Month: October 2023

The Roman Emperor Vespasian Fell Prey to the Lump-of-Labor Fallacy

Bust of the Roman Emperor Vespasian. (Photo from en.wikipedia.org.)

Some people worry that advances in artificial intelligence (AI), particularly the development of chatbots will permanently reduce the number of jobs available in the United States. Technological change is often disruptive, eliminating jobs and sometimes whole industries, but it also creates new industries and new jobs. For example, the development of mass-produced, low-priced automobiles in the early 1900s wiped out many jobs dependent on horse-drawn transportation, including wagon building and blacksmithing. But automobiles created many new jobs not only on automobile assembly lines, but in related industries, including repair shops and gas stations.

Over the long run, total employment in the United States has increased steadily with population growth, indicating that technological change doesn’t decrease the total amount of jobs available. As we discuss in Microeconomics, Chapter 16 (also Economics, Chapter 16), fears that firms will permanently reduce their demand for labor as they increase their use of the capital that embodies technological breakthroughs, date back at least to the late 1700s in England, when textile workers known as Luddites—after their leader Ned Ludd—smashed machinery in an attempt to save their jobs. Since that time, the term Luddite has described people who oppose firms increasing their use of machinery and other capital because they fear the increases will result in permanent job losses.

Economists believe that these fears often stem from the lump-of-labor fallacy, which holds that there is only a fixed amount of work to be performed in the economy. So the more work that machines perform, the less work that will be available for people to perform. As we’ve noted, though, machines are substitutes for labor in some uses—such as when chatbot software replace employees who currently write technical manuals or computer code—they are also complements to labor in other jobs—such as advising firms on how best to use chatbots. 

The lump-of-labor fallacy has a long history, probably because it seems like common sense to many people who see the existing jobs that a new technology destroys, without always being aware of the new jobs that the technology creates. There are historical examples of the lump-of-labor fallacy that predate even the original Luddites.

For instance, in his new book Pax: War and Peace in Rome’s Golden Age, the British historian Tom Holland (not to be confused with the actor of the same name, best known for portraying Spider-Man!), discusses an account by the ancient historian Suetonius of an event during the reign of Vespasian who was Roman emperor from 79 A.D. to 89 A.D. (p. 201):

“An engineer, so it was claimed, had invented a device that would enable columns to be transported to the summit of the [Roman] Capitol at minimal cost; but Vespasian, although intrigued by the invention, refused to employ it. His explanation was a telling one. ‘I have a duty to keep the masses fed.’”

Vespasian had fallen prey to the lump-of-labor fallacy by assuming that eliminating some of the jobs hauling construction materials would reduce the total number of jobs available in Rome. As a result, it would be harder for Roman workers to earn the income required to feed themselves.

Note that, as we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapters 10 and 11 (also Economics, Chapter 20 and 21), over the long-run, in any economy technological change is the main source of rising incomes. Technological change increases the productivity of workers and the only way for the average worker to consume more output is for the average worker to produce more output. In other words, most economists agree that the main reason that the wages—and, therefore, the standard of living—of the average worker today are much higher than they were in the past is that workers today are much more productive because they have more and better capital to work with.

Although the Roman Empire controlled most of Southern and Western Europe, the Near East, and North Africa for more than 400 years, the living standard of the average citizen of the Empire was no higher at the end of the Empire than it had been at the beginning. Efforts by emperors such as Vespasian to stifle technological progress may be part of the reason why. 

Who Is Wealthier, Iron Man or Batman?

Photo from Paramount Pictures via britannica.com.

Photo from Warner Brothers Pictures via insider.com.

Income and wealth are often confused. Media accounts of the “wealthy” typically switch back and forth between referring to people with high incomes and referring to people with substantial wealth. It’s possible to have a high income, but not much wealth, if you spend most of your income. It’s also possible, although less common, for someone to have substantial wealth while having a relatively low income.

As we discuss in the Don’t Let This Happen to You feature in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14 (also Economics, Chapter 24), Your income is equal to your earnings during the year, while your wealth is equal to the value of the assets you own minus the value of any debts you have. It’s also worth keeping in mind that income is a flow variable that is measured over a period of time—such as a year—while wealth is a stock variable that is measured at a particular point in time—such as the first or last day of the year.

