Category: Uncategorized

FOMC Meeting Results in Expected Rate Cut

Photo of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell from federalreserve.gov

Today’s meeting of the Federal Reserve’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) occurred against a backdrop of a shutdown of the federal government that has delayed release of most government economic data. (We discuss the government shutdown here, here, and here.)

As most observers had expected, the committee decided today to lower its target for the federal funds rate from a range of 4.00 percent to 4.25 percent to a range of 3.75 percent to 4.oo percent—a cut of 0.25 percentage point, or 25 basis points. The members of the committee voted 10 to 2 for the 25 basis point cut with Governor Stephen Miran dissenting because he preferred a 50 basis point cut and Jeffrey Schmid, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, dissenting because he preferred that the target range be left unchanged at this meeting.

The following figure shows, for the period since January 2010, the upper bound (the blue line) and the lower bound (the green line) for the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate, as well as the actual values of the federal funds rate (the red line). Note that the Fed has been successful in keeping the value of the federal funds rate in its target range. (We discuss the monetary policy tools the FOMC uses to maintain the federal funds rate in its target range in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.2).)

During his press conference following the meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell made news by stating that a further cut in the target rate at the FOMC’s meeting on December 9–10 is not a foregone conclusion. This statement came as a surprise to investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.)  As of yesterday, investors has assigned a probability of 90.5 percent to the committee cutting its target range by another 25 basis points at the December meeting. Today that probability dropped to zero. Instead investors now assign a probability of 67.8 percent to the target remaining unchanged at that meeting, and a probability of 32.2 percent of the committee raising its target by 25 basis points.

Powell also indicated that he believes that the recent increase in inflation was largely due to the effects of the increase in tariff rates that the Trump administration began implementing in April. (We discuss the recent data on inflation in this post.) Powell indicated that committee members expect that the tariff increases will cause a one-time increase in the price level, rather than a long-term increase in the inflation rate. As a result, he said that the shift in the “balance of risks” caused the committee to believe that cutting the target for the federal funds rate was warranted to avoid the possibility of a significant rise in the unemployment rate.

In discussing inflation, Powell highlighted three aspects of the recent CPI report: inflation in goods, inflation in shelter, and inflation in services not including shelter. (The BLS explains is measurement of shelter here.) The following figure shows inflation in each of those categories, measured as the percentage increase from the same month in the previous year. Inflation in goods (the blue line) has been trending up, reflecting the effect of increased tariffs rates. Inlation in shelter (the red line) and in services minus shelter (the green line) have generally been trending downward. Powell noted that the decline in inflation in shelter has been slower than most members of the committee had expected.

Still, Powell argued that with the downward trend in services, once the temporary inflation in goods due to the effects of tariffs had passed through the economy, inflation was likely to be close the Fed’s 2 percent annual target. He thought this was particularly likely to be true because even after today’s cut, the federal funds rate was “restrictive” because it remained above its long-run nominal and real values. A restrictive monetary policy will slow spending and inflation.

In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rates—that is, the annual inflation rates calculated by compounding the current month’s rates over an entire year—for the same three categories. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, goods inflation (the blue line) was running at a very high 6.6 percent in September. inflation in shelter (the red line) had declined to 2.5 per cent in September. Inflation in services minus shelter rose slightly in September to 2.1 percent.

Assuming that the shutdown of the federal government ends within the next few weeks, members of the FOMC will have a great deal of data on inflation, real GDP growth, and employment to consider before their next meeting in December.

Glenn’s Questions for the Fed

Photo from federalreserve.gov

This opinion column originally ran at Project Syndicate.

While recent media coverage of the US Federal Reserve has tended to focus on when, and by how much, interest rates will be cut, larger issues loom. The selection of a new Fed chair to succeed Jerome Powell, whose term ends next May, should focus not on short-term market considerations, but on policies and processes that could improve the Fed’s overall performance and accountability.

