What Does the Latest Jobs Report Tell Us about the State of the U.S. Economy?

Image of “people working in a store” generated by ChatGTP 4o.

This morning (June 7), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Employment Situation” report for May. Recent government releases of macroeconomic data have indicated that the expansion of the U.S. economy is slowing. For instance, as we noted in this recent post on the JOLTS report, the labor market seems to be normalizing. Real personal consumption expenditures declined from March to April. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Nowcast of real GDP growth during the current quarter declined from 2.74 percent at the end of April to 1.76 percent at the end of May. That decline reflects some weakness in the data series the economists at the New York Fed use to forecast current real GDP growth

In that context, today’s jobs report was, on balance, surprisingly strong. The report has two estimates of the change in employment during the month: one estimate from the establishment survey, often referred to as the payroll survey, and one from the household survey. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.1 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.1), many economists and policymakers at the Federal Reserve believe that employment data from the establishment survey provides a more accurate indicator of the state of the labor market than do either the employment data or the unemployment data from the household survey. (The groups included in the employment estimates from the two surveys are somewhat different, as we discuss in this post.)

According to the establishment survey, there was a net increase of 272,000 jobs during May. This increase was well below the increase of 190,000 that economists had forecast in a survey by the Wall Street Journal and well above the net increase of 165,000 during April. (Bloomberg’s survey of economists yielded a similar forecast of an increase of 180,000.) The increase was also higher than the 232,000 average monthly increase during the past year. The following figure, taken from the BLS report, shows the monthly net changes in employment for each month during the past two years.

The surprising strength in employment growth in establishment survey was not echoed in the household survey, which reported a net decrease of 408,000 jobs. As the following figure shows, the net change in jobs from the household survey moves much more erratically than does the net change in jobs in the establishment survey, and—as noted earlier—the two surveys are of somewhat different groups. Still, the discrepancy between the two survey was notable.

The unemployment rate, which is also reported in the household survey, ticked up slightly from 3.9 percent to 4.0 percent. This is the first time that the unemployment has reached 4.0 percent since January 2022.

The establishment survey also includes data on average hourly earnings (AHE). As we note in this post, many economists and policymakers believe the employment cost index (ECI) is a better measure of wage pressures in the economy than is the AHE. The AHE does have the important advantage that it is available monthly, whereas the ECI is only available quarterly. The following figure show the percentage change in the AHE from the same month in the previous year. The 4.1 percent increase in May was a slight increase from the 4.0 percent increase in April. The increase in the rate of wage inflation is in contrast with the decline in employment and increase in the unemployment rate in the same report.

The following figure shows wage inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month wage inflation, whereas this figure shows 1-month wage inflation.) One-month wage inflation is much more volatile than 12-month inflation—note the very large swings in 1-month wage inflation in April and May 2020 during the business closures caused by the Covid pandemic.
The 1-month rate of wage inflation of 4.9 percent in May is a sharp increase from the 2.8 percent rate in April, although it’s unclear whether the increase represents a significant acceleration in wage inflation or is just reflecting the greater volatility in wage inflation when calculated this way.

To answer the question posed in the title to this post, the latest jobs report is a mixed bag that doesn’t send a clear message as to the state of the economy. The strong increase in employment and the increase in the rate of wage growth indicate that economy may not be slowing sufficiently to result in inflation declining to the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent annual target. On the other hand, the decline in employment as measured in the household survey and the tick up in the unemployment rate, along with the data in the recent JOLTS report, indicate that the labor market may be returning to more normal conditions.

It seems unlikely that this jobs report will have much effect on the thinking of the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which has its next meeting next week on June 11-12.

JOLTS Report Indicates Further Normalizing of the Job Market

Image of “a small business with a help wanted sign in the window” generated by ChatGTP 4o.

