Tag: Macroeconomics

Real GDP Growth Revised Up and PCE Inflation Running Slightly Below Expectations

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Today (September 26), the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released monthly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index as part of its “Personal Income and Outlays” report. Yesterday, the BEA released its revised estimate of real GDP growth in the second quarter. Taken together, the two reports show that economic growth remains realtively strong and that inflation continues to run above the Fed’s 2 percent annual target.

Taking the inflation report first, the following figure shows headline PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2018, with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. In August, headline PCE inflation was 2.7 percent, up from 2.6 percent in July. Core PCE inflation in August was 2.9 percent, unchanged from July. Headline PCE inflation was equal to the forecast of economists surveyed, while core PCE inflation was slightly lower than forecast.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation, while this figure shows 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, headline PCE inflation increased from 2.0 percent in July to 3.2 percent in August. Core PCE inflation declined slightly from 2.9 percent in July to 2.8 percent in August. So, both 1-month and 12-month PCE inflation are telling the same story of inflation being well above the Fed’s target. The usual caution applies that 1-month inflation figures are volatile (as can be seen in the figure). In addition, these data likely reflect higher prices resulting from the tariff increases the Trump administration has implemented. Once the one-time price increases from tariffs have worked through the economy, inflation may decline. It’s not clear, however, how long that may take and President Trump indicated yesterday that he may impose new tariffs on pharmaceuticals, large trucks, and furniture.

Fed Chair Jerome Powell has frequently mentioned that inflation in non-market services can skew PCE inflation. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices fall, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also fall. Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.” The following figure shows 12-month headline inflation (the blue line) and 12-month core inflation (the red line) for market-based PCE. (The BEA explains the market-based PCE measure here.)


Headline market-based PCE inflation was 2.4 percent in August, unchanged from July. Core market-based PCE inflation was 2.6 percent in August, also unchanged from July. So, both market-based measures show inflation as stable but above the Fed’s 2 percent target.

In the following figure, we look at 1-month inflation using these measures. One-month headline market-based inflation increase sharply to 2.5 percent in August from 0.9 percent in July. One-month core market-based inflation increased slightly to 1.9 percent in August from 1.8 percent in July. As the figure shows, the 1-month inflation rates are more volatile than the 12-month rates, which is why the Fed relies on the 12-month rates when gauging how close it is coming to hitting its target inflation rate.


Inflation running above the Fed’s 2 percent target is consistent with relatively strong growth in real GDP. The following figure shows compound annual rates of growth of real GDP, for each quarter since the first quarter of 2023. The value for the second quarter of 2025 is the BEA’s third estimate. This revised estimate increased the growth rate of real GDP to 3.8 percent from the second estimate of 3.3 percent.

The most important contributor to real GDP growth was growth in real personal consumption expenditures, which, as shown in the following figure, increased aat compound annual rate of 2.5 percent in the second quarter, up from 0.6 percent in the first quarter.

High interest rates continue to hold back residential construction, which declined by a compound annual rate of 5.1 percent in the second quarter after declining 1.0 percent in the first quarter.

Business investment in structures, such as factories and office buildings, continued a decline that began in the first quarter of 2024.

Will the relatively strong growth in real GDP in the second quarter continue in the third quarter? Economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta prepare nowcasts of real GDP. A nowcast is a forecast that incorporates all the information available on a certain date about the components of spending that are included in GDP. The Atlanta Fed calls its nowcast GDPNow. As the following figure from the Atlanta Fed website shows, today the GDPNow forecast is for real GDP to grow at an annual rate of 3.9 percent in the third quarter.

Finally, the macroeconomic data released in the last two days has had realtively little effect on the expectations of investors trading federal funds rate futures. Investors assign an 89.8 percent probability to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cutting its target for the federal funds rate at its meeting on October 28–29 by 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) from its current range of 4.00 percent to 4.25 percent. That probability is only slightly lower than 91.9 percent probaiblity that investors had assigned to a 25 basis point cut a week ago. However, the probability of the committee cutting its target rate by another 25 basis points at its December 9–10 fell to 67.0 percent today from 78.6 percent one week ago.