By demanding that the Fed cut the federal funds rate sharply to boost economic activity and lower the government’s borrowing costs, US President Donald Trump risks pushing the central bank toward an overly inflationary monetary policy. And that, in turn, risks increasing the term premium in the ten-year Treasury yield—the very financial indicator that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has emphasized. A higher premium would raise, not lower, borrowing costs for the federal government, households, and businesses alike. Moreover, concerns about the Fed’s independence in setting monetary policy could undermine confidence in US financial markets and further weaken the dollar’s exchange rate. 

But this does not imply that Trump should simply seek continuity at the Fed. The Fed, under Powell, has indeed made mistakes, leading to higher inflation, sometimes inept and uncoordinated communications, and an unclear strategy for monetary policy.

I do not share the opinion of Trump and his advisers that the Fed has acted from political or partisan motives. Even when I have disagreed with Fed officials or Powell on matters of policy, I have not doubted their integrity. However, given their mistakes, I do believe that some institutional introspection is warranted. The next chair—along with the Board of Governors and the Federal Open Market Committee—will have many policy questions to address beyond the near-term path for the federal funds rate. 

Three issues are particularly important. The first is the Fed’s dual mandate: to ensure stable prices and maximum employment. Many economists (including me) have been critical of the Fed for exhibiting an inflationary bias in 2021 and 2022. The highest inflation rate in 40 years raised pressing questions about whether the Fed has assigned the right weights to inflation and employment. 

Clearly, the strategy of pursuing a flexible average inflation target (implying that inflation can be permitted to rise above 2% if it had previously been below 2%) has not been successful. What new approach should the Fed adopt to hit its inflation target? And how can the Fed be held more accountable to Congress and the public? Should it issue a regular inflation report? 

The second issue concerns the size and composition of the Fed’s balance sheet. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, the Fed has had a much larger balance sheet and has evolved toward an “ample reserves model” (implying a perpetually high level of reserves). But how large must the balance sheet be to conduct monetary policy, and how important should long-term Treasury debt and mortgage-backed securities be, relative to the rest of the balance sheet? If such assets are to play a central role, how can the Fed best separate the conduct of monetary policy from that of fiscal policy? 

The third issue is financial regulation. What regulatory changes does the Fed believe are needed to avoid the kind of costly stresses in the Treasury market we have witnessed in recent years? How can bank supervision be improved? Given that regulation is an inherently political subject, how can the Fed best separate these activities from its monetary policymaking (where independence is critical)? 

Addressing these policy questions requires a rethink of process, too. The Fed would be more effective in dealing with a changing economic environment if it acknowledged and debated more diverse viewpoints about the roles of monetary policy and financial regulation in how the economy works.

The Fed’s inflation mistakes, overconfidence in financial regulation, and other errors partly reflect the “groupthink” to which all organizations are prone. Regional Fed presidents’ views traditionally have reflected their own backgrounds and local conditions, but that doesn’t translate easily into a diversity of economic views. Instead of choosing Fed officials based on how they are likely to vote at the next rate-setting meeting, Trump should put more weight on intellectual and experiential diversity. Equally, the Fed itself could more actively seek and listen to dissenting views from academic and business leaders. 

Raising questions about policy and process offers guidance about the characteristics that the next Fed chair will need to succeed. These obviously include knowledge of monetary policy and financial regulation and mature, independent judgment; but they also include diverse leadership experience and an openness to new ideas and perspectives that might enhance the institution’s performance and accountability. One hopes that Trump’s selection of the next Fed chair, and the Senate’s confirmation process, will emphasize these attributes.

Are Stablecoins about to Become an Important Part of the U.S. Financial System?

Image illustrating stablecoins generated by ChatGTP4-o

Recently, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent testified before Congress that the value of stablecoins could reach $2 trillion. In a post on X (formerly Twitter) he stated that “that stablecoins could grow into a $3.7 trillion market by the end of the decade.” Those amounts are far above the $250 billion estimated value of stablecoins in June 2025, yet still small relative to the value of M2—currently $21.9 trillion. But if the value of stablecoins were to rise to $2 trillion, that would be large enough to have a noticeable effect on the U.S. financial system.