Both income and wealth can be difficult to accurately measure. Although we typically think of a person’s income as being equal to the salary and wages the person earns, income, properly measured, also includes changes in the value of the assets the person owns. For example, suppose that at the start of the year you own shares of Apple stock worth $5,000. If at the end of the year, the price on the stock market of your Apple shares has risen to $5,500, the $500 increase is part of your income for the year. (Note that this capital gain on your stock is included in your taxable income only if you sell the stock. Whether you sell the stock or not, though, the capital gain is part of your income.)

It can be difficult to measure the wealth of someone who owns significant assets that, unlike shares of stock, aren’t regularly bought and sold in a market. For instance, if someone owns a restaurant, determining what the price the restaurant would sell for—and, therefore, how wealthy the person is—can be difficult. Although other restaurants in the area may have sold recently, every restaurant is different, which makes it possible to determine only approximately what the sales price of a particular restaurant would be. As we discuss in the Apply the Concept feature “Should the Federal Government Begin to Tax Wealth?” in Microeconomics, Chapter 17 (also Economics, Chapter 17), the difficulty of valuing some types of wealth is one complication the federal government would face in enacting a tax on wealth. 

If measuring the wealth of someone in the real world is difficult, measuring the wealth of a fictional character is even more daunting. Some years ago, undergraduate students, most of whom were economics majors at Lehigh University, estimated the wealth of Bruce Wayne, the alter ego of Batman. To narrow the focus, the students based their estimate on only the information available in the three Batman films directed by Christopher Nolan. On the basis of that information, they estimate that Bruce Wayne’s wealth is $11.6 billion. At the time the films were produced, that would have made Bruce Wayne the seventy-third wealthiest person in the world—if, of course, he had been a real person! You can read the details of their estimate here. 

Bruce Wayne is apparently very wealthy, but is he as wealthy as Tony Stark, the alter ego of Iron Man? Apparently not, according to an estimate appearing on the business web site forbes.com. Although he doesn’t seem to give the details of how he arrived at the estimate, the author of the post values Tony Stark’s wealth at $9.3 billion, making him about 20 percent less wealthy than Bruce Wayne.  Score one for the Caped Crusader!

Very Strong GDP Report

Photo from Lena Buonanno

This morning the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of GDP for the third quarter of 2023. (The report can be found here.) The BEA estimates that real GDP increased by 4.9 percent at an annual rate in the third quarter—July through September. That was more than double the 2.1 percent increase in real GDP in the second quarter, and slightly higher than the 4.7 percent that economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal last week had expected. The following figure shows the rates of GDP growth each quarter beginning in 2021.

Note that the BEA’s most recent estimates of real GDP during the first two quarters of 2022 still show a decline. The Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee only switched from a strongly expansionary monetary policy, with a target for the federal funds of effectively zero, to a contractionary monetary policy following its March 16, 2022 meeting. That real GDP was declining even before the Fed had pivoted to a contractionary monetary policy helps explain why, despite strong increases employment during this period, most economists were expecting that the U.S. economy would experience a recession at some point during 2022 or 2023. This expectation was reinforced when inflation soared during the summer of 2022 and it became clear that the FOMC would have to substantially raise its target for the federal funds rate.

Clearly, today’s data on real GDP growth, along with the strong September employment report (which we discuss in this blog post), indicates that the chances of the U.S. economy avoiding a recession in the future have increased and are much better than they seemed at this time last year.

Consumer spending was the largest contributor to third quarter GDP growth. The following figure shows growth rates of real personal consumption expenditures and the subcategories of expenditures on durable goods, nondurable goods, and services. There was strong growth in each component of consumption spending. The 7.6 percent increase in expenditures on durables was particularly strong, particularly given that spending on durables had fallen by 0.3 percent in the second quarter.

Investment spending and its components were a more mixed bag, as shown in the following figure. Overall, gross private domestic investment increased at a very strong rate of 8.4 percent—the highest rate since the fourth quarter of 2021. Residential investment increased 3.9 percent, which was particularly notable following nine consecutive quarters of decline and during a period of soaring mortgage interest rates. But business fixed investment was noticeably weak, falling by 0.1 percent. Spending on structures—such as factories and office buildings—increased by only 1.6 percent, while spending on equipment fell by 3.8 percent.