This morning (June 4), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) released its “Job Openings and Labor Turnover” (JOLTS) report for April 2024. The report proivided more data indicating that the U.S. labor market is continuing its return to pre-pandemic conditions. The following figure shows that, at 4.8 percent, the rate of job openings has continued its slow decline from the rate of 7.4 percent in March 2022. The rate in April was the same as the rate in January 2019, although it was till above the rates during most of 2019 and early 2020, as well as the rates during most of the period following the Great Recession of 2007–2009.

The BLS defines a job opening as a full-time or part-time job that a firm is advertising and that will start within 30 days. The rate of job openings is the number of job openings divided by the number of job openings plus the number of employed workers, multiplied by 100.

In the following figure, we compare the total number of job openings to the total number of people unemployed. The figure shows a slow decline from a peak of more than 2 job openings per unemployed person in the spring of 2022 to 1.2 job openings per employed person in April 2024—about the same as in 2019 and early 2020, before the pandemic. Note that the number is still above 1.0, indicating that the demand for labor is still high, although no higher than during the strong labor market of 2019.

The rate at which workers are willing to quit their jobs is an indication of how they perceive the ease of finding a new job. As the following figure shows, the quit rate declined slowly from a peak of 3 percent in late 2021 and early 2022 to 2.2 percent in November 2023, where it has remained through April of 2024. That rate is slightly below the rate during 2019 and early 2020. By this measure, workers perceptions of the state of the labor market seem largely unchanged in recent months.

The JOLTS data indicate that the labor market is about as strong as it was in the months priod to the start of the pandemic, but it’s not as historically tight as it was through most of 2022 and 2023.

On Friday morning, the BLS will release its “Employment Situation” report for May, which will provide additional data on the state of the labor market. (Note that the data in the JOLTS report lag the data in the “Employment Situation” report by one month.)

Is Zimbabwe Now on the Gold Standard?

Image of “someone in Zimbabwe holding the new ZiG currency” generated by ChatGPT 4o.

The classical gold standard lasted from 1880 until the outbreak of World War I in 1914 disrupted the global financial system. Under the gold standard, countries stood ready to redeem their paper currencies in gold and many business contracts contained “gold clauses” that allowed the receiver of funds to insist on being paid in gold. The countries shaded in yellow in the following figure were on the gold standard at the beginning of 1914.

After World War I, the United States remained on the gold standard but the very high inflation rates during and immediately after the war made it difficult for most European countries to resume redeeming their domestic currencies in gold. The United Kingdom didn’t return to the gold standard until 1925—seven years after the end of the war—at which time several other countries participated with the United Kingdom and the United States in what was called the gold exchange standard. In this system, countries fixed their exchange rates against the U.S. dollar and the British pound and held their international reserves in either pounds or dollars. By fixing the value of their currencies against the dollar and the pound—which were both convertible into gold—the currencies effectively fixed the value of their currencies against gold.  The gold exhange standard ended in 1931 when, as the result of financial problems caused by the Great Depression, the United Kingdom stopped the convertibility of pounds into gold. The United States stopped the convertiblity of dollars into gold in 1933. (We discuss the gold standard in the online appendix to Macroeconomics, Chapter 18 and Economics, Chapter 28, and in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 16, Section 16.4).

In 1944, near the end of World War II, several countries meeting at Bretton Woods New Hampshire agreed to fix the exchange rates between their currencies. Under the Bretton Woods system, the United States agreed to convert U.S. dollars into gold at a price of $35 per ounce—but only in dealing with foreign central banks. U.S. citizens continued to be prohibited from redeeming dollars for gold. The central banks of all other members of the system pledged to buy and sell their currencies at fixed rates against the dollar but not to exchange their currencies for gold either domestically or internationally. As can be seen, the Bretton Woods system was not actually a gold standard because no members of the system allowed their currencies to be freely convertible into gold. The difficulty of keeping exchange rates fixed over long periods led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. (We discuss the Bretton Woods system in the places referenced at the end of the last paragraph.)