As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 24 and in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 2, stablecoins are a type of cryptocurrency—bitcoin is the best-known cryptocurrency—that can be bought and sold for a constant number of units of a currency, usually U.S. dollars. Typically, one stablecoin can be exchanged for one dollar. 

Tether CEO Paolo Ardoino (photo from Bloomberg news via the Wall Street Journal)

Firms that issue stablecoins will redeem them in the underlying currency, which—as already noted—is nearly always the U.S. dollar. To make the promise to redeem stablecoins in dollars credible, firms that issue stablecoins hold reserve assets that are safe and highly liquid, such as U.S. Treasury bills or U.S. dollar bank deposits. Tether, which is headquartered in El Salvador, is the largest issuer of stablecoins, with about two-thirds of the market. As with bitcoins and other cryptocurrencies, stablecoins are stored and traded on public blockchains, which are decentralized networks of ledgers that record transactions. This system avoids the use of financial intermediaries—such as banks—which advocates for cryptocurrencies see as a key advantage because it eliminates the possibility that the intermediary might reject the transaction. But it also increases the appeal of stablecoins to people engaged in illegal activities.  

Advocates for stablecoins believe that they can become a digital medium of exchange, which is a role that initially bitcoin was intended to play. The swings in the value of bitcoin turned out to be much larger than most people expected and made that crypto currency unsuitable for use as a medium of exchange. Stablecoins avoid this problem by keeping the value of the stablecoins fixed at one dollar. To this point, though, stablecoins have been primarily used to buy and sell bitcoin and other crypto currencies. As Federal Reserve Governor Christopher Waller put it in a speech earlier this year: “By their tie to the dollar, stablecoins are the medium of exchange and unit of account in the crypto ecosystem.” According to Waller, more than 80 percent of trading in cryptocurrencies is conducted using stablecoins.

One drawback to stablecoins is that firms that issue them charge a fee to redeem them. For instance, Tether requires that a minimum of $100,000 of stablecoins be redeemed and charges a fee of 0.1 percent of the amount redeemed with a minimum charge of $1,000. The redemption fee would be less important if stablecoins are used in large dollar transactions, such as occur in international trade. Advocates for stablecoins believe that they are particularly well suited for use in cross-border transactions because they don’t involve banks, as typically is necessary when firms buy or sell goods or services in foreign countries. The fees stablecoin issuers charge are generally lower than the fees banks charge for foreign exchange transactions.

The main source of profit for firms issuing stablecoins is the interest they earn on the assets they use to back the stablecoins they issue. Note, though, that firms issuing stablecoins have an incentive to buy riskier assets in order to increase the return on the stablecoins they issue. The incentives are similar to those banks face in investing depositors’ funds in assets that are riskier than the depositors would prefer. However, the risk that commercial banks take on is limited by bank regulations, which don’t yet apply to firms issuing stablecoins, although they may soon.

On June 17, the U.S. Senate moved to provide a regulatory framework for stablecoins by passing the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (Genius Act). The act requires that firms issuing stablecoins in the United States back them 100 percent with a limited number of reserve assets: dollar deposits in banks, Treasury securities that mature in 93 days or less, repurchase agreements backed by Treasuries (we discuss repurchase agreements in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15; Economics, Chapter 25; and Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 10), and money market funds that invest in eligible Treasury securities and repurchase agreements. Issuers of stablecoins will be subject to audits by U.S. federal regulators. To become law, the Genius Act must also be passed by the U.S. House and signed by President Trump.

