Tag: President Trump’s relationship with Fed Chair Powell

Glenn’s Questions for the Fed

Photo from federalreserve.gov

This opinion column originally ran at Project Syndicate.

While recent media coverage of the US Federal Reserve has tended to focus on when, and by how much, interest rates will be cut, larger issues loom. The selection of a new Fed chair to succeed Jerome Powell, whose term ends next May, should focus not on short-term market considerations, but on policies and processes that could improve the Fed’s overall performance and accountability.

By demanding that the Fed cut the federal funds rate sharply to boost economic activity and lower the government’s borrowing costs, US President Donald Trump risks pushing the central bank toward an overly inflationary monetary policy. And that, in turn, risks increasing the term premium in the ten-year Treasury yield—the very financial indicator that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has emphasized. A higher premium would raise, not lower, borrowing costs for the federal government, households, and businesses alike. Moreover, concerns about the Fed’s independence in setting monetary policy could undermine confidence in US financial markets and further weaken the dollar’s exchange rate. 

But this does not imply that Trump should simply seek continuity at the Fed. The Fed, under Powell, has indeed made mistakes, leading to higher inflation, sometimes inept and uncoordinated communications, and an unclear strategy for monetary policy.

I do not share the opinion of Trump and his advisers that the Fed has acted from political or partisan motives. Even when I have disagreed with Fed officials or Powell on matters of policy, I have not doubted their integrity. However, given their mistakes, I do believe that some institutional introspection is warranted. The next chair—along with the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee—will have many policy questions to address beyond the near-term path for the federal funds rate. 

Three issues are particularly important. The first is the Fed’s dual mandate: to ensure stable prices and maximum employment. Many economists (including me) have been critical of the Fed for exhibiting an inflationary bias in 2021 and 2022. The highest inflation rate in 40 years raised pressing questions about whether the Fed has assigned the right weights to inflation and employment. 

Clearly, the strategy of pursuing a flexible average inflation target (implying that inflation can be permitted to rise above 2% if it had previously been below 2%) has not been successful. What new approach should the Fed adopt to hit its inflation target? And how can the Fed be held more accountable to Congress and the public? Should it issue a regular inflation report? 

The second issue concerns the size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, the Fed has had a much larger balance sheet and has evolved toward an “ample reserves model” (implying a perpetually high level of reserves). But how large must the balance sheet be to conduct monetary policy, and how important should long-term Treasury debt and mortgage-backed securities be, relative to the rest of the balance sheet? If such assets are to play a central role, how can the Fed best separate the conduct of monetary policy from that of fiscal policy? 

The third issue is financial regulation. What regulatory changes does the Fed believe are needed to avoid the kind of costly stresses in the Treasury market we have witnessed in recent years? How can bank supervision be improved? Given that regulation is an inherently political subject, how can the Fed best separate these activities from its monetary policymaking (where independence is critical)? 

Addressing these policy questions requires a rethink of process, too. The Fed would be more effective in dealing with a changing economic environment if it acknowledged and debated more diverse viewpoints about the roles of monetary policy and financial regulation in how the economy works.

The Fed’s inflation mistakes, overconfidence in financial regulation, and other errors partly reflect the “groupthink” to which all organizations are prone. Regional Fed presidents’ views traditionally have reflected their own backgrounds and local conditions, but that doesn’t translate easily into a diversity of economic views. Instead of choosing Fed officials based on how they are likely to vote at the next rate-setting meeting, Trump should put more weight on intellectual and experiential diversity. Equally, the Fed itself could more actively seek and listen to dissenting views from academic and business leaders. 

Raising questions about policy and process offers guidance about the characteristics that the next Fed chair will need to succeed. These obviously include knowledge of monetary policy and financial regulation and mature, independent judgment; but they also include diverse leadership experience and an openness to new ideas and perspectives that might enhance the institution’s performance and accountability. One hopes that Trump’s selection of the next Fed chair, and the Senate’s confirmation process, will emphasize these attributes.

