Fed Chair Jerome Powell speaking at a press conference following a meeting of the FOMC (photo from federalreserve.gov)
Members of the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had signaled clearly before today’s (June 18) meeting that the committee would leave its target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent. In the statement released after its meeting, the committee noted that a key reason for keeping its target range unchanged was that: “Uncertainty about the economic outlook has diminished but remains elevated.” Committee members were unanimous in voting to keep its target range unchanged.
In his press conference following the meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell indicated that a key source of economic uncertainty was the effect of tariffs on the inflation rate. Powell indicated that the likeliest outcome was that tariffs would lead to the inflation rate temporarily increasing. He noted that: “Beyond the next year or so, however, most measures of longer-term expectations [of inflation] remain consistent with our 2 percent inflation goal.”
The following figure shows, for the period since January 2010, the upper bound (the blue line) and lower bound (the green line) for the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate and the actual values of the federal funds rate (the red line) during that time. Note that the Fed has been successful in keeping the value of the federal funds rate in its target range. (We discuss the monetary policy tools the FOMC uses to maintain the federal funds rate in its target range in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.2).)
After the meeting, the committee also released a “Summary of Economic Projections” (SEP)—as it typically does after its March, June, September, and December meetings. The SEP presents median values of the 18 committee members’ forecasts of key economic variables. The values are summarized in the following table, reproduced from the release.
There are several aspects of these forecasts worth noting:
Committee members reduced their forecast of real GDP growth for 2025 from 1.7 percent in March to 1.4 percent today. (It had been 2.1 percent in their December forecast.) Committee members also slightly increased their forecast of the unemployment rate at the end of 2025 from 4.4 percent to 4.5 percent. (The unemployment rate in May was 4.2 percent.)
Committee members now forecast that personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price inflation will be 3.0 percent at the end of 2025. In March they had forecast that it would be 2.7 percent at the end of 2025, and in December, they had forecast that it would 2.5 percent. Similarly, their forecast of core PCE inflation increased from 2.8 percent to 3.1 percent. It had been 2.5 percent in December. The committee does not expect that PCE inflation will decline to the Fed’s 2 percent annual target until sometime after 2027.
The committee’s forecast of the federal funds rate at the end of 2025 was unchanged at 3.9 percent. The federal funds rate today is 4.33 percent, which indicates that the median forecast of committee members is for two 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) cuts in their target for the federal funds rate this year. Investors are similarly forecasting two 25 basis point cuts.
During his press conference, Powell indicated that because the tariff increases the Trump administration implemented beginning in April were larger than any in recent times, their effects on the economy are difficult to gauge. He noted that: “There’s the manufacturer, the exporter, the importer and the retailer and the consumer. And each one of those is going to be trying not to be the one to pay for the tariff, but together they will all pay together, or maybe one party will pay it all.” The more of the tariff that is passed on to consumers, the higher the inflation rate will be.
Earlier today, President Trump reiterated his view that the FOMC should be cutting its target for the federal funds rate, labeling Powell as “stupid” for not doing so. Trump has indicated that the Fed should cut its target rate by 1 percentage point to 2.5 percentage points in order to reduce the U.S. Treasury’s borrowing costs. During World War II and the beginning of the Korean War, the Fed pegged the interest rates on Treasury securities at low levels: 0.375 percent on Treasury bills and 2.5 percent on Treasury bonds. Following the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord, reached in March 1951, the Federal Reserve was freed from the obligation to fix the interest rates on Treasury securities. (We discuss the Accord in Chapter 13 of Money, Banking, and the Financial System.) Since that time, the Fed has focused on its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability and it has not been directly concerned with affecting the Treasury’s borrowing cost.
Barring a sharp slowdown in the growth of real GDP, a significant rise in the unemployment rate, or a significant rise in the inflation rate, the FOMC seems unlikely to change its target for the federal funds rate before its meeting on September 16–17 at the earliest.
Today (May 30), the BEA released monthly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index as part of its “Personal Income and Outlays” report. The Fed relies on annual changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target. The following figure shows PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2016, with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. In April, PCE inflation was 2.1 percent, down from 2.3 percent in March. Core PCE inflation in April was 2.5 percent, down from 2.7 percent in March. Headline PCE inflation was below the forecast of economists surveyed, while core PCE inflation was consistent with the forecast.
The following figure shows PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation, while this figure shows 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, PCE inflation increased in April to 1.2 percent from 0.1 percent in March. Core PCE inflation also increased from 1.1 percent in March to 1.4 percent in April. So, both 1-month PCE inflation estimates are well below the Fed’s 2 percent target. The usual caution applies that 1-month inflation figures are volatile (as can be seen in the figure), so we shouldn’t attempt to draw wider conclusions from one month’s data. In addition, because these data are for April, they don’t capture fully the price increases resulting from the tariff increases the Trump administration announced on April 2.
Fed Chair Jerome Powell has noted that inflation in non-market services has been high. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices fall, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also fall. Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.” The following figure shows 12-month headline inflation (the blue line) and 12-month core inflation (the red line) for market-based PCE. (The BEA explains the market-based PCE measure here.)
Headline market-based PCE inflation was 1.9 percent in April, unchanged from March. Core market-based PCE inflation was 2.3 percent in April, which was also unchanged from March. So, both market-based measures show about the same rate of inflation in April as the total measures do. In the following figure, we look at 1-month inflation using these measures. The 1-month inflation rates are both higher than the 12-month rates. Headline market-based inflation was 2.6 percent in April, up from 0.1 percent in March. Core market-based inflation was 3.1 percent in April, up from 1.2 percent in March. As the figure shows, the 1-month inflation rates are more volatile than the 12-month rates, which is why the Fed relies on the 12-month rates when gauging how close it is coming to hitting its target inflation rate.
