Photo of a Walmart store from the Associated Press via the Wall Street Journal.
Many people are familiar with Fortune magazine’s list of the 500 largest U.S.-based firms, measured by their revenue in 2022. (Note: It’s easy to confuse the Fortune 500 with the S&P 500. Firms are included in the S&P 500 on the basis of their market capitalization—the value of all of their outstanding shares of stock—rather than on the basis of their revenue. The S&P 500 is used to compute the most widely followed stock market index. See Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 8, Section 8.2, and Macroeconomics and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 6, Section 6.2.)
Fortune also compiles a global 500 list, which includes firms based anywhere in the world. The table below shows the top 10 firms on this Fortune list. With more than $600 billion in revenue in 2022, Walmart tops the list. Five of the ten largest firms are in the oil industry. The three firms based in China are owned by the Chinese government. The Saudi government owns more than half of Saudi Aramco.
Firm
Industry
Country
Walmart
Retailing
United States
Saudi Aramco
Oil
Saudi Arabia
State Grid
Public utility
China
Amazon
Retailing
United States
China National Petroleum
Oil
China
Sinopec Group
Oil
China
Exxon Mobil
Oil
United States
Apple
Consumer electronics
United States
Shell
Oil
United Kingdom
UnitedHealth Group
Health insurance
United States
The following table shows how many firms among the top 100 are headquartered in the listed countries. All countries that have more than one firm located in them are included. Far more of these large firms are located in the United States and China than in any of the other countries. Germany, Japan, France, and South Korea are the only other countries that are the headquarters for more than two firms.
Supports: Microeconomics, Chapter 6, Section 6.3, Economics, Chapter 6, Section 6.3, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 7, Section 7.7
The Walt Disney Studios in Burbank, California (Photo from reuters.com)
On August 9, Disney released its earnings for the third quarter of its fiscal year. In a conference call with investors, Disney CEO Bob Iger announced that the price for a subscription to the Disney+ streaming service would increase from $10.99 per month to $13.99. An article in the Wall Street Journal quoted Iger as saying that the company had been more uncertain about pricing Disney+ than rival Netflix was about pricing its streaming service “because we’re new at all this.” According to the article, Iger had also said that “there was room to raise prices further [for Disney+] without reducing demand.” A column in the New York Times made the following observation: “The strategy now is to extract more money from subscribers via hefty price increases for Disney+, and hoping that those efforts don’t drive them away.”
a. What is Disney assuming about the price elasticity of demand for Disney+? Briefly explain.
b. Assuming that Disney is only concerned with the total revenue it earns from Disney+, what is the largest percentage of subscribers Disney can afford to “drive away” as a result of its price increase?
c. Why would Iger point out that Disney was new at selling streaming services when discussing the large price increase they were implementing?
d. According to the Wall Street Journal’s account of Iger’s remarks, did he use the phrase “reducing demand” as an economist would? Briefly explain.
Solving the Problem
Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the effect of a price change on a firm’s revenue, so you may want to review the section “The Relationship between Price Elasticity of Demand and Total Revenue.”
Step 2: Answer part (a) by explaining what Disney is assuming about the price elasticity of demand for Disney+.Disney must be assuming that the demand for Disney+ is price inelastic because they expect that the price increase will increase the revenue they earn from the service. If the demand were price elastic, they would earn less revenue following the price increase.
Step 3: Answer part (b) by calculating the largest percentage of subscribers that Disney can drive away with the price increase. Disney is increasing the price of Disney+ by $3 per month, from $10.99 to $13.99. That is a ($3/$10.99) × 100 = 27.3 percent increase. (Note that we would get a somewhat different result if we used the midpoint formula described in Section 6.1.) For the price increase to increase Disney’s revenue from Disney+, the percentage decrease in the quantity demanded must be less than the percentage increase in the price. Therefore, the price increase can’t drive away more than 27.3 percent of Disney+ subscribers.
