December had increased by 256,000, well above expectations. The unemployment rate—which is calculated from data in the household survey—was 4.1 percent, down slightly from 4.2 percent in November. The following figure, taken from the BLS report, shows the net changes in employment for each month during the past two years.
As the following figure shows, the net change in jobs from the household survey moves much more erratically than does the net change in jobs from the establishment survey. The net change in jobs as measured by the household survey for December also showed a strong increase of 478,000 jobs following a decline of 273,000 jobs in November. In any particular month, the story told by the two surveys can be inconsistent with employment increasing in one survey while falling in the other. But in December the two surveys were sending the same signal of rapid employment growth. (In this blog post, we discuss the differences between the employment estimates in the household survey and the employment estimates in the establishment survey.)
The employment-population ratio for prime age workers—those aged 25 to 54—also increased, as shown in the following figure, to 80.5 percent in December from 80.4 percent in November. Although the employment-population is below its recent high of 80.9 percent, it remains high relative to levels seen since 2001.
As the following figure shows, the unemployment rate, which is also reported in the household survey, decreased slightly to 4.1 percent in December from 4.2 percent in November. The unemployment rate has been remarkably stable over the past two years, varying only 0.2 percentage point above or below 4.0 percent.
The establishment survey also includes data on average hourly earnings (AHE). As we noted in this post, many economists and policymakers believe the employment cost index (ECI) is a better measure of wage pressures in the economy than is the AHE. The AHE does have the important advantage that it is available monthly, whereas the ECI is only available quarterly. The following figure shows the percentage change in the AHE from the same month in the previous year. The AHE increased 3.9 percent in December, down slightly from 4.0 percent in November.
The following figure shows wage inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month wage inflation, whereas this figure shows 1-month wage inflation.) One-month wage inflation is much more volatile than 12-month wage inflation—note the very large swings in 1-month wage inflation in April and May 2020 during the business closures caused by the Covid pandemic. The December 1-month rate of wage inflation was 3.4 percent, a decline from the 4.9 percent rate in November. Whether measured as a 12-month increase or as a 1-month increase, AHE is still increasing somewhat more rapidly than is consistent with the Fed achieving its 2 percent target rate of price inflation.
Given these data from the jobs report, it seems unlikely that the FOMC will reduce its target range for the federal funds rate at its next meeting. One indication of expectations of future rate cuts comes from investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) As shown in the following figure, today these investors assign a probability of 97.3 percent to the FOMC keeping its target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at the current range of 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent, at its next meeting. Investors assign a probability of only 2.7 percent of the committee cutting its target range by 25 basis points at that meeting.
As the following figure shows, investors also expect the FOMC to keep its target range unchanged at its meeting on March 18-19, although there is greater uncertainty. Investors assign:
A 74.0 percent probability that the FOMC keeps its target range for the federal funds rate unchanged
A 25.4 percent probability that the committee cuts its target range by 25 basis points
A 0.6 percent probability that the committee cuts its target range by 50 basis points
President-elect Donald Trump has stated that he believes that presidents should have more say in monetary policy. There had been some speculation that once in office Trump would try to replace Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, although Trump later indicated that he would not attempt to replace Powell until Powell’s term as chair ends in May 2026. Can the president remove the Fed Chair or another member of the Board of Governors? The relevant section of the Federal Reserve Act States that: “each member [of the Board of Governors] shall hold office for a term of fourteen years from the expiration of the term of his predecessor, unless sooner removed for cause by the President.”
“Removed for cause” has generally been interpreted by lawyers inside and outside of the Fed as not authorizing the president to remove a member of the Board of Governors because of a disagreement over monetary policy. The following flat statement appears on a page of the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: “Federal Reserve officials cannot be fired simply because the president or a member of Congress disagrees with Federal Reserve decisions about interest rates.”
At his press conference following the November 7 meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), Powell was asked by a reporter: “do you believe the President has the power to fire or demote you, and has the Fed determined the legality of a President demoting at will any of the other Governors with leadership positions?” Powell replied: “Not permitted under the law.” Despite Powell’s definitive statement, because no president has attempted to remove a member of the Board of Governors, the federal courts have never been asked to decide what the “removed for cause” language in the Federal Reserve Act means.