In summary, today’s data provide some evidence that the inflation rate is getting closer to the Fed’s 2 percent annual target. Improving inflation combined with some indications that output growth is slowing—the BEA release indicated that growth in real consumption expenditures slowed in April—might make it more likely that the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will cut its target for the federal funds rate relatively soon.
However, investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts expect that the FOMC will leave its federal funds rate target unchanged at its next meetings on June 17–18 and July 29–30. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) Investors assign a probability 0f 72.6 percent to the FOMC cutting its target at its September 29–30 meeting. Investor expectations reflect the recent statements from Fed Chair Jerome Powell and other members of the FOMC that they intend to wait until the effects of the tariff increases on the economy are clearer before changing the target for the federal funds rate.
Photo of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell from federalreserve.gov.
As we discussed in a recent blog post, through the years a number of presidents have attempted to pressure Fed chairs to implement the monetary policy the president preferred. Although President Donald Trump nominated Jerome Powell to his first term as Fed chair—which began in February 2018—Trump has had many critical things to say about Powell’s conduct of monetary policy. Early in Trump’s current term, it seemed possible that he would attempt to replace Powell as Fed chair before the end of Powell’s second term in May 2026. Trump has stated, though, that he doesn’t intend to remove Powell. (As we discussed in this recent blog post, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would allow a president to remove a Fed chair because of disagreements over monetary policy.)
It’s not unusual for Fed chairs to meet with presidents, but until today (May 29) Powell had not met with Trump. When asked in a press conference on May 7 about a meeting with Trump, Powell responded that: “I don’t think it’s up to a Fed Chair to seek a meeting with the President, although maybe some have done so. I’ve never done so, and I can’t imagine myself doing that. It’s—I think it’s always—comes the other way: A President wants to meet with you. But that hasn’t happened.”
Today, Powell met with Trump after Trump requested a meeting. After the meeting, the Fed released this brief statement:
“At the President’s invitation, Chair Powell met with the President today at the White House to discuss economic developments including for growth, employment, and inflation.
Chair Powell did not discuss his expectations for monetary policy, except to stress that the path of policy will depend entirely on incoming economic information and what that means for the outlook.
Finally, Chair Powell said that he and his colleagues on the FOMC will set monetary policy, as required by law, to support maximum employment and stable prices and will make those decisions based solely on careful, objective, and non-political analysis.”
According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, following the meeting, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt stated that:
“The president did say that he believes the Fed chair is making a mistake by not lowering interest rates, which is putting us at an economic disadvantage to China and other countries. The president has been very vocal about that both publicly—and now I can reveal—privately, as well.”
Photo of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell from federalreserve.gov
Can a president fire the chair of the Federal Reserve in the same way that presidents have been able to fire cabinet secretaries? President Donald Trump has had a contentious relationship with Fed Chair Jerome Powell. Powell’s term as Fed chair is scheduled to end in May 2026. At times, Trump has indicated that he would like to remove Powell before Powell’s term ends, although most recently he’s indicated that he won’t do so.
Does Trump, or any president, have the legal authority to replace a Fed chair before the chair’s term expires? As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 27 (Economics Chapter 17), according to the Federal Reserve Act, once a Fed chair is nominated to a four-year term by the president (President Trump first nominated Powell to be chair in 2017 and Powell took office in 2018) and confirmed by the Senate, the president cannot remove the Fed chair except “for cause.” As we’ve noted in previous blog posts, most legal scholars argue that a president cannot remove a Fed chair due to a disagreement over monetary policy.
But if the Fed is part of the executive branch of the federal government and the president is the head of executive branch, why shouldn’t the president be able to replace a Fed chair. Article I, Section II of the Constitution of the United States states that: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” The ability of Congress to limit the president’s power to appoint and remove heads of commissions, agencies, and other bodies in the executive branch of government—such as the Federal Reserve—is not clearly specified in the Constitution. In 1935, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled in the case of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States that President Franklin Roosevelt couldn’t remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) because in creating the FTC, Congress specified that members could only be removed for cause. Legal scholars have presumed that the ruling in this case would also bar attempts by a president to remove members of the Fed’s Board of Governors because of a disagreement over monetary policy.
Earlier this year, the Trump administration fired a member of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and a member of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The members sued and an appeals court ordered the president to reinstate the members. The Trump administration appealed the order to the Supreme Court, which on Thursday (May 22) granted a stay of the order on the grounds that “the Government is likely to show that both the NLRB and MSPB exercise considerable executive power,” and therefore can be removed by the president, when the case is heard by the lower court. The ruling indicated that a majority of the Supreme Court is likely to overturn the Humphrey’s Executor precedent either in this case, if it ends up being argued before the court, or in a similar case. (The Supreme Court’s order is here. An Associated Press article describing the decision is here. An article in the Wall Street Journal discussing the issues involved is here.)
Does the Supreme Court’s ruling in this case indicate that it would allow a president to remove a Fed chair? The court explicitly addressed this question, first noting that attorneys for the two board members had argued that “arguments in this case necessarily implicate the constitutionality of for-cause removal protections for members of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors or other members of the Federal Open Market Committee.” But the majority of the court didn’t accept the attorneys’ argument: “We disagree. The Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.” (We discuss the First and Second Banks of the United States in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 10.)