Although over the decades there have been various proposals to return to the gold standard, it seems unlikely that the United States or other high-income countries will ever do so. Current day advocates of returning to the gold standard often mention the check the gold standard can place on inflation because the size of a country’s money supply is limited by the country’s gold reserves. In the United States and most other high-income countries the central bank attempts to regulate the inflation rate by controlling short-term interest rates. In lower-income countries, central banks are often not able to act independently of the government. That has been the situation in the African country of Zimbabwe, which has frequently experienced hyperinflation—that is, rates of inflation exceeding 50 percent per month. The inflation rate in 2008 reached a staggering 15 billion percent. As a result, most people in Zimbabwe lost faith in Zimbabwean currency and instead used U.S. dollars for most buying and selling.

That most of the currency in circulation in Zimbabwe is U.S. dollars causes two problems: 1) The supply of available U.S. dollars is limited—so much so that some businesses carefully wash dollars to try to prolong their usability; and 2) few U.S. coins are available, making it difficult for businesses to make change for purchases that aren’t priced in even dollar amounts. Some businesses give customers change in the form of candy or other small food items. The government has made several attempts to resume printing Zimbawean dollars but has had trouble getting consumers and businesses to accept them.

In late April, the Zimbabwean tried a different approach, introducing a new currency, the ZiG, which is short for Zimbabwe Gold. The new paper currency is “backed” by the government’s gold supply, which has a value of about $185 million U.S. dollars. We put the word “backed” in quotation marks because the government isn’t backing the ZiG in the way that governments backed their currency during the period of the classical gold standard. Under the gold standard, paper currency was freely convertible into gold, so anyone wishing to exchange currency for gold was able to do so. The ZiG isn’t convertible into gold. The government is backing the currency with gold only in the sense that it pledges not to issue more currency than it has gold. In other words, the government is essentially promising to put a limit on the total value of the ZiG currency it will issue. Zimbabwean governments have made similar promises in the past that they have ended up breaking.

In its first weeks, the ZiG was having trouble finding acceptance among consumers and businesses, despite efforts by the government to require most businesses to accept it. An article in the Financial Times quoted the owner of a grocery store in the capital of Harare as stating that he won’t accept the ZiG because “My business is alive because I stick to the US dollar.” Similarly, the web site of the BBC quoted the owner of a market stall as saying that “Everything, absolutely everything, is still in US dollars.”

As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 24, the key to the acceptance of any paper currency is that households and firms have confidence that if they accept the paper currency in exchange for goods and services, the currency will not lose much value during the time they hold it. Without this confidence, currency can’t fulfill the key function of serving as a medium of exchange. In Zimbabwe, as a post on the web site of the World Economic Forum puts it: “It remains to be seen whether the new ZiG can gain the confidence of the public and become a stable local currency, which would allow officials to regain control over monetary policy.”

Solved Problem: The Fed and the Value of Money

Supports: Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Economics, Chapter 25, Essentials of Economics, Chapter 17, and Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 15.

Image generated by ChatGTP-4o.

In a book review in the Wall Street Journal, the financial writer James Grant referred to “the Federal Reserve’s goal to cheapen the dollar by 2% a year.” 

  1. Briefly explain what “cheapen the dollar” means.
  2. Briefly explain what Grant means by writing that the Fed has a “goal to cheapen the dollar by 2% a year.”
  3. Do you agree with Grant that the Fed has this goal? Briefly explain.

Solving the Problem
Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the economic effects of the Federal Reserve’s policy goal of a 2 percent annual inflation rate, so you may want to review Chapter 15, Section 15.5, “A Closer Look at the Fed’s Setting Monetary Policy Targets.”

Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining what “cheapen the dollar” means. Judging from the context, “cheapen the dollar” means to reduce the purchasing power of a dollar. Whenever inflation occurs, the amount of goods and services a dollar can purchase declines. If the inflation rate in a year is 10 percent, than at the end of the year $1,000 can buy 10 percent fewer goods and services than it could at the beginning of the year.

