Tag: Federal Reserve District Banks

Does the Structure of the Fed Matter?

Photo of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas from federalreservehistory.org.

The unusual structure of the Federal Reserve System reflects the political situation at the time that Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. As we discuss in Money, Banking, and the Financial System, Chapter 13, at that time, many members of Congress believed that a unified central bank based in Washington, DC would concentrate too much economic power in the hands of the officials running the bank. So, the act divided economic power within the Federal Reserve System in three ways: among bankers and business interests, among states and regions, and between the federal government and the private sector.

As part of its plan to divide authority within the Federal Reserve System, Congress decided not to establish a single central bank with branches, which had been the structure of both the First and Second Banks of the United States—which were the two attempts by Congress during the period from 1791 to 1836 to establish a central bank. Instead, the Federal Reserve Act divided the United States into 12 Federal Reserve districts, each of which has a Federal Reserve Bank in one city (and, in most cases, additional branches in other cities in the district). The following figure is the original map drawn by the Federal Reserve Organizing Committee in 1913 showing the 12 Federal Reserve Districts. Congress adopted the map with a few changes, following which the areas of the 12 districts have remained largely unchanged down to the present.

The map is from federalreservehistory.org.

The following map shows the current boundaries of the Federal Reserve Districts.

The map is reproduced from the working paper discussed below.

All national banks—commercial banks with charters from the federal government—were required to join the Federal Reserve System. State banks—commercial banks with charters from state governments—were given the option to join. Congress intended that the primary function of each of the Federal Reserve Banks would be to make discount loans to member banks in its region. These loans were to provide liquidity to banks, thereby fulfilling in a decentralized way the system’s role as a lender of last resort.

When banks join the Federal Reserve System, they are required to buy stock in their Federal Reserve Bank, which pays member banks a dividend on this stock. So, in principle, the private commercial banks in each district that are members of the Federal Reserve System own the District Bank. In fact, each Federal Reserve Bank is a private–government joint venture because the member banks enjoy few of the rights and privileges that shareholders ordinarily exercise. For example, member banks do not have a legal claim on the profits of the District Banks, as shareholders of private corporations do.

On paper, the Federal Reserve System is a decentralized organization with a public-private structure. In practice, power within the system is concentrated in the seven member Board of Governors in Washington, DC. Control over the most important aspect of monetary policy—setting the target for the federal funds rate—is vested in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The voting membership of the FOMC consists of the seven member of the Board of Governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and four other district bank presidents on a rotating basis (although all 12 district presidents participate in committee discussions). The district bank presidents are elected by the boards of directors of the district banks, but the Board of Governors has final say on who is chosen as a district bank president.

Given these considerations, does the structure of the Fed matter or is it an unimportant historical curiosity? There are reasons to think the Fed’s structure does still matter. First, as we discuss in this blog post, in a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court implied—but didn’t state explicitly—that, because of the Fed’s structure, U.S. presidents will likely not be allowed to remove Fed chairs except for cause. That is, if presidents disagree with monetary policy actions, they will not be able to remove Fed chairs on that basis.

Second, as Michael Bordo of Rutgers University and the late Nobel Laureate Edward Prescott argue, the decentralized structure of the Fed has helped increase the variety of policy views that are discussed within the system:

“What is unique about the Federal Reserve, at least compared with other
entities created by the federal government, is that the Reserve Banks’
semi-independent corporate structure allows for ideas to be communicated to
the System . . . . Moreover, it also allows for new and sometimes dissenting views to develop and gestate within the System without being viewed as an expression of disloyalty that undermines the organization as a whole, as would be more likely within a government bureau.”

Finally, recent research by Anton Bobrov of the University of Michigan, Rupal Kamdar of Indiana University, and Mauricio Ulate of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco indicates that the FOMC votes of the district bank presidents reflect economic conditions in those districts. This result indicates that the district bank presidents arrive at independent judgements about monetary policy rather than just reflecting the views of the Board of Governors, which has to approve the appointment of the presidents. The authors analyze the 896 dissenting votes district bank presidents (other than the president of the NY Fed) cast during the period from 1990 to 2017. A dissenting vote is one in which the district bank president voted to either increase or decrease the target for the federal funds relative to the target the majority of the committee favored.

The authors’ key finding is that the FOMC votes of district bank presidents are influenced by the level of unemployment in the district: “a 1 percentage point higher District unemployment rate increases the likelihood that the respective District president will dissent in favor of looser policy [that is, a lower federal funds rate target than the majority of the committee preferred] at the FOMC by around 9 percentage points.” The authors note that: “The influence of local economic conditions on dissents by District presidents reflects the regional structure of the Federal Reserve System, which was designed to accommodate diverse views across the nation.” (The full text of the paper can be found here. A summary of the paper’s findings by Ulate and Caroline Paulson and Aditi Poduri of the San Francisco Fed can be found here.)

Latest CPI Report Shows Slowing Inflation and the FOMC Appears Likely to Cut Its Target for the Federal Funds Rate at Least Once This Year

Image of “a woman shopping in a grocery store” generated by ChatGTP 4o.

