How does the number of people who majored in economics in college compare with the number of people who pursued other majors? How do the earnings of economics majors compare with the earnings of other majors? Recent data released by the Census Bureau provides some interesting answers to these and other questions about the economics major.
Each year the Census Bureau conducts the American Community Survey (ACS) by mailing a questionnaire to about 3.5 million households. The questionnaire contains 100 questions that ask about, among other things, the race, sex, age, educational attainment, employment, earnings, and health status of each person in the household. Responses are collected online, by mail, by telephone, or by a personal visit from a census employee.
Although the Census Bureau releases some data about 1 year after the data is collected, it typically takes longer to publish detailed studies of specific topics. The ACS report on Field of Bachelor’s Degree in the United States: 2022 was released this month, although it’s based on data collected during 2022. Anyone interested in the subject will find the whole report to be worthwhile reading, but we can summarize a few of the results.
According to the census, in 2022, there were 81.9 million people in the United States aged 25 and older who had graduated from college with a bachelor’s degree. The report includes economics, along with several other social sciences—psychology, political science, and sociology—in the category of “Engineering and Science Degrees.” The following figure shows the leading majors in this category ranked by the percentage of all holders of a bachelor’s degree. (Sociology is included for comparison with the other three social sciences listed.) Psychology has the largest share of majors at 4.6 percent. Economics accounts for 2.0 percent of majors.
We can conclude that among social science majors, economics is less than half as popular as psychology, slightly less popular than political science, and significantly more popular than sociology.
Economics departments are sometimes located in undergraduate business colleges. The following figure compares economics to other majors listed in the “Business Degrees” category of the report. At nearly 6 percent of all majors, “business management and administration” is the most popular of business majors, followed by general business and accounting. “Other business,” marketing, finance, and economics are all about equally popular with around 2 percent of all majors.
The figure below shows the median annual earnings for people aged 25 years to 64 years—prime-age workers—who majored in each of fields used in the first figure above, as well as for all holders of a bachelor’s degree. People who majored in economics earn significantly more than people who majored in the other social sciences listed and 35 percent more than people in all majors.
The next figure shows median annual earnings for economics majors compared with majors in other business fields. Perhaps surprisingly—although not to people who know the many benefits from majoring in economics!—economics majors earn more on average than do majors in other business fields.
The following figure shows how many people with bacherlor’s degrees in economics majors fall into each age group. People aged 25 years to 34 years make up 22 percent of all economics majors, the most of any of the age groups. This result indicates that the economics major has gained in popularity (although note that the age groups don’t have equal numbers of people in them).
Finally, we can look at the demographic characteristics of economics majors. The next figure shows the percentage of degree holders in some popular majors who are women. Although women hold 53 percent of all bachelor’s degrees, they hold only 33 percent of bachelor’s degrees in economics. The share for economics is lower than for the other social sciences shown, the same as for finance majors, and more than for computer science and mechanical engineering majors.
The next figure shows bachelor’s degrees in economics by race and Hispanic origin. Non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic Asians are overrepresented among economics majors compared with the percentages they make up of all bachelor’s degree holders. Non-Hispanic Blacks and Hispanics are underrepresented among economics majors compared with the percentages they make up of all bachelor’s degree holders. People who are multiracial or of another race hold the same percentage of economics degrees as of degrees in other subjects.
Photo of Caitlin Clark when she played for the University of Iowa from Reuters via the Wall Street Journal.
Caitlin Clark’s ability to hit three-point shots made her a star at the University of Iowa. Since she joined the Indiana Fever of the Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA) in 2024, she’s been, arguably, the league’s biggest star. An article on theathletic.com discussing Clark’s effect on the league includes the following chart:
Clark’s popularity has resulted in substantially increased revenue for her team and for the WNBA. Should that fact affect the salary she receives from the Indiana Fever? The article states that: “Clark will almost assuredly never receive in salary what she is worth to the WNBA. In that regard, she’s a lot like [former men’s basketball star Michael] Jordan, and other all-time greats across sports.” Why won’t Clark be paid a salary equal to her worth to the WNBA?
