Fed Governor Christopher Wallace on October 21, 2025 at the Fed’s Payment Innovation Conference (photo from federalreserve.gov)
The current partial shutdown of the federal government has delayed the release by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of its “Employment Situation” report (often called the “jobs report”). The report had originally been scheduled to be released on October 3. In a recent blog post we discussed how well the employment data collected by the private payroll processing firm Automatic Data Processing (ADP) serves as an alternative measure of the state of the labor market. In that post we showed that ADP data on total private payroll employment tracks fairly well the BLS data on total private employment from its establishment survey (often called the payroll survey) .
An article in today’s Wall Street Journal reports that ADP has stopped providing the Fed with early access to its data. Apparently, as a public service ADP had been providing its data to the Fed a week before the data was publicly released. The article notes that ADP stopped providing the data soon after this speech delievered by Fed Governor Christopher Wallace in late August. In a footnote to the speech Wallace refers to “data that Federal Reserve staff maintains in collaboration with the employment services firm ADP.” The article points out, though, that Waller’s speech was only one of several times since 2019 that a Fed official has publicly mentioned receiving data from ADP.
Losing early access to the ADP data comes at a difficult time for the Fed, given that the BLS employment data are not available. In addition, the labor market has shown signs of weakening even though growth has remained strong in measures of output. If payroll employment has been falling, rather than growing slowly as it was in the August jobs report, that knowledge would affect the deliberations of the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) at its next meeting on October 28–29. Serious deterioration in the labor market could lead the FOMC to cut its target for the federal funds rate by more than the expected 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points).
In a speech in 2019, Fed Chair Jerome Powell noted that the Fed staff had used ADP data to develop a new measure of payroll employment. Had that measure been available in 2008, Powell argued, the FOMC would have realized earlier than it did that employment was being severely affected by the deepening of the financial crisis:
“[I]n the first eight months of 2008, as the Great Recession was getting underway, the official monthly employment data showed total job losses of about 750,000. A later benchmark revision told a much bleaker story, with declines of about 1.5 million. Our new measure, had it been available in 2008, would have been much closer to the revised data, alerting us that the job situation might be considerably worse than the official data suggested.”
The Wall Street Journal article notes that Powell has urged ADP to resume sharing its employment data with the Fed.
Today (September 26), the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released monthly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index as part of its “Personal Income and Outlays” report. Yesterday, the BEA released its revised estimate of real GDP growth in the second quarter. Taken together, the two reports show that economic growth remains realtively strong and that inflation continues to run above the Fed’s 2 percent annual target.
Taking the inflation report first, the following figure shows headline PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2018, with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. In August, headline PCE inflation was 2.7 percent, up from 2.6 percent in July. Core PCE inflation in August was 2.9 percent, unchanged from July. Headline PCE inflation was equal to the forecast of economists surveyed, while core PCE inflation was slightly lower than forecast.
The following figure shows headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation, while this figure shows 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, headline PCE inflation increased from 2.0 percent in July to 3.2 percent in August. Core PCE inflation declined slightly from 2.9 percent in July to 2.8 percent in August. So, both 1-month and 12-month PCE inflation are telling the same story of inflation being well above the Fed’s target. The usual caution applies that 1-month inflation figures are volatile (as can be seen in the figure). In addition, these data likely reflect higher prices resulting from the tariff increases the Trump administration has implemented. Once the one-time price increases from tariffs have worked through the economy, inflation may decline. It’s not clear, however, how long that may take and President Trump indicated yesterday that he may impose new tariffs on pharmaceuticals, large trucks, and furniture.
Fed Chair Jerome Powell has frequently mentioned that inflation in non-market services can skew PCE inflation. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices fall, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also fall. Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.” The following figure shows 12-month headline inflation (the blue line) and 12-month core inflation (the red line) for market-based PCE. (The BEA explains the market-based PCE measure here.)
Headline market-based PCE inflation was 2.4 percent in August, unchanged from July. Core market-based PCE inflation was 2.6 percent in August, also unchanged from July. So, both market-based measures show inflation as stable but above the Fed’s 2 percent target.
In the following figure, we look at 1-month inflation using these measures. One-month headline market-based inflation increase sharply to 2.5 percent in August from 0.9 percent in July. One-month core market-based inflation increased slightly to 1.9 percent in August from 1.8 percent in July. As the figure shows, the 1-month inflation rates are more volatile than the 12-month rates, which is why the Fed relies on the 12-month rates when gauging how close it is coming to hitting its target inflation rate.
Inflation running above the Fed’s 2 percent target is consistent with relatively strong growth in real GDP. The following figure shows compound annual rates of growth of real GDP, for each quarter since the first quarter of 2023. The value for the second quarter of 2025 is the BEA’s third estimate. This revised estimate increased the growth rate of real GDP to 3.8 percent from the second estimate of 3.3 percent.
The most important contributor to real GDP growth was growth in real personal consumption expenditures, which, as shown in the following figure, increased aat compound annual rate of 2.5 percent in the second quarter, up from 0.6 percent in the first quarter.