Solved Problem: The Fed’s Dilemma

Supports: Macroeconomics, Chapter 13, Section 13.3; Economics, Chapter 23, Section 23.3; and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 15, Section 15.3

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A recent article on axios.com made the following observation: “The mainstream view on the Federal Open Market Committee is based on risk management—that the possibility of a further downshift in the job market appears to be the more pressing concern than the chance that inflation will spiral higher.” The article also notes that: “Tariffs’ effects on inflation are probably a one-time bump.”

a. What is the dual mandate that Congress has given the Federal Reserve?

b. In what circumstances might the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) be faced with a conflict between the goals in the dual mandate?

c. What does the author mean by tariffs’ effects on inflation being a “one-time bump”?

d. What does the author mean by the FOMC engaging in “risk management”? What is a “downshift” in the labor market? If the FOMC is more concerned about a downshift in the labor market than about inflation, will the committee raise or lower its target for the federal funds rate? Briefly explain.

Solving the Problem
Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the policy dilemma the Fed can face when the unemployment rate and the inflation rate are both rising, so you may want to review Macroeconomics, Chapter 13, Section 13.3, “Macroeconomic Equilibrium in the Long Run and the Short Run.”

Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining what the Fed’s dual mandate is. Congress has given the Fed a dual mandate of achieving price stability and maximum employment.

Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining when the FOMC may face a conflict with respect to its dual mandate. When the FOMC is faced with rising unemployment and falling inflation, its preferred policy response is clear: The committee will lower its target for the federal funds rate in order to increase the growth of aggregate demand, which will increase real GDP and reduce unemployment. When the FOMC is faced with falling unemployment and rising inflation, its preferred policy response is also clear: The committee will raise its target for the federal funds rate in order to slow the growth of aggregate demand, which will reduce the inflation rate.

But when the Fed faces an aggregate supply shock, its preferred policy response is unclear. An aggregate supply shock, such as the U.S. economy experienced during the Covid pandemic and again with the tariff increases that the Trump administration began implementing in April, will shift the short-run aggregate supply curve (SRAS) will shift to the left, causing an increase in the price level, along with a decline in real GDP and employment. This combination of rising unemployment and inflation is called stagflation. In this situation, the FOMC faces a policy dilemma: Raising the target for the federal funds rate will help reduce inflation, but will likely increase unemployment, while lowering the target for the federal funds rate will lead to lower unemployment, but will likely increase inflation. The following figure shows the situation during the Covid pandemic when the economy experienced both an aggregate demand and aggregate supply shock. The aggregate demand curve and the aggregate supply curve both shifted to the left, resulting in falling real GDP (and employment) and a rising price level.

Step 4: Answer part c. by explaining what it means to refer to the effect of tariffs on inflation being a “one-time bump.” Tariffs cause the aggregate supply curve to shift to the left because by increasing the prices of raw materials and other inputs, they increase the production costs of some businesses. Assuming that tariffs are not continually increasing, their effect on the price level will end once the production costs of firms stop rising.

Step 5: Answer part d. by explaining what the author means by the FOMC engaing in “risk management,” explaining what a “downshift” in the labor is, and whether if the FOMC is more concerned about a downshift in the labor market than in inflation, it will raise or lower its target for the federal funds rate. The article refers to the “possibility” of a further downshift in the labor market. A downshift in the labor market means that the demand for labor may decline, raising the unemployment rate. Managing the risk of this possibility would involve concentrating on the maximum employment part of the Fed’s dual mandate by lowering its target for the federal funds rate. Note that the expectation that the effect of tariffs on the price level is a one-time bump makes it easier for the committee to focus on the maximum employment part of its mandate because the increase in inflation due to the tariff increases won’t persist.

CPI Inflation Worsens, as Expected

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Today (September 11), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its report on the consumer price index (CPI) for August. The following figure compares headline CPI inflation (the blue line) and core CPI inflation (the red line).

  • The headline inflation rate, which is measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous year, was 2.9 percent in August, up from 2.7 in July. 
  • The core inflation rate, which excludes the prices of food and energy, was 3.1 percent in August, up slightly from 3.0 percent in July. 

Headline inflation and core inflation were both the same as economists surveyed had expected.

In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, headline inflation (the blue line) jumped from 2.4 percent in July to 4.7 percent in August. Core inflation (the red line) increased from 3.9 percent in July to 4.2 percent in August.

The 1-month and 12-month inflation rates are both indicating that inflation accelerated in August. Core inflation—which is often a good indicator of future inflation—in particular has been running well above the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target during the last two months.

Of course, it’s important not to overinterpret the data from a single month. The figure shows that the 1-month inflation rate is particularly volatile. Also note that the Fed uses the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, rather than the CPI, to evaluate whether it is hitting its 2 percent annual inflation target.