Step 3: Answer part b. by expalining what Grant means by the Fed having a goal of cheapening the dollar by 2 percent a year. Congress has given a dual mandate of high employment and price stability.  Since 2012, the Fed has interpreted a 2 percent annual inflation rate as meeting its mandate for price stability. So, Grant means that the Fed’s 2 percent annual inflation goal in effect is also a goal to cheapen—or reduce the purchasing power of the dollar—by 2 percent a year.

Step 4: Answer part c. by explaining whether you agree with Grant that the Fed has a goal of cheapening the dollar by 2 percent a year. As explained in the answer to part b., there is a sense in which Grant is correct; the Fed’s goal of a 2 percent inflation rate is a goal of allowing the purchasing power of the dollar to decline by 2 percent a year. One complication, however, is that most economists believe that changes in price indexes such as the consumer price index (CPI) and the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index overstate the actual amount of inflation occurring in the economy. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 9, Section 9.4 (Economics, Chapter 19, Section 19.4, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 13, Section 13.4), there are several biases that cause price indexes to overstate the true inflation rate; the most important of the biases is the failure of price indexes to take fully into account improvements over time in the quality of many goods and services. If increases in price indexes are overstating the inflation rate by one percentage point, then the Fed’s goal of a 2 percent inflation rate results in the dollar losing 1 percent—rather than 2 percent—of its purchasing power over time, corrected for changes in quality. 

Another Middling Inflation Report

A meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (Photo from federalreserve.gov)

On Friday, May 31, the Bureau of Eeconomic Analysis (BEA) released its “Personal Income and Outlays” report for April, which includes monthly data on the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. Inflation as measured by changes in the consumer price index (CPI) receives the most attention in the media, but the Federal Reserve looks instead to inflation as measured by changes in the PCE price index to evaluate whether it’s meeting its 2 percent annual inflation target. 

The following figure shows PCE inflation (blue line) and core PCE inflation (red line)—which excludes energy and food prices—for the period since January 2015 with inflation measured as the change in the PCE from the same month in the previous year. Measured this way, PCE inflation in April was 2.7 percent, which was unchanged since March. Core PCE inflation was also unchanged in April at 2.8 percent. (Note that carried to two digits past the decimal place, both measures decreased slightly in April.)

The following figure shows PCE inflation and core PCE inflation calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year. (The figure above shows what is sometimes called 12-month inflation, while this figure shows 1-month inflation.) Measured this way, PCE inflation declined from 4.1 percent in March to 3.1 percent in April. Core PCE inflation declined from 4.1 percent in March to 3.0 percent in April.  This decline may indicate that inflation is slowing, but data for a single month should be interpreted with caution and, even with this decline, inflation is still above the Fed’s 2 percent target.

The following figure shows another way of gauging inflation by including the 12-month inflation rate in the PCE (the same as shown in the figure above—although note that PCE inflation is now the red line rather than the blue line), inflation as measured using only the prices of the services included in the PCE (the green line), and the trimmed mean rate of PCE inflation (the blue line). Fed Chair Jerome Powell has said that he is particularly concerned by elevated rates of inflation in services. The trimmed mean measure is compiled by economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas by dropping from the PCE the goods and services that have the highest and lowest rates of inflation. It can be thought of as another way of looking at core inflation by excluding the prices of goods and services that had particularly high or particularly low rates of inflation during the month.

Inflation using the trimmed mean measure was 2.9 percent in April, down from 3.0 percent in March. Inflation in services remained high, although it declined slightly from 4.0 percent in March to 3.9 percent in April.

It seems unlikely that this month’s PCE data will have much effect on when the members of the Fed’s policy-making Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) will decide to lower the target for the federal funds rate. The next meeting of the FOMC is June 11-12. That meeting is one of the four during the year at which the committee publishes a Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). The SEP should provide greater insight into what committee members expect will happen with inflation during the remained of the year and whether it’s likely that the committee will lower its target for the federal funds rate this year.