High interest rates continue to hold back residential construction, which declined by a compound annual rate of 5.1 percent in the second quarter after declining 1.0 percent in the first quarter.
Business investment in structures, such as factories and office buildings, continued a decline that began in the first quarter of 2024.
Will the relatively strong growth in real GDP in the second quarter continue in the third quarter? Economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta prepare nowcasts of real GDP. A nowcast is a forecast that incorporates all the information available on a certain date about the components of spending that are included in GDP. The Atlanta Fed calls its nowcast GDPNow. As the following figure from the Atlanta Fed website shows, today the GDPNow forecast is for real GDP to grow at an annual rate of 3.9 percent in the third quarter.
Finally, the macroeconomic data released in the last two days has had realtively little effect on the expectations of investors trading federal funds rate futures. Investors assign an 89.8 percent probability to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cutting its target for the federal funds rate at its meeting on October 28–29 by 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) from its current range of 4.00 percent to 4.25 percent. That probability is only slightly lower than 91.9 percent probaiblity that investors had assigned to a 25 basis point cut a week ago. However, the probability of the committee cutting its target rate by another 25 basis points at its December 9–10 fell to 67.0 percent today from 78.6 percent one week ago.
Supports:Macroeconomics, Chapter 13, Section 13.3; Economics, Chapter 23, Section 23.3; and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 15, Section 15.3
Image generated by ChatGPT
A recent article on axios.com made the following observation: “The mainstream view on the Federal Open Market Committee is based on risk management—that the possibility of a further downshift in the job market appears to be the more pressing concern than the chance that inflation will spiral higher.” The article also notes that: “Tariffs’ effects on inflation are probably a one-time bump.”
a. What is the dual mandate that Congress has given the Federal Reserve?
b. In what circumstances might the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) be faced with a conflict between the goals in the dual mandate?
c. What does the author mean by tariffs’ effects on inflation being a “one-time bump”?
d. What does the author mean by the FOMC engaging in “risk management”? What is a “downshift” in the labor market? If the FOMC is more concerned about a downshift in the labor market than about inflation, will the committee raise or lower its target for the federal funds rate? Briefly explain.
Solving the Problem Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the policy dilemma the Fed can face when the unemployment rate and the inflation rate are both rising, so you may want to review Macroeconomics, Chapter 13, Section 13.3, “Macroeconomic Equilibrium in the Long Run and the Short Run.”
Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining what the Fed’s dual mandate is. Congress has given the Fed a dual mandate of achieving price stability and maximum employment.
Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining when the FOMC may face a conflict with respect to its dual mandate. When the FOMC is faced with rising unemployment and falling inflation, its preferred policy response is clear: The committee will lower its target for the federal funds rate in order to increase the growth of aggregate demand, which will increase real GDP and reduce unemployment. When the FOMC is faced with falling unemployment and rising inflation, its preferred policy response is also clear: The committee will raise its target for the federal funds rate in order to slow the growth of aggregate demand, which will reduce the inflation rate.
But when the Fed faces an aggregate supply shock, its preferred policy response is unclear. An aggregate supply shock, such as the U.S. economy experienced during the Covid pandemic and again with the tariff increases that the Trump administration began implementing in April, will shift the short-run aggregate supply curve (SRAS) will shift to the left, causing an increase in the price level, along with a decline in real GDP and employment. This combination of rising unemployment and inflation is called stagflation. In this situation, the FOMC faces a policy dilemma: Raising the target for the federal funds rate will help reduce inflation, but will likely increase unemployment, while lowering the target for the federal funds rate will lead to lower unemployment, but will likely increase inflation. The following figure shows the situation during the Covid pandemic when the economy experienced both an aggregate demand and aggregate supply shock. The aggregate demand curve and the aggregate supply curve both shifted to the left, resulting in falling real GDP (and employment) and a rising price level.
Step 4: Answer part c. by explaining what it means to refer to the effect of tariffs on inflation being a “one-time bump.” Tariffs cause the aggregate supply curve to shift to the left because by increasing the prices of raw materials and other inputs, they increase the production costs of some businesses. Assuming that tariffs are not continually increasing, their effect on the price level will end once the production costs of firms stop rising.
Step 5: Answer part d. by explaining what the author means by the FOMC engaing in “risk management,” explaining what a “downshift” in the labor is, and whether if the FOMC is more concerned about a downshift in the labor market than in inflation, it will raise or lower its target for the federal funds rate. The article refers to the “possibility” of a further downshift in the labor market. A downshift in the labor market means that the demand for labor may decline, raising the unemployment rate. Managing the risk of this possibility would involve concentrating on the maximum employment part of the Fed’s dual mandate by lowering its target for the federal funds rate. Note that the expectation that the effect of tariffs on the price level is a one-time bump makes it easier for the committee to focus on the maximum employment part of its mandate because the increase in inflation due to the tariff increases won’t persist.
