This morning (July 30), the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of real GDP for the first quarter of 2025. (The report can be found here.) The BEA estimates that real GDP increased by 3.0 percent, measured at an annual rate, in the second quarter—April through June. Economists surveyed had expected a 2.4 percent increase. Real GDP declined by an estimated 0.5 percent in the first quarter of 2025, so the increase in the second quarter represents a strong rebound in economic growth. The following figure shows the estimated rates of GDP growth in each quarter beginning with the first quarter of 2021.
As the following figure—taken from the BEA report—shows, the decrease in imports in the second quarter was the most important factor contributing to the increase in real GDP. During the first quarter, imports had soared as businesses tried to stay ahead of what were expected to be large tariff increases implement by the Trump Administration. Consumption spending increased in the second quarter, while investment spending and exports decreased.
It’s notable that real private inventories declined by $29.6 billion in the second quarter after having increased by $2070 billion in the first quarter. Again, it’s likely that the large swings in inventories represented firms stockpiling goods in the first quarter in anticipation of the tariff increases and then drawing down those stockpiles in the second quarter.
One way to strip out the effects of imports, inventory investment, and government purchases—which can also be volatile—is to look at real final sales to domestic purchasers, which includes only spending by U.S. households and firms on domestic production. As the following figure shows, real final sales to domestic purchasers increased by 1.2 percent in the second quarter of 2025, which was a decrease from the 1.9 percent increase in the first quarter. The large difference between the change in real GDP and the change in real final sales to domestic purchasers is an indication of how strongly the data on national income in the first two quarters of 2025 were affected by businesses anticipating tariff increases. Compared with data on real GDP, data on real final sales to domestic purchasers shows the economy doing significantly better in the first quarter and significantly worse in the second quarter.
The BEA report this morning included quarterly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. The Fed relies on annual changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target. The following figure shows headline PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since the first quarter of 2018, with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same quarter in the previous year. In the second quarter, headline PCE inflation was 2.4 percent, down slightly from 2.5 percent in the first quarter. Core PCE inflation in the second quarter was 2.7 percent, down from 2.8 percent in the first quarter. Both headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation remained above the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation target.
The following figure shows quarterly PCE inflation and quarterly core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current quarter’s rate over an entire year. Measured this way, headline PCE inflation decreased from 3.7 percent in the first quarter of 2025 to 2.1 percent in the second quarter. Core PCE inflation decreased from 3.5 percent in the first quarter of 2025 to 2.5 percent in the secondt quarter. Measured this way, headline PCE inflation in the second quarter was close to the Fed’s target, while core PCE was well above the target. As we discuss in this blog post, tariff increases result in an aggregate supply shock to the economy. As a result, we may see a significant increase in inflation in the coming months as the higher tariff rates that have been negotiated recently begin to be implemented.
This morning (April 30), the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of GDP for the first quarter of 2025. (The report can be found here.) The BEA estimates that real GDP fell by 0.3 percent, measured at an annual rate, in the first quarter—January through March. Economists surveyed had expected an 0.8 percent increase. Real GDP grew by an estimated 2.5 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024. The following figure shows the estimated rates of GDP growth in each quarter beginning in 2021.
As the following figure—taken from the BEA report—shows, the increase in imports was the most important factor contributing to the decline in real GDP. The quarter ended before the Trump Administration announced large tariff increases on April 2, but the increase in imports is likely attributable to firms attempting to beat the tariff increases they expected were coming.
It’s notable that the change in real private inventories was a large $140 billion, which contributed 2.3 percentage points to the change in real GDP. Again, it’s likely that the large increase in inventories represented firms stockpiling goods in anticipation of the tariff increases.