In Microeconomics, Chapter 16, we show that in a competitive labor market, workers receive the value of their maginal products. The value of a basketball player’s marginal product is the additional revenue the player’s team earns from employing the player. We note that the marginal product of an athlete is the additional number of games the athlete’s team wins by employing the player. The value of a player’s marginal product is the additional revenue the team earns from those additional wins. Teams that win more games attract more fans to watch the teams play—both in person and on television or online. Teams earn revenue from selling tickets, as well as concessions and souvenirs sold in the area. Teams are paid for the rights to broadcast or stream their games. And, as the chart above shows, a player as popular as Clark will increase the game jerseys and other merchandise a team can sell.
We note in Chapter 16 that, once their inital contracts with their teams expire, the best professional athletes tend to sign contracts with teams in larger cities. Although an athlete’s marginal product may be no larger in a big city than in a smaller city, the revenue a team earns from the additional games the team wins from employing a star athlete depends in part on the population of the city the team plays in. Clark’s 2025 salary is only $78,066, far below the value of her marginal product, which is likely at least several million dollars. Her current contract with the Fever lasts through the 2027 season. But even after the contract expires, by league rules, she can’t be paid more than $294,244 by whichever team signs her. (It’s possible that amount may have increased by the time her current contract expires.)
The ceiling on WBNA salaries is far below the average salary in most U.S. men’s professional leagues. For instance, the average salary in the men’s National Basketball Association (NBA) during the 2024–2025 year was nearly $12 million. A low salary cap is common in leagues that are relatively new or that aren’t popular enough to receive large payments for the rights to broadcast or stream their games. For example, men’s Major League Soccer (MLS) has a salary limit of about $6 million per team. The WNBA was founded in 1996 (the NBA was founded in 1946) and, although the broadcast and online viewership for its games has increased, its viewership remains well below the NBA’s viewership.
Clark has been earning millions of dollars from endorisng Nike, Gatoade, and other products. But unless the factors just discussed change, it seems unlikely that she will receive a salary equal to the value of her marginal product to the Fever or any WNBA team she might play for in the future. The excerpt from theathletic.com article that we quoted above, though, compares her salary not to the value of her marginal product to the Fever but to the WNBA as a whole. Are there any circumstances under which we might expect a major sports star to be paid a salary equal to the additional revenue he or she is generating for a league as a whole?
The quotation from the article notes that no “all-time great” players, inclduing Michael Jordan of the NBA, have received salaries equal to the value of their marginal product to the leagues they played in. This outcome shouldn’t be surprising. Returns that entrepreneurs or workers earn in a market system are typically well below the total value they provide to society. For example, in a classic academic paper Nobel laureate William Nordhaus of Yale University estimated that entrepreneurs keep just 2.2 percent of the economic surplus they create by founding new firms. (We discuss the concept of economic surplus in Microeconomics, Chapter 4.) Leaving aside the monetary value of Clark to her team and her league, she has provided substantial consumer surplus to viewers of her games that is not captured by arena ticket prices or cable or streaming subscriptions. As we discuss in Chapter 4, the same is true of most goods and services in competitive markets.
Caitlin Clark, like Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, has only received a small fraction of the economic surplus she has created. (Photo from the Wall Street Journal)
So, although Caitlin Clark is a millionaire as a result of the money she has been paid to endorse products, the actual additional value she has created for her team, her league, and the economy is far greater than the income she earns.
“Clark will almost assuredly never receive in salary what she is worth to the WNBA. In that regard, she’s a lot like [Michael] Jordan, and other all-time greats across sports.”
This morning (June 6), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Employment Situation” report (often called the “jobs report”) for May. The data in the report show that the labor market continues to be strong. There have been many stories in the media about businesspeople becoming pessimistic as a result of the large tariff increases the Trump Administration announced on April 2—some of which have since been reduced—but we don’t see the effects in the employment data. Some firms may be maintaining employment until they receive greater clarity about where tariff rates will end up. Similarly, although there are some indications that consumer spending may be slowing, to this point, the effects are not evident in the labor market.
The jobs report has two estimates of the change in employment during the month: one estimate from the establishment survey, often referred to as the payroll survey, and one from the household survey. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1), many economists and Federal Reserve policymakers believe that employment data from the establishment survey provide a more accurate indicator of the state of the labor market than do the household survey’s employment data and unemployment data. (The groups included in the employment estimates from the two surveys are somewhat different, as we discuss in this post.)