Photo of Fed Chair Jerome Powell from federalreserve.gov
Today’s meeting of the Federal Reserve’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) occurred against a backdrop of President Trump pressuring the committee to reduce its target for the federal funds rate. In a controversial move, Trump nominated Stephen Miran, chair of Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), to fill an open seat on the Fed’s Board of Governors. Miran took a leave of absence from the CEA rather than resign his position, which made him the first member of the Board of Governors in decades to maintain an appointment elsewhere in the executive branch while serving on the Board. In addition, Trump had fired Governor Lisa Cook on the grounds that she had committed fraud in applying for a mortgage at a time before her appointment to the Board. Cook denied the charge and a federal appeals court sustained an injunction allowing her to participate in today’s meeting.
As most observers had expected, the committee decided today to lower its target for the federal funds rate from a range of 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent to a range of 4.00 percent to 4.25 percent—a cut of 0.25 percentage point, or 25 basis points. The members of the committee voted 11 to 1 for the 25 basis point cut with Miran dissenting because he preferred a 50 basis point cut.
The following figure shows, for the period since January 2010, the upper bound (the blue line) and lower bound (the green line) for the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate and the actual values of the federal funds rate (the red line) during that time. Note that the Fed has been successful in keeping the value of the federal funds rate in its target range. (We discuss the monetary policy tools the FOMC uses to maintain the federal funds rate in its target range in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.2).)
After the meeting, the committee also released a “Summary of Economic Projections” (SEP)—as it typically does after its March, June, September, and December meetings. The SEP presents median values of the 19 committee members’ forecasts of key economic variables. The values are summarized in the following table, reproduced from the release. (Note that only 5 of the district bank presidents vote at FOMC meetings, although all 12 presidents participate in the discussions and prepare forecasts for the SEP.)
There are several aspects of these forecasts worth noting:
Committee members slightly increased their forecasts of real GDP growth for each year from 2025 through 2027. Committee members also slightly decreased their forecasts of the unemployment rate in 2026 and 2027. They left their forecast of unemployment in the fourth quarter of 2025 unchanged at 4.5 percent. (The unemployment rate in August was 4.3 percent.)
Committee members left their forecasts for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price inflation unchanged for 2025 and 2026, while raising their forecast for 2026 from 2.4 percent to 2.6 percent. Similarly, their forecasts of core PCE inflation were unchanged for 2025 and 2027 but increased from 2.4 percent to 2.6 percent for 2026. The committee does not expect that PCE inflation will decline to the Fed’s 2 percent annual target until 2028.
The committee’s forecast of the federal funds rate at the end of 2025 was lowered from 3.9 percent in June to 3.6 percent today. They also lowered their forecast for federal funds rate at the end of 2026 from 3.6 percent to 3.4 pecent and at the end of 2027 from 3.4 percent to 3.1 percent.
Prior to the meeting there was much discussion in the business press and among investment analysts about the dot plot, shown below. Each dot in the plot represents the projection of an individual committee member. (The committee doesn’t disclose which member is associated with which dot.) Note that there are 19 dots, representing the 7 members of the Fed’s Board of Governors and all 12 presidents of the Fed’s district banks.
The plots on the far left of the figure represent the projections of each of the 19 members of the value of the federal funds rate at the end of 2025. Ten of the 19 members expect that the committee will cut its target range for the federal funds rate by at least 50 basis points in its two remaining meetings this year. That narrow majority makes it likely that an unexpected surge in inflation during the next few months might result in the target range being cut by only 25 basis points or not cut at all. Members of the business press and financial analysts are expecting tht the committee will implement a 25 basis point cut in each of its last two meetings this year.
During his press conference following the meeting, Powell indicated that the recent increase in inflation was largely due to the effects of the increase in tariff rates that the Trump administration began implementing in April. (We discuss the recent data on inflation in this post.) Powell indicated that committee members expect that the tariff increases will cause a one-time increase in the price level, rather than causing a long-term increase in the inflation rate. Powell also noted recent slow growth in real GDP and employment. (We discuss the recent employment data in this blog post.) As a result, he said that the shift in the “balance of risks” caused the committee to believe that cutting the target for the federal funds rate was warranted to avoid the possibility of a significant rise in the unemployment rate.
The next FOMC meeting is on October 28–29 by which time the status of Lisa Cook on the committee may have been clarified. It also seems likely that President Trump will have named the person he intends to nominate to succeed Powell as Fed chair when Powell’s term ends on May 15, 2026. (Powel’s term on the Board doesn’t end until January 31, 2028, although Fed chairs typically resign from the Board if they aren’t reappointed as chair). And, of course, additional data on inflation and unemployment will also have been released.
Today (September 11), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its report on the consumer price index (CPI) for August. The following figure compares headline CPI inflation (the blue line) and core CPI inflation (the red line).
The headline inflation rate, which is measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous year, was 2.9 percent in August, up from 2.7 in July.
The core inflation rate,which excludes the prices of food and energy, was 3.1 percent in August, up slightly from 3.0 percent in July.
Headline inflation and core inflation were both the same as economists surveyed had expected.