One way to strip out the effects of imports, inventory investment, and government purchases—which can also be volatile—is to look at real final sales to domestic purchasers, which includes only spending by U.S. households and firms on domestic production. As the following figure shows, real final sales to domestic purchasers increase by 3.0 percent in the first quarter of 2024, which was a slight increase from the 2.9 percent increase in the fourth quarter of 2024. The large difference between the change in real GDP and the change in real final sales to domestic purchasers is an indication of how strongly this quarter’s national income data were affected by businesses anticipating the tariff increases.
In the separate “Personal Income and Outlays” report that the BEA also released this morning, the bureau reported monthly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. The Fed relies on annual changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target. The following figure shows PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2017 with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. In March, PCE inflation was 2.3 percent, down from 2.7 percent in February. Core PCE inflation in March was 2.6 percent, down from 3.0 percent in February. Both headline and core PCE inflation were higher than the forecasts of economists surveyed.
The BEA also released quarterly PCE data as part of its GDP report. The following figure shows quarterly headline PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line). Inflation is calculated as the percentage change from the same quarter in the previous year. Headline PCE inflation in the first quarter was 2.5 percent, unchanged from the fourth quarter of 2025. Core PCE inflation was 2.8 percent, also unchanged from the fourth quarter of 2025. Both measures were still above the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target.
The following figure shows quarterly PCE inflation and quarterly core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current quarter’s rate over an entire year. Measured this way, headline PCE inflation increased from 2.4 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024 to 3.6 percent in the first quarter of 2025. Core PCE inflation increased from 2.6 percent in the fourth quarter of 2024 to 3.5 percent in the first quarter of 2025. Clearly, the quarterly data show significantly higher inflation than do the monthly data. As we discuss in this blog post, tariff increases result in an aggregate supply shock to the economy. As a result, unless the current and scheduled tariff increases are reversed, we will likely see a significant increase in inflation in the coming months. So, neither the monthly nor the quarterly PCE data may be giving a good indication of the course of future inflation.
What should we make of today’s macro data releases? First, it’s important to remember that these data will be subject to revisions in coming months. If we are heading into a recession, the revisions may well be very large. Second, we are sailing into unknown waters because the U.S. economy hasn’t experienced tariff increases as large as these since passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930. Third, at this point we don’t know whether some, most, all, or none of the tariff increases will be reversed as a result of negotiations during the coming weeks. Finally, on Friday, the Bureau of Labor Statistics will release its “Employment Situation Report” for March. That report will provide some additional insight into the state of the economy—as least as it was in March before the full effects of the tariffs have been felt.
Today (January 30), the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of GDP for the fourth quarter of 2024. (The report can be found here.) The BEA estimates that real GDP increased at an annual rate of 2.3 percent in the fourth quarter—October through December. That was down from the 3.1 percent increase in real GDP in the third quarter. On an annual basis, real GDP grew by 2.5 percent in 2024, down from 3.2 percent in 2023. A 2.5 percent growth rate is still well above the Fed’s estimated long-run annual growth rate in real GDP of 1.8 percent. The following figure shows the growth rate of real GDP (calculated as a compound annual rate of change) in each quarter since the first quarter of 2021.
Personal consumption expenditures increased at an annual rate of 4.2 percent in the fourth quarter, while gross private domestic investment fell at a 5.6 annual rate. As we discuss in this blog post, Fed Chair Jerome Powell’s preferred measure of the growth of output is growth in real final sales to private domestic purchasers. This measure of production equals the sum of personal consumption expenditures and gross private fixed investment. By excluding exports, government purchases, and changes in inventories, final sales to private domestic purchasers removes the more volatile components of gross domestic product and provides a better measure of the underlying trend in the growth of output.
The following figure shows growth in real GDP (the blue line) and in real final sales to private domestic purchasers (the red line) with growth measured as compound annual rates of change. Measured this way, in the fourth quarter of 2024, real final sales to private domestic producers increased by 3.2 percent, well above the 2.3 percent increase in real GDP. Growth in real final sales to private domestic producers was down from 3.4 percent in the third quarter, while growth in real GDP was down from 3.1 percent in third quarter. Overall, using Powell’s preferred measure, growth in production seems strong.