Core inflation had been running significantly higher than headline inflation in the past few months because gasoline prices had generally been falling since February. Gasoline prices turned around in August, however, increasing at a 25.5 percent annual rate. As shown in the following figure, 1-month inflation in gasoline prices moves erratically—which is the main reason that gasoline prices aren’t included in core inflation.

Does the increase in inflation represent the effects of the increases in tariffs that the Trump administration announced on April 2? (Note that many of the tariff increases announced on April 2 have since been reduced) The following figure shows 12-month inflation in durable goods—such as furniture, appliances, and cars—which are likely to be affected directly by tariffs, and services, which are less likely to be affected by tariffs.. To make recent changes clearer, we look only at the months since January 2022. In August, inflation in durable goods increased to 1.9 percent from 1.2 percent in July. Inflation in services in August was 3.8 percent, unchanged from July.

The following figure shows 1-month inflation in the prices of these products, which may make the effects of tariffs clearer. In August, durable goods inflation was 5.1 percent up from 4.5 percent in July. Service inflation was 3.9 percent in August, down slightly from 4.0 percent in July. Inflation in goods and services both running well above 2 percent is not good news for inflation falling back to the Fed’s 2 percent target in the near future.

To better estimate the underlying trend in inflation, some economists look at median inflation and trimmed mean inflation.

  • Median inflation is calculated by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Ohio State University. If we listed the inflation rate in each individual good or service in the CPI, median inflation is the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates. 
  • Trimmed-mean inflation drops the 8 percent of goods and services with the highest inflation rates and the 8 percent of goods and services with the lowest inflation rates. 

The following figure shows that 12-month trimmed-mean inflation (the blue line) was 3.3 percent in August, up slightly from 3.2 July. Twelve-month median inflation (the red line) 3.6 percent in August, unchanged from July.


The following figure shows 1-month trimmed-mean and median inflation. One-month trimmed-mean inflation rose from 2.9 percent in July to 3.2 percent in August. One-month median inflation remained unchanged at 3.4 percent in August. These data are consistent with the view that inflation is running above the Fed’s 2 percent target.


The CPI inflation data combined with the recent jobs data (which we discuss here and here), indicate that the U.S. economy may be entering a period of stagflation—a combination of rising inflation with falling, or stagnating, output. Stagflation poses a policy dilemma for the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) because cutting its target for the federal funds rate to increase economic growth and employment may worsen inflation. At this point, it seems likely that the FOMC will “look through” this month’s rising inflation because it may be largely due to one-time price increases caused by tariffs. Committee members have signaled that they are likely to cut their target for the federal funds rate by 0.25 percent (25 basis points) at the conclusion of their meeting on September 16–17 and again at the conclusion of the following meeting on October 28–29.

Where Did 911,000 Jobs Go?

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Today (September 9), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) issued revised estimates of the increase in employment, as measured by the establishment survey, over the period from April 2024 through March 2025. The BLS had initially estimated that during that period net employment had increased by a total of 1,758,000 or an average of 147,000 jobs per month. The revision lowered this estimate by more than half to a total of 839,000 jobs or an average of only 70,000 net new jobs created per month. The difference between those two monthly averages means that the U.S. economy had generated a total of 919,000 fewer jobs during that period.  The revision was larger than the downward revision of 800,000 jobs forecast by economists at Wells Fargo, Comerica Bank, and Pantheon Macroeconomics.

Why does the BLS have to revise its employment estimates? As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1) the initial estimates that the BLS issues each month in its “Employment Situation” reports are based on a sample of 121,000 businesses and government agencies representing 631,000 worksites or “establishments.” The monthly data also rely on estimates of the number of employees at establishments that opened or closed during the month and on employment changes at establishments that failed to respond to the survey. In August or September of each year, the BLS issues revised employment estimates based on data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which relies on state unemployment insurance tax records. The unemployment tax records are much more comprehensive than the original sample of establishments because nearly all employers are included. 

In today’s report, the BLS cited two likely sources of error in their preliminary estimates:

“First, businesses reported less employment to the QCEW than they reported to the CES survey (response error). Second, businesses who were selected for the CES survey but did not respond reported less employment to the QCEW than those businesses who did respond to the CES survey (nonresponse error).”

The preliminary benchmark estimates the BLS released today will be revised again and the final estimates for these months will be released in February 2026. The difference between the preliminary and final benchmark estimates can be substantial. For example, last year, the BLS’s initially preliminary benchmark estimate indicated that the net employment increase from April 2023 to March 2024 had been overestimated by 818,000 jobs. In February 2025, the final benchmark estimate reduced this number to 598,000 jobs.