According to the establishment survey, there was a net increase of 139,000 nonfarm jobs during May. This increase was above the increase of 125,000 that economists surveyed had forecast. Somewhat offsetting this increase, the BLS revised downward its previous estimates of employment in March and April by a combined 95,000 jobs. (The BLS notes that: “Monthly revisions result from additional reports received from businesses and government agencies since the last published estimates and from the recalculation of seasonal factors.”) The following figure from the jobs report shows the net change in nonfarm payroll employment for each month in the last two years.
The unemployment rate was unchanged to 4.2 percent in May. As the following figure shows, the unemployment rate has been remarkably stable over the past year, staying between 4.0 percent and 4.2 percent in each month since May 2024. In March, the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) forecast that the unemployment rate for 2025 would average 4.4 percent.
As the following figure shows, the monthly net change in jobs from the household survey moves much more erratically than does the net change in jobs from the establishment survey. As measured by the household survey, there was a net decrease of 696,000 jobs in May, following an increase of 461,000 jobs in April. As an indication of the volatility in the employment changes in the household survey note the very large swings in net new jobs in January and February. In any particular month, the story told by the two surveys can be inconsistent with employment increasing in one survey while falling in the other. This month, the discrepancy between the two surveys in their estimates of the change in net jobs was particularly large. (In this blog post, we discuss the differences between the employment estimates in the two surveys.)
The household survey has another important labor market indicator. The employment-population ratio for prime age workers—those aged 25 to 54—declined from 80.7 percent in April to 80.5 percent in May. The prime-age employment-population ratio is somewhat below the high of 80.9 percent in mid-2024, but is above what the ratio was in any month during the period from January 2008 to December 2019.
It remains unclear how many federal workers have been laid off since the Trump Administration took office. The establishment survey shows a decline in total federal government employment of 22,000 in May and a total decline of 59,000 beginning in February. However, the BLS notes that: “Employees on paid leave or receiving ongoing severance pay are counted as employed in the establishment survey.” It’s possible that as more federal employees end their period of receiving severance pay, future jobs reports may report a larger decline in federal employment. To this point, the decline in federal employment has been too small to have a significant effect on the overall labor market.
The establishment survey also includes data on average hourly earnings (AHE). As we noted in this post, many economists and policymakers believe the employment cost index (ECI) is a better measure of wage pressures in the economy than is the AHE. The AHE does have the important advantage of being available monthly, whereas the ECI is only available quarterly. The following figure shows the percentage change in the AHE from the same month in the previous year. The AHE increased 3.9 percent in May. Movements in AHE have been remarkably stable, showing increases of 3.9 percent each month since January.
The following figure shows wage inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month wage inflation, whereas this figure shows 1-month wage inflation.) One-month wage inflation is much more volatile than 12-month wage inflation—note the very large swings in 1-month wage inflation in April and May 2020 during the business closures caused by the Covid pandemic. In May, the 1-month rate of wage inflation was 5.1 percent, up sharply from 2.4 percent in April. If the 1-month increase in AHE is sustained, it would indicate that the Fed will struggle to achieve its 2 percent target rate of price inflation. But one month’s data from such a volatile series may not accurately reflect longer-run trends in wage inflation.
Today’s jobs report leaves the situation facing the Federal Reserve’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) largely unchanged. Looming over monetary policy, however, is the expected effect of the Trump Administration’s tariff increases. As we note in this blog post, a large unexpected increase in tariffs results in an aggregate supply shock to the economy. In terms of the basic aggregate demand and aggregate supply model that we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 13 (Economics, Chapter 23), an unexpected increase in tariffs shifts the short-run aggregate supply curve (SRAS) to the left, increasing the price level and reducing the level of real GDP.
One indication of expectations of future changes in the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate comes from investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) The data from the futures market indicate that, despite the potential effects of the tariff increases, investors don’t expect that the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate at its June 17–18 meeting. As shown in the following figure, investors assign a 99.9 percent probability to the committee keeping its target unchanged at 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent at that meeting.
As the following figure shows, investors don’t expect the FOMC to cut its federal funds rate target until the committee’s September 16-17 meeting. Investors assign a probability of 54.6 percent that at that meeting the committee will cut its target range by 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) to 4.00 percent to 4.25 percent. And a probability of 9.4 percent that the committee will cut its target rate by 50 baisis points to 3.75 percent to 4.00 percent. At 35.9 percent, investors assign a fairly high probability to the committee keeping its target range constant at that meeting.
