Federal Reserve Governor Christopher J. Waller (photo from the Associated Press via the Wall Street Journal)
Fed Governor Christopher Waller has a reputation for being a policy hawk, which means that since the spring of 2022 he has been a forceful advocate of multiple increases in the target for the federal funds rate as the Fed attempts to slow the economy and bring inflation back to the Fed’s 2 percent target. (Waller’s biography on the Fed’s web site can be found here.)
So, it was notable that in a speech at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) on November 28, he said that “I am increasingly confident that policy is currently well positioned to slow the economy and get inflation back to 2 percent.” Although he also stressed that “there is still significant uncertainty about the pace of future activity, and so I cannot say for sure whether the [Federal Open Market Committee] FOMC has done enough to achieve price stability” his remarks were interpreted as reinforcing the growing view among non-Fed economists and investors that the FOMC is unlikely to increase its target for the federal funds rate further and is likely to reduce the target at some point during 2024. The text of Waller’s speech can be found here.
AEI economist Michael Strain interviewed Waller following his speech. In the interview (which can be found here), Strain made the case for believing that the Fed’s ability to achieve a soft landing—returning inflation to the 2 percent target without pushing the economy into a recession—would be more difficult than Waller seems to believe. Included in the interview are discussions of whether expecting a soft landing is consistent with the historical record, what guidance the Taylor rule can give to monetary policymakers (we discuss the Taylor rule in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5, Economics, Chapter 25, Section 15.5, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 17, Section 17.5), the significance of rising labor force participation rates among prime-age workers, and the implications large federal budget deficits have for monetary policy.
A job fair in Jackson, Mississippi (photo from the Associated Press)
As part of the Social Security Act of 1935,Congress created the unemployment insurance program to make payments to unemployed workers. The program run jointly by the federal government and the state governments. It’s financed primarily by state and federal taxes on employers. States are allowed to determine which workers are eligible, the dollar amount of the unemployment benefit workers will receive, and for how long workers will receive the benefit.
What’s the purpose of the unemployment insurance program? A document published the U.S. Department of Labor explains that: “Unemployment compensation is a social insurance program. It is designed to provide benefits to most individuals out of work, generally through no fault of their own, for periods between jobs…. [Unemployment compensation] ensures that a significant proportion of the necessities of life can be met on a week-to-week basis while a search for work takes place.”
But the same document also notes that unemployment compensation “maintains [unemployed workers’] purchasing power which also acts as an economic stabilizer in times of economic downturn.” By “economic stabilizer,” the Department of Labor is noting that unemployment compensation is what in Macroeconomics, Chapter 16, Section 16.1 (Economics, Chapter 26, Section 26.1) we call an automatic stabilizer. An automatic stabilizer is a government spending or taxing program that automatically increases or decreases along with the business cycle.
As shown in the following figure, when the economy enters a recession, the total amount of unemployment compensation payments increases without the federal government or the state governments having to take any action because eligibility for the payments is already defined in existing law. So, during a recession, the unemployment insurance program helps to keep aggregate demand higher than it would otherwise be, which can lessen the severity of the recession.
As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.3 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.3), the unemployment insurance program can have an unintended effect. The higher the unemployment insurance payment a worker receives and the longer the worker receives it, the more likely the worker is to delay searching for another job. In other words, by reducing the opportunity cost of being unemployed, unemployment insurance benefits may unintentionally increase the length of unemployment spells—the amount of time the typical worker is unemployed.
During and immediately after the 2020 recession, the federal government increased the dollar amount of the unemployment insurance payments that workers received and extended the number of months workers could continue to receive these payments. Under the American Rescue Plan, a law which President Biden proposed and Congress passed in March 2021, workers receiving unemployment insurance benefits received an additional $300 weekly from March 2021 until September 6, 2021. Also, under the law, people, such as the self-employed and gig workers, would receive unemployment insurance benefits even though they had previously been ineligible to receive them. (Note the resulting spike during this period in the total dollar amount of unemployment insurance benefits as shown in the above figure.)
Some state governments were concerned that the extended benefits might cause some workers to delay taking jobs, thereby slowing the recovery of these states’ economies from the effects of the pandemic. Accordingly, 18 states stopped participating in the programs in June 2021, meaning that at that time unemployed workers would no longer receive the extra $300 per week and workers who prior to March 2021 hadn’t been eligible to receive unemployment benefits would again be ineligible.
Were unemployed workers in the states that ended the expanded unemployment insurance benefits in June more likely to become employed than were unemployed workers in states that continued the expanded benefits into September? On the one hand, ending the expanded benefits would increase the opportunity cost of not having a job. But, on the other hand, because government payments to workers would decline in these states, the result could be a decline in consumer spending that would decrease the demand for labor. Which of these effects was larger would determine whether employment increased or decreased in the states that ended expanded unemployment benefits early.
Glenn, along with Harry Holzer of Georgetown University and Michael Strain of the American Enterprise Institute, carried out an econometric analysis to explore the effects ending expanded unemployment benefits early had on the labor markets in those states. They find that:
Among unemployed workers ages 25 to 54 (“prime-age workers”), ending the expanded unemployment benefit program increased the number of workers in those states who moved from being unemployed to being employed by 14 percentage points.
Among prime-age workers, the employment-to-population ratio in those states increased by about 1 percentage point.
Among prime-age workers, the unemployment rate in those stated decreased by about 0.9 percentage point.
These estimates indicate that the effect of ending the expanded unemployment benefit program raised the opportunity cost of being unemployed more than it decreased the demand for labor by reducing the incomes of some household. But what about the larger question of whether households were made better or worse off as a result of ending the program early? The authors find that ending the program early decreased the share of households that had no difficulty meeting expenses. They, therefore, conclude that the effects on household well-being of ending the program early are ambiguous.
The paper presenting these results can be found here. Warning! The econometric analysis is quite technical.
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