Step 4: Answer part (c) by explaining why Iger mentioned that Disney was new to streaming when discussing the Disney+ price increase. Firms sometimes attempt to statistically estimate their demand curves to determine the price elasticity. But particularly when a firm has only recently started selling a product, it often searches for the profit maximizing price through a process of trial and error. Iger contrasted Disney’s relative lack of experience in selling streaming services with Netflix’s much longer experience. In that context, it’s plausible that Disney had been substantially overestimating the price elasticity of demand for Disney+ (that is, Disney had thought that in absolute value, the price elasticity was larger than it actually was). So, the profit maximizing price might be significantly higher than the company had initially thought.
Step 5: Answer part (d) by explaining whether Iger used the phrase “reducing demand” as an economist would. Following a price increase, Disney will experience a reduction in the quantity demanded of Disney+ subscriptions—a movement along the demand curve for subscriptions. For Disney to experience reduced demand for Disney+ subscriptions—a shift of the demand curve—a change in some variable other than price would have to cause consumers to reduce their willingness to buy subscriptions at every price.
Sources: Robbie Whelan, “Disney to Significantly Raise Prices of Disney+, Hulu Streaming Services,” Wall Street Journal, August 9, 2023; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ravi Mattu, Sarah Kessler, Michael J. de la Merced, and Ephrat Livni, “Bob Iger Tweaks Disney’s Strategy on Streaming,” New York Times, August 10, 2023.
The Federal Reserve building in Washington, DC. (Photo from Bloomberg News via the Wall Street Journal.)
The key macroeconomic question of the past two years is whether the Federal Reserve could bring down the high inflation rate without triggering a recession. In this blog post from back in February, we described the three likely macroeconomic outcomes as:
A soft landing—inflation returns to the Fed’s 2 percent target without a recession occurring.
A hard landing—inflation returns to the Fed’s 2 percent target with a recession occurring.
No landing—inflation remains above the Fed’s 2 percent target but no recession occurs.
The following figure shows inflation measured as the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index and in the core PCE, which excludes food and energy prices. Recall that the Fed uses inflation as measured by the PCE to determine whether it is hitting its inflation target of 2 percent. Because food and energy prices tend to be volatile, many economists inside and outside of the Fed use the core PCE to better judge the underlying rate of inflation—in other words, the inflation rate likely to persist in at least the near future.
The figure shows that inflation first began to rise above the Fed’s target in March 2021. Most members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) believed that the inflation was caused by temporary disruptions to supply chains caused by the effects of the Covid–19 pandemic. Accordingly, the FOMC didn’t raise its target for the federal funds from 0 to 0.25 percent until March 2022. Since March 2022, the FOMC has raised its target for the federal funds rate in a series of steps until the target range reached 5.25 to 5.50 percent following the FOMC’s July 26, 2023 meeting.
PCE inflation peaked at 7.0 percent in June 2022 and had fallen to 2.9 percent in June 2023. Core PCE had a lower and earlier peak of 5.4 percent in February 2023, but had experienced a smaller decline—to 4.1 percent in June 2023. Inflation as measured by the consumer price index (CPI) followed a similar pattern, as shown in the following figure. Inflation measured by core CPI reached a lower peak than did inflation measured by the CPI and declined by less through June 2023.
As inflation has been falling since mid-2022, , the unemployment rate has remained low and the employment-population ratio for prime-age workers (workers aged 25 to 54) has risen above its 2019 pre-pandemic peak, as the following two figures show.
So, the Fed seems to be well on its way to achieving a soft landing. But in the press conference following the July 26 FOMC meeting Chair Jerome Powell was cautious in summarizing the inflation situation:
“Inflation has moderated somewhat since the middle of last year. Nonetheless, the process of getting inflation back down to 2 percent has a long way to go. Despite elevated inflation, longer-term inflation expectations appear to remain well anchored, as reflected in a broad range of surveys of households, businesses, and forecasters, as well as measures from financial markets.”
By “longer-term expectations appear to remain well anchored,” Powell was referring to the fact that households, firms, and investors appear to be expecting that the inflation rate will decline over the following year to the Fed’s 2 percent target.