Although this year’s revision is particularly large in absolute terms—the largest since at least 2001—it still represents only about 0.56 percent of the more than 159.5 million people employed in the U.S. economy. Still the size of this revision is likely to increase political criticism of the BLS.

How will this revision affect the decision by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) at its next meeting on September 16-17 to cut or maintain its target for the federal funds rate? The members of the committee were probably not surprised by the downward revision in the employment estimates, although they may have anticipated that the revision would be smaller. In six of the past seven years, the BLS has revised its estimates of payroll employment downward in its annual preliminary benchmark revision.

As we noted in this recent post, even before the BLS revised its employment estimates downward, recent monthly net employment increases were well below the increases during the first half of the year. There was already a high likelihood that the FOMC intended to cut its target for the federal funds rate at its meeting on September 16–17. The substantial downward revision in the employment data makes a cut at the September meeting nearly a certainty and increases the likelihood that the FOMC will implement a second cut in its target for the federal funds rate at the committee’s meeting on October 28–29.

PCE Inflation Is Steady, but Still Above the Fed’s Target

On August 29, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released data for July on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index as part of its “Personal Income and Outlays” report. The Fed relies on annual changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2017, with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. In July, headline PCE inflation was 2.6 percent, unchanged from June. Core PCE inflation in July was 2.9 percent, up slightly from 2.8 percent in June. Headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation were both equal to what economists surveyed had forecast.

The following figure shows headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation, while this figure shows 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, headline PCE inflation fell from 3.5 percent in June to 2.4 percent in July. Core PCE inflation increased slightly from 3.2 percent in June to 3.3 percent in July. So, both 1-month PCE inflation estimates are above the Fed’s 2 percent target, with 1-month core PCE inflation being well above target. The usual caution applies that 1-month inflation figures are volatile (as can be seen in the figure), so we shouldn’t attempt to draw wider conclusions from one month’s data. In addition, these data may reflect higher prices resulting from the tariff increases the Trump administration has implemented. Once the one-time price increases from tariffs have worked through the economy, inflation may decline. It’s not clear, however, how long that may take and it’s likely that not all the effects of the tariff increases on the price level are reflected in this month’s data.

As usual, we need to note that Fed Chair Jerome Powell has frequently mentioned that inflation in non-market services can skew PCE inflation. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices fall, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also fall. Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.” The following figure shows 12-month headline inflation (the blue line) and 12-month core inflation (the red line) for market-based PCE. (The BEA explains the market-based PCE measure here.)

Headline market-based PCE inflation was 2.3 percent in July, unchanged from June. Core market-based PCE inflation was 2.6 percent in July, also unchanged from June. So, both market-based measures show inflation as stable but above the Fed’s 2 percent target.

In the following figure, we look at 1-month inflation using these measures. One-month headline market-based inflation declined sharply to 1.1 percent in July from 4.1 percent in June. One-month core market-based inflation also declined sharply to 2.1 percent in July from 3.8 percent in June. As the figure shows, the 1-month inflation rates are more volatile than the 12-month rates, which is why the Fed relies on the 12-month rates when gauging how close it is coming to hitting its target inflation rate. Still, looking at 1-month inflation gives us a better look at current trends in inflation, which these data indicate is slowing significantly.

As we noted earlier, some of the increase in inflation is likely attributable to the effects of tariffs. The effect of tariffs are typically seen in goods prices, rather than in service prices because tariffs are levied primarily on imports of goods. As the following figure shows, one-month inflation in goods prices jumped in June to 4.8 percent, but then declined sharply to –1.6 in July. One-month inflation in services prices increased from 2.9 percent in June to 4.3 percent in July. Clearly, the 1-month inflation data—particularly for goods—are quite volatile.

Finally, these data had little effect on the expectations of investors trading federal funds rate futures. Investors assign an 86.4 percent probability to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cutting its target for the federal funds rate at its meeting on September 16–17 by 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) from its current range of 4.25 percent to 4.5o percent. There has been some speculation in the business press that the FOMC might cut its target by 50 basis points at that meeting, but with inflation remaining above target, investors don’t foresee a larger cut in the target range happening.

In Jackson Hole Speech, Fed Chair Powell Signals a Rate Cut and Introduces the Fed’s Revised Monetary Policy Framework

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Federal Reserve chairs often take the opportunity of the Kansas City Fed’s annual monetary policy symposium held in Jackson Hole, Wyoming to provide a summary of their views on monetary policy and on the state of the economy. In these speeches, Fed chairs are careful not to preempt decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) by stating that policy changes will occur that the committee hasn’t yet agreed to. In his speech at Jackson Hole today (August 22), Powell came about as close as Fed chairs ever do to announcing a policy change in a speech. In addition, Powell announced changes to the Fed’s monetary policy framework that had been in place since 2020.