We discuss the unusual nature of the Fed’s structure in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.4, where we note that Congress gave the Fed a hybrid public-private structure and the ability to fund its own operations without needing appropriations from Congress. Fed Chair Powell clearly agrees that the Fed’s structure distinguishes its situation from that of other federal boards and commissions. Responding to a question following a speech in April, Powell indicated that he believes that the Fed’s unique structure means that a president would not have the power to remove a Fed chair.
It’s worth noting that the statement the court issued had the limited scope of staying the appeals court’s ruling that the members of the two commissions be reinstated. If a case arises that addresses directly the question of whether presidents can remove Fed chairs, it’s possible that, after hearing oral and written arguments, some of the justices may change their minds and decide that the president has that power. It wouldn’t be unusual for justices to change their minds during the process of deciding a case. But for now it appears that the Supreme Court would likely not allow a president to remove a Fed chair.
Fed Chair Jerome Powell speaking at a press conference following a meeting of the FOMC (photo from federalreserve.gov)
Members of the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had signaled clearly before today’s (May 7) meeting that the committee would leave its target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent. In the statement released after its meeting, the committee made one significant change to the wording in its statement following its last meeting on March 19. The committee added the words in bold to the following sentence:
“The Committee is attentive to the risks to both sides of its dual mandate and judges that the risks of higher unemployment and higher inflation have risen.”
The key event since the last FOMC meeting was President Trump’s announcement on April 2 that he would implement tariff increases that were much higher than had previously been expected.
As we noted in an earlier blog post, an unexpected increase in tariff rates will result in an aggregate supply shock to the economy. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 13,Section 13.3 (Economics, Chapter 23, Section 23.3), an aggregate supply shock puts upward pressure on the price level at the same time as it causes a decline in real GDP and employment. The result, as the FOMC statement indicates, can be both rising inflation and rising unemployment. If higher inflation and higher unemployment persist, the U.S. economy would be experiencing stagflation. The United States last experienced stagflation during the 1970s when large increases in oil prices caused an aggregate supply shock.
During his press conference following the meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell indicated that the increase in tariffs might the Fed’s dual mandate goals of price stability and maximum employment “in tension” if both inflation and unemployment increase. If the FOMC were to increase its target for the federal funds rate in order to slow the growth of demand and bring down the inflation rate, the result might be to further increase unemployment. But if the FOMC were to cut its target for the federal funds rate to increase the growth of demand and reduce the unemployment rate, the result might be to further increase the inflation rate.
Powell emphasized during his press conference that tariffs had not yet had an effect on either inflation or unemployment that was large enough to be reflected in macroeconomic data—as we’ve noted in blog posts discussing recent macroeconomic data releases. As a result, the consensus among committee members is that it would be better to wait to future meetings before deciding what changes in the federal funds rate might be needed: “We’re in a good position to wait and see. We don’t have to be in a hurry.”
The following figure shows, for the period since January 2010, the upper bound (the blue line) and lower bound (the green line) for the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate and the actual values of the federal funds rate (the red line) during that time. Note that the Fed is successful in keeping the value of the federal funds rate in its target range. (We discuss the monetary policy tools the FOMC uses to maintain the federal funds rate in its target range in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.2).)
In his press conference, Powell indicated that when the committee would change its target for the federal funds rate was dependent on the trends in macroeconomic data on inflation, unemployment, and output during the coming months. He noted that if both unemployment and inflation significantly increased, the committee would focus on which variable had moved furthest from the Fed’s target. He also noted that it was possible that neither inflation nor unemployment might end up significantly increasing either because tariff negotiations lead to lower tariff rates or because the economy proves to be better able to deal with the effects of tariff increases than many economist now expect.
One indication of expectations of future changes in the target for the federal funds rate comes from investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) The data from the futures market indicate that investors don’t expect that the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate at its May 17–18 meeting. As shown in the following figure, investors assign a 80.1 percent probability to the committee keeping its target unchanged at 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent at that meeting.
When will the Fed likely cut its target for the federal funds rate? As the following figure shows, investors expect it to happen at the FOMC’s July 29–30 meeting. Investors assign a probably of 58.5 percent to the committee cutting its target by 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) at that meeting and a probability of 12.7 percent to the committee cutting its target by 50 basis points. Investors assign a probability of only 28.8 percent to the committee leaving its target unchanged.
An image generated by ChatGTP-4o of a hypothetical meeting between President Richard Nixon and Fed Chair Arthur Burns in the White House.
In a speech on April 15 at the Economic Club of Chicago, Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell discussed how the Fed might react to President Donald Trump’s tariff increases: “Tariffs are highly likely to generate at least a temporary rise in inflation. The inflationary effects could also be more persistent…. Our obligation is to keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored and to make certain that a one-time increase in the price level does not become an ongoing inflation problem.”
Powell’s remarks were interpreted as indicating that the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was unlikely to cut its target for the federal funds rate anytime soon. President Trump, who has stated several times that the FOMC should cut its target, was displeased with Powell’s position and posted on social media that “Powell’s termination cannot come fast enough!” Stock prices declined sharply on the possibility that Trump might try to fire Powell because many economists and market participants believed that move would increase uncertainty and possibly undermine the FOMC’s continuing attempts to bring inflation down to the Fed’s 2 percent target. Trump, possibly responding to the fall in stock prices, stated to reporters that he had “no intention” of firing Powell. In this recent blog post we discuss the debate over whether presidents can legally fire Fed chairs.
Leaving aside the legal issue of whether a president can fire a Fed chair, would it be better or worse for the conduct of monetary if the presdient did have that power? We review the arguments for and against the Fed conducting monetary policy independently of the president and Congress in Macroeconomics, Chapter 17, Section 17.4 (Economics, Chapter 27, Section 27.4). One key point that’s often made in favor of Fed independence is illustrated in Figure 17.12, which is reproduced below.