In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, headline inflation (the blue line) jumped from 2.4 percent in July to 4.7 percent in August. Core inflation (the red line) increased from 3.9 percent in July to 4.2 percent in August.
The 1-month and 12-month inflation rates are both indicating that inflation accelerated in August. Core inflation—which is often a good indicator of future inflation—in particular has been running well above the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target during the last two months.
Of course, it’s important not to overinterpret the data from a single month. The figure shows that the 1-month inflation rate is particularly volatile. Also note that the Fed uses the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, rather than the CPI, to evaluate whether it is hitting its 2 percent annual inflation target.
Core inflation had been running significantly higher than headline inflation in the past few months because gasoline prices had generally been falling since February. Gasoline prices turned around in August, however, increasing at a 25.5 percent annual rate. As shown in the following figure, 1-month inflation in gasoline prices moves erratically—which is the main reason that gasoline prices aren’t included in core inflation.
Does the increase in inflation represent the effects of the increases in tariffs that the Trump administration announced on April 2? (Note that many of the tariff increases announced on April 2 have since been reduced) The following figure shows 12-month inflation in durable goods—such as furniture, appliances, and cars—which are likely to be affected directly by tariffs, and services, which are less likely to be affected by tariffs.. To make recent changes clearer, we look only at the months since January 2022. In August, inflation in durable goods increased to 1.9 percent from 1.2 percent in July. Inflation in services in August was 3.8 percent, unchanged from July.
The following figure shows 1-month inflation in the prices of these products, which may make the effects of tariffs clearer. In August, durable goods inflation was 5.1 percent up from 4.5 percent in July. Service inflation was 3.9 percent in August, down slightly from 4.0 percent in July. Inflation in goods and services both running well above 2 percent is not good news for inflation falling back to the Fed’s 2 percent target in the near future.
To better estimate the underlying trend in inflation, some economists look at median inflation and trimmed mean inflation.
Median inflation is calculated by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Ohio State University. If we listed the inflation rate in each individual good or service in the CPI, median inflation is the inflation rate of the good or service that is in the middle of the list—that is, the inflation rate in the price of the good or service that has an equal number of higher and lower inflation rates.
Trimmed-mean inflation drops the 8 percent of goods and services with the highest inflation rates and the 8 percent of goods and services with the lowest inflation rates.
The following figure shows that 12-month trimmed-mean inflation (the blue line) was 3.3 percent in August, up slightly from 3.2 July. Twelve-month median inflation (the red line) 3.6 percent in August, unchanged from July.
The following figure shows 1-month trimmed-mean and median inflation. One-month trimmed-mean inflation rose from 2.9 percent in July to 3.2 percent in August. One-month median inflation remained unchanged at 3.4 percent in August. These data are consistent with the view that inflation is running above the Fed’s 2 percent target.
The CPI inflation data combined with the recent jobs data (which we discuss here and here), indicate that the U.S. economy may be entering a period of stagflation—a combination of rising inflation with falling, or stagnating, output. Stagflation poses a policy dilemma for the Fed’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) because cutting its target for the federal funds rate to increase economic growth and employment may worsen inflation. At this point, it seems likely that the FOMC will “look through” this month’s rising inflation because it may be largely due to one-time price increases caused by tariffs. Committee members have signaled that they are likely to cut their target for the federal funds rate by 0.25 percent (25 basis points) at the conclusion of their meeting on September 16–17 and again at the conclusion of the following meeting on October 28–29.
Today (September 9), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) issued revised estimates of the increase in employment, as measured by the establishment survey, over the period from April 2024 through March 2025. The BLS had initially estimated that during that period net employment had increased by a total of 1,758,000 or an average of 147,000 jobs per month. The revision lowered this estimate by more than half to a total of 839,000 jobs or an average of only 70,000 net new jobs created per month. The difference between those two monthly averages means that the U.S. economy had generated a total of 919,000 fewer jobs during that period. The revision was larger than the downward revision of 800,000 jobs forecast by economists at Wells Fargo, Comerica Bank, and Pantheon Macroeconomics.
Why does the BLS have to revise its employment estimates? As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1) the initial estimates that the BLS issues each month in its “Employment Situation” reports are based on a sample of 121,000 businesses and government agencies representing 631,000 worksites or “establishments.” The monthly data also rely on estimates of the number of employees at establishments that opened or closed during the month and on employment changes at establishments that failed to respond to the survey. In August or September of each year, the BLS issues revised employment estimates based on data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), which relies on state unemployment insurance tax records. The unemployment tax records are much more comprehensive than the original sample of establishments because nearly all employers are included.
In today’s report, the BLS cited two likely sources of error in their preliminary estimates:
“First, businesses reported less employment to the QCEW than they reported to the CES survey (response error). Second, businesses who were selected for the CES survey but did not respond reported less employment to the QCEW than those businesses who did respond to the CES survey (nonresponse error).”