Congress has given the Federal Reserve a dual mandate to achieve price stability and maximum employment. To reach its goal of price stability, the Fed has set an inflation target of 2 percent, with inflation being measured by the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. In the statement that the FOMC releases after each meeting, it generally indicates the current “balance of risks” to meeting its two goals. In a press conference on July 30 following the last meeting of the FOMC, Powell stated that while the labor market appeared to be in balance at close to maximum employment, inflation was still running above the Fed’s 2 percent annual target.

In today’s speech, Powell stated that “the balance of risks appears to be shifting” and “that downside risks to employment are rising. And if those risks materialize, they can do so quickly in the form of sharply higher layoffs and rising unemployment.” These statements seem to signal that he expects that at its next meeting on September 16–17 the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate from its current range of 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent.

One indication of expectations of future changes in the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate comes from investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) Yesterday, investors assigned a 75.0 percent probability to the committee cutting its target by 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) to a range of 4.00 percent to 4.25 percent at its September meeting. After Powell’s speech at 10 a.m. eastern time, the probability of a 25 basis point cut increased to 85.3 percent. As the following figure from the Wall Street Journa shows, the stock market also jumped, with the S&P 500 stock index having increased about 1.5 percent at 2:00 p.m. Investors were presumably expecting that by cutting its federal funds rate target, the FOMC would help to offset some of the current weakness in the labor market. (We discussed the weakness in the latest jobs report in this blog post.)

Powell also announced that the Fed had revised its monetary policy framework, which had been in place since 2020. The previous framework was called flexible average-inflation targeting (FAIT). The policy was intended to automatically make monetary policy expansionary during recessions and contractionary during periods of unexpectedly high inflation. If households and firms accept that the Fed is following this policy, then during a recession when the inflation rate falls below the target, they would expect that the Fed would take action to increase the inflation rate. If a higher inflation rate results in a lower real interest rate, there will be an expansionary effect on the economy. Similarly, if the inflation rate were above the target, households and firms would expect future inflation rates to be lower, raising the real interest rate, which would have a contractionary effect on the economy.

An important point to note is that with a FAIT policy, after a period in which inflation is below 2%, the Fed would aim to keep inflation above 2% for a time to “make up” for the period of low inflation. But the converse would not be true—if inflation runs above 2%, the Fed would attempt to bring the inflation back to 2%, but would not push inflation below 2% for a time to make up for the period of low inflation. The result is that, on average, the economy would run “hotter,” lowering the average unemployment rate over time. Many policymakers at the Fed believed that, in the years before 2019, the unemployment could have been lower without causing the inflation rate to be persistently above the Fed’s target.

With hindsight, some economists and policymakers argue that FAIT was implemented at just the wrong time. The policy was designed to address the problem of inflation running below the 2% target for most of the period between 2012 and 2019, resulting in unemployment being higher  than was consistent with the Fed’s mandate for maximum employment. But, in fact, as the following figure shows, in 2020 the U.S. economy was about to enter a period with the highest inflation rates since the early 1980s. 

In his speech today, Powell noted that:

“The economic conditions that brought the policy rate to the ELB [effective lower bound to the federal funds rate, 0 percent to 0.25 percent] and drove the 2020 framework changes were thought to be rooted in slow-moving global factors that would persist for an extended period—and might well have done so, if not for the pandemic. … In the event, rather than low inflation and the ELB, the post-pandemic reopening brought the highest inflation in 40 years to economies around the world.”

Powell outlined the key changes in the policy framework:

“First, we removed language indicating that the ELB was a defining feature of the economic landscape. Instead, we noted that our ‘monetary policy strategy is designed to promote maximum employment and stable prices across a broad range of economic conditions.'”

“Second, we returned to a framework of flexible inflation targeting and eliminated the ‘makeup’ strategy. As it turned out, the idea of an intentional, moderate inflation overshoot [after a period when inflation had been below the 2 percent annual target] had proved irrelevant. … Our revised statement emphasizes our commitment to act forcefully to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored, to the benefit of both sides of our dual mandate. It also notes that ‘price stability is essential for a sound and stable economy and supports the well-being of all Americans.’ “

“Third, our 2020 statement said that we would mitigate ‘shortfalls,’ rather than ‘deviations,’ from maximum employment. … [T]he use of ‘shortfalls’ was not intended as a commitment to permanently forswear preemption or to ignore labor market tightness. Accordingly, we removed ‘shortfalls’ from our statement. Instead, the revised document now states more precisely that ‘the Committee recognizes that employment may at times run above real-time assessments of maximum employment without necessarily creating risks to price stability.’ … [But] preemptive action would likely be warranted if tightness in the labor market or other factors pose risks to price stability.”