Those economists who still believe that there is a good chance of a recession occuring during the next year have tended to focus on the following three points:
1. As shown in the following two figures, the labor market remains tight, with wage increases remaining high—although slowing in recent months—and the ratio of job openings to the number of unemployed workers remaining at historic levels—although that ratio has also been declining in recent months. If the labor market remains very tight, wages may continue to rise at a rate that isn’t consistent with 2 percent inflation. In that case, the FOMC may have to persist in raising its target for the federal funds rate, increasing the chances for a recession.
2. The lagged effect of the Fed’s contractionary monetary policy over the past year—increases in the target for the federal funds rate and quantitative tightening (allowing the Fed’s holdings of Treasury securites and mortgage-backed securities to decline; a process of quantitative tightening (QT))—may have a significant negative effect on the growth of aggegate demand in the coming months. Economists disagree on the extent to which monetary policy has lagged effects on the economy. Some economists believe that lags in policy have been significantly reduced in recent years, while other economists believe the lags are still substantial. The lagged effects of monetary policy, if sufficiently large, may be enough to push the economy into a recession.
3. The economies of key trading partners, including the European Union, the United Kingdom, China, and Japan are either growing more slowly than in the previous year or are in recession. The result could be a decline in net exports, which have been contributing to the growth of aggregate demand since early 2021.
In summary, we can say that in early August 2023, the probability of the Fed bringing off a soft landing has increased compared with the situation in mid-2022 or even at the beginning of 2023. But problems can still arise before the plane is safely on the ground.
Runs at Silicon Valley Bank and others emerged quickly and drove steep losses in regional bank equity values. Regulators shouldn’t have been caught by surprise, but at least they should take lessons from the shock. The subsequent ad hoc fixes to deposit insurance and assurances that the banking system is sufficiently well-capitalized don’t yet suggest a serious policy focus on those lessons. Calls for much higher levels of bank capital and tighter financial regulation notwithstanding, deeper questions about bank regulation merit greater attention.
Runs are a feature of banking. Banks transform short-term, liquid (even demandable) deposits into longer-term, sometimes much less liquid assets. Bank capital offers a partial buffer against the risk of a run, though a large-scale dash for cash can topple almost any institution, as converting blocks of assets to cash quickly to satisfy deposit withdrawals is almost sure to bring losses. The likelihood of a run goes up with bad news or rumors about the bank and correlation among depositors’ on their demand for funds back. That’s what happened at Silicon Valley Bank. Think also George Bailey’s impassioned speech in the classic movie It’s a Wonderful Life,explaining how maturity and liquidity transformations can unravel, with costs to depositors, bankers, and credit reductions to local businesses and households. The bank examiner in the movie, eager to get home, didn’t see it coming.
While bank runs and banking crises can be hard to predict, a simple maxim can guide regulation and supervision: Increase scrutiny in areas and institutions in which significant changes are occurring over a short period. On an aggregate level, the sharp, rapid increase in the federal funds rate since March 2022 should have focused attention on asset values and interest rate risks. So, too, should the fast potential compression in values of office real estate in many locations as a consequence of pandemic-related working shifts and rate hikes. At the bank level, significant inflows of deposits—particularly uninsured deposits—merit closer risk review. This approach isn’t limited to banking. A recent report of the Brookings-Chicago Booth Task Force on Financial Stability, co-chaired by Donald Kohn and me, put forth a similar change-based approach to scrutiny of nonbank financial institutions.
Such an approach would have magnified supervisory attention to Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic Bank . It also suggests the desirability of greater scrutiny and stress testing of midsize banks generally facing interest rate and commercial real estate risk. Those stress tests can give the Fed and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. an indication of capital adequacy concerns that could give rise to mergers or bank closures.
Even with this enhanced regulatory and supervisory attention, two major questions remain: For bank liabilities, what role should deposit insurance play in forestalling costly runs? For bank assets, what role should banks play in commercial lending?