Glenn, along with co-authors Douglas Elmendorf of Harvard’s Kennedy School and Zachary Liscow of the Yale Law School, has written a new National Bureau of Economic Research working paper: “Policies to Reduce Federal Budget Deficits by Increasing Economic Growth”
Here’s the abstract:
Could policy changes boost economic growth enough and at a low enough cost to meaningfully reduce federal budget deficits? We assess seven areas of economic policy: immigration of high-skilled workers, housing regulation, safety net programs, regulation of electricity transmission, government support for research and development, tax policy related to business investment, and permitting of infrastructure construction. We find that growth-enhancing policies almost certainly cannot stabilize federal debt on their own, but that such policies can reduce the explicit tax hikes, spending cuts, or both that are needed to stabilize debt. We also find a dearth of research on the likely impacts of potential growth-enhancing policies and on ways to design such policies to restrain federal debt, and we offer suggestions for ways to build a larger base of evidence.
ChatGTP-4o image of customers at a teller’s window in a nineteenth century bank.
The United States has many more commercial banks than do other high-income countries. At the end of 2024, there were about 4,000 commercial banks in the United States. In contrast, in 2024, there were only 35 commercial banks in Canada, 20 in South Korea, and fewer than 400 in Japan, France, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
But even 4,000 commercial banks is many fewer than the peak of 29,417 commercial banks in the United States in 1921. The following figure shows the number of commercial banks in the United States from 1781, when the Bank of North America became the first bank to operate in the United States, through 2024. The grey line shows the total number of banks; the blue line shows the number of state banks—banks with a charter from a state government; and the orange line shows the number of national banks—banks with a charter from the federal government.
A key to the rapid expansion in the number of banks in the United States—there were already 1,600 in 1861—was legislation in most states that restricted banks to a single location. Without the ability to operate branches and with travel slow and expensive, most banks collected deposits and made loans only to businesses and firms in a small geographical area. Research by David Wheelock of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis has shown that in 1900, of the 12,427 commercial banks in the United States, only 87 had any branches. In addition, a series of federal laws limited the ability of banks to operate in more than one state. The most recent of these laws was the McFadden Act, which Congress passed in 1927. With their loans concentrated in one geographic area—and often in a single industry—unit banks were inefficient because they were exposed to greater credit risk. If a bank is located in a town in down-state Illinois where most local businesses depend on agriculture, a drought could force many farmers to default on loans, causing the bank to suffer heavy losses and possibly fail.
The figure shows a surge in the number of banks during the World War I period. The total number of banks rose from 24,308 in 1913 to 29,417 in 1921—an increase of 21 percent. Research by David Wheelock and Mathew Jaremski of Utah State University discusses the reasons for the sharp increase in the number of banks through 1921 and the rapid decline in the number of banks in the following years. World War I led to problems in European agriculture, which drove up agricultural prices worldwide. U.S. farmers responded by expanding production and new banks opened to meet farmers’ increased demand for credit. Newly opened banks were particularly aggressive lenders. When European agriculture revived following the end of the war in 1918, agricultural prices declined sharply and many farmers defaulted on their loans. As unit banks, the assets of many newly opened banks were highly concentrated in loans to local farmers. When defaults on these loans sharply increased, many banks failed.
The number of banks declined slowly through the 1920s, reflecting in part the continuing problems of U.S. agriculture during those years. The Great Depression, which began in August 1929, led to a series of bank panics that reduced the number of banks from 25,125 in 1928 to 13,949 in 1933.
Over time, legal restrictions on the size and geographic scope of banking were gradually removed. After the mid-1970s, most states eliminated restrictions on branching within the state. In 1994, Congress passed the Riegle–Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, which allowed for the phased removal of restrictions on interstate banking. The 1998 merger of NationsBank, based in North Carolina, and Bank of America, based in California, produced the first bank with branches on both coasts.
Rapid consolidation in the U.S. banking industry has resulted from these regulatory changes. While in 1984, there were 14,496 commercial banks in the United States, in 2024, as noted earlier, there were only about 4,000. This consolidation is what we would expect in an industry with substantial economies of scale when firms are free to compete with each other. When an industry has economies of scale, firms that expand have a lower average cost of producing goods or services. This lower cost allows the expanding firms to sell their goods or services at a lower price than smaller rivals, driving them out of business or forcing them to merge with other firms. Because large banks have lower costs than smaller banks, they can offer depositors higher interest rates, offer borrowers lower interest rates, and provide investment advice and other financial services at a lower price. (We discuss many aspects of the history and economics of banking in Chapter 10 of Money, Banking, and theFinancial System.)