“Fourth, consistent with the removal of ‘shortfalls,’ we made changes to clarify our approach in periods when our employment and inflation objectives are not complementary. In those circumstances, we will follow a balanced approach in promoting them.”

“Finally, the revised consensus statement retained our commitment to conduct a public review roughly every five years.”

To summarize, the two key changes in the framework are: 1) The FOMC will no longer attempt to push inflation beyond its 2 percent goal if inflation has been below that goal for a period, and 2) The FOMC may still attempt to preempt an increase in inflation if labor market conditions or other data make it appear likely that inflation will accelerate, but it won’t necessarily do so just because the unemployment rate is currently lower than what had been considered consistent with maximum employment.

Glenn’s Questions for the Fed

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This opinion column originally ran at Project Syndicate.

While recent media coverage of the US Federal Reserve has tended to focus on when, and by how much, interest rates will be cut, larger issues loom. The selection of a new Fed chair to succeed Jerome Powell, whose term ends next May, should focus not on short-term market considerations, but on policies and processes that could improve the Fed’s overall performance and accountability.

By demanding that the Fed cut the federal funds rate sharply to boost economic activity and lower the government’s borrowing costs, US President Donald Trump risks pushing the central bank toward an overly inflationary monetary policy. And that, in turn, risks increasing the term premium in the ten-year Treasury yield—the very financial indicator that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has emphasized. A higher premium would raise, not lower, borrowing costs for the federal government, households, and businesses alike. Moreover, concerns about the Fed’s independence in setting monetary policy could undermine confidence in US financial markets and further weaken the dollar’s exchange rate. 

But this does not imply that Trump should simply seek continuity at the Fed. The Fed, under Powell, has indeed made mistakes, leading to higher inflation, sometimes inept and uncoordinated communications, and an unclear strategy for monetary policy.

I do not share the opinion of Trump and his advisers that the Fed has acted from political or partisan motives. Even when I have disagreed with Fed officials or Powell on matters of policy, I have not doubted their integrity. However, given their mistakes, I do believe that some institutional introspection is warranted. The next chair—along with the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee—will have many policy questions to address beyond the near-term path for the federal funds rate. 

Three issues are particularly important. The first is the Fed’s dual mandate: to ensure stable prices and maximum employment. Many economists (including me) have been critical of the Fed for exhibiting an inflationary bias in 2021 and 2022. The highest inflation rate in 40 years raised pressing questions about whether the Fed has assigned the right weights to inflation and employment. 

Clearly, the strategy of pursuing a flexible average inflation target (implying that inflation can be permitted to rise above 2% if it had previously been below 2%) has not been successful. What new approach should the Fed adopt to hit its inflation target? And how can the Fed be held more accountable to Congress and the public? Should it issue a regular inflation report? 

The second issue concerns the size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, the Fed has had a much larger balance sheet and has evolved toward an “ample reserves model” (implying a perpetually high level of reserves). But how large must the balance sheet be to conduct monetary policy, and how important should long-term Treasury debt and mortgage-backed securities be, relative to the rest of the balance sheet? If such assets are to play a central role, how can the Fed best separate the conduct of monetary policy from that of fiscal policy? 

The third issue is financial regulation. What regulatory changes does the Fed believe are needed to avoid the kind of costly stresses in the Treasury market we have witnessed in recent years? How can bank supervision be improved? Given that regulation is an inherently political subject, how can the Fed best separate these activities from its monetary policymaking (where independence is critical)? 

Addressing these policy questions requires a rethink of process, too. The Fed would be more effective in dealing with a changing economic environment if it acknowledged and debated more diverse viewpoints about the roles of monetary policy and financial regulation in how the economy works.

The Fed’s inflation mistakes, overconfidence in financial regulation, and other errors partly reflect the “groupthink” to which all organizations are prone. Regional Fed presidents’ views traditionally have reflected their own backgrounds and local conditions, but that doesn’t translate easily into a diversity of economic views. Instead of choosing Fed officials based on how they are likely to vote at the next rate-setting meeting, Trump should put more weight on intellectual and experiential diversity. Equally, the Fed itself could more actively seek and listen to dissenting views from academic and business leaders. 