The preliminary benchmark estimates the BLS released today will be revised again and the final estimates for these months will be released in February 2026. The difference between the preliminary and final benchmark estimates can be substantial. For example, last year, the BLS’s initially preliminary benchmark estimate indicated that the net employment increase from April 2023 to March 2024 had been overestimated by 818,000 jobs. In February 2025, the final benchmark estimate reduced this number to 598,000 jobs.
Although this year’s revision is particularly large in absolute terms—the largest since at least 2001—it still represents only about 0.56 percent of the more than 159.5 million people employed in the U.S. economy. Still the size of this revision is likely to increase political criticism of the BLS.
How will this revision affect the decision by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) at its next meeting on September 16-17 to cut or maintain its target for the federal funds rate? The members of the committee were probably not surprised by the downward revision in the employment estimates, although they may have anticipated that the revision would be smaller. In six of the past seven years, the BLS has revised its estimates of payroll employment downward in its annual preliminary benchmark revision.
As we noted in this recent post, even before the BLS revised its employment estimates downward, recent monthly net employment increases were well below the increases during the first half of the year. There was already a high likelihood that the FOMC intended to cut its target for the federal funds rate at its meeting on September 16–17. The substantial downward revision in the employment data makes a cut at the September meeting nearly a certainty and increases the likelihood that the FOMC will implement a second cut in its target for the federal funds rate at the committee’s meeting on October 28–29.
This morning (September 5), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Employment Situation” report (often called the “jobs report”) for August. The data in the report show that the labor market was weaker than expected in August.
The jobs report has two estimates of the change in employment during the month: one estimate from the establishment survey, often referred to as the payroll survey, and one from the household survey. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1), many economists and Federal Reserve policymakers believe that employment data from the establishment survey provide a more accurate indicator of the state of the labor market than do the household survey’s employment data and unemployment data. (The groups included in the employment estimates from the two surveys are somewhat different, as we discuss in this post.)
According to the establishment survey, there was a net increase of only 22,000 nonfarm jobs during August. This increase was well below the increase of 110,000 that economists surveyed by FactSet had forecast. Economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal had forecast a smaller increase of 75,000 jobs. In addition, the BLS revised downward its previous estimates of employment in June and July by a combined 21,000 jobs. The estimate for June was revised from a net gain of 14,000 to a net loss of 13,000. This was the first month with a net job loss since December 2020. (The BLS notes that: “Monthly revisions result from additional reports received from businesses and government agencies since the last published estimates and from the recalculation of seasonal factors.”)
The following figure from the jobs report shows the net change in nonfarm payroll employment for each month in the last two years. The figure makes clear the striking deceleration in job growth since April. The Trump administration announced sharp increases in U.S. tariffs on April 2. Media reports indicate that some firms have slowed hiring due to the effects of the tariffs or in anticipation of those effects.
The unemployment rate increased from 4.2 percent in July to 4.3 percent in August, the highest rate since October 2021. The unemployment rate is above the 4.2 percent rate economists surveyed by FactSet had forecast. As the following figure shows, the unemployment rate had been remarkably stable over the past year, staying between 4.0 percent and 4.2 percent in each month May 2024 to July 2025 before breaking out of that range in August. In June, the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) forecast that the unemployment rate during the fourth quarter of 2025 would average 4.5 percent. The unemployment rate would still have to rise significantly for that forecast to be accurate.
Each month, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta estimates how many net new jobs are required to keep the unemployment rate stable. Given a slowing in the growth of the working-age population due to the aging of the U.S. population and a sharp decline in immigration, the Atlanta Fed currently estimates that the economy would have to create 97,591 net new jobs each month to keep the unemployment rate stable at 4.3 percent. If this estimate is accurate, continuing monthly net job increases of 22,000 would result in a a rising unemployment rate.
As the following figure shows, the monthly net change in jobs from the household survey moves much more erratically than does the net change in jobs from the establishment survey. As measured by the household survey, there was a net increase of 288,000 jobs in August, following a net decrease of 260,000 jobs in July. As an indication of the volatility in the employment changes in the household survey note the very large swings in net new jobs in January and February. In any particular month, the story told by the two surveys can be inconsistent. as was the case this month with employment increasing much more in the household survey than in the employment survey. (In this blog post, we discuss the differences between the employment estimates in the two surveys.)
The household survey has another important labor market indicator: the employment-population ratio forprime age workers—those aged 25 to 54. In August the ratio rose to 80.7 percent from 8.4 percent in July. The prime-age employment-population ratio is somewhat below the high of 80.9 percent in mid-2024, but is still above what the ratio was in any month during the period from January 2008 to February 2020. The increase in the prime-age employment-population ratio is a bright spot in this month’s jobs report.
It is still unclear how many federal workers have been laid off since the Trump Administration took office. The establishment survey shows a decline in federal government employment of 15,000 in August and a total decline of 97,000 since the beginning of February 2025. However, the BLS notes that: “Employees on paid leave or receiving ongoing severance pay are counted as employed in the establishment survey.” It’s possible that as more federal employees end their period of receiving severance pay, future jobs reports may report a larger decline in federal employment. To this point, the decline in federal employment has had a small effect on the overall labor market.