This BEA report also includes data on the private consumption expenditure (PCE) price index, which the FOMC uses to determine whether it is achieving its goal of a 2 percent inflation rate. The following figure shows inflation as measured using the PCE (the blue line) and the core PCE (the red line)—which excludes food and energy prices—since the beginning of 2016. (Note that these inflation rates are measured using quarterly data and as percentage changes from the same quarter in the previous year to match the way the Fed measures inflation relative to its 2 percent target.) Inflation as measured by PCE was 2.4 percent, up slightly from 2.3 percent in the third quarter. Core PCE, which may be a better indicator of the likely course of inflation in the future, was 2.8 percent in the fourth quarter, unchanged since the third quarter. As has been true of other inflation data in recent months, these data show that inflation has declined greatly from its mid-2022 peak while remaining above the Fed’s 2 percent target.
This latest BEA report doesn’t change the consensus view of the overall macroeconomic situation: Production and employment are growing at a steady pace, while inflation remains stubbornly above the Fed’s target.
This week, two data releases paint a picture of the U.S. economy as possibly slowing slightly, but still demonstrating considerable strength. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of GDP for the third quarter of 2024. (The report can be found here.) The BEA estimates that real GDP increased by 2.8 percent at an annual rate in the third quarter—July through September. That was down from the 3.0 percent increase in real GDP in the second quarter and below the 3.1 percent that economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal had expected. The following figure from the BEA report shows the growth rate of real GDP in each quarter since the fourth quarter of 2020.
Two other points to note: In June, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) had forecast that the growth rate of real GDP in the third quarter would be only 2.1 percent. The CBO forecasts that, over the longer run, real GDP will grow at a rate of 1.7 to 1.8 percent per year. So, the growth rate of real GDP according to the BEA’s advance estimate (which, it’s worth recalling, is subject to potentially large revisions) was above expectations from earlier this year and above the likely long run growth rate.
Consumer spending was the largest contributor to third quarter GDP growth. The following figure shows growth rates of real personal consumption expenditures and the subcategories of expenditures on durable goods, nondurable goods, and services. There was strong growth in each component of consumption spending. The 8.1 percent increase in expenditures on durables was particularly strong. It was the second quarter in a row of strong growth in spending on durables after a decline of –1.8 percent in the first quarter.
Investment spending and its components were a more mixed bag, as shown in the following figure. Investment spending is always more volatile than consumption spending. Overall, gross private domestic investment increased at a slow rate of 0.3 percent—the slowest rate since a decline in the first quarter of 2023. Residential investment decreased by 5.1 percent, reflecting difficulties in residential construction due to mortgage interest rates remaining high. Business fixed investment grew 3.1 percent, powered by an increase of 11.1 percent in spending on business equipment. Spending on structures—such as factories and office buildings—had increased rapidly over the past two years before slowing to a 0.2 percent increase in the second quarter and a decline of 4.0 percent in the fourth quarter.
The GDP report also contained data on the private consumption expenditure (PCE) price index, which the FOMC uses to determine whether it is achieving its goal of a 2 percent inflation rate. The following figure shows inflation as measured using the PCE and the core PCE—which excludes food and energy prices—since the beginning of 2016. (Note that these inflation rates are measured using quarterly data and as compound annual rates of change.) Despite the strong growth in real GDP, inflation as measured by PCE was only 1.5 percent, below the 2.5 percent increase in the second quarter and below the Federal Reserve’s 2.0 percent inflation target. Core PCE, which may be a better indicator of the likely course of inflation in the future, declined to 2.2 percent in the third quarter from 2.8 percent in the second quarter. The third quarter increase was slightly above the rate that economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal had expected.