Passage of the Genius Act would potentially provide a regulatory framework that would reassure users that the stablecoins they hold can be readily redeemed for dollars. Passage is also expected to lead some large retail firms, such as Walmart and Amazon, to issue stablecoins that could be used to make purchases on their sites. If enough consumers are willing to use stablecoins, these large retailers could save the fees they currently pay to credit card companies. In addition, stablecoin transactions can be cleared instantly, as opposed to the several days it can take for credit card payments to clear. Why would a consumer want to use stablecoin rather than a credit card to pay for something? Apart from the familiarity of using credit cards, the cards often provide rewards, such as points that can be redeemed for airline tickets or hotel stays. To attract consumers, stablecoin issuers would likely have to offer similar rewards to consumers who use stablecoins to make purchases.

As Waller notes, it will likely take years before consumers and firms routinely use stablecoins for day-to-day transactions. Today, very few retail firms are equipped to accept stablecoins and very few consumers own stablecoins.

Passage of the Genius Act would pose potential problems for Tether. Tether has held a wide range of reserve assets to back its stablecoins, including bitcoin and precious metals. It has also not been willing to be fully audited. Either Tether would have to change its business model to fit the requirements of the Genius Act or it would have to issue a separate stablecoin that would be used only in the United States and would meet the Genius Act requirements.

We noted earlier that Treasury Secretary Bessent believes that over the next few years, the value of stablecoins could increase to several trillions dollars. If that happens, the demand for Treasury securities would increase substantially as firms issuing stablecoins accumulated reserve assets. The result could be higher prices on Treasury securities and lower interest rates, which would eventually reduce the interest payments the Treasury makes on the federal government’s debt.

Finally, as we note in the text, Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley as been a notable skeptic of stablecoins. As he wrote back in 2018, when the idea of stablecoins was just beginning to be widely discussed, when someone exchanges a dollar for a stablecoin, “one of us then will have traded a perfectly liquid dollar, supported by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, for a cryptocurrency with questionable backing that is awkward to use. This exchange may be attractive to money launderers and tax evaders, but not to others.”

Could issuers of stablecoins be subject to runs like the one that led to the failure of Silicon Valley Bank in the spring of 2023?

In a recent opinion column in the New York Times, Eichengreen wrote that he is concerned about the possibility of runs on stablecoins. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, and in Money, Banking, and the Financial Systems, Chapter 10, a commercial bank can be subject to a run if the bank’s depositors believe that the value of the bank’s assets are no longer sufficient to pay off the bank’s depositors. As we discuss in this blog post, Silocon Valley Bank experienced a run in the spring of 2023 that affected several other banks. Runs on commercial banks are unusual in the United States because of deposit insurance and the willingness of the Federal Reserve to act as lender of last resort to banks suffering liquidity problems. Eichengreen raises the question of whether stablecoins could experience runs if holders of the stablecoins come to doubt that the value of issuers’ reserve assets is sufficient to redeem all the coins.

Although the Genius Act provides for regulation of stablecoin issuers, Eichengreen believes that if enough firms begin issuing stablecoins, it’s likely that at some point one of them will experience a decline in the value of its reserve assets, which will cause a run. If the run spreads from one issuer to many in a process called contagion, stablecoin issuers will have to sell reserve assets, including Treasury securities. The result could be a sharp fall in the prices of those asset and an increase in interest rates. It’s possible that the outcome could be a wider financial panic and a deep recession. To head off that possibility, the Federal Reserve might feel obliged to intervene to save some, possibly many, stablecoin issuers from failing. The result could be that taxpayer dollars would flow to firms issuing stablecoins, which would likely cause a significant political backlash.

Many people see stablecoins as an exciting development in the financial system. But, as we’ve noted, there still remain some substantial roadblocks in the way of stablecoins becoming an important means of transacting business in the U.S. economy.

Should We Turn Monetary Policy over to Generative Artificial Intelligence?

Image generated by ChatGTP-4o One of the key issues in monetary policy—dating back decades—is whether policy should be governed by a rule or whether the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) should make “data-driven” decisions. Currently, the FOMC believes that the best approach is to let macroeconomic data drive decisions about the appropriate target … Continue reading “Should We Turn Monetary Policy over to Generative Artificial Intelligence?”