The president is free to remove the members of most agencies of the federal government, so why shouldn’t he or she be able to remove the Fed Chair? When Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, it intended the central bank to be able set policy independently of the president and Congress. The president and members of Congress may take a short-term view of policy, focusing on conditions at the time that they run for reelection. Expansionary monetary policies can temporarily boost employment and output in the short run, but cause inflation to increase in the long run.
As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 17, Section 17.4 (Economics, Chapter 27, Section 27.4), in a classic study, Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers compared the degree of central bank independence and the inflation rate for 16 high-income countries during the years from 1955 to 1988. As the following figure shows, countries with highly independent central banks, such as the United States, Switzerland, and Germany, had lower inflation rates than countries whose central banks had little independence, such as New Zealand, Italy, and Spain.
Yesterday, something unusual happened that might seem to undermine Fed independence. Michael Barr, a member of the Board of Governors and the Board’s Vice Chair for Supervision, said that on February 28 he will step down from his position as Vice Chair, but will remain on the Board. His term as Vice Chair was scheduled to end in July 2026. His term on the Board is scheduled to end in January 2032.
Barr has been an advocate for stricter regulation of banks, including higher capital requirements for large banks. These positions have come in for criticism from banks, from some policymakers, and from advisers to Trump. Barr stated that he was stepping down because: “The risk of a dispute over the position could be a distraction from our mission. In the current environment, I’ve determined that I would be more effective in serving the American people from my role as governor.” Trump will nominate someone to assume the position of vice chair, but because there are no openings on the Board of Governors he will have to choose from among the current members.
Does this episode indicate that Fed independence is eroding? Not necessarily because the Fed’s regulatory role is distinct from its monetary policy role. As financial journalist Neil Irwin points out, “top [Fed] bank supervision officials view their role as more explicitly carrying out the regulatory agenda of the president who appointed them—and that a new president is entitled, in reasonable time, to their own choices.” In the past, other members of the Board who have held positions similar to the one Barr holds have resigned following the election of a new president.
So, it’s unclear at this point whether Barr’s resignation as vice chair indicates that the incoming Trump Administration will be taking steps to influence the Fed’s monetary policy actions or how the Fed’s leadership will react if it does.
On January 5, 2025 at the American Economic Association meetings in San Francisco, Jason Furman of Harvard’s Kennedy School, former Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke (now of the Brookings Institution), former Council of Economic Advisers Chair Christina Romer of the University of California, Berkeley, and John Cochrane of Stanford’s Hoover Institition participated in a panel on “Inflation and the Macroeconomy.”
The discussion provides an interesting overview of a number of macroeconomic topics including:
The roles of aggregate demand shocks and aggregate supply shocks in explaining the sharp increase of inflation beginning in the spring of 2021.
The reasons for the Fed’s delay in responding to the increase in inflation.
Why macroeconomic forecasting models and most economists failed to anticipate the rise in inflation.
The role of the Fed’s 2020 monetary policy framework, how the Fed should revise the framework as a result of the review currently underway, and whether the Fed should change its inflation target. (We discuss the Fed’s monetary policy framework in several blog posts, including this one.)
The likely future course of inflation and the potential effects of the Trump Administration’s policies.
The likely consequences of large federal budget deficits.
Threats to Fed independence.
The discussion is fairly long at two hours, but most of it is nontechnical and should be understandable by students who have reached the monetary and fiscal policy chapters of a macroeconomic principles course (Chapters 15 and 16 of Macroeconomics; Chapters 25 and 26 of Economics).
Image generated by GTP-4o illustrating labor productivity
Several articles in the business press have discussed the recent increases in labor productivity. For instance, this article appeared in this morning’s Wall Street Journal (a subscription may be required).
The most widely used measure of labor productivity is output per hour of work in the nonfarm business sector. The BLS calculates output in the nonfarm business sector by subtracting from GDP production in the agricultural, government, and nonprofit sectors. (The definitions used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in estimating labor productivity are discussed in the “Technical Notes” that appear at the end of the BLS’s quarterly “Productivity and Costs” releases.) The blue line in the following figure shows the annual growth rate in labor productivity in the nonfarm business sector as measured by the percentage change from the same quarter in the previous year. The green line shows labor productivity growth in manufacturing.