Actions taken since Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse have effectively increased deposit-insurance guarantees for troubled institutions. But the absence of a clearer policy framework for dealing with uninsured deposits dragged out the unwinding of First Republic Bank and threatens other institutions experiencing rapid deposit increases and interest rate risk. When regulators asserted in the wake of the runs that the status quo of a $250,000 limit remained unchanged, they lacked both credibility and a means to reduce uncertainty about future policy actions in a run. That makes runs at vulnerable institutions both more likely and more severe. One reform would be to increase deposit insurance limits for transaction accounts of households and small and midsize firms, as recently proposed by the FDIC. Of course, even this reform raises concerns about implementation, how to price the enhanced coverage, and whether supervision will shift toward the “focus on the changes” framework I outlined earlier.
Retaining a more modest role for deposit insurance raises a larger question: What role should banks play in business lending for working capital, investment, and commercial real estate? The FDIC is mandated to resolve bank failures at the least cost to the deposit-insurance fund, but following that path may lead to more mergers of vulnerable institutions into the nations’ largest banks. While consolidation may mitigate risks for depositors with greater diversification of deposits, it leaves open effects on the mix of lending. Knowing local borrowers better, small and midsize banks have a prominent local lending presence in commercial and industrial loans and real estate. Whether such projects would be financed in a similar mix by local branches of megabanks is a question. Congress should consider whether other alternatives might be reasonable. It might permit consolidation among smaller institutions, even if more costly in resolution in the near term to taxpayers. Or nonbank institutions could be permitted to play a role in resolving troubled banks. The latter mechanism should be considered, as nonbank asset managers like Blackstone or BlackRock could fund loans originated by local banks.
Two lessons for regulation loom large. The first is that attention should be paid to policy risk management as well as bank risk management in identifying areas of concern. Think easy money and the reach for yield, inflationary fiscal and monetary policy during the pandemic, and the Fed’s rapid-fire increase in short-term rates to combat stubborn inflation. Second, regulators and Congress need to be wary of both too much deposit insurance (with likely increased risk-taking and pressure on supervision) and too little deposit insurance (with likely jumps in banking concentration and disruption of local credit to businesses).
One can reasonably anticipate additional erosion of capital in non-money-center banks from rising interest rates and lower office real estate collateral values, hopefully motivating a quick grasp of these lessons. While banks don’t have to mark assets to market if current and can survive turbulence until monetary policy eases, potential runs can upset this equilibrium. Declining regional bank stock prices make this risk clear. Only good fortune or a more thoughtful policy stand in the way of additional bank distress and attendant credit supply reductions.
(Photo from the Associated Press via the Wall Street Journal.)
During most periods, the “Employment Situation” report that the Bureau of Labor Statistics issues on the first Friday of each month includes the most closely watched macroeconomic data. Since the spring of 2021, high inflation rates have made the BLS’s “Consumer Price Index Summary” at least a close second in interest to the employment report. The data in the CPI report is usually more readily comprehensible than the data in the employment report. So, we think it’s worth class time to go into some of the details of the employment report, as we do in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1, Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 13, Section 13.1.
When the BLS released the May employment report, the Wall Street Journal noted that: “Employers added 339,000 jobs last month; unemployment rate rose to 3.7%.” Employment increased … but the unemployment rate also rose? How is that possible? One key to understanding media accounts of the report is to note that the report contains data from two separate surveys: 1) the household survey and 2) the employment or establishment survey. As in the statement just quoted from the Wall Street Journal, media accounts often mix data from the two surveys.
The data showing an increase of 339,000 jobs in May are from the payroll survey, while the data showing that the unemployment rate rose are from the household survey. Below we reproduce part of the relevant table from the report showing some of the data from the household survey. Note that total employment in the household survey falls by 310,000, so there appears to be no contradiction to explain—the unemployment rate increased because the number of people employed fell and the number of people unemployed rose. But why, then, did employment rise in the payroll survey?
Employment can rise in one survey and fall in the other because: 1) the types of employment measured in the two series differ, 2) the periods during which the data are collected differ, and 3) because of measurement error. The household survey uses a broader measure of employment that includes several categories of workers who are not included in the payroll survey: agricultural workers, self-employed workers, unpaid workers in family businesses, workers employed in private households rather than in businsses, and workers on unpaid leave from their jobs. In addition, the payroll employment numbers are revised—sometimes substantially—as additional data are collected from firms, while the household employment numbers are subject to much smaller revisions because data in the household survey are collected during a single week. A detailed discussion of the differences between the employment measures in the two series can be found here.