This week, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Job Openings and Labor Turnover” (JOLTS) report for September 2024. The report provided data indicating some weakening in the U.S. labor market. The following figure shows the rate of job openings. The BLS defines a job opening as a full-time or part-time job that a firm is advertising and that will start within 30 days and the rate of job openings as the number of job openings divided by the number of job openings plus the number of employed workers, multiplied by 100. The 4.9 percent job opening rate in September continued the slow decline from the peak rate of 7.4 percent in March 2022. The rate is also slightly below the rate during late 2018 and 2019 before the Covid pandemic.
In the following figure, we compare the total number of job openings to the total number of people unemployed. The figure shows a slow decline from a peak of more than 2 job openings per unemployed person in the spring of 2022 to 1.1 job openings per employed person in September 2024, somewhat below the levels in 2019 and early 2020, before the pandemic. Note that the number is still above 1.0, indicating that the demand for labor is still high, although no higher than during the strong labor market of 2019.
Finally, note from the figure that over the period during which the BLS has been conducting the JOLTS survey, the rate of job openings has declined just before and during recessions. Does that fact indicate that the decline in the job opening rate in recent months is signaling that a recession is likely to begin soon? We can’t say with certainty, particularly because the labor market was severely disrupted by the pandemic. The decline in the job openings rate since 2022 is more likely to reflect the labor market returning to more normal conditions than a weakening in hiring that signals a recession is coming.
To summarize these data:
Real GDP growth is strong, although below what economists had been projecting.
Inflation as measured by the PCE is below the Fed’s 2 percent target, although core inflation remains slightly above the target.
The job market has weakened somewhat, although there is no strong indication that a recession will happen in the near future.
About one month after a calendar quarter ends, the Bureau of Economic Analyis (BEA) releases its advanced estimate of real GDP. In July 2022, the BEA’s advance estimates indicated that real GDP had declined in both the first and second quarters. A common definition of a recession is two consecutive quarters of declining real GDP. Accordingly, in mid-2022 there were a number of articles in the media suggesting that the U.S. economy was in a recession.
But, as we discussed at the time in this blog post, most economists don’t follow the popular definition of a recession as being two consecutive quarters of declining real GDP. Instead, as we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 10, Section 10.3 (Economics, Chapter 20, Section 20.3), economists typically follow the definition of a recession used by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER): “A recession is a significant decline in activity spread across the economy, lasting more than a few months, visible in industrial production, employment, real income, and wholesale-retail trade.”
During the first half of 2022, the other data that the NBER tracks were all expanding rather than contracting. So, it seemed safe to conclude that despite the declines in real GDP in those quarters, the U.S. economy was not, in fact, in a recession.
That conclusion was confirmed by the BEA in September 2024 when it released its most recent revisions of real GDP . As the following table shows, although the BEA still estimates that real GDP fell during the first quarter of 2022, it now estimates that it increased during the second quarter.
In the earlier post from 2022, we also noted that the BEA publishes data on gross domestic income (GDI), as well as on GDP. As we discuss in Chapter 8, Section 8.1, when considering the circular-flow diagram, the value of every final good and service produced in the economy (GDP) should equal the value of all the income in the economy resulting from that production (GDI). The BEA has designed the two measures to be identical by including in GDI some non-income items, such as sales taxes and depreciation. But as we discuss in the Apply the Concept, “Should We Pay More Attention to Gross Domestic Income?” GDP and GDI are compiled by the BEA from different data sources and can sometimes significantly diverge.
We noted that although, according to the BEA’s advance estimates, real GDP declined during the first two quarters of 2022, real GDI increased. The following figure shows movements in real GDP and real GDI using the current estimates from the BEA. The revised estimates now show real GDP falling the first quarter of 2021 and increasing in the second quarter while real GDI is still estimated as rising in both quarters. The revisions closed some of the gap between real GDP and real GDI during this period by increasing the estimate for real GDP, which indicates that the advance estimate of real GDI was giving a more accurate measure of what was happening in the U.S. economy.