Image generated by ChatGTP-4o

One of the key issues in monetary policy—dating back decades—is whether policy should be governed by a rule or whether the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) should make “data-driven” decisions. Currently, the FOMC believes that the best approach is to let macroeconomic data drive decisions about the appropriate target for the federal funds rate rather than to allow a policy rule to determine the target.

In its most recent Monetary Policy Report to Congress, the Fed’s Board of Governors noted that policy rules “can provide useful benchmarks for the consideration of monetary policy. However, simple rules cannot capture all of the complex considerations that go into the formation of appropriate monetary policy, and many practical considerations make it undesirable for the FOMC to adhere strictly to the prescriptions of any specific rule.” We discuss the debate over monetary policy rules—sometimes described as the debate over “rules versus discretion” in conducting policy—in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.5.)

Probably the best known advocate of the Fed relying on policy rules is John Taylor of Stanford University. The Taylor rule for monetary policy begins with an estimate of the value of the real federal funds rate, which is the federal funds rate—adjusted for inflation—that would be consistent with real GDP being equal to potential real GDP in the long run. With real GDP equal to potential real GDP, cyclical unemployment should be zero, and the Fed will have attained its policy goal of maximum employment, as the Fed defines it.

According to the Taylor rule, the Fed should set its current federal funds rate target equal to the sum of the current inflation rate, the equilibrium real federal funds rate, and two additional terms. The first of these terms is the inflation gap—the difference between current inflation and the target rate (currently 2 percent, as measured by the percentage change in the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index; the second term is the output gap—the percentage difference of real GDP from potential real GDP. The inflation gap and the output gap are each given “weights” that reflect their influence on the federal funds rate target. With weights of one-half for both gaps, we have the following Taylor rule:

Federal funds rate target = Current inflation rate + Equilibrium real federal funds rate + (1/2 × Inflation gap) + (1/2 × Output gap).

So when the inflation rate is above the Fed’s target rate, the FOMC will raise the target for the federal funds rate. Similarly, when the output gap is negative—that is, when real GDP is less than potential GDP—the FOMC will lower the target for the federal funds rate. In calibrating this rule, Taylor assumed that the equilibrium real federal funds rate is 2 percent and the target rate of inflation is 2 percent. (Note that the Taylor rule we are using here was the one Taylor first proposed in 1993. Since that time, Taylor and other economists have also analyzed other similar rules with, for instance, an assumption of a lower equilibrium real federal funds rate.)

The following figure shows the level of the federal funds rate that would have occurred if the Fed had strictly followed the original Taylor rule (the blue line) and the actual federal funds rate (the red line). The figure indicates that because during many years the two lines are close together, the Taylor rule does a reasonable job of explaining Federal Reserve policy. There are noticeable exceptions, however, such as the period of high inflation that began in the spring of 2021. During that period, the Taylor rule indicates that the FOMC should have begun raising its target for the federal funds rate earlier and raised it much higher than it did.

Taylor has presented a number of arguments in favor of the Fed relying on a rule in conducting monetary policy, including the following:

  1. A simple policy rule (such as the Taylor rule) makes it easier for households, firms, and investors to understand Fed policy.
  2. Conducting policy according to a rule makes it less likely that households, firms, and investors will be surprised by Fed policy.
  3. Fed policy is less likely to be subject to political pressure if it follows a rule: “If monetary policy appears to be run in an ad hoc and complicated way rather than a systematic way, then politicians may argue that they can be just as ad hoc and interfere with monetary policy decisions.”
  4. Following a rule makes it easier to hold the Fed accountable for policy errors.

The Fed hasn’t been persuaded by Taylor’s arguments, preferring its current data-driven approach. In setting monetary policy, the members of the FOMC believe in the importance of being forward looking, attempting to take into account the future paths of inflation and unemployment. But committee members can struggle to accurately forecast inflation and unemployment. For instance, at the time of the June 2021 meeting of the FOMC, inflation had already risen above 4%. Nevertheless, committee members forecast that inflation in 2022 would be 2.1%. Inflation in 2022 turned out to be much higher—6.6%.