The establishment survey also includes data on average hourly earnings (AHE). As we noted in this post, many economists and policymakers believe the employment cost index (ECI) is a better measure of wage pressures in the economy than is the AHE. The AHE does have the important advantage of being available monthly, whereas the ECI is only available quarterly. The following figure shows the percentage change in the AHE from the same month in the previous year. The AHE increased 3.7 percent in August, down from an increase of 3.9 percent in July.
The following figure shows wage inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month wage inflation, whereas this figure shows 1-month wage inflation.) One-month wage inflation is much more volatile than 12-month wage inflation—note the very large swings in 1-month wage inflation in April and May 2020 during the business closures caused by the Covid pandemic. In August, the 1-month rate of wage inflation was 3.3 percent, down from 4.0 percent in July. This slowdown in wage growth may be another indication of a weakening labor market. But one month’s data from such a volatile series may not accurately reflect longer-run trends in wage inflation.
What effect might today’s jobs report have on the decisions of the Federal Reserve’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) with respect to setting its target for the federal funds rate? One indication of expectations of future changes in the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate comes from investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) As we’ve noted in earlier blog posts, since the weak July jobs report, investors have assigned a very high probability to the committee cutting its target by 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) from its current range of 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent at its September 16–17 meeting. This morning, as the following figure shows, investors raised the probability they assign to a 50 basis point reduction at the September meeting from 0 percent to 14.2 percent. Investors are also now assigning a 78.4 percent probability to the committee cutting its target range by at least an additional 25 basis points at its October 28–29 meeting.
On August 29, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) released data for July on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index as part of its “Personal Income and Outlays” report. The Fed relies on annual changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target.
The following figure shows headline PCE inflation (the blue line) and core PCE inflation (the red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2017, with inflation measured as the percentage change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. In July, headline PCE inflation was 2.6 percent, unchanged from June. Core PCE inflation in July was 2.9 percent, up slightly from 2.8 percent in June. Headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation were both equal to what economists surveyed had forecast.
The following figure shows headline PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation, while this figure shows 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, headline PCE inflation fell from 3.5 percent in June to 2.4 percent in July. Core PCE inflation increased slightly from 3.2 percent in June to 3.3 percent in July. So, both 1-month PCE inflation estimates are above the Fed’s 2 percent target, with 1-month core PCE inflation being well above target. The usual caution applies that 1-month inflation figures are volatile (as can be seen in the figure), so we shouldn’t attempt to draw wider conclusions from one month’s data. In addition, these data may reflect higher prices resulting from the tariff increases the Trump administration has implemented. Once the one-time price increases from tariffs have worked through the economy, inflation may decline. It’s not clear, however, how long that may take and it’s likely that not all the effects of the tariff increases on the price level are reflected in this month’s data.
As usual, we need to note that Fed Chair Jerome Powell has frequently mentioned that inflation in non-market services can skew PCE inflation. Non-market services are services whose prices the BEA imputes rather than measures directly. For instance, the BEA assumes that prices of financial services—such as brokerage fees—vary with the prices of financial assets. So that if stock prices fall, the prices of financial services included in the PCE price index also fall. Powell has argued that these imputed prices “don’t really tell us much about … tightness in the economy. They don’t really reflect that.” The following figure shows 12-month headline inflation (the blue line) and 12-month core inflation (the red line) for market-based PCE. (The BEA explains the market-based PCE measure here.)
Headline market-based PCE inflation was 2.3 percent in July, unchanged from June. Core market-based PCE inflation was 2.6 percent in July, also unchanged from June. So, both market-based measures show inflation as stable but above the Fed’s 2 percent target.
In the following figure, we look at 1-month inflation using these measures. One-month headline market-based inflation declined sharply to 1.1 percent in July from 4.1 percent in June. One-month core market-based inflation also declined sharply to 2.1 percent in July from 3.8 percent in June. As the figure shows, the 1-month inflation rates are more volatile than the 12-month rates, which is why the Fed relies on the 12-month rates when gauging how close it is coming to hitting its target inflation rate. Still, looking at 1-month inflation gives us a better look at current trends in inflation, which these data indicate is slowing significantly.
As we noted earlier, some of the increase in inflation is likely attributable to the effects of tariffs. The effect of tariffs are typically seen in goods prices, rather than in service prices because tariffs are levied primarily on imports of goods. As the following figure shows, one-month inflation in goods prices jumped in June to 4.8 percent, but then declined sharply to –1.6 in July. One-month inflation in services prices increased from 2.9 percent in June to 4.3 percent in July. Clearly, the 1-month inflation data—particularly for goods—are quite volatile.
Finally, these data had little effect on the expectations of investors trading federal funds rate futures. Investors assign an 86.4 percent probability to the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cutting its target for the federal funds rate at its meeting on September 16–17 by 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) from its current range of 4.25 percent to 4.5o percent. There has been some speculation in the business press that the FOMC might cut its target by 50 basis points at that meeting, but with inflation remaining above target, investors don’t foresee a larger cut in the target range happening.