Solved Problem: Elasticity and the Incidence of the Gasoline Tax

Supports: Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 6.

Photo from the New York Times.

Blogger Matthew Yglesias made the following observation in a recent post: “If you look at gasoline prices, it’s obvious that if fuel gets way more expensive next week, most people are just going to have to pay up. But if you compare the US versus Europe, it’s also obvious that the structurally higher price of gasoline over there makes a massive difference: They have lower rates of car ownership, drive smaller cars, and have a higher rate of EV adoption.” (The blog post can be found here, but may require a subscription.)

  1. What does Yglesias mean by Europe having a “structurally higher price” of gasoline?
  2. Assuming Yglesias’s observations are correct, what can we conclude about the price elasticity of the demand for gasoline in the short run and in the long run?
  3. Currently, the federal government imposes a tax of 18.4 cents per gallon of gasoline. Suppose that Congress increases the gasoline tax to 28.4 cents per gallon. Again assuming that Yglesias’s observations are correct, would you expect that the incidence of the tax would be different in the long run than in the short run? Briefly explain.
  4. Would you expect the federal government to collect more revenue as a result of the 10 cent increase in the gasoline tax in the short run or in the long run? Briefly explain. 

Solving the Problem

Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the determinants of the price elasticity of demand and the effect of the value of the price elasticity of demand on the incidence of a tax, so you may want to review Chapter 6, Section 6.2 and Solved Problem 6.5. (Note that a fuller discussion of the effect of the price elasticity of demand on tax incidence appears in Chapter 17, Section 17.3.)

Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining what Yglesias means when he writes that Europe has a “structurally higher” price of gasoline. Judging from the context, Yglesias is saying that European gasoline prices are not just temporarily higher than U.S. gasoline prices but have been higher over the long run.

Step 3: Answer part b. by expalining what we can conclude from Yglesias’s observations about the price elasticity of demand for gasoline in the short run and in the long run. When Yeglesias is referring to gasoline prices rising “next week,” he is referring to the short run. In that situation he says “most people are going to have to pay up.” In other words, the increase in price will lead to only a small decrease in the quantity demanded, which means that in the short run, the demand for gasoline is price inelastic—the percentage change in the quantity demanded will be smaller than the percentage change in the price.

Because he refers to high gasoline prices in Europe being structural, or high for a long period, he is referring to the long run. He notes that in Europe people have responded to high gasoline prices by owning fewer cars, owning smaller cars, and owning more EVs (electric vehicles) than is true in the United States. Each of these choices by European consumers results in their buying much less gasoline as a result of the increase in gasoline prices. As a result, in the long run the demand for gasoline is price elastic—the percentage change in the quantity demanded will be greater than the percentage change in the price.

Note that these results are consistent with the discussion in Chapter 6 that the more time that passes, the more price elastic the demand for a product becomes.

Step 4: Answer part c. by explaining how the incidence of the gasoline tax will be different in the long run than in the short run. Recall that tax incidence refers to the actual division of the burden of a tax between buyers and sellers in a market. As the figure in Solved Problem 6.5 illustrates, a tax will result in a larger increase in the price that consumers pay for a product in the situation when demand is price inelastic than when demand is price elastic. The larger the increase in the price that consumers pay, the larger the share of the burden of the tax that consumers bear. So, we can conclude that the tax incidence of the gasoline tax will be different in the short run than in the long run: In the short run, more of the burden of the tax is borne by consumers (and less of the burden is borne by suppliers); in the long run, less of the burden of the tax is borne by consumers (and more of the burden is borne by suppliers).

Step 5: Answer part d. by explaining whether you would expect the federal government to collect more revenue as a result of the 10 cent increase in the gasoline tax in the short run or in the long run. The revenue the federal government collects is equal to the 10 cent tax multiplied by the quantity of gallons sold. As the figure in Solved Problem 6.5 illustrates, a tax will result in a smaller decrease in the quantity demanded when demand is price inelastic than when demand is price elastic. Therefore, we would expect that the federal government will collect more revenue from the tax in the short run than in the long run.