Even though over the past 30 years there has been tremendous consolidation in the U.S. banking industry, 4,000 banks is still many more banks than in most other countries. So, it seems likely that further consolidation will take place, and the number of banks will continue to dwindle.
The economy and financial markets nervously await the July 8 end of the 90-day pause of the Trump administration’s “reciprocal” tariffs. But four days earlier, Republicans can allay those fears with a pro-growth policy that advances President Trump’s Made in America agenda without tariffs. The fix: tax reform.
July 4 is the date that Treasury Secretary Bessent has predicted Congress and the White House will have ready a 2.0 version of the landmark Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, or TCJA. Without congressional action, some of these reforms will expire at the end of 2025, killing changes that still benefit the economy. Corporate tax changes, in particular, boosted investment and growth. These should remain the focal point of this next tax bill—for many reasons. Done right, corporate tax reform could advance President Trump’s goal to bring investment to American production without using economy-roiling tariffs. Call it TCJA+.
Renewing some parts of the original TCJA will help investment in the U.S. The 2017 reform offered incentives for investment in new businesses by allowing them to expense the cost of assets, rather than writing them off over time. But these benefits were set to be phased out from 2023 to 2026, removing a key pro-growth element of the earlier law.
Then there are two new provisions Republicans should add to secure Mr. Trump’s goal to have more made in America. Both were in the original 2016 House Republican tax reform blueprint.
First, Congress should change business taxation from the current income tax to a cash-flow tax, which taxes a firm’s revenue, minus all its expenses, including investment. Long championed by economists and tax-law experts, a cash-flow tax would allow businesses to expense investment immediately. It would also disallow nonfinancial companies from making interest deductions, because unlike an income tax, a cash-flow tax treats debt and equity the same. This removes an important tax incentive for firms to allow themselves to be leveraged. A cash-flow tax is also much simpler than a corporate income tax, which requires complex depreciation schedules. Most important, the reform would stimulate business investment.
Second, legislators should add a border adjustment to corporate taxes. That would deny companies a tax deduction for expenses of inputs imported from abroad, while exempting U.S. exports from taxation. As the Trump administration has observed, other countries already use border adjustments in their value-added taxes on consumption. America uses a similar mechanism in state and local retail taxes, too. If you buy a kitchen appliance in New York, you pay New York sales tax, even if it was made in Ohio. Sales tax applies only where the good is sold, not where it originates.
Though distinct from tariffs, border adjustments can promote domestic production. Adding a border adjustment to the federal corporate tax would eliminate any extra tax businesses suffer now simply as a consequence of producing in the U.S. Though the 2017 law made the U.S. tax system more globally competitive by lowering the corporate income tax rate from 35% to 21%, it’s still higher than in many other countries, which attract production with low cost. A border adjustment would remove this incentive for American firms to locate profits or activities abroad, while increasing incentives for non-U.S. firms to locate activities within our borders.
As with the original pro-investment features in the 2017 law, this TCJA+ reform would increase investment and incomes—and thereby revenue. For the original TCJA, when the Congressional Budget Office included the macroeconomic effects of higher incomes buoyed by the reforms’ pro-growth elements, the CBO reduced the estimated revenue loss from the tax cuts by almost 30%. Changing the corporate income tax to a cash-flow levy would similarly increase revenue by removing taxes on what economists call the “normal return” on investment, or the cost of capital. Companies would instead pay only on profits above this amount. A border adjustment can likewise raise substantial revenue over the next decade because imports (which would receive no deduction) are larger than exports (which would no longer be taxed).
The higher revenue these two TCJA+ provisions promise could be used to lower the tax rate on business cash flow or to fund other tax-policy objectives. Importantly, that revenue can replace revenue raised from the tariffs the Trump administration had planned to implement on July 8. These two tax provisions would accomplish the president’s America-first and revenue objectives without destabilizing businesses with whipsawing tariffs.
Finally, TCJA+ would offer another big benefit: It would move the U.S. toward independence from political meddling in the economy via targeted protection or subsidies. This added predictability and breathing room for investment would be one more reason to produce in America. Pluses indeed.