The figure is from a classic study by Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, who were both economists at Harvard University at the time. Alesina and Summers tested the assertion that the less independent a country’s central bank, the higher the country’s inflation rate will be by comparing the degree of central bank independence and the inflation rate for 16 high-income countries during the years from 1955 to 1988. As the figure shows, countries with highly independent central banks, such as the United States, Switzerland, and Germany, had lower inflation rates than countries whose central banks had little independence, such as New Zealand, Italy, and Spain. In the following years, New Zealand and Canada granted their banks more independence, at least partly to better fight inflation.
Debates over Fed independence didn’t start with President Trump and Fed Chair Powell; they date all the way back to the passage of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. The background to the passage of the Act is the political struggle over establishing a central bank during the early years of the country. In 1791, Congress established the Bank of the United States, at the urging of the country’s first Treasury secretary, Alexander Hamilton. When the bank’s initial 20-year charter expired in 1811, political opposition kept the charter from being renewed, and the bank went out of existence. The bank’s opponents believed that the bank’s actions had the effect of reducing loans to farmers and owners of small businesses and that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority in establishing the bank. Financial problems during the War of 1812 led Congress to charter the Second Bank of the United States in 1816. But, again, political opposition, this time led by President Andrew Jackson, resulted in the bank’s charter not being renewed in 1836.
As we discuss in Chapter 14, Section 14.4, Congress established the Federal Reserve as a lender of last resort to bring an end to bank panics. In 1913, Congress was less concerned aboout making the Fed independent from Congress and the president than it was in overcoming political opposition to establishing a central bank located in Washington, DC. Accordingly, Congress established a decentralized system by having 12 District Banks that would be owned by the member banks in the district. Congress gave the responsibility for overseeing the system to the Federal Reserve Board, which was the forerunner of the current Board of Governors. The president had a greater influence on the Federal Reserve Board than presidents today have on the Board of Governors because the Federal Reserve Board included the secretary of the Treasury and the comptroller of the currency as members. Then as now, the president is free to replace the secretary of the Treasury and the comptroller of the currency at any time.
When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, the Fed came under pressure to help the Treasury finance the war by making loans to banks to help the banks purchase Treasury securities—Liberty Bonds—and by lending funds to banks that banks could loan to households to purchase bonds. In 1919, a ruling by the attorney general clarified that Congress had intended in the Federal Reserve Act to give the Federal Reserve Board the power to set the discounts rate the 12 District Banks charged member banks on loans.
Despite this ruling, authority within the Fed remained much more divided than is true today. Divided authority proved to be a serious problem when the Fed had to deal with the Great Depression, which began in August 1929 and worsened as the result of a series of bank panics. As we’ve seen, the secretary of the Treasury and the comptroller of the currency, both of whom report directly to the president of the United States, served on the Federal Reserve Board. So, the Fed had less independence from the executive branch of the government than it does today.
In addition, the heads of the 12 District Banks operated much more independently than they do today, with the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York having nearly as much influence within the system as the head of the Federal Reserve Board. At the time of the bank panics, George Harrison, the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, served as chair of the Open Market Policy Conference, the predecessor of the current Federal Open Market Committee. Harrison frequently acted independently of Roy Young and Eugene Meyer, who served as heads of the Federal Reserve Board during those years. Important decisions could be made only with the consensus of these different groups. During the early 1930s, consensus proved hard to come by, and taking decisive policy actions was difficult.
The difficulties the Fed had in responding to the Great Depression led Congress to reorganize the system with the passage of the Banking Act of 1935. Most of the current structure of the Fed was put in place by that law. Power was concentrated in the hands of the Board of Governors. The removal of the secretary of the Treasury and the comptroller of the currency from the Board reduced the ability of the president to influence the Fed’s decisions.
During World War II, the Fed again came under pressure to help the federal government finance the war. The Fed agreed to hold interest rates on Treasury securities at low levels: 0.375% on Treasury bills and 2.5% on Treasury bonds. The Fed could keep interest rates at these low levels only by buying any bonds that were not purchased by private investors, thereby fixing, or pegging, the rates.
When the war ended in 1945, the Treasury and President Harry Truman wanted to continue this policy, but the Fed didn’t agree. The Fed’s concern was inflation: Larger purchases of Treasury securities by the Fed could increase the growth rate of the money supply and the rate of inflation. Fed Chair Marriner Eccles strongly objected to the policy of fixing interest rates. His opposition led President Truman to not reappoint him as chair in 1948,although Eccles continued to fight for Fed independence during the remainder of his time as a governor. On March 4, 1951, the federal government formally abandoned the wartime policy of fixing the interest rates on Treasury securities with the Treasury–Federal Reserve Accord. This agreement was important in eestablishing the Fed’s ability to operate independently of the Treasury.
Conflicts between the Treasury and the Fed didn’t end with that agreement, however. Thomas Drechsel of the University of Maryland has analyzed the daily schedules of presidents during the period from 1933 to 2016 and finds that during these years presidents met with Fed officials on more than 800 occasions. Of course, not all of these interactions involved attempts by a president to influence the actions of a Fed Chair, but some seem to have. For example, research by Helen Fessenden of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond has shown that in 1967, President Lyndon Johnson, who was facing reelection in 1968, was anxious that Fed Chair William McChesney Martin adopt a more expansionary monetary policy. There is some evidence that Johnson and Martin came to an agreement that if Johnson agreed to push Congress to increase taxes, Martin would pursue an expansionary monetary policy.