Usefully, the BLS publishes a series labeled “Adjusted employment” that estimates what the value for household employment would be if the household survey was measuring the same categories of employment as the payroll survey. In this case, the adjusted employment series shows an increase in employment in May of 394,000—close to the payroll survey’s increase of 339,000.
To summarize, the May employment report indicates that payroll employment increased, while the non-payroll categories of household employment declined, and the unemployment rate rose. Note also in the table above that the number of people counted as not being in labor force rose slightly and the employment-population ratio fell slightly. Average weekly hours (not shown in the table above) decreased slightly from 34.4 hours per week to 34.3.
A reasonable conclusion from the report is that the labor market remains strong, although it may have weakened slightly. Prior to release of the report, there was much speculation in the business press about how the report might affect the deliberations of the Federal Reserve’s Federal Open Market Committe (FOMC) at its next meeting to be held on June 13th and 14th. The report showed stronger employment growth than economists surveyed by Dow Jones had expected, indicating that the FOMC was likely to remain concerned that a tight labor market might continue to put upward pressure on wages, which firms could pass through to higher prices. Members of the FOMC had been signalling that they were likely to keep their target for the federal funds rate unchanged in June. The reported employment increase was likely not large enough to cause the FOMC to change course.
The Magic Kingdom in Walt Disney World in Florida. Photo by the AP via the Wall Street Journal.
Elasticity is near the top of the list of topics that students struggle with in the principles course. Some students struggle with the arithmetic of calculating elasticities, while others have difficulty understanding the basic concept. The importance and difficulty of elasticity led us to devote an entire chapter to it: Chapter 6 in both Microeconomics and Economics. (We include a briefer discussion in Chapter 7, Sections 7.5 and 7.6 in Essentials of Economics.)
When the Walt Disney Company released its 2023 second quarter earnings report on May 10, it turned out that Disney CEO Bob Iger is also a little shaky on the concept of price elasticity. During Iger’s previous time as Disney CEO he had started the Disney+ subscription streaming service. Like some other streaming services during the past year, Disney+ has struggled to earn a profit. Disney’s announcement in November 2022 that Disney+ had lost $1.47 billion during the previous quarter contributed to Bob Chapek, Iger’s predecessor as CEO, being fired by Disney’s board of directors.
For this quarter, Iger was able to announce that losses at Disney+ had been reduced to $659 million, although skepticism among investors about whether the service would turn a profit by next year as Iger indicated contributed to a sharp decline in Disney’s stock price. The smaller loss at Disney+ was largely the result of Disney having raised the price of the service in December 2022 from $7.99 per month to $10.99 per month. According to an article in the Wall Street Journal, Iger noted that the price increase had caused only a very small decline in subscribers. Iger was quoted as concluding: “That leads us to believe that we, in fact, have pricing elasticity” with respect to Disney+.
Taken literally, Iger has the concept of elasticity backwards. If “having pricing elasticity” means having price elastic demand, then Disney would have experienced a large loss of Disney+ subscribers after the price increase, not a small loss. To use the concept correctly, Iger should have said something like “we have price inelastic demand.” If we give Iger the benefit of the doubt and assume that he knows the definitions of price elastic and price inelastic, then we can interpret what he said as meaning “we have favorable price elasticity.” Favorable in this case would mean demand is price inelastic.
In any case, this episode is a good example of why many students–and CEOs!–can struggle with the concept of price elasticity.
Photo from the Associated Press of Fed Chair Jerome Powell at a news conference
At its Wednesday, May 3, 2023 meeting, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) raised its target for the federal funds rate by 0.25 percentage point to a range of 5.00 to 5.25. The decision by the committee’s 11 voting members was unanimous. After each meeting, the FOMC releases a statement (the statement for this meeting can be found here) explaining its reasons for its actions at the meeting.
The statement for this meeting had a key change from the statement the committee issued after its last meeting on March 22. The previous statement (found here) included this sentence:
“The Committee anticipates that some additional policy firming may be appropriate in order to attain a stance of monetary policy that is sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent over time.”