Recently, Glenn appeared on the Firing Line program to discuss tariffs. Coincidentally, Margaret Hoover, the host of the program, is the great-granddaughter of Herbert Hoover. Herbert Hoover was the president who signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff bill in 1930. We discussed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in a recent blog post.
In this photo of a Federal Open Market Committee meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell is on the far left and Fed Governor Christopher Waller is the third person to Powell’s left. (Photo from federalreserve.gov)
This post discusses two developments this week that involve the Federal Reserve. First, we discuss the apparent disagreement between Fed Chair Jerome Powell and Fed Governor Christopher Waller over the best way to respond to the Trump Administration’s tariff increases. As we discuss in this blog post and in this podcast, in terms of the aggregate demand and aggregate supply model, a large unexpected increase in tariffs results in an aggregate supply shock to the economy, shifting the short-run aggregate supply curve (SRAS) to the left. The following is Figure 13.7 from Macroeconomics (Figure 23.7 from Economics) and illustrates the effects of an aggregate supply shock on short-run macroeconomic equilibrium.
Although the figure shows the effects of an aggregate supply shock that results from an unexpected increase in oil prices, using this model, the result is the same for an aggregate supply shock caused by an unexpected increase in tariffs. Two-thirds of U.S. imports are raw materials, intermediate goods, or capital goods, all of which are used as inputs by U.S. firms. So, in both the case of an increase in oil prices and in the case of an increase in tariffs, the result of the supply shock is an increase in U.S. firms’ production costs. This increase in costs reduces the quantity of goods firms will supply at every price level, shifting the SRAS curve to the left, as shown in panel (a) of the figure. In the new macroeconomic equilibrium, point B in panel (a), the price level increases and the level of real GDP declines. The decline in real GDP will likely result in an increase in the unemployment rate.
An aggregate supply shock poses a policy dilemma for the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). If the FOMC responds to the decline n real GDP and the increase in the unemployment rate with an expansionary monetary policy of lowering the target for the federal funds rate, the result is likely to be a further increase in the price level. Using a contractionary monetary policy of increasing the target for the federla funds rate to deal with the rising price level can cause real GDP to fall further, possibly pushing the economy into a recession. One way to avoid the policy dilemma from an aggregate supply shock caused by an increase in tariffs is for the FOMC to “look through”—that is, not respond—to the increase in tariffs. As panel (b) in the figure shows, if the FOMC looks through the tariff increase, the effect of the aggregate supply shock can be transitory as the economy absorbs the one-time increase in the price level. In time, real GDP will return to equilibrium at potential real GDP and the unemployment rate will fall back to the natural rate of unemployment.
On Monday (April 14), Fed Governor Christopher Waller in a speech to the Certified Financial Analysts Society of St. Louis made the argument for either looking through the macroeconomic effects of the tariff increase—even if the tariff increase turns out to be large, which at this time is unclear—or responding to the negative effects of the tariffs increases on real GDP and unemployment:
“I am saying that I expect that elevated inflation would be temporary, and ‘temporary’ is another word for ‘transitory.’ Despite the fact that the last surge of inflation beginning in 2021 lasted longer than I and other policymakers initially expected, my best judgment is that higher inflation from tariffs will be temporary…. While I expect the inflationary effects of higher tariffs to be temporary, their effects on output and employment could be longer-lasting and an important factor in determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy. If the slowdown is significant and even threatens a recession, then I would expect to favor cutting the FOMC’s policy rate sooner, and to a greater extent than I had previously thought.”
In a press conference after the last FOMC meeting on March 19, Fed Chair Jerome Powell took a similar position, arguing that: “If there’s an inflation that’s going to go away on its own, it’s not the correct response to tighten policy.” But in a speech yesterday (April 16) at the Economic Club of Chicago, Powell indicated that looking through the increase in the price level resulting from a tariff increase might be a mistake:
“The level of the tariff increases announced so far is significantly larger than anticipated. The same is likely to be true of the economic effects, which will include higher inflation and slower growth. Both survey- and market-based measures of near-term inflation expectations have moved up significantly, with survey participants pointing to tariffs…. Tariffs are highly likely to generate at least a temporary rise in inflation. The inflationary effects could also be more persistent…. Our obligation is to keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored and to make certain that a one-time increase in the price level does not become an ongoing inflation problem.”