An image generated by ChatGTP-4o of a hypothetical meeting between President Lyndon Johnson and Fed Chair William McChesney Martin in the White House.
Similarly, in late 1971, President Richard Nixon was concerned that the unemployment rate was at 6%, which he believed would, if it persisted, endanger his chance of reelection in 1972. Dreschel finds that Nixon met with Fed Chair Arthur Burns 34 times during the second half of 1971. Evidence from tape recordings of Nixon’s conversations with Burns at the White House and from Burns’s diary entries indicate that Nixon pressured Burns to increase the rate of growth of the money supply and that Burns agreed to do so.
President Ronald Reagan and Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker argued over who was at fault for the severe economic recession of the early 1980s. Reagan blamed the Fed for soaring interest rates. Volcker held that the Fed could not take action to bring down interest rates until the budget deficit—which results from policy actions of the president and Congress—was reduced. Similar conflicts occurred during the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, with the Treasury frequently pushing for lower short-term interest rates than the Fed considered advisable.
During the financial crisis of 2007–2009 and during the 2020 Covid pandemic, the Fed worked closely with the Treasury. The relationship was so close, in fact, that some economists and policymakers worried that the Fed might be sacrificing some of its independence. The frequent consultations between Fed Chair Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson in the fall of 2008, during the height of the crisis, were a break with the tradition of Fed chairs formulating policy independently of a presidential administration. During the 2020 pandemic, Fed Chair Jerome Powell and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin also frequently consulted on policy.
These examples from the Fed’s history indicate that presidents have persistently attempted to influence Fed policy. Most economists believe that central bank independence is an important check on inflation. But, given the importance of monetary policy, it’s probably inevitable that presidents and members of Congress will continue to attempt to sway Fed policy.
In this photo of a Federal Open Market Committee meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell is on the far left and Fed Governor Christopher Waller is the third person to Powell’s left. (Photo from federalreserve.gov)
This post discusses two developments this week that involve the Federal Reserve. First, we discuss the apparent disagreement between Fed Chair Jerome Powell and Fed Governor Christopher Waller over the best way to respond to the Trump Administration’s tariff increases. As we discuss in this blog post and in this podcast, in terms of the aggregate demand and aggregate supply model, a large unexpected increase in tariffs results in an aggregate supply shock to the economy, shifting the short-run aggregate supply curve (SRAS) to the left. The following is Figure 13.7 from Macroeconomics (Figure 23.7 from Economics) and illustrates the effects of an aggregate supply shock on short-run macroeconomic equilibrium.
Although the figure shows the effects of an aggregate supply shock that results from an unexpected increase in oil prices, using this model, the result is the same for an aggregate supply shock caused by an unexpected increase in tariffs. Two-thirds of U.S. imports are raw materials, intermediate goods, or capital goods, all of which are used as inputs by U.S. firms. So, in both the case of an increase in oil prices and in the case of an increase in tariffs, the result of the supply shock is an increase in U.S. firms’ production costs. This increase in costs reduces the quantity of goods firms will supply at every price level, shifting the SRAS curve to the left, as shown in panel (a) of the figure. In the new macroeconomic equilibrium, point B in panel (a), the price level increases and the level of real GDP declines. The decline in real GDP will likely result in an increase in the unemployment rate.
An aggregate supply shock poses a policy dilemma for the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). If the FOMC responds to the decline n real GDP and the increase in the unemployment rate with an expansionary monetary policy of lowering the target for the federal funds rate, the result is likely to be a further increase in the price level. Using a contractionary monetary policy of increasing the target for the federla funds rate to deal with the rising price level can cause real GDP to fall further, possibly pushing the economy into a recession. One way to avoid the policy dilemma from an aggregate supply shock caused by an increase in tariffs is for the FOMC to “look through”—that is, not respond—to the increase in tariffs. As panel (b) in the figure shows, if the FOMC looks through the tariff increase, the effect of the aggregate supply shock can be transitory as the economy absorbs the one-time increase in the price level. In time, real GDP will return to equilibrium at potential real GDP and the unemployment rate will fall back to the natural rate of unemployment.
On Monday (April 14), Fed Governor Christopher Waller in a speech to the Certified Financial Analysts Society of St. Louis made the argument for either looking through the macroeconomic effects of the tariff increase—even if the tariff increase turns out to be large, which at this time is unclear—or responding to the negative effects of the tariffs increases on real GDP and unemployment:
“I am saying that I expect that elevated inflation would be temporary, and ‘temporary’ is another word for ‘transitory.’ Despite the fact that the last surge of inflation beginning in 2021 lasted longer than I and other policymakers initially expected, my best judgment is that higher inflation from tariffs will be temporary…. While I expect the inflationary effects of higher tariffs to be temporary, their effects on output and employment could be longer-lasting and an important factor in determining the appropriate stance of monetary policy. If the slowdown is significant and even threatens a recession, then I would expect to favor cutting the FOMC’s policy rate sooner, and to a greater extent than I had previously thought.”
In a press conference after the last FOMC meeting on March 19, Fed Chair Jerome Powell took a similar position, arguing that: “If there’s an inflation that’s going to go away on its own, it’s not the correct response to tighten policy.” But in a speech yesterday (April 16) at the Economic Club of Chicago, Powell indicated that looking through the increase in the price level resulting from a tariff increase might be a mistake:
“The level of the tariff increases announced so far is significantly larger than anticipated. The same is likely to be true of the economic effects, which will include higher inflation and slower growth. Both survey- and market-based measures of near-term inflation expectations have moved up significantly, with survey participants pointing to tariffs…. Tariffs are highly likely to generate at least a temporary rise in inflation. The inflationary effects could also be more persistent…. Our obligation is to keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored and to make certain that a one-time increase in the price level does not become an ongoing inflation problem.”
