Tag: Dissenting votes at the FOMC

Three Dissents as the FOMC Cuts Its Target for the Federal Funds Rate

Photo from federalreserve.gov

Today’s meeting of the Federal Reserve’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) had the expected result with the committee deciding to lower its target for the federal funds rate from a range of 3.75 percent to 4.00 percent to a range of 3.50 percent to 3.75 percent—a cut of 25 basis points. The members of the committee voted 9 to 3 in favor of the cut. Fed Governor Stephen Miran voted against the action, preferring to lower the target range for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points. President Austan Goolsbee of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and President Jeffrey Schmid of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City also voted against the action, preferring to leave the target range unchanged.

The following figure shows for the period since January 2010, the upper bound (the blue line) and the lower bound (the green line) for the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate, as well as the actual values for the federal funds rate (the red line). Note that the Fed has been successful in keeping the value of the federal funds rate in its target range. (We discuss the monetary policy tools the FOMC uses to maintain the federal funds rate within its target range in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.2).)

After the meeting, the committee also released a “Summary of Economic Projections” (SEP)—as it typically does after its March, June, September, and December meetings. The SEP presents median values of the 19 committee members’ forecasts of key economic variables. The values are summarized in the following table, reproduced from the release. (Note that only 5 of the district bank presidents vote at FOMC meetings, although all 12 presidents participate in the discussions and prepare forecasts for the SEP.)

There are several aspects of these forecasts worth noting:

  1. Compared with September, the committee members increased their forecasts of real GDP growth for each year from 2025 through 2027. The increase for 2026 was substantial, from 1.8 percent to 2.3 percent, although some of this increase was attributable to the federal government shutdown causing some economic output to be shifted from 2025 to 2026. Committee members slightly decreased their forecasts of the unemployment rate in 2027. They left their forecast of the unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 2025 unchanged at 4.5 percent.
  2. Committee members reduced their forecasts for personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price inflation for 2025 and 2026. Similarly, their forecasts of core PCE inflation for 2025 and 2026 were also reduced. The committee does not expect that PCE inflation will decline to the Fed’s 2.0 percent annual target until 2028.
  3. The committee’s forecasts of the federal funds rate at the end of each year from 2025 through 2028 were unchanged.

Prior to the meeting there was much discussion in the business press and among investment analysts about the dot plot, shown below. Each dot in the plot represents the projection of an individual committee member. (The committee doesn’t disclose which member is associated with which dot.) Note that there are 19 dots, representing the 7 members of the Fed’s Board of Governors and all 12 presidents of the Fed’s district banks. 

The plots on the far left of the figure represent the projections by the 19 members of the value of the federal funds rate at the end of 2025. The fact that several members of the committee preferred that the federal funds rate end 2025 above 4 percent—in other words higher than it will be following the vote at today’s meeting—indicates that several non-voting district bank presidents, beyond Goolsbee and Schmid, would have preferred to not cut the target range. The plots on the far right of the figure indicate that there is substantial disagreement among comittee members as to what the long-run value of the federal funds rate—the so-called neutral rate—should be.

During his press conference following the meeting, Powell indicated that the increase in inflation in recent months was largely due to the effects of the increase in tariffs on goods prices. Powell indicated that committee members expect that the tariff increases will cause a one-time increase in the price level, rather than causing a long-term increase in the inflation rate. Powell also noted the recent slow growth in employment, which he noted might actually be negative once the Bureau of Labor Statistics revises the data for recent months. This slow growth indicated that the risk of unemployment increasing was greater than the risk of inflation increasing. As a result, he said that the “balance of risks” caused the committee to believe that cutting the target for the federal funds rate was warranted to avoid the possibility of a significant rise in the unemployment rate. 

The next FOMC meeting is on January 27–28. By that time a significant amount of new macroeconomic data, which has not been available because of the government shutdown, will have been released. It also seems likely that President Trump will have named the person he intends to nominate to succeed Powell as Fed chair when Powell’s term ends on May 15, 2026. (Powel’s term on the Board doesn’t end until January 31, 2028, although he declined at the press conference to say whether he will serve out the remainder of his term on the Board after he steps down as chair.) In addition, it’s possible that by the time of the next meeting the Supreme Court will have ruled on whether President Trump can legally remove Governor Lisa Cook from the Board and on whether President Trump’s tariff increases this year are Constitutional.

FOMC Meeting Results in Expected Rate Cut

Photo of Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell from federalreserve.gov

Today’s meeting of the Federal Reserve’s policymaking Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) occurred against a backdrop of a shutdown of the federal government that has delayed release of most government economic data. (We discuss the government shutdown here, here, and here.)

As most observers had expected, the committee decided today to lower its target for the federal funds rate from a range of 4.00 percent to 4.25 percent to a range of 3.75 percent to 4.oo percent—a cut of 0.25 percentage point, or 25 basis points. The members of the committee voted 10 to 2 for the 25 basis point cut with Governor Stephen Miran dissenting because he preferred a 50 basis point cut and Jeffrey Schmid, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, dissenting because he preferred that the target range be left unchanged at this meeting.