In a discussion following his speech, Powell argued that tariff increases may disrupt global supply chains for some U.S. industries, such as automobiles, in way that could be similar to the disruptions caused by the Covid pandemic of 2020. As a result: “When you think about supply disruptions, that is the kind of thing that can take time to resolve and it can lead what would’ve been a one-time inflation shock to be extended, perhaps more persistent.” Whereas Waller seemed to indicate that as a result of the tariff increases the FOMC might be led to cut its target for the federal funds sooner or to larger extent in order to meet the maximum employment part of its dual mandate, Powell seemed to indicate that the FOMC might keep its target unchanged longer in order to meet the price stability part of the dual mandate.
Powell’s speech caught the notice of President Donald Trump who has been pushing the FOMC to cut its target for the federal funds rate sooner. An article in the Wall Street Journal, quoted Trump as posting to social media that: “Powell’s termination cannot come fast enough!” Powell’s term as Fed chair is scheduled to end in May 2026. Does Trump have the legal authority to replace Powell earlier than that? As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 27 (Economics Chapter 17), according to the Federal Reserve Act, once a Fed chair is notimated to a four-year term by the president (President Trump first nominated Powell to be chair in 2017 and Powell took office in 2018) and confirmed by the Senate, the president cannot remove the Fed chair except “for cause.” Most legal scholars argue that a president cannot remove a Fed chair due to a disagreement over monetary policy.
Article I, Section II of the Constitution of the United States states that: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” The ability of Congress to limit the president’s power to appoint and remove heads of commissions, agencies, and other bodies in the executive branch of government—such as the Federal Reserve—is not clearly specified in the Constitution. In 1935, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled in the case of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States that President Franklin Roosevelt couldn’t remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) because in creating the FTC, Congress specified that members could only be removed for cause. Legal scholars have presumed that the ruling in this case would also bar attempts by a president to remove members of the Fed’s Board of Governors because of a disagreement over monetary policy.
The Trump Administration recently fired a member of the National Labor Relations Board and a member of the Merit Systems Protection Board. The members sued and the Supreme Court is considering the case. The Trump Adminstration is asking the Court to overturn the Humphrey’s Executor decision as having been wrongly decided because the decision infringed on the executive power given to the president by the Constitution. If the Court agrees with the administration and overturns the precdent established by Humphrey’s Executor, would President Trump be free to fire Chair Powell before Powell’s term ends? (An overview of the issues involved in this Court case can be found in this article from the Associated Press.)
The answer isn’t clear because, as we’ve noted in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.4, Congress gave the Fed an unusual hybrid public-private structure and the ability to fund its own operations without needing appropriations from Congress. It’s possible that the Court would rule that in overturning Humphrey’s Executor—if the Court should decide to do that—it wasn’t authorizing the president to replace the Fed chair at will. In response to a question following his speech yesterday, Powell seemed to indicate that the Fed’s unique structure might shield it from the effects of the Court’s decision.
If the Court were to overturn its ruling in Humphrey’s Executor and indicate that the ruling did authorize the president to remove the Fed chair, the Fed’s ability to conduce monetary policy independently of the president would be seriously undermined. In Macroeconomics, Chapter 17, Section 17.4 we review the arguments for and against Fed independence. It’s unclear at this point when the Court might rule on the case.
Supports:Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 6, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 7, Section 7.5-7.7
ChatGTP-4o image of cars in the Lincoln Tunnel, which connects New Jersey with midtown Manhattan.
In January 2025, New York City began enforcing congestion pricing in the borough of Manhattan south of 60th Street—the congestion relief zone. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) in New York collects a toll from a vehicle entering that zone either automatically using the vehicle’s E-ZPass transponder or by reading the vehicle’s license plate and mailing a bill to the vehicle’s owner. Nobel Laureate William Vickrey of Columbia University first proposed congestion pricing in the 1950s as a way to deal with the negative externalities from traffic congestion. Congestion pricing acts as a Pigovian tax that internalizes the external costs drivers generate by using streets in congested areas. (We discuss Pigovian taxes in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 5, Section 5.3, and in Essentials of Economics, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.)
The New York City congestion toll is somewhat complex, varying according to the type of vehicle and how the vehicle enters the area in which the toll applies. The congestion toll fora car entering Manhattan through the Lincoln Tunnel on a weekday between 5 am and 9 pm is $6.00 on top of the existing toll of $16.06. In January 2025, the volume of cars driving through the Lincoln Tunnel declined by 8 percent during the weekday hours of 5 am to 9 pm. According to an article in Crain’s New York Business, the number of vehicles entering the congestion relief zone compared with the same month in the previous year declined by 8 percent in January, 12 percent in February, and 13 percent in March.