The figure shows that the revised estimates indicate that real GDP and real GDI moved closely together during 2021, differed somewhat during 2022—with real GDI being greater than real GDP—and differed more substantially during 2023 and 2024—with real GDP now being greater than real GDI. Because the two measures should be the same, we can expect that further revisions by the BEA will bring the two measures closer together.
It’s even possible, but unlikely, that further revisions of the data for 2022 could again present us with the paradox of real GDP declining for two quarters despite other measures of economic activity expanding.
Arthur Burns was Fed chair during the stagflation of the 1970s. (Photo from the Wall Street Journal)
This morning, Thursday April 25, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of real GDP growth during the first quarter of 2024. The two most striking points in the report are, first, that real GDP increased in the first quarter at an annual rate of only 1.6 percent—well below the 2.5 percent increase expected in a survey of economists and the 2.7 percent increase indicated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s GDPNow forecast. As the following figure shows, the growth rate of real GDP has declined in each of the last two quarters from the very strong growth rate of 4.9 percent during the third quarter of 2023.
The second striking point in the report was an unexpected increase in inflation, as measured using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. As the following figure shows, PCE inflation (the red line), measured as a compound annual rate of change, increased from 1.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 3.4 percent in the first quarter of 2024. Core PCE inflation (the blue line), which excludes food and energy prices, increased from 2.0 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 3.7 percent in the first quarter of 2024. These data indicate that inflation in the first quarter of 2024 was running well above the Federal Reserve’s 2.0 percent target.
A combination of weak economic growth and above-target inflation poses a policy dilemma for the Fed. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 13, Section 13.3 (Economics, Chapter 23, Section 23.3), the combination of slow growth and inflation is called stagflation. During the 1970s, when the U.S. economy suffered from stagflation, Fed Chair Arthur Burns (whose photo appears at the beginning of this post) was heavily criticized by members of Congress for his inability to deal with the problem. Stagflation poses a dilemma for the Fed because using an expansionary monetary policy to deal with slow economic growth may cause the inflation rate to rise. Using a contractionary monetary policy to deal with high inflation can cause growth to slow further, possibly pushing the economy into a recession.
Is Fed Chair Jerome Powell in as difficult a situation as Arthur Burns was in the 1970s? Not yet, at least. First, Burns faced a period of recession—declining real GDP and rising unemployment—whereas currently, although economic growth seems to be slowing, real GDP is still rising and the unemployment rate is still below 4 percent. In addition, the inflation rate in these data are below 4 percent, far less than the 10 percent inflation rates during the 1970s.
Second, it’s always hazardous to draw conclusions on the basis of a single quarter’s data. The BEA’s real GDP estimates are revised several times, so that the value for the first quarter of 2024 may well be revised significantly higher (or lower) in coming months.
Third, the slow rate of growth of real GDP in the first quarter is accounted for largely by a surge in imports—which are subtracted from GDP—and a sharp decline in inventory investment. Key components of aggregate demand remained strong: Consumption expenditures increased at annual rate of 2.5 per cent and business investment increased at an annual rate of 3.2 percent. Residential investment was particularly strong, growing at an annual rate 0f 13.2 percent—despite the effects of rising mortgage interest rates. One way to strip out the effects of net exports, inventory investment, and government purchases—which can also be volatile—is to look at final sales to domestic purchasers, which includes only spending by U.S. households and firms on domestic production. As the following figure shows, real final sales to domestic purchasers declined only modertately from 3.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2023 to 3.1 percent in the first quarter of 2024.
Looking at these details of the GDP report indicate that growth may have slowed less during the first quarter than the growth rate of real GDP seems to indicate. Investors on Wall Street may have come to this same conclusion. As shown by this figure from the Wall Street Journal, shows that stock prices fell sharply when trading opened at 9:30 am, but by 2 pm has recovered some of their losses as investors considered further the implications of the GDP report. (As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 6, Section 6.2 and Economics, Chapter 8, Section 8.2, movements in stock price indexes can provide some insight into investors’ expectations of future movements in corporate profits, which, in turn, depend in part on future movements in economic growth.)