In the statement for this meeting, the committee rewrote that sentence to read:
“In determining the extent to which additional policy firming may be appropriate to return inflation to 2 percent over time, the Committee will take into account the cumulative tightening of monetary policy, the lags with which monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation, and economic and financial developments.”
This change indicates that the FOMC has stopped—or at least suspended—use of forward guidance. As we explain in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 15, Section 5.2, forward guidance refers to statements by the FOMC about how it will conduct monetary policy in the future.
After the March meeting, the committee was providing investors, firms, and households with the forward guidance that it intended to continue raising its target for the federal funds rate—which is what the reference to “additional policy firming” means. The statement after the May meeting indicated that the committee was no longer giving guidance about future changes in its target for the federal funds rate other than to state that it would depend on the future state of the economy. In other words, the committee was indicating that it might not raise its target for the federal funds rate after its next meeting on June 14. The committee didn’t indicate directly that it was pausing further increases in the federal funds rate but indicated that pausing further increases was a possible outcome.
Following the end of the meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell conducted a press conference. Although not yet available when this post was written, a transcript will be posted to the Fed’s website here. Powell made the following points in response to questions:
He was not willing to move beyond the formal statement to indicate that the committee would pause further rate increases.
He believed that the bank runs that had led to the closure and sale of Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank were likely to be over. He didn’t believe that other regional banks were likely to experience runs. He indicated that the Fed needed to adjust its regulatory and supervisory actions to help ensure that similar runs didn’t happen in the future.
He repeated that he believed that the Fed could achieve its target inflation rate of 2 percent without the U.S. economy experiencing a recession. In other words, he believed that a soft landing was still possible. He acknowledged that some other members of the committee and the committee’s staff economist disagreed with him and expected a mild recession to occur later this year.
He stated that as banks have attempted to become more liquid following the failure of the three regional banks, they have reduced the volume of loans they are making. This credit contraction has an effect on the economy similar to that of an increase in the federal funds rate in that increases in the target for the federal funds rate are also intended to reduce demand for goods, such as housing and business fixed investment, that depend on borrowing. He noted that both those sectors had been contracting in recent months, slowing the economy and potentially reducing the inflation rate.
He indicated that although inflation had declined somewhat during the past year, it was still well above the Fed’s target. He mentioned that wage increases were still higher than is consistent with an inflation rate of 2 percent. In response to a question, he indicated that if the inflation rate were to fall from current rates above 4 percent to 3 percent, the FOMC would not be satisfied to accept that rate. In other words, the FOMC still had a firm target rate of 2 percent.
In summary, the FOMC finds itself in the same situation it has been in since it began raising its target for the federal funds rate in March 2022: Trying to bring high inflation rates back down to its 2 percent target without causing the U.S. economy to experience a significant recession.
Join authors Glenn Hubbard & Tony O’Brien as they discuss the state of the landing the economy will achieve – hard vs. soft – or “no landing”. Also, they address the debt ceiling and the barriers it might present to a recovery. We also delve into the Chips Act and what economics has to say about the subsidy of a particular industry. Gain insights into today’s economy through our final podcast of the 2022-2023 academic year! Our discussion covers these points but you can also check for updates on our blog post that can be found HERE .
The Federal Reserve’s goal has been to end the current period of high inflation by bringing the economy in for a soft landing—reducing the inflation rate to closer to the Fed’s 2 percent target while avoiding a recession. Although Fed Chair Jerome Powell has said repeatedly during the last year that he expected the Fed would achieve a soft landing, many economists have been much more doubtful.
It’s possible to read recent economic data as indicating that it’s more likely that the economy is approaching a soft landing, but there is clearly still a great deal of uncertainty. On April 12, the Bureau of Labor Statistics released the latest CPI data. The figure below shows the inflation rate as measured by the CPI (blue line) and by core CPI—which excludes the prices of food and fuel (red line). In both cases the inflation rate is the percentage change from the same month in the previous year.