Federal Reserve chairs often take the opportunity of the Kansas City Fed’s annual monetary policy symposium held in Jackson Hole, Wyoming to provide a summary of their views on monetary policy and on the state of the economy. In these speeches, Fed chairs are careful not to preempt decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) by stating that policy changes will occur that the committee hasn’t yet agreed to. In his speech at Jackson Hole today (August 22), Powell came about as close as Fed chairs ever do to announcing a policy change in a speech. In addition, Powell announced changes to the Fed’s monetary policy framework that had been in place since 2020.
Congress has given the Federal Reserve a dual mandate to achieve price stability and maximum employment. To reach its goal of price stability, the Fed has set an inflation target of 2 percent, with inflation being measured by the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. In the statement that the FOMC releases after each meeting, it generally indicates the current “balance of risks” to meeting its two goals. In a press conference on July 30 following the last meeting of the FOMC, Powell stated that while the labor market appeared to be in balance at close to maximum employment, inflation was still running above the Fed’s 2 percent annual target.
In today’s speech, Powell stated that “the balance of risks appears to be shifting” and “that downside risks to employment are rising. And if those risks materialize, they can do so quickly in the form of sharply higher layoffs and rising unemployment.” These statements seem to signal that he expects that at its next meeting on September 16–17 the FOMC will cut its target for the federal funds rate from its current range of 4.25 percent to 4.50 percent.
One indication of expectations of future changes in the FOMC’s target for the federal funds rate comes from investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.) Yesterday, investors assigned a 75.0 percent probability to the committee cutting its target by 0.25 percentage point (25 basis points) to a range of 4.00 percent to 4.25 percent at its September meeting. After Powell’s speech at 10 a.m. eastern time, the probability of a 25 basis point cut increased to 85.3 percent. As the following figure from the Wall Street Journa shows, the stock market also jumped, with the S&P 500 stock index having increased about 1.5 percent at 2:00 p.m. Investors were presumably expecting that by cutting its federal funds rate target, the FOMC would help to offset some of the current weakness in the labor market. (We discussed the weakness in the latest jobs report in this blog post.)
Powell also announced that the Fed had revised its monetary policy framework, which had been in place since 2020. The previous framework was called flexible average-inflation targeting (FAIT). The policy was intended to automatically make monetary policy expansionary during recessions and contractionary during periods of unexpectedly high inflation. If households and firms accept that the Fed is following this policy, then during a recession when the inflation rate falls below the target, they would expect that the Fed would take action to increase the inflation rate. If a higher inflation rate results in a lower real interest rate, there will be an expansionary effect on the economy. Similarly, if the inflation rate were above the target, households and firms would expect future inflation rates to be lower, raising the real interest rate, which would have a contractionary effect on the economy.
An important point to note is that with a FAIT policy, after a period in which inflation is below 2%, the Fed would aim to keep inflation above 2% for a time to “make up” for the period of low inflation. But the converse would not be true—if inflation runs above 2%, the Fed would attempt to bring the inflation back to 2%, but would not push inflation below 2% for a time to make up for the period of low inflation. The result is that, on average, the economy would run “hotter,” lowering the average unemployment rate over time. Many policymakers at the Fed believed that, in the years before 2019, the unemployment could have been lower without causing the inflation rate to be persistently above the Fed’s target.
With hindsight, some economists and policymakers argue that FAIT was implemented at just the wrong time. The policy was designed to address the problem of inflation running below the 2% target for most of the period between 2012 and 2019, resulting in unemployment being higher than was consistent with the Fed’s mandate for maximum employment. But, in fact, as the following figure shows, in 2020 the U.S. economy was about to enter a period with the highest inflation rates since the early 1980s.
In his speech today, Powell noted that:
“The economic conditions that brought the policy rate to the ELB [effective lower bound to the federal funds rate, 0 percent to 0.25 percent] and drove the 2020 framework changes were thought to be rooted in slow-moving global factors that would persist for an extended period—and might well have done so, if not for the pandemic. … In the event, rather than low inflation and the ELB, the post-pandemic reopening brought the highest inflation in 40 years to economies around the world.”
Powell outlined the key changes in the policy framework:
“First, we removed language indicating that the ELB was a defining feature of the economic landscape. Instead, we noted that our ‘monetary policy strategy is designed to promote maximum employment and stable prices across a broad range of economic conditions.'”
“Second, we returned to a framework of flexible inflation targeting and eliminated the ‘makeup’ strategy. As it turned out, the idea of an intentional, moderate inflation overshoot [after a period when inflation had been below the 2 percent annual target] had proved irrelevant. … Our revised statement emphasizes our commitment to act forcefully to ensure that longer-term inflation expectations remain well anchored, to the benefit of both sides of our dual mandate. It also notes that ‘price stability is essential for a sound and stable economy and supports the well-being of all Americans.’ “
“Third, our 2020 statement said that we would mitigate ‘shortfalls,’ rather than ‘deviations,’ from maximum employment. … [T]he use of ‘shortfalls’ was not intended as a commitment to permanently forswear preemption or to ignore labor market tightness. Accordingly, we removed ‘shortfalls’ from our statement. Instead, the revised document now states more precisely that ‘the Committee recognizes that employment may at times run above real-time assessments of maximum employment without necessarily creating risks to price stability.’ … [But] preemptive action would likely be warranted if tightness in the labor market or other factors pose risks to price stability.”