Solved Problem: How Much Did Using a Ticket to a Taylor Swift Concert Cost You?

Supports: Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Economics, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 1.

Photo of Taylor Swift from the Wall Street Journal.

Suppose that as a “verified fan” of Taylor Swift, you are able to buy a ticket to one of her concerts for $215. The price of the ticket isn’t refundable. (We discuss how Taylor Swift handles the sale of tickets to her concerts in the Apply the Concept “Taylor Swift Tries to Please Fans and Make Money” in Microeconomics and in Economics, Chapter 10, and in Essentials of Economics, Chapter 7.) You had been hoping to work a few hours of overtime at your job to earn some extra money. The day of the concert, your boss tells you that the only overtime available for the next month is that night from 6 pm to 10 pm—the same time as the concert. Working those hours of overtime will earn you $100 (after taxes). You check StubHub and find that you can resell your ticket for $1,000 (afer paying StubHub’s fee).

Given that information, briefly explain which of the following statements is correct:

  1. If you attend the concert, the cost of using your ticket is $215—the price that you paid for it.
  2. If you attend the concert, the cost of using your ticket is $1,000—the amount you can resell your ticket for.
  3. If you attend the concert, the cost of using your ticket is $1,000 + $100 = $1,100—the amount you can resell your ticket for plus the amount you would have earned from working overtime rather than attending the concert.
  4. If you attend the concert, the cost of using your ticket is $1,000 + $100 – $215 = $885—the amount you can resell your ticket for plus the amount you would have earned from working overtime rather than attending the concert minus the price you paid to buy the ticket. 

Solving the Problem

Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about the concept of opportunity cost, so you may want to review Chapter 1, Section 1.2.

Step 2: Solve the problem by using the concept of opportunity cost to determine which of the four statements is correct. Economists measure the cost of engaging in an activity as an opportunity cost—the value of what you have to give up to engage in the activity. Using this definition, only statement c. is correct; if you decide to use your ticket to attend the concert you will give up the $1,000 you could have received from selling the ticket plus the $100 you fail to earn as a result of attending the concert rather than working overtime. Note that the price you paid for the ticket isn’t relevant to your decision whether to attend the concert because the price of the ticket is nonrefundable. (The amount you paid for the ticket is a sunk cost because it can’t recovered. We discuss the role of sunk costs in decision making in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 10, Section 10.4, and in Essentials of Economics, Chapter 7, Section 7.4.)

More Data on the Progressivity of the U.S. Income Tax

Photo from the Associated Press via the Wall Street Journal.

A tax is progressive if people with lower incomes pay a lower percentage of their income in tax than do people with higher incomes. (We discuss the U.S. tax system in Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 17, Section 17.2.) Recently, the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) of the U.S. Congress released a report, “Overview of the Federal Tax System as in Effect for 2024,” that provides data on the progressivity of the U.S. tax system. (An overview of the role of the JCT can be found here.)

The progressivity of the federal individual income tax is shown in the following figure from the JCT report. The column on the right shows that for each category of taxpayers shown—single people, heads of households (who are unmarried people who financially support at least one other person), and married people—the marginal income tax rate increases with a taxpayer’s income. The marginal tax rate is the rate that someone pays on additional income that they earn. So, for instance, the table shows that an individual who has taxable income of $80,000 faces a marginal tax rate of 22 percent because that is the rate the person pays on the income they earn between $47,150 and $80,000. An individual who has a taxable income of $700,000 faces a marginal tax rate of 37 percent because that is the rate the person pays on the income they earn between $609,350 and $700,000.