In a discussion following his speech, Powell argued that tariff increases may disrupt global supply chains for some U.S. industries, such as automobiles, in way that could be similar to the disruptions caused by the Covid pandemic of 2020. As a result: “When you think about supply disruptions, that is the kind of thing that can take time to resolve and it can lead what would’ve been a one-time inflation shock to be extended, perhaps more persistent.” Whereas Waller seemed to indicate that as a result of the tariff increases the FOMC might be led to cut its target for the federal funds sooner or to larger extent in order to meet the maximum employment part of its dual mandate, Powell seemed to indicate that the FOMC might keep its target unchanged longer in order to meet the price stability part of the dual mandate.
Powell’s speech caught the notice of President Donald Trump who has been pushing the FOMC to cut its target for the federal funds rate sooner. An article in the Wall Street Journal, quoted Trump as posting to social media that: “Powell’s termination cannot come fast enough!” Powell’s term as Fed chair is scheduled to end in May 2026. Does Trump have the legal authority to replace Powell earlier than that? As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 27 (Economics Chapter 17), according to the Federal Reserve Act, once a Fed chair is notimated to a four-year term by the president (President Trump first nominated Powell to be chair in 2017 and Powell took office in 2018) and confirmed by the Senate, the president cannot remove the Fed chair except “for cause.” Most legal scholars argue that a president cannot remove a Fed chair due to a disagreement over monetary policy.
Article I, Section II of the Constitution of the United States states that: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” The ability of Congress to limit the president’s power to appoint and remove heads of commissions, agencies, and other bodies in the executive branch of government—such as the Federal Reserve—is not clearly specified in the Constitution. In 1935, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled in the case of Humphrey’s Executor v. United States that President Franklin Roosevelt couldn’t remove a member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) because in creating the FTC, Congress specified that members could only be removed for cause. Legal scholars have presumed that the ruling in this case would also bar attempts by a president to remove members of the Fed’s Board of Governors because of a disagreement over monetary policy.
The Trump Administration recently fired a member of the National Labor Relations Board and a member of the Merit Systems Protection Board. The members sued and the Supreme Court is considering the case. The Trump Adminstration is asking the Court to overturn the Humphrey’s Executor decision as having been wrongly decided because the decision infringed on the executive power given to the president by the Constitution. If the Court agrees with the administration and overturns the precdent established by Humphrey’s Executor, would President Trump be free to fire Chair Powell before Powell’s term ends? (An overview of the issues involved in this Court case can be found in this article from the Associated Press.)
The answer isn’t clear because, as we’ve noted in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.4, Congress gave the Fed an unusual hybrid public-private structure and the ability to fund its own operations without needing appropriations from Congress. It’s possible that the Court would rule that in overturning Humphrey’s Executor—if the Court should decide to do that—it wasn’t authorizing the president to replace the Fed chair at will. In response to a question following his speech yesterday, Powell seemed to indicate that the Fed’s unique structure might shield it from the effects of the Court’s decision.
If the Court were to overturn its ruling in Humphrey’s Executor and indicate that the ruling did authorize the president to remove the Fed chair, the Fed’s ability to conduce monetary policy independently of the president would be seriously undermined. In Macroeconomics, Chapter 17, Section 17.4 we review the arguments for and against Fed independence. It’s unclear at this point when the Court might rule on the case.
Today (April 10), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its monthly report on the consumer price index (CPI). The following figure compares headline inflation (the blue line) and core inflation (the red line).
The headline inflation rate, which is measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous year, was 2.4 percent in March—down from 2.8 percent in February.
The core inflation rate,which excludes the prices of food and energy, was 2.8 percent in March—down from 3.1 percent in February.
Both headline inflation and core inflation were below what economists surveyed had expected.
In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, headline inflation (the blue line) fell sharply from 2.6 percent in March to –0.6 percent—that is, the economy experienced deflation in March. Core inflation (the red line) decreased from 2.6 percent in February to 0.7 percent in March.
Overall, considering 1-month and 12-month inflation together, inflation slowed significantly in March. Of course, it’s important not to overinterpret the data from a single month. The figure shows that 1-month inflation rate is particularly volatile. Also note that the Fed uses the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, rather than the CPI, to evaluate whether it is hitting its 2 percent annual inflation target.
There’s been considerable discussion in the media about continuing inflation in grocery prices. In the following figure the blue line shows inflation in the CPI category “food at home,” which is primarily grocery prices. Inflation in grocery prices was 2.4 percent in March, up from 1.8 percent in February, but still far below the peak of 13.6 percen in August 2022. Although, on average, grocery price inflation has been low over the past 18 months, there have been substantial increases in the prices of some food items. For instance, egg prices—shown by the red line—increased by 108.1 percent in March. But, as the figure shows, egg prices are usually quite volatile month-to-month, even when the country is not dealing with an epidemic of bird flu.
To better estimate the underlying trend in inflation, some economists look at median inflation and trimmed mean inflation.
Median inflation is calculated by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Ohio State University. If we listed the inflation rate in each individual good or service in the CPI, median inflation is the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates.
Trimmed-mean inflation drops the 8 percent of goods and services with the highest inflation rates and the 8 percent of goods and services with the lowest inflation rates.
The following figure shows that 12-month trimmed-mean inflation (the blue line) was 3.0 percent in March, down from 3.1 percent in February. Twelve-month median inflation (the red line) also declined slightly from 3.1 percent in February to 3.0 percent in March.