Finally, we may get more insight into the rate of inflation tomorrow morning when the BEA releases its report on “Personal Income and Outlays,” which will include data on PCE inflation during March. The monthly PCE data provide more current information than do the quarterly data in the GDP report.
In short, today’s report wasn’t good news, but may not have been as bad as it appeared at first glance. We are far from being able to conclude that the U.S. economy is entering into a period of stagflation.
A bookstore in New York City closed during Covid. (Photo from the New York Times)
Four years ago, in mid-March 2020, Covid–19 began to significantly affect the U.S. economy, with hospitalizations rising and many state and local governments closing schools and some businesses. In this blog post we review what’s happened to key macro variables during the past four years. Each monthly series starts in February 2020 and the quarterly series start in the fourth quarter of 2019.
Production
Real GDP declined by 5.8 percent from the fourth quarter of 2019 to the first quarter of 2020 and by an additional 28.0 percent from the first quarter of 2020 to the second quarter. This decline was by far the largest in such a short period in the history of the United States. From the second quarter to the third quarter of 2020, as businesses began to reopen, real GDP increased by 34.8 percent, which was by far the largest increase in a single quarter in U.S. history.
Industrial production followed a similar—although less dramatic—path to real GDP, declining by 16.8 percent from February 2020 to April 2020 before increasing by 12.3 percent from April 2020 to June 2020. Industrial production did not regain its February 2020 level until March 2022. The swings in industrial production were smaller than the swings in GDP because industrial production doesn’t include the output of the service sector, which includes firms like restaurants, movie theaters, and gyms that were largely shutdown in some areas. (Industrial production measures the real output of the U.S. manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities industries. The data are issued by the Federal Reserve and discussed here.)
Employment
Nonfarm payroll employment, collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in its establishment survey, followed a path very similar to the path of production. Between February and April 2020, employment declined by an astouding 22 million workers, or by 14.4 percent. This decline was by far the largest in U.S. history over such a short period. Employment increased rapidly beginning in April but didn’t regain its February 2020 level until June 2022.
The employment-population ratio measures the percentage of the working-age population that is employed. It provides a more comprehensive measure of an economy’s utilization of available labor than does the total number of people employed. In the following figure, the blue line shows the employment-population ratio for the whole working-age population and the red line shows the employment-population ratio for “prime age workers,” those aged 25 to 54.
For both groups, the employment-population ratio plunged as a result of Covid and then slowly recovered as the production began increasing after April 2020. The employment-population ratio for prime age workers didn’t regain its February 2020 value until February 2023, an indication of how long it took the labor market to fully overcome the effects of the pandemic. As of February 2024, the employment-population ratio for all people of working age hasn’t returned to its February 2020 value, largely because of the aging of the U.S. population.
Average weekly hours worked followed an unusual pattern, declining during March 2020 but then increasing to beyond its February 2020 level to a peak in April 2021. This increase reflects firms attempting to deal with a shortage of workers by increasing the hours of those people they were able to hire. By April 2023, average weekly hours worked had returned to its February 2020 level.
Income
Real average hourly earnings surged by more than six percent between February and April 2020—a very large increase over a two-month period. But some of the increase represented a composition effect—as workers with lower incomes in services industries such as restaurants were more likely to be out of work during this period—rather than an actual increase in the real wages received by people employed during both months. (Real average hourly earnings are calculated by dividing nominal average hourly earnings by the consumer price index (CPI) and multiplying by 100.)
Median weekly real earnings, because it is calculated as a median rather than as an average (or mean), is less subject to composition effects than is real average hourly earnings. Median weekly real earnings increased sharply between February and April of 2020 before declining through June 2022. Earnings then gradually increased. In February 2024 they were 2.5 percent higher than in February 2020.