To succeed with a data-driven approach to policy, members of the FOMC must be able to correctly interpret the importance of new data on economic variables as it becomes available and also accurately forecast the effects of policy changes on key variables, particularly unemployment and inflation. How do the committee members approach these tasks? To some extent they rely on formal economic models, such as those developed by the economists on the committee’s staff. But, judging by their speeches and media interviews, committee members also rely on qualitative analysis in interpreting new data and in forming their expectations of how monetary policy will affect the economy.

In recent years, generative artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) programs have made great strides in analyzing large data sets. Should the Fed rely more heavily on these programs in conducting monetary policy? The Fed is currently only in the beginning stages of incorporating AI into its operations. In 2024, the Fed appointed a Chief Artificial Intelligence Officer (CAIO) to coordinate its AI initiatives. Initially, the Fed has used AI primarily in the areas of supervising the payment system and promoting financial stability. AI has the ability to quickly analyze millions of financial transactions to identify those that may be fraudulent or may not be in compliance with financial and banking regulations. How households, firms, and investors respond to Fed policies is an important part of how effective the policies will be. The Fed staff has used AI to analyze how financial markets are likely to react to FOMC policy announcements.

The Central Bank of Canada has gone further than the Fed in using AI. According to Tiff Macklem, the Governor of the Bank of Canada, AI is used to:

• forecast inflation, economic activity and demand for bank notes
• track sentiment in key sectors of the economy
• clean and verify regulatory data
• improve efficiency and de-risk operations

Will central banks begin to use AI to carry out the key activity of setting policy interest rates, such as the federal funds rate in the United States? AI has the potential to adjust the federal funds rate more promptly than the members of the FOMC are able to do in their eight yearly meetings. Will it happen? At this point, generative AI and ML models are not capable of taking on that responsibility. In addition, as noted earlier, Taylor and other supporters of rules-based policies have argued that simple rules are necessary for the public to understand Fed policy. AI generated rules are likely to be too complex to be readily understood by non-specialists.

It’s too early in the process of central banks adopting AI in their operations to know the eventual outcome. But AI is likely to have a significant effect on central banks, just as it is already affecting many businesses.

Trump Administration Implements Historically Large Tariff Increases … and a Related Solved Problem

Image generated by ChatGTP-4o of new cars on a dealer’s lot.

This afternoon (April 2), President Donald Trump announced a sweeping increase in tariff rates on imported goods. The increases were by far the largest since the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930. The United States will impose 10 percent across-the-board tariff on all imports, with higher tariffs being imposed on individual countries. Taking into account earlier tariffs, Chinese imports will be subject to a 54 percent tariff. Imports from Vietnam will be subject to a 46 percent tariff, and imports from the countries in the European Union will be subject to a 20 percent tariff.

President Trump’s objectives in imposing the tariffs aren’t entirely clear because he and his advisers have emphasized different goals at different times. The most common objectives the president and his advisers have offered for the tariff increases are these three:

  1. To increase the size of the U.S. manufacturing sector by raising the prices of imported manufactured goods.
  2. To retaliate against barriers that other countries have raised against U.S. exports.
  3. To raise revenue for the federal government.

The effects of the tariffs on the U.S. economy depend in part on whether foreign countries retaliate by raising their tariffs on imports from the United States and on whether, in the future, the president reduces tariffs in exchange for other countries reducing barriers to U.S. imports. For a background discussion of tariffs, see this post. Glenn and Tony discuss tariffs in this podcast, which was recorded on Friday afternoon (March 28). A discussion of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff can be found here.

The following Solved Problem looks at one aspect of the effects of a tariff increase.

Supports: Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 6, Section 6.3.