The following figure shows 1-month trimmed-mean and median inflation. One-month trimmed-mean inflation fell from 3.3 percent in February to 2.6. percent in March. One-month median inflation increased from 3.5 percent in February to 4.1 percent in March. These data are noticeably higher than either the 12-month measures for these variables or the 1-month and 12-month measures of headline and core inflation. Again, though, all 1-month inflation measures can be volatile.
There isn’t much sign in today’s CPI report that the tariffs recently imposed by the Trump Administration have affected retail prices. President Trump announced yesterday that many of the tariffs would be suspended for at least 90 days, although the across-the-board tariff of 10 percent remains in place and a tariff of 145 percent has been imposed on goods imported from China. It would surprising if those tariff increases don’t begin to have at least some effect on the CPI over the next few months. As we noted in this post from earlier in the month, Tariffs pose a dilemma for the Fed, because tariffs have the effect of both increasing the price level and reducing real GDP and employment.
What are the implications of this CPI report for the actions the Federal Reserve’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) may take at its next two meetings? Investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts still do not expect that the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate at its next two meetings. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) Today, investors assigned only a 29.9 percent probability that the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will cut its target from the current 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent range at its meeting on May 6–7. Investors assigned a probability of 85.2 percent that the FOMC would cut its target after its meeting on June 17–18 by at least 0.25 percent (or 25 basis points).
By the time the FOMC meets again in early May we may have more data on the effects the tariffs are having on the economy.
As we’ve noted in earlier posts, according to the usually reliable GDPNow forecast from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, real GDP in the first quarter of 2025 will decline by 2.8 percent. This morning (April 4), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Employment Situation” report (often called the “jobs report”) for March. The data in the report show no sign that the U.S. economy is in a recession. We should add two caveats, however: 1. The effects of the unexpectedly large tariff increases announced this week by the Trump Administration are not reflected in the data from this report, and 2. at the beginning of a recession the data in the jobs report can be subject to large revisions.
The jobs report has two estimates of the change in employment during the month: one estimate from the establishment survey, often referred to as the payroll survey, and one from the household survey. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1), many economists and Federal Reserve policymakers believe that employment data from the establishment survey provide a more accurate indicator of the state of the labor market than do the household survey’s employment data and unemployment data. (The groups included in the employment estimates from the two surveys are somewhat different, as we discuss in this post.)
According to the establishment survey, there was a net increase of 228,000 jobs during March. This increase was well above the increase of 140,000 that economists had forecast. Somewhat offsetting this unexpectedly large increase was the BLS revising downward its previous estimates of employment in January and February by a combined 48,000 jobs. (The BLS notes that: “Monthly revisions result from additional reports received from businesses and government agencies since the last published estimates and from the recalculation of seasonal factors.”) The following figure from the jobs report shows the net change in payroll employment for each month in the last two years.
The unemployment rate rose slightly to 4.2 percent in March from 4.1 percent in February. As the following figure shows, the unemployment rate has been remarkably stable in recent months, staying between 4.0 percent and 4.2 percent in each month since May 2024. In March, the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) forecast that the unemployment rate for 2025 would average 4.4 percent.
As the following figure shows, the monthly net change in jobs from the household survey moves much more erratically than does the net change in jobs from the establishment survey. As measured by the household survey, there was a net increase of 201,000 jobs in March, following a sharp decrease of 588,000 jobs in February. In any particular month, the story told by the two surveys can be inconsistent with employment increasing in one survey while falling in the other. This month, however, both surveys showed roughly the same net job increase. (In this blog post, we discuss the differences between the employment estimates in the two surveys.)
One concerning sign in the household survey is the fall in the employment-population ratio for prime age workers—those aged 25 to 54. The ratio declined from 80.5 percent in February to 80.4 percent in March. Although the prime-age employment-population is still high relative to the average level since 2001, it’s now well below the high of 80.9 percent in mid-2024. Continuing declines in this ratio would indicate a significant softening in the labor market.
It’s unclear how many federal workers have been laid off since the Trump Administration took office. The establishment survey shows a decline in total federal government employment of 4,000 in March. However, the BLS notes that: “Employees on paid leave or receiving ongoing severance pay are counted as employed in the establishment survey.” It’s possible that as more federal employees end their period of receiving severance pay, future jobs reports may find a more significant decline in federal employment.
The establishment survey also includes data on average hourly earnings (AHE). As we noted in this post, many economists and policymakers believe the employment cost index (ECI) is a better measure of wage pressures in the economy than is the AHE. The AHE does have the important advantage of being available monthly, whereas the ECI is only available quarterly. The following figure shows the percentage change in the AHE from the same month in the previous year. The AHE increased 3.8 percent in March, down from 4.0 percent in February.
The following figure shows wage inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month wage inflation, whereas this figure shows 1-month wage inflation.) One-month wage inflation is much more volatile than 12-month wage inflation—note the very large swings in 1-month wage inflation in April and May 2020 during the business closures caused by the Covid pandemic. The March 1-month rate of wage inflation was 3.0 percent, up from 2.7 percent in February. Whether measured as a 12-month increase or as a 1-month increase, AHE is still increasing somewhat more rapidly than is consistent with the Fed achieving its 2 percent target rate of price inflation.
Taken by itself, today’s jobs report leaves the situation facing the Federal Reserve’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) largely unchanged. There are some indications that the economy may be weakening, as shown by some of the data in the jobs report and by some of the data incorporated by the Atlanta Fed in its pessimistic nowcast of first quarter real GDP. But the Fed hasn’t yet brought inflation down to its 2 percent annual target.