“Fourth, consistent with the removal of ‘shortfalls,’ we made changes to clarify our approach in periods when our employment and inflation objectives are not complementary. In those circumstances, we will follow a balanced approach in promoting them.”
“Finally, the revised consensus statement retained our commitment to conduct a public review roughly every five years.”
To summarize, the two key changes in the framework are: 1) The FOMC will no longer attempt to push inflation beyond its 2 percent goal if inflation has been below that goal for a period, and 2) The FOMC may still attempt to preempt an increase in inflation if labor market conditions or other data make it appear likely that inflation will accelerate, but it won’t necessarily do so just because the unemployment rate is currently lower than what had been considered consistent with maximum employment.
This opinion column originally ran at Project Syndicate.
While recent media coverage of the US Federal Reserve has tended to focus on when, and by how much, interest rates will be cut, larger issues loom. The selection of a new Fed chair to succeed Jerome Powell, whose term ends next May, should focus not on short-term market considerations, but on policies and processes that could improve the Fed’s overall performance and accountability.
By demanding that the Fed cut the federal funds rate sharply to boost economic activity and lower the government’s borrowing costs, US President Donald Trump risks pushing the central bank toward an overly inflationary monetary policy. And that, in turn, risks increasing the term premium in the ten-year Treasury yield—the very financial indicator that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has emphasized. A higher premium would raise, not lower, borrowing costs for the federal government, households, and businesses alike. Moreover, concerns about the Fed’s independence in setting monetary policy could undermine confidence in US financial markets and further weaken the dollar’s exchange rate.
But this does not imply that Trump should simply seek continuity at the Fed. The Fed, under Powell, has indeed made mistakes, leading to higher inflation, sometimes inept and uncoordinated communications, and an unclear strategy for monetary policy.
I do not share the opinion of Trump and his advisers that the Fed has acted from political or partisan motives. Even when I have disagreed with Fed officials or Powell on matters of policy, I have not doubted their integrity. However, given their mistakes, I do believe that some institutional introspection is warranted. The next chair—along with the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee—will have many policy questions to address beyond the near-term path for the federal funds rate.
Three issues are particularly important. The first is the Fed’s dual mandate: to ensure stable prices and maximum employment. Many economists (including me) have been critical of the Fed for exhibiting an inflationary bias in 2021 and 2022. The highest inflation rate in 40 years raised pressing questions about whether the Fed has assigned the right weights to inflation and employment.
Clearly, the strategy of pursuing a flexible average inflation target (implying that inflation can be permitted to rise above 2% if it had previously been below 2%) has not been successful. What new approach should the Fed adopt to hit its inflation target? And how can the Fed be held more accountable to Congress and the public? Should it issue a regular inflation report?
The second issue concerns the size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, the Fed has had a much larger balance sheet and has evolved toward an “ample reserves model” (implying a perpetually high level of reserves). But how large must the balance sheet be to conduct monetary policy, and how important should long-term Treasury debt and mortgage-backed securities be, relative to the rest of the balance sheet? If such assets are to play a central role, how can the Fed best separate the conduct of monetary policy from that of fiscal policy?
The third issue is financial regulation. What regulatory changes does the Fed believe are needed to avoid the kind of costly stresses in the Treasury market we have witnessed in recent years? How can bank supervision be improved? Given that regulation is an inherently political subject, how can the Fed best separate these activities from its monetary policymaking (where independence is critical)?
Addressing these policy questions requires a rethink of process, too. The Fed would be more effective in dealing with a changing economic environment if it acknowledged and debated more diverse viewpoints about the roles of monetary policy and financial regulation in how the economy works.
The Fed’s inflation mistakes, overconfidence in financial regulation, and other errors partly reflect the “groupthink” to which all organizations are prone. Regional Fed presidents’ views traditionally have reflected their own backgrounds and local conditions, but that doesn’t translate easily into a diversity of economic views. Instead of choosing Fed officials based on how they are likely to vote at the next rate-setting meeting, Trump should put more weight on intellectual and experiential diversity. Equally, the Fed itself could more actively seek and listen to dissenting views from academic and business leaders.
Raising questions about policy and process offers guidance about the characteristics that the next Fed chair will need to succeed. These obviously include knowledge of monetary policy and financial regulation and mature, independent judgment; but they also include diverse leadership experience and an openness to new ideas and perspectives that might enhance the institution’s performance and accountability. One hopes that Trump’s selection of the next Fed chair, and the Senate’s confirmation process, will emphasize these attributes.
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