The FOMC Leaves Its Target for the Federal Funds Rate Unchanged While Still Projecting Two Rate Cuts This Year

Fed Chair Jerome Powell speaking at a press conference following a meeting of the FOMC (photo from federalreserve.gov)

Members of the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had signaled clearly before today’s (June 18) meeting that the committee would leave its target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent. In the statement released after its meeting, the committee noted that a key reason for keeping its target range unchanged was that: “Uncertainty about the economic outlook has diminished but remains elevated.” Committee members were unanimous in voting to keep its target range unchanged.

In his press conference following the meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell indicated that a key source of economic uncertainty was the effect of tariffs on the inflation rate. Powell indicated that the likeliest outcome was that tariffs would lead to the inflation rate temporarily increasing. He noted that: “Beyond the next year or so, however, most measures of longer-term expectations [of inflation] remain consistent with our 2 percent inflation goal.”

The following figure shows, for the period since January 2010, the upper bound (the blue line) and lower bound (the green line) for the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate and the actual values of the federal funds rate (the red line) during that time. Note that the Fed has been successful in keeping the value of the federal funds rate in its target range. (We discuss the monetary policy tools the FOMC uses to maintain the federal funds rate in its target range in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.2).)

After the meeting, the committee also released a “Summary of Economic Projections” (SEP)—as it typically does after its March, June, September, and December meetings. The SEP presents median values of the 18 committee members’ forecasts of key economic variables. The values are summarized in the following table, reproduced from the release.

There are several aspects of these forecasts worth noting:

  1. Committee members reduced their forecast of real GDP growth for 2025 from 1.7 percent in March to 1.4 percent today. (It had been 2.1 percent in their December forecast.) Committee members also slightly increased their forecast of the unemployment rate at the end of 2025 from 4.4 percent to 4.5 percent. (The unemployment rate in May was 4.2 percent.)
  2. Committee members now forecast that personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price inflation will be 3.0 percent at the end of 2025. In March they had forecast that it would be 2.7 percent at the end of 2025, and in December, they had forecast that it would 2.5 percent. Similarly, their forecast of core PCE inflation increased from 2.8 percent to 3.1 percent. It had been 2.5 percent in December. The committee does not expect that PCE inflation will decline to the Fed’s 2 percent annual target until sometime after 2027.
  3. The committee’s forecast of the federal funds rate at the end of 2025 was unchanged at 3.9 percent. The federal funds rate today is 4.33 percent, which indicates that the median forecast of committee members is for two 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) cuts in their target for the federal funds rate this year. Investors are similarly forecasting two 25 basis point cuts.

During his press conference, Powell indicated that because the tariff increases the Trump administration implemented beginning in April were larger than any in recent times, their effects on the economy are difficult to gauge. He noted that: “There’s the manufacturer, the exporter, the importer and the retailer and the consumer. And each one of those is going to be trying not to be the one to pay for the tariff, but together they will all pay together, or maybe one party will pay it all.” The more of the tariff that is passed on to consumers, the higher the inflation rate will be.

Earlier today, President Trump reiterated his view that the FOMC should be cutting its target for the federal funds rate, labeling Powell as “stupid” for not doing so. Trump has indicated that the Fed should cut its target rate by 1 percentage point to 2.5 percentage points in order to reduce the U.S. Treasury’s borrowing costs. During World War II and the beginning of the Korean War, the Fed pegged the interest rates on Treasury securities at low levels: 0.375 percent on Treasury bills and 2.5 percent on Treasury bonds. Following the Treasury-Federal Reserve Accord, reached in March 1951, the Federal Reserve was freed from the obligation to fix the interest rates on Treasury securities. (We discuss the Accord in Chapter 13 of Money, Banking, and the Financial System.) Since that time, the Fed has focused on its dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability and it has not been directly concerned with affecting the Treasury’s borrowing cost.

Barring a sharp slowdown in the growth of real GDP, a significant rise in the unemployment rate, or a significant rise in the inflation rate, the FOMC seems unlikely to change its target for the federal funds rate before its meeting on September 16–17 at the earliest.