The following figure shows, for the period since January 2010, the upper bound (the blue line) and the lower bound (the green line) for the FOMC’s target range for the federal funds rate, as well as the actual values of the federal funds rate (the red line). Note that the Fed has been successful in keeping the value of the federal funds rate in its target range. (We discuss the monetary policy tools the FOMC uses to maintain the federal funds rate in its target range in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.2 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.2).)

During his press conference following the meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell made news by stating that a further cut in the target rate at the FOMC’s meeting on December 9–10 is not a foregone conclusion. This statement came as a surprise to investors who buy and sell federal funds futures contracts. (We discuss the futures market for federal funds in this blog post.)  As of yesterday, investors has assigned a probability of 90.5 percent to the committee cutting its target range by another 25 basis points at the December meeting. Today that probability dropped to zero. Instead investors now assign a probability of 67.8 percent to the target remaining unchanged at that meeting, and a probability of 32.2 percent of the committee raising its target by 25 basis points.

Powell also indicated that he believes that the recent increase in inflation was largely due to the effects of the increase in tariff rates that the Trump administration began implementing in April. (We discuss the recent data on inflation in this post.) Powell indicated that committee members expect that the tariff increases will cause a one-time increase in the price level, rather than a long-term increase in the inflation rate. As a result, he said that the shift in the “balance of risks” caused the committee to believe that cutting the target for the federal funds rate was warranted to avoid the possibility of a significant rise in the unemployment rate.

In discussing inflation, Powell highlighted three aspects of the recent CPI report: inflation in goods, inflation in shelter, and inflation in services not including shelter. (The BLS explains is measurement of shelter here.) The following figure shows inflation in each of those categories, measured as the percentage increase from the same month in the previous year. Inflation in goods (the blue line) has been trending up, reflecting the effect of increased tariffs rates. Inlation in shelter (the red line) and in services minus shelter (the green line) have generally been trending downward. Powell noted that the decline in inflation in shelter has been slower than most members of the committee had expected.

Still, Powell argued that with the downward trend in services, once the temporary inflation in goods due to the effects of tariffs had passed through the economy, inflation was likely to be close the Fed’s 2 percent annual target. He thought this was particularly likely to be true because even after today’s cut, the federal funds rate was “restrictive” because it remained above its long-run nominal and real values. A restrictive monetary policy will slow spending and inflation.

In the following figure, we look at the 1-month inflation rates—that is, the annual inflation rates calculated by compounding the current month’s rates over an entire year—for the same three categories. Calculated as the 1-month inflation rate, goods inflation (the blue line) was running at a very high 6.6 percent in September. inflation in shelter (the red line) had declined to 2.5 per cent in September. Inflation in services minus shelter rose slightly in September to 2.1 percent.

Assuming that the shutdown of the federal government ends within the next few weeks, members of the FOMC will have a great deal of data on inflation, real GDP growth, and employment to consider before their next meeting in December.

Does the Structure of the Fed Matter?

Photo of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas from federalreservehistory.org.

The unusual structure of the Federal Reserve System reflects the political situation at the time that Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. As we discuss in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 13, at that time, many members of Congress believed that a unified central bank based in Washington, DC would concentrate too much economic power in the hands of the officials running the bank. So, the act divided economic power within the Federal Reserve System in three ways: among bankers and business interests, among states and regions, and between the federal government and the private sector.

As part of its plan to divide authority within the Federal Reserve System, Congress decided not to establish a single central bank with branches, which had been the structure of both the First and Second Banks of the United States—which were the two attempts by Congress during the period from 1791 to 1836 to establish a central bank. Instead, the Federal Reserve Act divided the United States into 12 Federal Reserve districts, each of which has a Federal Reserve Bank in one city (and, in most cases, additional branches in other cities in the district). The following figure is the original map drawn by the Federal Reserve Organizing Committee in 1913 showing the 12 Federal Reserve Districts. Congress adopted the map with a few changes, following which the areas of the 12 districts have remained largely unchanged down to the present.

The map is from federalreservehistory.org.

The following map shows the current boundaries of the Federal Reserve Districts.

The map is reproduced from the working paper discussed below.

All national banks—commercial banks with charters from the federal government—were required to join the Federal Reserve System. State banks—commercial banks with charters from state governments—were given the option to join. Congress intended that the primary function of each of the Federal Reserve Banks would be to make discount loans to member banks in its region. These loans were to provide liquidity to banks, thereby fulfilling in a decentralized way the system’s role as a lender of last resort.

When banks join the Federal Reserve System, they are required to buy stock in their Federal Reserve Bank, which pays member banks a dividend on this stock. So, in principle, the private commercial banks in each district that are members of the Federal Reserve System own the District Bank. In fact, each Federal Reserve Bank is a private–government joint venture because the member banks enjoy few of the rights and privileges that shareholders ordinarily exercise. For example, member banks do not have a legal claim on the profits of the District Banks, as shareholders of private corporations do.