Inflation
The inflation rate most commonly mentioned in media reports is the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous year. The following figure shows that inflation declined from February to May 2020. Inflation then began to rise slowly before rising rapidly beginning in the spring of 2021, reaching a peak in June 2022 at 9.0 percent. That inflation rate was the highest since November 1981. Inflation then declined steadily through June 2023. Since that time it has fluctuated while remaining above 3 percent.
As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.5), the Federal Reserve gauges its success in meeting its goal of an inflation rate of 2 percent using the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. The following figure shows that PCE inflation followed roughly the same path as CPI inflation, although it reached a lower peak and had declined below 3 percent by November 2023. (A more detailed discussion of recent inflation data can be found in this post and in this post.)
Monetary Policy
The following figure shows the effective federal funds rate, which is the rate—nearly always within the upper and lower bounds of the Fed’s target range—that prevails during a particular period in the federal funds market. In March 2020, the Fed cut its target range to 0 to 0.25 percent in response to the economic disruptions caused by the pandemic. It kept the target unchanged until March 2022 despite the sharp increase in inflation that had begun a year earlier. The members of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had initially hoped that the surge in inflation was largely caused by disuptions to supply chains and would be transitory, falling as supply chains returned to normal. Beginning in March 2022, the FOMC rapidly increased its target range in response to continuing high rates of inflation. The targer range reached 5.25 to 5.50 percent in July 2023 where it has remained through March 2024.
Although the money supply is no longer the focus of monetary policy, some economists have noted that the rate of growth in the M2 measure of the money supply increased very rapidly just before the inflation rate began to accelerate in the spring of 2021 and then declined—eventually becoming negative—during the period in which the inflation rate declined.
As we discuss in the new 9th edition of Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.5), some economists believe that the FOMC should engage in nominal GDP targeting. They argue that this approach has the best chance of stabilizing the growth rate of real GDP while keeping the inflation rate close to the Fed’s 2 percent target. The following figure shows the economy experienced very high rates of inflation during the period when nominal GDP was increasing at an annual rate of greater than 10 percent and that inflation declined as the rate of nominal GDP growth declined toward 5 percent, which is closer to the growth rates seen during the 2000s. (This figure begins in the first quarter of 2000 to put the high growth rates in nominal GDP of 2021 and 2022 in context.)
Fiscal Policy
As we discuss in the new 9th edition of Macroeconomics, Chapter 15 (Economics, Chapter 25), in response to the Covid pandemic Congress and Presidents Trump and Biden implemented the largest discretionary fiscal policy actions in U.S. history. The resulting increases in spending are reflected in the two spikes in federal government expenditures shown in the following figure.
The initial fiscal policy actions resulted in an extraordinary increase in federal expenditures of $3.69 trillion, or 81.3 percent, from the first quarter to the second quarter of 2020. This was followed by an increase in federal expenditures of $2.31 trillion, or 39.4 percent, from the fourth quarter of 2020 to the first quarter of 2021. As we recount in the text, there was a lively debate among economists about whether these increases in spending were necessary to offest the negative economic effects of the pandemic or whether they were greater than what was needed and contributed substantially to the sharp increase in inflation that began in the spring of 2021.
Saving
As a result of the fiscal policy actions of 2020 and 2021, many households received checks from the federal government. In total, the federal government distributed about $80o billion directly to households. As the figure shows, one result was to markedly increase the personal saving rate—measured as personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income—from 6.4 percent in December 2019 to 22.0 in April 2020. (The figure begins in January 2020 to put the size of the spike in the saving rate in perspective.)
The rise in the saving rate helped households maintain high levels of consumption spending, particularly on consumer durables such as automobiles. The first of the following figure shows real personal consumption expenditures and the second figure shows real personal consumption expenditures on durable goods.
Taken together, these data provide an overview of the momentous macroeconomic events of the past four years.