The inflation rate as measured by the CPI has been trending down since it hit a peak of 8.9 percent in June 2022. The inflation rate as measured by core CPI has been trending down more gradually since it reached a peak of 6.6 percent in September 2022. In March, it was up slightly to 5.6 percent from 5.5 percent in February.
As the following figure shows, payroll employment while still increasing, has been increasing more slowly during the past three months—bearing in mind that the payroll employment data are often subject to substantial revisions. The slowing growth in payroll employment is what we would expect with a slowing economy. The goal of the Fed in slowing the economy is, of course, to bring down the inflation rate. That payroll employment is still growing indicates that the economy is likely not yet in a recession.
The slowing in employment growth has been matched by slowing wage growth, as measured by the percentage change in average hourly earnings. As the following figure shows, the rate of increase in average hourly earnings has declined from 5.9 percent in March 2022 to 4.2 percent in March 2023. This decline indicates that businesses are experiencing somewhat lower increases in their labor costs, which may pass through to lower increases in prices.
Credit conditions also indicate a slowing economy As the following figure shows, bank lending to businesses and consumers has declined sharply, partly because banks have experienced an outflow of deposits following the failure of Silicon Valley and Signature Banks and partly because some banks have raised their requirements for households and firms to qualify for loans in anticipation of the economy slowing. In a slowing economy, households and firms are more likely to default on loans. To the extent that consumers and businesses also anticipate the possibility of a recession, they may have reduced their demand for loans.
But such a sharp decline in bank lending may also be an indication that the economy is not just slowing, on its way to a making a soft landing, but is on the verge of a recession. The minutes of the March meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) included the information that the FOMC’s staff economists forceast “at the time of the March meeting included a mild recession starting later this year, with a recovery over the subsequent two years.” (The minutes can be found here.) The increased chance of a recession was attributed largely to “banking and financial conditions.”
At its next meeting in May, the FOMC will have to decide whether to once more increase its target range for the federal funds rate. The target range is currently 4.75 percent to 5.00 percent. The FOMC will have to decide whether inflation is on a course to fall back to the Fed’s 2 percent target or whether the FOMC needs to further slow the economy by increasing its target range for the federal funds rate. One factor likely to be considered by the FOMC is, as the following figure shows, the sharp difference between the inflation rate in prices of goods (blue line) and the inflation rate in prices of services (red line).
During the period from January 2021 to November 2022, inflation in goods was higher—often much higher—than inflation in services. The high rates of inflation in goods were partly the result of disruptions to supply chains resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic and partly due to a surge in demand for goods as a result of very expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Since November 2022, inflation in the prices of services has remained high, while inflation in the prices of goods has continued to decline. In March, goods inflation was only 1.6 percent, while services inflation was 7.2 percent. In his press conference following the last FOMC meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell stated that as long as services inflation remains high “it would be very premature to declare victory [over inflation] or to think that we’ve really got this.” (The transcript of Powell’s news conference can be found here.) This statement coupled with the latest data on service inflation would seem to indicate that Powell will be in favor of another 0.25 percentage point increase in the federal funds rate target range.
The Fed’s inflation target is stated in terms of the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index, not the CPI. The Bureau of Economic Analysis will release the March PCE on April 28, before the next FOMC meeting. If the Fed is as closely divided as it appears to be over whether additional increases in the federal funds rate target range are necessary, the latest PCE data may prove to have a significan effect on their decision.
So—as usual!—the macroeconomic picture is murky. The economy appears to be slowing and inflation seems to be declining but it’s still difficult to determine whether the Fed will be able to bring inflation back to its 2 percent target without causing a recession.
Join authors Glenn Hubbard and Tony O’Brien as they discuss the future of small banks in the US financial system in the wake of recent bank failures. With a government that is guaranteeing just about all deposits, what is the role of deposit insurance. Small banks serve a real purpose in our economy and will further government regularly only complicate their mission. Other small business rely on small banks for their intimate knowledge of their market and of their business. However, many may now rely on larger banks that may seem a safer place over the next few years. Our discussion covers these points but you can also check for updates on our blog post that can be found HERE .
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