As the figure shows, both labor productivity growth in the nonfarm business sector and labor productivity growth in manufacturing are volatile. The business press has focused on the growth of productivity in the nonfarm business sector during the period from the third quarter of 2023 through the third quarter of 2024. During this time, labor productivity has grown at an average annual rate of 2.5 percent. That growth rate is notably higher than the growth rate that many economists are expecting over the next 10 years. For instance, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has forecast that labor productivity will grow at an average annual rate of only 1.6 percent over the period from 2025 to 2034.
The CBO forecasts that the total numbers of hours worked in the economy will grow at an average annual rate of 0.5 percent. Combining that estimate with a 2.5 percent annual rate of growth of labor productivity results in output per person—a measure of the standard of living—increasing by 34 percent by 2034. If labor productivity increases at a rate of only 1.6 percent, then output per person will have increased by only 23 percent by 2034.
The standard of living of the average person in United States increasing 11 percent more would make a noticeable difference in people’s lives by allowing them to consume and save more. Higher rates of labor productivity growth leading to a faster growth rate of income and output would also increase the federal government’s tax revenues, helping to decrease federal budget deficits that are currently forecast to be historically large. (We discuss the components of long-run economic growth in Macroeconomics, Chapter 16, Section 16.7; Economics, Chapter 26, Section 26.7, and the economics of long-run growth in Macroeconomics, Chapter 11; Economics, Chapter 21.)
Can the recent growth rates in labor productivity be maintained over the next 10 years? There is an historical precedent. Labor productivity in the nonfarm business sector grew at an average annual rate of 2.6 percent between 1950 and 1973. But growth rates that high have proven difficult to achieve in more recent years. For instance, from 2008 to 2023, labor productivity grew at an average annual rate of only 1.5 percent. (We discuss the debate over future growth rates in Macroeconomics, Chapter 11, Section 11.3; Economics, Chapter 21, Section 21.3.)
The Wall Street Journal article we cited earlier provides an overview of some of the factors that may account for the recent increase in labor productivity growth rates. The 2020 Covid pandemic may have led to some increases in labor productivity. Workers who temporarily or permanently lost their jobs as businesses closed during the height of the pandemic may have found new jobs that better matched their skills, making them more productive. Similarly, businesses that were forced to operate with fewer workers, may have found ways to restore their previous levels of output with lower levels of employment. These changes may have led to one-time increases in labor productivity at some firms, but are unlikely to result in increased rates of labor productivity growth in the future.
Some businesses have used newly available generative artificial intelligence (AI) software to increase labor productivity by, for instance, using software to replace workers who previously produced marketing materials or responded to customer questions or complaints. It will take at least several years before generative AI software spreads throughout the economy, so it seems too early for it to have had a broad enough effect on the economy to be visible in the productivity data.
Note also that, as the green line in the figure above shows, manufacturing productivity has been lagging recently. From the third quarter of 2023 to the third quarter of 2024, labor productivity in manufacturing has increased at an annual average rate of only 0.4 percent. This slowdown is surprising given that over the long run productivity in manufacturing has typically increased faster than has productivity in the overall economy. It seems unlikely that labor productivity in the overall economy can sustain its recent growth rates if labor productivity growth in manufacturing continues to lag.
Finally, the productivity data are subject to revision as better estimates of output and of hours worked become available. It’s possible that what appear to be rapid rates of productivity growth during the last five quarters may turn out to have been less rapid following data revisions.
So, while the recent increase in the growth rate of labor productivity is an encouraging sign of the strength of the U.S. economy, it’s too soon to tell whether we have entered a sustained period of higher productivity growth.
Because inflation in chocolate chip cookie prices ended, or course! In December 2023, the average retail price of a pound of chocolate chip cookies (even we try not to eat a pound of cookies in one sitting!) was $5.12. In November 2024, the price had declined to $4.92 per pound. As the following figure shows, the days of 20 percent annual inflation in chocolate chip cookie inflation that lasted from September 2022 to April 2023 are behind us—at least for now.