Today’s real GDP report also contained data on the private consumption expenditure (PCE) price index, which the FOMC uses tp determine whether it is achieving its goal of a 2 percent inflation rate. The following figure shows inflation as measured using the PCE and the core PCE—which excludes food and energy prices—since the beginning of 2015. (Note that these inflation rates are measured using quarterly data and as compound annual rates of change.) Despite the strong growth in real GDP and employment, inflation as measured by PCE increased only from 2.5 percent in the second quarter to 2.9 percent in the third quarter. Core PCE, which may be a better indicator of the likely course of inflation in the future, continued the long decline that began in first quarter of 2022 by failling from 3.7 percent to 2.9 percent.

The combination of strong growth in real GDP and declining inflation indicates that the Fed appears well on its way to a soft landing—achieving  a return to its 2 percent inflation target without pushing the economy into a recession. There are reasons to be cautious, however.

GDP, inflation, and employment data are all subject to—possibly substantial—revisions. So growth may have been significantly slower than today’s advance estimate of real GDP indicates. Even if the estimate of real GDP growth of 4.9 percent proves in the long run to have been accurate, there are reasons to doubt whether output growth can be maintained at near that level. Since 2000, annual growth in real GDP has average only 2.1 percent. For GDP to begin increasing at a rate substantially higher than that would require a significant expansion in the labor force and an increase in productivity. While either or both of those changes may occur, they don’t seem likely as of now.

In addition, the largest contributor to GDP growth in the third quarter was from consumption expenditures. As households continue to draw down the savings they built up as a result of the federal government’s response to the Covid recession of 2020, it seems unlikely that the current pace of consumer spending can be maintained. Finally, the lagged effects of monetary policy—particularly the effects of the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note having risen to nearly 5 percent (which we discuss in our most recent podcast)—may substantially reduce growth in real GDP and employment in future quarters.

But those points shouldn’t distract from the fact that today’s GDP report was good news for the economy.

10/21/23 Podcast – Authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien reflect on the Fed’s efforts to execute the soft-landing.

Join authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien as they reflect on the Fed’s efforts to execute the soft landing, ponder if the effect will stick, and wonder if future economies will be tethered to an anchor point above two percent.

California Deals with the Paradox of Tobacco Taxes

(Photo from Zuma Press via the Wall Street Journal.)

When state and local governments impose taxes on sales of liquor, on cigarettes and other tobacco products, or on soda and other sweetened beverages, they typically have two objectives: (1) Discourage consumption of the taxed goods, and (2) raise revenue to pay for government services.  As we discuss in Chapter 6 of Microeconomics (also Economics, Chapter 6), these objectives can be at odds with each other. The tax revenue a government receives depends on both the size of the tax and the number of units sold. Therefore, the more successful a tax is in significantly reducing, say, sales of cigarettes, the less tax revenue the government receives from the tax.

As we discuss in Chapter 6, a tax on a good shifts the supply curve for the good up by the amount of the tax. (We think it’s intuitively easier to think of a tax as shifting up a supply curve, but analytically the effect on equilibrium is the same if we illustrate the effect of the tax by shifting down the demand curve for the taxed good by the amount of the tax.)  A tax will raise the equilibrium price consumers pay and reduce the equilibrium quantity of the taxed good that they buy. For a supply curve of a given price elasticity in the relevant range of prices, how much a tax increases equilibrium  price relative to how much it decreases equilibrium quantity is determined by the price elasticity of demand. 

The following figure illustrates these points. If a city implements a tax of $0.75 per 2-liter bottle of soda, the supply curve shifts up from S1 to S2. If demand is price elastic, the equilibrium price increases from $1.75 to $2.00, while the equilibrium quantity falls from 90,000 bottles per day to 70,000. If demand is price inelastic, the equilibrium price rises by more, but the equilibrium quantity falls by less. Therefore, a more price elastic demand curve is good news for objective (1) above—soda consumption falls by more—but bad news for the amount of tax revenue the government collects. When the demand for soda is price inelastic, the government collects tax revenue of $0.75 per bottle multiplied by 80,000 bottles, or $60,000 per day. When the demand for soda is price elastic, the government collects tax revenue of $0.75 per bottle multiplied by 70,000 bottles, or only $52,500 per day.