From the information given, can we determine the price elasticity of demand for entering Manhattan by driving though the Lincoln Tunnel during weekdays from 5am to 9am? Briefly explain.
Suppose someone makes the following claim: “Because the quantity of cars using the Lincoln Tunnel has declined by 8 percent, we know that the MTA must have collected less revenue from cars using the tunnel than before the congestion toll was imposed.” Briefly explain whether you agree.
Is the pattern of increasing percentage declines in vehicle traffic in the congestion relief zone each month from January to March what we would expect? Be sure your answer refers to concepts related to the price elasticity of demand.
Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the price elasticity of demand, so you may want to review Chapter 6, Sections 6.1-6.4.
Step 2: Answer part (a) by explaining whether from the information given we can determine the price elasticity of demand for entering Manhattan by driving through the Lincoln Tunnel. We do have sufficient information to determine the price elasticity, provided that nothing else that would affect the demand for driving through the Lincoln Tunnel changed during January. We’re told the percentage change in the quantity demand, so we need only to calculate the percentage change in the price to determine the price elasticity. The change in the price is the $6 congestion toll. The average of the price before and the price after the toll is imposed is ($16.06 + $22.06) = $19.06. Therefore, the percentage change in the price is ($6/$19.06) × 100 = 31.5 percent. The price elasticity of demand is equal to the percentage change in quantity dmanded divided by the percentage change in price: –6%/31.5% = –0.3. Because this value is less than 1 in absolute value, we can conclude that the demand for driving through the Lincoln Tunnel is price inelastic.
Step 3: Answer part (b) by explaining whether because the quantity of cars driving through the Lincoln Tunnel has declined the MTA must have collected less revenue from cars using the tunnel. As shown in Section 6.3 of the textbook, total revenue received will fall after a price increase only if demand is price elastic. In this case, demand is price inelastic, so the total revenue the MTA collects from cars using the Lincoln Tunnel will rise, not fall.
Step 3: Answer part (c) by explaining whether the pattern of increasing percentage declines in vehicle traffic in the congestion relief zone is one we would expect. In Section 6.2, we see that the passage of time is one of the determinants of the price elasticity of demand. The more time that passes, the more price elastic the demand for a product becomes. In other words, the longer the time that people have to adjust to the congestion toll—by, for instance, taking a bus rather than driving through the Lincoln Tunnel in a car—the more likely it is that people will decide not to drive into the congestion relief zone. So, it is not surprising that the number of vehicles entering the congestion relief zone declined by a greater percentage each month from January to March.
Photo of U.S. President Donald Trump and China President Xi Jinping from Reuters.
The tit-for-tat tariff increases the U.S. and Chinese governments have levied on each other’s imports have reached dizzying heights today (April 11). The United States has imposed a tariff rate of 134.7 percent on imports from China, while China has imposed a tariff rate of 147.6 percent on imports from the United States. On all other countries—the rest of the world (ROW)—the United States imposes an average tariff rate of 10.5 percent, which is a sharp increase reflecting the Trump Administration’s imposition of a tariff of at least 10 percent on all countries. The government of China imposes a tariff rate of 6.5 percent on the ROW.
The Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) is a think tank located in Washington, DC. Chad Brown, a senior fellow at PIIE, has created two charts that dramatically illustrate the current state of the U.S.-China trade war. The first chart shows the changes since the beginning of the first Trump Administration in 2017 in the tariff rates the countries have imposed on each other’s imports.
The second chart shows the percentage of each country’s exports to the other country that have been subject to tariffs. As of today, 100 percent of each country’s exports are subject to the other country’s tariffs.
Finally, we repeat a figure from an earlier blog post showing changes over time in the average tariff rate the United States levies on imports. The value for 2025 of 16.5 percent is an estimate by the Tax Foundation and assumes that the tariff rates that the Trump Administration announced on April 2 go into force, although the rates are currently suspended for 90 days—apart from those imposed on China. (An average tariff rate of 16.5 percent would be the highest levied by the United States since 1937.)
Thanks to Fernando Quijano for preparing this figure.
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