Raising questions about policy and process offers guidance about the characteristics that the next Fed chair will need to succeed. These obviously include knowledge of monetary policy and financial regulation and mature, independent judgment; but they also include diverse leadership experience and an openness to new ideas and perspectives that might enhance the institution’s performance and accountability. One hopes that Trump’s selection of the next Fed chair, and the Senate’s confirmation process, will emphasize these attributes.

08-16-25- Podcast – Authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien discuss tariffs, Fed independence, & the controversies at the BLS.

In today’s episode, Glenn Hubbard and Tony O’Brien take on three timely topics that are shaping economic conversations across the country. They begin with a discussion on tariffs, exploring how recent trade policies are influencing prices, production decisions, and global relationships. From there, they turn to the independence of the Federal Reserve Bank, explaining why central bank autonomy is essential for sound monetary policy and what risks arise when political pressures creep in. Finally, they shed light on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), unpacking how its data collection and reporting play a vital role in guiding both public understanding and policymaking.

It’s a lively and informative conversation that brings clarity to complex issues—and it’s perfect for students, instructors, and anyone interested in how economics connects to the real world.

https://on.soundcloud.com/RA09RWn30NyDc8w8Tj

CPI Inflation Comes in Slightly Below Expectations, Increasing Likelihood of Fed Rate Cuts

Fed Chair Jerome Powell (left) and Vice Chair Philip Jefferson (photo from federalreserve.gov)

Today (August 12), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its report on the consumer price index (CPI) for July. The following figure compares headline CPI inflation (the blue line) and core CPI inflation (the red line).

  • The headline inflation rate, which is measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous year, was 2.7 percent in July, unchanged from June. 
  • The core inflation rate, which excludes the prices of food and energy, was 3.0 percent in July, up slightly from 2.9 percent in June. (Note that there was some inconsistency in how the core inflation rate is reported. The BLS, and some news outlets, give the value as 3.1 percent. The unrounded value is 3.0486 percent.)

Headline inflation and core inflation were slightly lower than what economists surveyed had expected.

In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, headline inflation (the blue line) declined from 3.5 percent in June to 2.4 percent in July. Core inflation (the red line) increased from 2.8 percent in June to 3.9 percent in July.

The 1-month and 12-month inflation rates are telling somewhat different stories, with 12-month inflation indicating that inflation is stable, although moderately above the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target. The 1-month core inflation rate indicates that inflation may have increased during July. 

Of course, it’s important not to overinterpret the data from a single month. The figure shows that the 1-month inflation rate is particularly volatile. Also note that the Fed uses the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, rather than the CPI, to evaluate whether it is hitting its 2 percent annual inflation target.

A key reason for core inflation being significantly higher than headline inflation is that gasoline prices declined by 23.1 percent at an annual rate in June. As shown in the following figure, 1-month inflation in gasoline prices moves erratically—which is the main reason that gasoline prices aren’t included in core inflation.

Does the increase in inflation represent the effects of the increases in tariffs that the Trump administration announced on April 2? (Note that many of the tariff increases announced on April 2 have since been reduced) The following figure shows 12-month inflation in three categories of products whose prices are thought to be particularly vulnerable to the effects of tariffs: apparel (the blue line), toys (the red line), and motor vehicles (the green line). To make recent changes clearer, we look only at the months since January 2021. In July, prices of apparel fell, while the prices of toys and motor vehicles rose by less than 1.0 percent.

The following figure shows 1-month inflation in these prices of these products. In July, motor vehicles prices and apparel prices increased by less than 1 percent, while toy prices increased by 1.9 percent after having soared soared by 24.3 percent in June. At least for these three products, it’s difficult to see tariffs as having had a significant effect on inflation in July.

To better estimate the underlying trend in inflation, some economists look at median inflation and trimmed mean inflation.

  • Median inflation is calculated by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Ohio State University. If we listed the inflation rate in each individual good or service in the CPI, median inflation is the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates. 
  • Trimmed-mean inflation drops the 8 percent of goods and services with the highest inflation rates and the 8 percent of goods and services with the lowest inflation rates. 

The following figure shows that 12-month trimmed-mean inflation (the blue line) was 3.2 percent in July, unchanged from June. Twelve-month median inflation (the red line) 3.6 percent in July, unchanged from June.