On paper, the Federal Reserve System is a decentralized organization with a public-private structure. In practice, power within the system is concentrated in the seven member Board of Governors in Washington, DC. Control over the most important aspect of monetary policy—setting the target for the federal funds rate—is vested in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The voting membership of the FOMC consists of the seven member of the Board of Governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and four other district bank presidents on a rotating basis (although all 12 district presidents participate in committee discussions). The district bank presidents are elected by the boards of directors of the district banks, but the Board of Governors has final say on who is chosen as a district bank president.

Given these considerations, does the structure of the Fed matter or is it an unimportant historical curiosity? There are reasons to think the Fed’s structure does still matter. First, as we discuss in this blog post, in a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court implied—but didn’t state explicitly—that, because of the Fed’s structure, U.S. presidents will likely not be allowed to remove Fed chairs except for cause. That is, if presidents disagree with monetary policy actions, they will not be able to remove Fed chairs on that basis.

Second, as Michael Bordo of Rutgers University and the late Nobel Laureate Edward Prescott argue, the decentralized structure of the Fed has helped increase the variety of policy views that are discussed within the system:

“What is unique about the Federal Reserve, at least compared with other
entities created by the federal government, is that the Reserve Banks’
semi-independent corporate structure allows for ideas to be communicated to
the System . . . . Moreover, it also allows for new and sometimes dissenting views to develop and gestate within the System without being viewed as an expression of disloyalty that undermines the organization as a whole, as would be more likely within a government bureau.”

Finally, recent research by Anton Bobrov of the University of Michigan, Rupal Kamdar of Indiana University, and Mauricio Ulate of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco indicates that the FOMC votes of the district bank presidents reflect economic conditions in those districts. This result indicates that the district bank presidents arrive at independent judgements about monetary policy rather than just reflecting the views of the Board of Governors, which has to approve the appointment of the presidents. The authors analyze the 896 dissenting votes district bank presidents (other than the president of the NY Fed) cast during the period from 1990 to 2017. A dissenting vote is one in which the district bank president voted to either increase or decrease the target for the federal funds relative to the target the majority of the committee favored.

The authors’ key finding is that the FOMC votes of district bank presidents are influenced by the level of unemployment in the district: “a 1 percentage point higher District unemployment rate increases the likelihood that the respective District president will dissent in favor of looser policy [that is, a lower federal funds rate target than the majority of the committee preferred] at the FOMC by around 9 percentage points.” The authors note that: “The influence of local economic conditions on dissents by District presidents reflects the regional structure of the Federal Reserve System, which was designed to accommodate diverse views across the nation.” (The full text of the paper can be found here. A summary of the paper’s findings by Ulate and Caroline Paulson and Aditi Poduri of the San Francisco Fed can be found here.)

Fed Governor Michelle Bowman Explains Her Dissenting Vote at the FOMC Meeting

Federal Reserve Governor Michelle Bowman (Photo from federalreserve.gov)

Federal Reserve Chairs place a high value on consensus, particularly with respect to the decisions of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) setting the target for the federal funds rate. (Note that the chair of the Fed’s Board of Governors also serves as the chair of the FOMC.) As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.4 (Economics, Chapter 24, Sectio 24.4), the FOMC has 12 voting members: the 7 members of the Board of Governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and 4 of the other 11 District Bank presidents, who serve rotating one-year terms.

Decisions by the FOMC in setting the target for the federal funds rate are usually unanimous. Prior to the FOMC meeting on September 17-18, each vote of the committee had been unanimous since Esther George, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City cast a dissenting vote at the meeting on June 14-15, 2022. At that meeting, the committee voted to raise its target for the federal funds rate by 0.75 percentage point (75 basis points). George voted against the move because she believed a 0.50 percentage point (50 basis points) increase would have been more appropriate.

At the September 17-18 meeting, Fed Governor Michelle Bowman voted against the decision to reduce the target for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points because she believed a cut of 25 basis point would have been more appropriate. She was the first member of the Board of Governors to cast a dissenting vote at an FOMC meeting since 2005.

Perhaps because it’s unusual for a member of the Board of Governors to dissent from an FOMC decision, Bowman issued a statement explaining her vote. In her statement, Bowman argued that although inflation has declined substantially over the past two years, she was concerned that inflation as measured by the 12-month percentage change in the core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index was still 2.5 percent—above the Fed’s target inflation rate of 2 percent: “Although it is important to recognize that there has been meaningful progress on lowering inflation, while core inflation remains around or above 2.5 percent, I see the risk that the Committee’s larger policy action could be interpreted as a premature declaration of victory on our price stability mandate.” (Note that the Fed uses the PCE rather than the core PCE to gauge whether it is hitting its inflation target, but core PCE is generally thought to be a better indicator of the underlying inflation rate.)

Bowman also noted the difficulty of interpreting developments in the labor market: “My reading of labor market data has become more uncertain due to increased measurement challenges and the inherent difficulty in assessing the effects of recent immigration flows.” (We discuss the effects on employment measures of differing estimates of the level of immigration in this blog post.)