Nearly every automobile assembled in the United States contains at least some imported parts. An article on axis.com made the following statement about the effect on U.S. automobile manufacturers of an increase in the tariff on imported auto parts: “If car prices [in the United States] go up, Americans will buy fewer of them, meaning less revenue ….” What assumption is the author of this article making about the demand for new automobiles in the United States?

Solving the Problem

Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the effect of price increases on a firm’s revenue, so you may want to review the section “The Relationship between Price Elasticity of Demand and Total Revenue.”

Step 2: Answer the question by explaining what must be true of the demand for new automobiles in the United States if an increase in automobile prices results in a decline in the revenue received by automobile producers. This section of Chapter 6 explains how the price elasticity of demand affects the revenue a firm receives following a price increase. A price increase, holding everything else constant that affects the demand for a good, always causes a decline in the quantity demanded. If demand is price inelastic, an increase in price will result in an increase in revenue because the percentage decline in quantity demanded will be smaller than the percentage increase in the price. If demand is price elastic, an increase in price will result in a decrease in revenue because the percentage decline in the quantity demanded will be larger than the percentage increase in price. We can conclude that the author of the article must be assuming that the demand for new automobiles in the United States is price elastic.

A Sign of the (Digital) Times

An issue of the American Economic Review celebrating the 100th anniversary of the journal in 2011.

The American Economic Association (AEA) was founded in 1885 and is the leading organization of business and academic economists in the United States. It first began publishing the American Economic Review (AER) in 1911. The AER remains the leading academic economic journal in the United States. Like most other academic journals, in recent years the AER has been available in both digital format and in paper copies mailed to subscribers. In January 2024, the AEA announced that the paper version of the journal will soon end:

“The AEA will phase out print journals over the next year by no longer offering print subscriptions for members and institutional subscribers as of February 1.  Existing print subscriptions for members and institutions will be honored through January 2025 but will be unable to be renewed.”

The transition of the AER from a paper-only to a digital-only format has been a long one, strecthing over three decades. The tranisition began in the 1990s when the development of the internet made electronic publishing feasible. An important step in making academic journals available electronically was the establishment by William Bowen of the Mellon Foundation of JSTOR in 1994. JSTOR was intended to make electronic versions of back issues of academic journals available inexpensively to libraries and other institutions.

Typically, at the end of a year, libraries would send the issues of academic journals published during that year to be bound into volumes. The libraries would then put the volumes on library shelves making them available to faculty, students, and researchers. University libraries that subscribed to large numbers of academic journals found that over time they were devoting more and more space to shelving bound volumes of academic journals. Many libraries began storing the volumes off site in warehouses, making the volumes less accessible to faculty and students. JSTOR made it possible for libraries to store back issues of journals electronically rather than physically. Many academic societies, like the AEA, were happy to allow JSTOR to make electronic copies of the back issues of their journals. Although academic societies often fund their activities in part from subscriptions to their journals, the societies earned little or no revenue from back issues of their journals.

During the 1990s, the AEA and other academic societies began to make current issues of some journals available on CD-ROMs as more factulty began to use personal computers that had those drives available. Many faculty—including Glenn and Tony!—found the CD-ROM versions of journal issues a little awkward and time consuming to use. CD-Roms never became an important way of distributing journal issues to subscribers. (This article published in 1997 by Hal Varian, who was then at the University of California, Berkeley and is now the chief economist at Google, provides an interesting discuss of the AEA’s first steps toward transitioning its journals to electronic formats.)

By the 2000s, the AEA was offering subscribers to the AER the choice of electronic-only subscriptions—with issues available for download on the AEA’s website—or electronic access along with print copies at a higher annual price. This model was one widely used by non-academic magazines and newspapers. As the number of subscribers receiving print copies of the AER dwindled, the leadership of the AEA eventually decided to eliminate print copies, as indicated in the announcement quoted at the beginning of this post.

For better or worse, in most fields, print copies of academic journals seem to be well on their way to extinction.