Today (June 12) we had the unusual coincidence of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) releasing its monthly report on the consumer price index (CPI) on the same day that the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) concluded a meeting. The CPI report showed that the inflation rate had slowed more than expected. As the following figure shows, the inflation rate for May measured by the percentage change in the CPI from the same month in the previous month—headline inflation (the blue line)—was 3.3 percent—slightly below the 3.4 percent rate that economists surveyed by the Wall Street Journal had expected, and slightly lower than the 3.4 percent rate in April. Core inflation (the red line(—which excludes the prices of food and energy—was 3.4 percent in May, down from 3.6 percent in April and slightly lower than the 3.5 percent rate that economists had been expecting.

As the following figure shows, if we look at the 1-month inflation rate for headline and core inflation—that is the annual inflation rate calculated by compounding the current month’s rate over an entire year—the declines in the inflation rate are much larger. Headline inflation (the blue line) declined from 3.8 percent in April to 0.1 percent in May. Core inflation (the red line) declined from 3.6 percent in April to 2.0 percent in May. Overall, we can say that inflation has cooled in May and if inflation were to continue at the 1-month rate, the Fed will have succeeded in bringing the U.S. economy in for a soft landing—with the annual inflation rate returning to the Fed’s 2 percent target without the economy being pushed into a recession. 

But two important notes of caution:

1. It’s hazardous to rely to heavily on data from a single month. Over the past year, the BLS has reported monthly inflation rates that were higher than economists expected and rates that was lower than economists expected. The current low inflation rate would have to persist over at least a few more months before we can safely conclude that the Fed has achieved a safe landing.

2. As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 15, Section 15.5 (Economics, Chapter 25, Section 25.5), the Fed uses the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, rather than the CPI in evaluating whether it is hitting its 2 percent inflation target. So, today’s encouraging CPI data would have to carry over to the PCE data that the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) will release on January 28 before we can conclude that inflation as the Fed tracks it did in fact slow significantly in April.

The BLS released the CPI report at 8:30 am eastern time. The FOMC began its meeting later in the day and so committee members were able to include in their deliberations today’s CPI data along with other previously available information on the state of the economy. At the close of the meeting, , the FOMC released a statement in which it stated, as expected, that it would leave its target range for the federal funds rate unchanged at 5.25 percent to 5.50 percent. After the meeting, the committee also released—as it typically does at its March, June, September, and December meetings—a “Summary of Economic Projections” (SEP), which presents median values of the committee members’ forecasts of key economic variables. The values are summarized in the following table, reproduced from the release.

The table shows that compared with their projections in March—the last time the FOMC published the SEP—committee members were expecting higher headline and core PCE inflation and a higher federal funds rate at the end of this year. In the long run, committee members were expecting a somewhat highr unemployment rate and somewhat higher federal funds rate than they had expected in March.

Note, as we discuss in Macreconomics, Chapter 14, Section 14.4 (Economics, Chapter 24, Section 24.4 and Essentials of Economics, Chapter 16, Section 16.4), there are twelve voting members of the FOMC: the seven members of the Board of Governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and presidents of four of the other 11 Federal Reserve Banks, who serve one-year rotating terms. In 2024, the presidents of the Richmond, Atlanta, San Francisco, and Cleveland Feds are voting members. The other Federal Reserve Bank presidents serve as non-voting members, who participate in committee discussions and whose economic projections are included in the SEP.

Prior to the meeting there was much discussion in the business press and among investment analysts about the dot plot, shown below. Each dot in the plot represents the projection of an individual committee member. (The committee doesn’t disclose which member is associated with which dot.) Note that there are 19 dots, representing the 7 members of the Fed’s Board of Governors and all 12 presidents of the Fed’s district banks. 

The plots on the far left of the figure represent the projections of each of the 19 members of the value of the federal funds rate at the end of 2024. Four members expect that the target for the federal funds rate will be unchanged at the end of the year. Seven members expect that the committee will cut the target range once, by 0.25 percentage point, by the end of the year. And eight members expect that the cut target range twice, by a total of 0.50 percent point, by the end of the year. Members of the business media and financial analysts were expecting tht the dot plot would project either one or two target rate cuts by the end of the year. The committee was closely divided among those two projections, with the median projection being for a single rate cut.

In its statement following the meeting, the committee noted that:

“In considering any adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will carefully assess incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks. The Committee does not expect it will be appropriate to reduce the target range until it has gained greater confidence that inflation is moving sustainably toward 2 percent. In addition, the Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage‐backed securities. The Committee is strongly committed to returning inflation to its 2 percent objective.”

In his press conference after the meeting, Fed Chair Jerome Powell noted that the morning’s CPI report was a “Better inflation report than nearly anyone expected.” But, Powell also noted that: “You don’t want to be motivated any one data point.” Reinforcing the view quoted above in the committee’s statement, Powell emphasized that before cutting the target for the federal funds rate, the committee would need “Greater confidence that inflation is moving back to 2% on a sustainable basis.”

In summary, today’s CPI report was an indication that the Fed is on track to bring about a soft landing, but the FOMC will be closely analyzing macroeconomic data over at least the next few months before it is willing to cut its target for the federal funds rate.