This morning the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released its advance estimate of GDP for the third quarter of 2023. (The report can be found here.) The BEA estimates that real GDP increased by 4.9 percent at an annual rate in the third quarter—July through September. That was more than double the 2.1 percent increase in real GDP in the second quarter, and slightly higher than the 4.7 percent that economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal last week had expected. The following figure shows the rates of GDP growth each quarter beginning in 2021.
Note that the BEA’s most recent estimates of real GDP during the first two quarters of 2022 still show a decline. The Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committee only switched from a strongly expansionary monetary policy, with a target for the federal funds of effectively zero, to a contractionary monetary policy following its March 16, 2022 meeting. That real GDP was declining even before the Fed had pivoted to a contractionary monetary policy helps explain why, despite strong increases employment during this period, most economists were expecting that the U.S. economy would experience a recession at some point during 2022 or 2023. This expectation was reinforced when inflation soared during the summer of 2022 and it became clear that the FOMC would have to substantially raise its target for the federal funds rate.
Clearly, today’s data on real GDP growth, along with the strong September employment report (which we discuss in this blog post), indicates that the chances of the U.S. economy avoiding a recession in the future have increased and are much better than they seemed at this time last year.
Consumer spending was the largest contributor to third quarter GDP growth. The following figure shows growth rates of real personal consumption expenditures and the subcategories of expenditures on durable goods, nondurable goods, and services. There was strong growth in each component of consumption spending. The 7.6 percent increase in expenditures on durables was particularly strong, particularly given that spending on durables had fallen by 0.3 percent in the second quarter.
Investment spending and its components were a more mixed bag, as shown in the following figure. Overall, gross private domestic investment increased at a very strong rate of 8.4 percent—the highest rate since the fourth quarter of 2021. Residential investment increased 3.9 percent, which was particularly notable following nine consecutive quarters of decline and during a period of soaring mortgage interest rates. But business fixed investment was noticeably weak, falling by 0.1 percent. Spending on structures—such as factories and office buildings—increased by only 1.6 percent, while spending on equipment fell by 3.8 percent.
Today’s real GDP report also contained data on the private consumption expenditure (PCE) price index, which the FOMC uses tp determine whether it is achieving its goal of a 2 percent inflation rate. The following figure shows inflation as measured using the PCE and the core PCE—which excludes food and energy prices—since the beginning of 2015. (Note that these inflation rates are measured using quarterly data and as compound annual rates of change.) Despite the strong growth in real GDP and employment, inflation as measured by PCE increased only from 2.5 percent in the second quarter to 2.9 percent in the third quarter. Core PCE, which may be a better indicator of the likely course of inflation in the future, continued the long decline that began in first quarter of 2022 by failling from 3.7 percent to 2.9 percent.
The combination of strong growth in real GDP and declining inflation indicates that the Fed appears well on its way to a soft landing—achieving a return to its 2 percent inflation target without pushing the economy into a recession. There are reasons to be cautious, however.
GDP, inflation, and employment data are all subject to—possibly substantial—revisions. So growth may have been significantly slower than today’s advance estimate of real GDP indicates. Even if the estimate of real GDP growth of 4.9 percent proves in the long run to have been accurate, there are reasons to doubt whether output growth can be maintained at near that level. Since 2000, annual growth in real GDP has average only 2.1 percent. For GDP to begin increasing at a rate substantially higher than that would require a significant expansion in the labor force and an increase in productivity. While either or both of those changes may occur, they don’t seem likely as of now.
In addition, the largest contributor to GDP growth in the third quarter was from consumption expenditures. As households continue to draw down the savings they built up as a result of the federal government’s response to the Covid recession of 2020, it seems unlikely that the current pace of consumer spending can be maintained. Finally, the lagged effects of monetary policy—particularly the effects of the interest rate on the 10-year Treasury note having risen to nearly 5 percent (which we discuss in our most recent podcast)—may substantially reduce growth in real GDP and employment in future quarters.
But those points shouldn’t distract from the fact that today’s GDP report was good news for the economy.
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