Looming over monetary policy is the fallout from the Trump Administration’s implementation of unexpectedly large tariff increases. As we note in this blog post, a large unexpected increase in tariffs results in an aggregate supply shock to the economy. In terms of the basic aggregate demand and aggregate supply model that we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 13 (Economics, Chapter 23), an unexpected increase in tariffs shifts the short-run aggregate supply curve (SRAS) to the left, increasing the price level and reducing the level of real GDP.
The effect of the tariffs poses a dilemma for the Fed. With inflation still running above the 2 percent annual target, additional upward pressure on the price level is unwelcome news. The dramatic decline in both stock prices and in the interest rate on the 10-Treasury note indicate that investors are concerned that the tariffs increases may push the U.S. economy into a recession. The FOMC can respond to the threat of a recession by cutting its target for the federal funds rate, but doing so runs the risk of pushing inflation higher.
In a speech today, Fed Chair Jerome Powell stated the following:
“We have stressed that it will be very difficult to assess the likely economic effects of higher tariffs until there is greater certainty about the details, such as what will be tariffed, at what level and for what duration, and the extent of retaliation from our trading partners. While uncertainty remains elevated, it is now becoming clear that the tariff increases will be significantly larger than expected. The same is likely to be true of the economic effects, which will include higher inflation and slower growth. The size and duration of these effects remain uncertain. While tariffs are highly likely to generate at least a temporary rise in inflation, it is also possible that the effects could be more persistent. Avoiding that outcome would depend on keeping longer-term inflation expectations well anchored, on the size of the effects, and on how long it takes for them to pass through fully to prices. Our obligation is to keep longer-term inflation expectations well anchored and to make certain that a one-time increase in the price level does not become an ongoing inflation problem.”
One indication of expectations of future cuts in the target for the federal funds rate comes from investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) The data from the futures market indicate that, despite the potential effects of the surprisingly large tariff increases, investors don’t expect that the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate at its May 6–7 meeting. As shown in the following figure, investors assign a 58.4 percent probability to the committee keeping its target unchanged at 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent at that meeting.
It’s a different story if we look at the end of the year. As the following figure shows, investors now expect that by the end of the FOMC’s meeting on December 9-10, the committee will have implemented at least four 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) cuts in its target range for the federal funds rate. Investors assign a probability of 75.8 percent that the target range will end the year 3.25 percent to 3.50 percent or lower. At their March meeting, FOMC members projected only two 25 basis point cuts this year—but that was before the announcement of the unexpectedly large tariff increases.
Today (March 28), the BEA released monthly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index as part of its “Personal Income and Outlays” report. The Fed relies on annual changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target. The following figure shows PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2016 with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. In February, PCE inflation was 2.5 percent, unchanged since January. Core PCE inflation in January was 2.8 percent, up slightly from 2.7 percent in January. Headline PCE inflation was consistent with the forecasts of economists, but core PCE inflation was higher.
The following figure shows PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation, while this figure shows 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, PCE inflation declined slightly in February to 4.0 percent from 4.1 percent in January. Core PCE inflation jumped in February to 4.5 percent from 3.6 percent in January. So, both 1-month PCE inflation estimates are running well above the Fed’s 2 percent target. The usual caution applies that 1-month inflation figures are volatile (as can be seen in the figure), so we shouldn’t attempt to draw wider conclusions from one month’s data. But it is definitely concerning that 1-month inflation has risen each month since November 2024.
Fed Chair Jerome Powell has noted that inflation in non-market services has been high. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices fall, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also fall. Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.” The following figure shows 12-month headline inflation (the blue line) and 12-month core inflation (the green line) for market-based PCE. (The BEA explains the market-based PCE measure here.)
Headline market-based PCE inflation was 2.2 percent in February, and core market-based PCE inflation was 2.4 percent. So, both market-based measures show less inflation in February than do the total measures. In the following figure, we look at 1-month inflation using these measures. The 1-month inflation rates are both very high. Headline market-based inflation was 4.0 percent in February, up from 3.5 percent in January. Core market-based inflation was 4.6 percent in February, up from 2.8 percent in January. Both 1-month market-based inflation members have increased each month since November.
In summary, today’s data don’t show any evidence that inflation is returning to the Fed’s 2 percent annual target. It has to concern the Fed that the 1-month inflation measures have been increasing since November with the latest data showing inflation running far above the Fed’s target. The Fed’s goal of a “soft landing”—with inflation returning to the Fed’s 2 percent target without the economy entering a recession—no longer appears to be on the horizon. The current data seem more consistent with a “no landing” scenario in which the economy avoids a recession but inflation doesn’t return to the Fed’s target. As a result, it seems very unlikely that the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will lower its target for the federal funds rate at its next meeting on May 6-7, unless the unemployment rate jumps or the growth of output slows dramatically.
Investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts expect that the FOMC will leave its federal funds rate target unchanged at its next meeting. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) As the following figure shows, investors assign a probability of 82.9 percent to the FOMC leaving its target for the federal funds rate unchanged at the current range of 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent. Investors assign a probability of only 17.1 percent to the FOMC cutting its target by 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points).
As the following figure shows, investors assign a probability of 72.9 percent percent to the FOMC cutting its target range by at least 25 basis points at its meeting on June 17–18. Despite the bad news on inflation in today’s BEA report, investors assign a zero probability to the FOMC increasing its target range for the federal funds rate to help push inflation back to the Fed’s target. One aspect of the current situation that both policymakers and investors are uncertain of is the effect of the Trump Administration’s new tariffs on the price level. It’s possible that some of the increase in inflation seen in today’s report is the result of tariff increases, but the full extent of the effect will only become evident when the tariffs are fully in place.
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