One further point: We would expect the amount of revenue the government earns from the tax to decline over time, holding constant other variables that might affect the market for the taxed good, . This conclusion follows from the fact that demand typically becomes more price elastic over time. In other words, when a tax is first imposed (or an existing tax is increased), consumers are likely to reduce purchases of the taxed good less in the short run than in the long run. This result can a problem for governments that make a commitment to use the tax revenues for a particular purpose.

A recent article in the Los Angeles Times highlighted this last point. In 1999, California voters passed Proposition 10, which increased the tax on cigarettes by $0.50 per pack, with similar tax increases on other tobacco products. The tax revenues were dedicated to funding “First 5” state government agencies, which are focused on providing services to children 5 years old and younger.  The article notes, as the above analysis would lead us to expect, that the additional revenue the state received from the tax increase was largest in the first year and has gradually declined since as the quantity of cigarettes and other tobacco products sold has fallen. (Note that over such a long period of time, other factors in addition to the effects of the tax have contributed to the decline in smoking in California.) As a result, the state and county governments have had to scramble to find additional sources of funds for the First 5 agencies. The article quotes Deborah Daro, a researcher at the University of Chicago, as noting: “It seemed like a brilliant solution—tax the sinners who are smoking to help newborns and their parents …. But then people stopped smoking, which from a public health perspective is great, but from a funding perspective for First 5—they don’t have another funding stream.”

Another Mixed Inflation Report

Fed Chair Jerome Powell and Fed Vice-Chair Philip Jefferson this summer at the Fed conference in Jackson Hole, Wyoming. (Photo from the AP via the Washington Post.)

This morning, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its report on the consumer price index (CPI) for September. (The full report can be found here.) The report was consistent with other recent data showing that inflation has declined markedly from its summer 2022 highs, but appears, at least for now, to be stuck in the 3 percent to 4 percent range—well above the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target. 

The report indicated that the CPI rose by 0.4 percent in September, which was down from 0.6 percent in August. Measured by the percentage change from the same month in the previous year, the inflation rate was 3.7 percent, the same as in August. Core CPI, which excludes the prices of food and energy, increased by 4.1 percent in September, down from 4.4 percent in August. The following figure shows inflation since 2015 measured by CPI and core CPI.

Reporters Gabriel Rubin and Nick Timiraos, writing in the Wall Street Journal summarized the prevailing interpretation of this report:

“The latest inflation data highlight the risk that without a further slowdown in the economy, inflation might settle around 3%—well below the alarming rates that prompted a series of rapid Federal Reserve rate increases last year but still above the 2% inflation rate that the central bank has set as its target.”

As we discuss in this blog post, some economists and policymakers have argued that the Fed should now declare victory over the high inflation rates of 2022 and accept a 3 percent inflation rate as consistent with Congress’s mandate that the Fed achieve price stability. It seems unlikely that the Fed will follow that course, however. Fed Chair Jerome Powell ruled it out in a speech in August: “It is the Fed’s job to bring inflation down to our 2 percent goal, and we will do so.”

To achieve its goal of bringing inflation back to its 2 percent targer, it seems likely that economic growth in the United States will have to slow, thereby reducing upward pressure on wages and prices. Will this slowing require another increase in the Federal Open Market Committe’s target range for the federal funds rate, which is currently 5.25 to 5.50 percent? The following figure shows changes in the upper bound for the FOMC’s target range since 2015.

Several members of the FOMC have raised the possibility that financial markets may have already effectively achieved the same degree of policy tightening that would result from raising the target for the federal funds rate. The interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note has been steadily increasing as shown in the following figure. The 10-year Treasury note plays an important role in the financial system, influencing interest rates on mortgages and corporate bonds. In fact, the main way in which monetary policy works is for the FOMC’s increases or decreases in its target for the federal funds rate to result in increases or decreases in long-run interest rates. Higher long-run interest rates typically result in a decline in spending by consumrs on new housing and by businesses on new equipment, factories computers, and software.

Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Lorie Logan, who serves on the FOMC, noted in a speech that “If long-term interest rates remain elevated … there may be less need to raise the fed funds rate.” Similarly, Fed Vice-Chair Philip Jefferson stated in a speech that: “I will remain cognizant of the tightening in financial conditions through higher bond yields and will keep that in mind as I assess the future path of policy.”

The FOMC has two more meetings scheduled for 2023: One on October 31-November 1 and one on December 12-13. The following figure from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta shows financial market expectations of the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate in December. According to this estimate, financial markets assign a 35 percent probability to the FOMC raising its target for the federal funds rate by 0.25 or more. Following the release of the CPI report, that probability declined from about 38 percent. That change reflects the general expectation that the report didn’t substantially affect the likelihood of the FOMC raising its target for the federal funds rate again by the end of the year.

Solved Problem: How Do You Calculate GDP?

Supports: Macroeconomics, Chapter 8, Economics, Chapter 18, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 12.

In a report, a consulting firm claimed that wealth is a better measure of the financial health of an economy than is GDP. They made the following argument:

“GDP counts items multiple times. For instance, if someone is paid USD 100 for a product/service and they then pay someone else that same USD 100 for another product/service, that adds USD 200 to a country’s GDP, despite the fact that only USD 100 was produced at the start.”

Briefly explain whether you agree with the consulting firm’s argument.

Solving the Problem

Step 1:  Review the chapter material. This problem is about how GDP is calculated, so you may want to review Macroeconomics, Chapter 8, Section 8.1, “Gross Domestic Product Measures Total Production” (Economics, Chapter 18, Section 8.1 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 12, Section 12.1)

Step 2: Answer the question by explaining whether the consulting firm has correctly explained how the Bureau of Economic Analysis calculates GDP. The consulting firm has given an incorrect explanation of how GDP is calculated, so you should disagree with the firm’s argument. The definition of GDP in the chapter is: “The market value of all final goods and services produced in a country during a period of time.” The quoted excerpt is incorrect in claiming that GDP counts items multiple times. In terms of the example, if you pay $100 for a (very nice!) haircut at a hair salon and the owner of the hair salon uses that $100 to buy groceries, both transactions should be included in GDP because they represent $200 worth of production—a $100 haircut and $100 worth of groceries. Only buying and selling of used goods or of intermediate goods is excluded from GDP. In other words, contrary to the firm’s claim, when the Bureau of Economic Analysis calculates GDP, it doesn’t “count items multiple times.”

H/T Wojtek Kopczuk on X.

Surprisingly Strong Jobs Report

Photo from Lena Buonanno

When the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employment Situation report is released on the first Friday of each month economists and policymakers—notably including the members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)—focus on the change in total nonfarm payroll employment as recorded in the establishment, or payroll, survey. That number gives what is generally considered to be the best indicator of the current state of the labor market. The most recent report showed a surprisingly strong net increase of 336,000 jobs during September. (The report can be found here.)

According to a survey by the Wall Street Journal, economists had been expecting an net increase in jobs of only 170,000. The larger than expected increase indicated that the economy might be expanding more rapidly than had been thought, raising the possibility that the FOMC might increase its target for the federal funds rate at least once more before the end of the year.

To meet increases in the growth of the U.S. working-age population, the economy needs to increase the total jobs available by approximately 80,000 jobs per month. A net increase of more than four times that amount may be an indication of an overheated job market. As always, one difficulty with drawing that conclusion is determing how many more people might be pulled into the labor market by a strong demand for workers. An increase in labor supply can potentially satisify an increase in labor demand without leading to an acceleration in wage growth and price inflation.

The following figure shows the employment-to-population ratio for workers ages 25 to 54—so-called prime-age workers—for the period since 1985. In September 2023, the ratio was 80.8 perccent, down slightly from 80.9 percent in August, but above the levels reached in early 2020 just before the effects of the Covid–19 pandemic were felt in the United States. The ratio was still below the record high of 81.9 percent reached in April 2000. The population of prime-age workers is about 128 million. So, if the employment-population ratio were to return to its 2000 peak, potentially another 1.3 million prime-age workers might enter the labor market. The likelihood of that happening, however, is difficult to gauge.