The following figure shows annual inflation in overall food prices as measured by the percentage change in the food component of the consumer price index (CPI) from the same month in the previous year. During 2024, food inflation has been running at an annual rate of between 2.0 percent and 2.5 percent. In contrast, chocolate chip cookies actually experienced deflation of –1.1 percent. So, the price of chocolate chip cookies relative to the prices of other food products declined by more than did the absolute price.
We were led to contemplate chocolate chip cookie prices by this article in the New York Times that discusses the FRED data set. (A subscription may be required to access the article.) Like many other economists, we heavily use the FRED site and greatly appreciate the efforts of those at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis who have made this data resource available.
As we discussed in this blog post on Wednesday, the Federal Reserve’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) voted to reduce its target for the federal funds rate by 0.25 percentage point. After the meeting, the committee released its “Summary of Economic Projections” (SEP). The SEP showed that the committee’s forecasts of the inflation rate as measured by the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index for this year and next year are both higher than the committee had forecast in September, when the last SEP was released. The Fed relies on annual changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target.
This morning (December 20), the BEA released monthly data on the PCE price index as part of its “Personal Income and Outlays” report for November.
The following figure shows PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2016 with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. Measured this way, in November PCE inflation was 2.4 percent, up from 2.3 percent in October. Core PCE inflation in November was 2.8 percent, unchanged from October. Both PCE inflation and core PCE inflation were slightly lower than the expectations of economists surveyed before the data were released.
The following figure shows PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation, while this figure shows 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, PCE inflation fell sharply in November to 1.5 percent from 2.8 percent in October. Core PCE inflation also fell from 3.2 percent in October to 1.4 percent in November. Although both 12-month PCE inflation and 12-month core PCE inflation remained above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target, 1-month PCE inflation and 1-month core PCE inflation dropped to well below the inflation target. But the usual caution applies that data from one month shouldn’t be overly relied on; it’s far too soon to draw the conclusion that inflation is likely to remain below the 2 percent target in future months.
Median inflation is calculated by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Ohio State University as another way of measuring the underlying trend in inflation. If we listed the inflation rate for each individual good or service included in the PCE, median inflation is the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates. The following figure from the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland includes, along with PCE inflation (the green line) and core PCE inflation (the blue line), median PCE inflation (the orange line). All three inflation rates are measured over 12 months. Median PCE inflation in November was 3.1 percent, unchanged from October.
In his press conference earlier this week, Fed Chair Jerome Powell noted that: “we’ve had recent high readings from non-market services.” Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices rise, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also rise. Powell argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.” The following figure shows 12-month inflation (the blue line) and 1-month inflation (the red line) for market-based PCE, excluding the prices of food and energy. (The BEA explains the market-based PCE measure here.)
These measures of inflation tell a similar story to the measures considered earlier: 12-month inflation continues to run above the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target, while 1-month inflation slowed significantly in November and is below the 2 percent target. By this measure 12-month inflation was unchanged in November at 2.4 percent, while 1-month inflation declined from 2.5 percent in October to 1.4 percent in November.
To summarize, the less volatile 12-month measures of inflation show it to be persistently above the Fed’s target, while the more volatile 1-month measures show inflation to have fallen below target. If the FOMC were to emphasize the 1-month measures, we might expect them to continue cutting the target for the federal funds rate at the committee’s next meeting on January 28-29. The more likely outcome is that, unless other macroeconomic data that are released between now and that meeting indicate a significant strengthening or weakening of the economy, the committee will leave its target for the federal funds rate unchanged. (The BEA’s next release of monthly PCE data won’t occur until January 31, which is after the FOMC meeting.)
Investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts expect that the FOMC will leave its federal funds rate target unchanged at its next meeting. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) As shown in the following figure, investors assign a probability of 91.4 percent to the FOMC leaving its target for the federal funds rate at the current range of 4.25 percent to 4.50. Investors assign a probability of only 8.6 percent to the FOMC cutting its target by 0.25 percentage point.
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