In Chapter 17, we use data from the Tax Policy Center to show the average income tax rate paid by different income groups. The average tax rate is computed as the total tax paid divided by taxable income. The marginal tax rate is a better indicator than the average tax rate of how a change in a tax will affect a person’s willingness to work, save, and invest. For instance, if you are considering working more hours in your job or taking on a second job, such driving part time for Uber or Lyft, you want to know what your tax rate is on the additional income you will earn. For that purpose, you should ignore your average tax rate and instead focus on your marginal tax rate.

The following table from the JCT report is similar to the table in Chapter 17, which was based on data from the Tax Policy Center. The JCT report has the advantage of direct access to government tax data, which, as a private group, the Tax Policy Center doesn’t have. In addition, the JCT reports on an income group—the top 0.1 percent of income earners—compiled from government data not available to the Tax Policy Center. (Much political discussion has focused on the income earned and taxes paid by the top 1 percent of earners, which is a much larger group than the top 0.1 percent. We discuss the top 1 percent in the Apply the Concept, “Who Are the 1 Percent, and How Do They Earn Their Incomes,” in Microeconomics and Economics, Chaper 17, Section 17.4.)

The table shows data for the first four quntiles (or groups of 20 percent of taxpayers), with the highest quintile divided further. The table shows that the federal individual income tax is highly progressive, with the two lowest income quintiles having negative average tax rates because they receive more in tax credits than they pay in taxes. Employment taxes—primarily the payroll tax used to fund the Social Security and Medicare Systems—are regressive, with the lowest deciles paying a larger percentage of their income in these taxes than do the higher deciles. The regressivity of employment taxes is the result of both payroll taxes being levied on the first dollar of wages and salaries individuals earn and the part of the payroll tax used to fund the Social Security system dropping to zero for incomes above a certain level—$168,600 in 2024. Because income taxes are much larger in total than employment taxes or excise taxes—such as the federal taxes on gasoline, airline tickets, and alcoholic beverages—the total of these three types of federal taxes is progressive, as shown by the fact that the average tax rate rises with income. (Although note that the top 0.1 percent pay taxes at a slightly lower rate than do the other taxpayers included in the top 1 percent.)

Would Caleb Williams Be Better Off Playing for the Jacksonville Jaguars Instead of the Chicago Bears?

USC quarterback Caleb Williams is shown with NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell at the NFL college draft in Detroit. (Photo from Reuters via the Wall Street Journal)

In late April, the National Football League (NFL) held its annual draft of eligible college players. NFL teams choose players through seven rounds in reverse order of how the teams finished in the previous year: The team with the worst record picks first and the winner of the Super Bowl picks last. Teams are allowed to trade picks with each other. This year, although the Carolina Panthers finished with the worst record during the 2023 season, they had traded their first round pick to the Chicago Bears, who picked first.

The Bears choose University of Southern California (USC) quarterback Caleb Williams with the first pick in the draft. Drafted players usually have no choice but to sign contracts with the team that chose them. A player can refuse to sign with the team that drafted him and not play that year, hoping that the next year a team they like better will draft them. Very few players have chosen that option.

When football fans and sportswriters discuss whether a team is a good match for a player they usually focus on factors such as whether a player’s skills are well suited to the team’s style of play and on how many other good players are on the team. One other factor that is seldom discussed is whether a player will benefit more financially by playing for the team that drafted him rather than for another team. Players chosen in the college draft are paid an amount fixed as a result of bargaining between the NFL and the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA), which is the labor union that represents NFL players.

As the first pick in the draft, Caleb Williams’s contract will pay him $39.4 million in total over the next four seasons. A sizeable fraction of that amount—probably $25.5 million—will be in the form of a lump-sum bonus that the Bears will pay Williams in full when he signs his contract. The dollar amount Williams is paid as the first pick in the draft would be the same whichever of the 32 NFL teams had drafted him. However, football players—like everyone else—are interested in their after-tax income and state and local income tax rates vary widely. Football players pay state and local income taxes based on where their teams’ games are played. In the 17-game NFL schedule, teams play either 8 or 9 games in their home city and the rest (road games) in the home cities of their opponents.