A couple of other points about the September employment report. First, it’s worth keeping in mind that the results from the establishment survey are subject to often substantial revisisons. The figure below shows the revisions the BLS has released as of October to their preliminary estimates for each month of 2023. In three of these eight months the revisions so far have been greater than 100,000 jobs. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 13, Section 13.1), the revisions that the BLS makes to its employment estimates are likely to be particularly large when the economy is about to enter a period of significantly lower or higher growth. So, the large revisions to the preliminary employment estimates in most months of 2023 may indicate that the surprisingly large preliminary estimate of a 336,000 increase in net employment will be revised lower in coming months.

Finally, data in the employment report provides some evidence of a slowing in wage growth, despite the sharp increase in employment. The following figure shows wage inflation as measured by the percentage increase in average hourly earnings (AHE) from the same month in the previous year. The increase in September was 4.2 percent, continuing a generally downward trend since March 2022, although still somewhat above wage inflation during the pre-2020 period.

As the following figure shows, September growth in average hourly earnings measured as a compound annual growth rate was 2.5 percent, which—if sustained—would be consistent with a rate of price inflation in the range of the Fed’s 2 percent target.  (The figure shows only the months since January 2021 to avoid obscuring the values for recent months by including the very large monthly increases and decrease during 2020.)

As we note in this blog post, the employment cost index (ECI), published quarterly by the BLS, measures the cost to employers per employee hour worked and can be a better measure than AHE of the labor costs employers face. The first figure shows the percentage change in ECI from the same quarter in the previous year. The second figure shows the compound annual growth rate of the ECI. Both measures show a general downward trend in the growth of labor costs, although the measures are somewhat dated because the most recent values are for the second quarter of 2023.

Ultimately, the key question is one we’ve considered in previous blog posts (most recently here) and podcasts (most recently here): Will the Fed be able to achieve a soft landing by bringing inflation down to its 2 percent target without triggering a recession? The September jobs report can be interpreted as increasing the probability of a soft landing if the slowing in wage growth is emphasized but decreasing the probability if the Fed decides that the strong employment growth is real—that is, the September increase is not likely to be revised sharply lower in coming months—and requires additional increases in the target for the federal funds rate. It’s worth mentioning, of course, that factors over which the Fed has no control, such as a federal government shutdown, rising oil prices, or uncertainty resulting from the attack on Israel by Hamas, will also affect the likelihood of a soft landing.

Claudia Goldin Wins the Nobel Prize in Economics

Claudia Goldin (Photo from Goldin’s web page at havard.edu.)

Claudia Goldin, the Henry Lee Professor of Economics at Harvard, has been awarded the 2023 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. Goldin’s research is wide-ranging, with a focus on the economic history of women and on gender disparities in wages and employment. She received her PhD from the University of Chicago in 1972 for a thesis that was published in 1976 as Urban Slavery in the American South, 1820 to 1860: A Quantitative History. Her thesis adviser, Robert Fogel, was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1993 for his work in economic history. He shared the prize that year with Douglas North of Washington University in St. Louis. Goldin’s work on economic history contributed to the cliometric revolution, which involves the application of theoretical models and econometric methods to the study of historical issues.  At the time of the award to Fogel and North, Goldin discussed their research and the cliometric revolution here.

Goldin’s pioneering and influential research on the economic history of women was the basis for her 1990 book Understanding the Gender Gap: An Economic History of American Women. The themes of that book were expanded on in 2021 in Career & Family: Women’s Century-Long Journey toward Equity, and in her forthcoming An Evolving Force: A History of Women in the Economy.

In research with Lawrence Katz, also a professor of economics at Harvard, Goldin has explored how technological change and educational attainment have affected income inequality, particularly the wage premium skilled workers receive. Goldin and Katz summarized their findings in 2008 in the influential book, The Race between Education and Technology.

The wide scope of Goldin’s research can be seen by reviewing her curriculum vitae, which can be found here. The announcement by the Nobel committee can be found here.