The following figure shows 1-month trimmed-mean and median inflation. One-month trimmed-mean inflation declined from 3.9 percent in June to 2.9 percent in July. One-month median inflation also declined from 4.1 percent in June to 3.7 percent in July. These data indicate that inflation may have slowed in July (the opposite conclusion we noted earlier when discussing 1-month core inflation), while remaining above the Fed’s 2 percent target.

What are the implications of this CPI report for the actions the Federal Reserve’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) may take at its next meetings? Even before today’s relatively favorable, if mixed, inflation report, the unexpectedly weak jobs report at the beginning of the month (which we discuss in this blog post) made it likely that the FOMC would soon begin cutting its target for the federal funds rate.

Investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts assign a probability of 94.3 percent to FOMC cutting its target for the federal funds rate at its September 16–17 meeting by 0.25 (25 basis points) from its current target range of 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent. That probability increased from 85.9 percent yesterday. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) Investors assign a probability of 61.5 percent to the FOMC cutting its target again by 25 basis points at its October 28–29 meeting, and a probability of 50.3 percent to a third 25 basis point cut at the committee’s December 9–10 meeting.

Why Were the Data Revisions to Payroll Employment in May and June So Large?

Image generated by ChatTP-4o

As we noted in yesterday’s blog post, the latest “Employment Situation” report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) included very substantial downward revisions of the preliminary estimates of net employment increases for May and June. The previous estimates of net employment increases in these months were reduced by a combined 258,000 jobs. As a result, the BLS now estimates that employment increases for May and June totaled only 33,000, rather than the initially reported 291,000. According to Ernie Tedeschi, director of economics at the Budget Lab at Yale University, apart from April 2020, these were the largest downward revisions since at least 1979.

The size of the revisions combined with the estimate of an unexpectedly low net increase of only 73,000 jobs in June prompted President Donald Trump to take the unprecedented step of firing BLS Commissioner Erika McEntarfer. It’s worth noting that the BLS employment estimates are prepared by professional statisticians and economists and are presented to the commissioner only after they have been finalized. There is no evidence that political bias affects the employment estimates or other economic data prepared by federal statistical agencies.

Why were the revisions to the intial May and June estimates so large? The BLS states in each jobs report that: “Monthly revisions result from additional reports received from businesses and government agencies since the last published estimates and from the recalculation of seasonal factors.” An article in the Wall Street Journal notes that: “Much of the revision to May and June payroll numbers was due to public schools, which employed 109,100 fewer people in June than BLS believed at the time.” The article also quotes Claire Mersol, an economist at the BLS as stating that: “Typically, the monthly revisions have offsetting movements within industries—one goes up, one goes down. In June, most revisions were negative.” In other words, the size of the revisions may have been due to chance.

Is it possible, though, that there was a more systematic error? As a number of people have commented, the initial response rate to the Current Employment Statistics (CES) survey has been declining over time. Can the declining response rate be the cause of larger errors in the preliminary job estimates?

In an article published earlier this year, economists Sylvain Leduc, Luiz Oliveira, and Caroline Paulson of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco assessed this possibility. Figure 1 from their article illustrates the declining response rate by firms to the CES monthly survey. The figure shows that the response rate, which had been about 64 percent during 2013–2015, fell significantly during Covid, and has yet to return to its earlier levels. In March 2025, the response rate was only 42.6 percent.

The authors find, however, that at least through the end of 2024, the falling response rate doesn’t seem to have resulted in larger than normal revisions of the preliminary employment estimates. The following figure shows their calculation of the average monthly revision for each year beginning with 1990. (It’s important to note that they are showing the absolute values of the changes; that is, negative change are shown as positive changes.) Depite lower response rates, the revisions for the years 2022, 2023, and 2024 were close to the average for the earlier period from 1990 to 2019 when response rates to the CES were higher.

The weak employment numbers correspond to the period after the Trump administration announced large tariff increases on April 2. Larger firms tend to respond to the CES in a timely manner, while responses from smaller firms lag. We might expect that smaller firms would have been more likely to hesitate to expand employment following the tariff announcement. In that sense, it may be unsurprising that we have seen downward revisions of the prelimanary employment estimates for May and June as the BLS received more survey responses. In addition, as noted earlier, an overestimate of employment in local public schools alone accounts for about 40 percent of the downward revisions for those months. Finally, to consider another possibility, downward revisions of employment estimates are more likely when the economy is heading into, or has already entered, a recession. The following figure shows the very large revisisons to the establishment survey employment estimates during the 2007–2010 period.

At this point, we don’t fully know the reasons for the downward employment revisions announced yesterday, although it’s fair to say that they may have been politically the most consequential revisions in the history of the establishment survey.