Jared Walczak of the Tax Foundation has compiled a table showing the tax rate each NFL team’s players will pay in 2024 based on the state and local taxes levied in their home city and the state and local taxes levied by the cities where the team’s road games will be played. To keep the numbers simple, let’s look at how the much in taxes Williams will owe on a $20 million bonus, which the Bears will pay him as soon as he signs his contract. (Note that, as indicated earlier, Williams’s bonus is likely to be greater than $20 million and he will also receive a salary during his first season of about $3.75 million.)

Given the income tax rate levied by the state of Illinois (the city of Chicago doesn’t levy a tax on income) and the state and local taxes levied by the cities and states in which the Bears will play their road games this year, Williams will owe a tax of $1,079,075 on his bonus. (Note that we are ignoring the substantial federal income tax that Williams will owe on the bonus because the federal tax won’t change no matter which city he plays in.) The lowest tax that Williams would pay on the bonus is $120,421, which would be his tax if he played for the Jacksonville Jaguars. Neither the city of Jacksonville nor the state of Florida levies a personal income tax, so Williams would only owe state and local income taxes on what he earns playing in cities where the Jaguars play their road games. The largest tax Williams would pay is $1,301,028, which would be his tax if he had been drafted by any of the three teams that play in California: the Los Angeles Rams, the Los Angeles Chargers, or the San Francisco ’49ers.

Although college players who are drafted are obliged to play for the team that drafted them, after players have completed their contracts they have the option of signing with a different team. At that stage of their careers, players—and their agents—can take into account state and local income taxes when deciding which team to sign a new contract with.

Solved Problem: When to Close a Sandwich Shop

Supports: Microeconomics and Economics, Chapter 12, and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 9.

Photo from the Wall Street Journal.

A recent article in the Los Angeles Times discussed the problems faced by the owners of a sandwich shop in the Chinatown neighborhood of Los Angeles.  The owners had closed the shop and then decided to reopen it. The article quoted one of the owners as saying: “After closing [the shop] we realized we still have our lease, we still have our loans from the [federal government’s Small Business Association], from COVID, the bills are still coming in. We can’t even afford to close. We can’t afford to be open, we can’t afford to be closed.”

a. What does the owner of the sandwich shop mean by saying they can’t afford to be open but they also can’t afford to be closed? Answer by explaining what the likely relationship is between the revenue the owners were earning from the shop and the shop’s fixed, variable, and total costs . 

b. Are the owners likely to keep the sandwich shop open in the long run? Briefly explain.

Solving the Problem

Step 1: Review the chapter material. This problem is about when a firm should decide to shut down in the short run, so you may want to review the section “Deciding Whether to Produce or to Shut Down in the Shortrun” in Microeconomics (and Economics), Chapter 12, Section 12.4, (Essentials of Economics, Chapter 9, Section 9.4).

Step 2: Answer part a. by explaining what the sandwich shop’s owner meant by her statement, using the likely relationship between the shop’s revenue and its fixed, variable, and total cost in your explanation. That the owner states that “we can’t afford to be open” indicates that the firm is incurring a loss, so the revenue from the shop is less than the toal cost of operating it. But after closing the shop, the owners reopened it because “we can’t afford to be closed.” That statement indicates that the owners will incur a smaller loss by operating the shop than by keeping it closed. If the shop is closed, the owners still have to pay the shop’s fixed costs, such as the rent on the shop and the payments the owners must make on loans. We can infer that the loss from remaining open is less than the loss from being closed. In that situation, the shop’s revenue must be enough to cover the variable cost of operating it, although not enough to cover the total cost.

Step 3: Answer part b. by explaining whether the owners are likely to keep the sandwich shop open in the long run. By definition, in the long run, the owners will no longer have any fixed costs because the period of its lease will have ended and it will have paid off its loans—or possibly defaulted on them. If the revenue from operating the shop remains less than the total cost of operating it in the long run, the owners will permanenly close the shop.