Tag: Bank regulation

Yesterday at the Fed Something Happened That Was Unusual … or Was It?

Photo of Michael Barr from federalreserve.gov

President-elect Donald Trump has stated that he believes that presidents should have more say in monetary policy. There had been some speculation that once in office Trump would try to replace Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell, although Trump later indicated that he would not attempt to replace Powell until Powell’s term as chair ends in May 2026. Can the president remove the Fed Chair or another member of the Board of Governors? The relevant section of the Federal Reserve Act States that: “each member [of the Board of Governors] shall hold office for a term of fourteen years from the expiration of the term of his predecessor, unless sooner removed for cause by the President.”

“Removed for cause” has generally been interpreted by lawyers inside and outside of the Fed as not authorizing the president to remove a member of the Board of Governors because of a disagreement over monetary policy. The following flat statement appears on a page of the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis: “Federal Reserve officials cannot be fired simply because the president or a member of Congress disagrees with Federal Reserve decisions about interest rates.”

At his press conference following the November 7 meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), Powell was asked by a reporter: “do you believe the President has the power to fire or demote you, and has the Fed determined the legality of a President demoting at will any of the other Governors with leadership positions?” Powell replied: “Not permitted under the law.” Despite Powell’s definitive statement, because no president has attempted to remove a member of the Board of Governors, the federal courts have never been asked to decide what the “removed for cause” language in the Federal Reserve Act means.

The president is free to remove the members of most agencies of the federal government, so why shouldn’t he or she be able to remove the Fed Chair? When Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, it intended the central bank to be able set policy independently of the president and Congress. The president and members of Congress may take a short-term view of policy, focusing on conditions at the time that they run for reelection. Expansionary monetary policies can temporarily boost employment and output in the short run, but cause inflation to increase in the long run.

As we discuss in Macroeconomics, Chapter 17, Section 17.4 (Economics, Chapter 27, Section 27.4), in a classic study, Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers compared the degree of central bank independence and the inflation rate for 16 high-income countries during the years from 1955 to 1988. As the following figure shows, countries with highly independent central banks, such as the United States, Switzerland, and Germany, had lower inflation rates than countries whose central banks had little independence, such as New Zealand, Italy, and Spain.

Yesterday, something unusual happened that might seem to undermine Fed independence. Michael Barr, a member of the Board of Governors and the Board’s Vice Chair for Supervision, said that on February 28 he will step down from his position as Vice Chair, but will remain on the Board. His term as Vice Chair was scheduled to end in July 2026. His term on the Board is scheduled to end in January 2032.

Barr has been an advocate for stricter regulation of banks, including higher capital requirements for large banks. These positions have come in for criticism from banks, from some policymakers, and from advisers to Trump. Barr stated that he was stepping down because: “The risk of a dispute over the position could be a distraction from our mission. In the current environment, I’ve determined that I would be more effective in serving the American people from my role as governor.” Trump will nominate someone to assume the position of vice chair, but because there are no openings on the Board of Governors he will have to choose from among the current members.

Does this episode indicate that Fed independence is eroding? Not necessarily because the Fed’s regulatory role is distinct from its monetary policy role. As financial journalist Neil Irwin points out, “top [Fed] bank supervision officials view their role as more explicitly carrying out the regulatory agenda of the president who appointed them—and that a new president is entitled, in reasonable time, to their own choices.” In the past, other members of the Board who have held positions similar to the one Barr holds have resigned following the election of a new president.

So, it’s unclear at this point whether Barr’s resignation as vice chair indicates that the incoming Trump Administration will be taking steps to influence the Fed’s monetary policy actions or how the Fed’s leadership will react if it does.

Glenn on Bank Regulation

(Photo from the Wall Street Journal.)

This opinion column first appeared on barrons.com. It is also on the web site of the American Enterprise Institute.

Runs at Silicon Valley Bank and others emerged quickly and drove steep losses in regional bank equity values. Regulators shouldn’t have been caught by surprise, but at least they should take lessons from the shock. The subsequent ad hoc fixes to deposit insurance and assurances that the banking system is sufficiently well-capitalized don’t yet suggest a serious policy focus on those lessons. Calls for much higher levels of bank capital and tighter financial regulation notwithstanding, deeper questions about bank regulation merit greater attention.

Runs are a feature of banking. Banks transform short-term, liquid (even demandable) deposits into longer-term, sometimes much less liquid assets. Bank capital offers a partial buffer against the risk of a run, though a large-scale dash for cash can topple almost any institution, as converting blocks of assets to cash quickly to satisfy deposit withdrawals is almost sure to bring losses. The likelihood of a run goes up with bad news or rumors about the bank and correlation among depositors’ on their demand for funds back. That’s what happened at Silicon Valley Bank. Think also George Bailey’s impassioned speech in the classic movie It’s a Wonderful Life, explaining how maturity and liquidity transformations can unravel, with costs to depositors, bankers, and credit reductions to local businesses and households. The bank examiner in the movie, eager to get home, didn’t see it coming.

While bank runs and banking crises can be hard to predict, a simple maxim can guide regulation and supervision: Increase scrutiny in areas and institutions in which significant changes are occurring over a short period. On an aggregate level, the sharp, rapid increase in the federal funds rate since March 2022 should have focused attention on asset values and interest rate risks. So, too, should the fast potential compression in values of office real estate in many locations as a consequence of pandemic-related working shifts and rate hikes. At the bank level, significant inflows of deposits—particularly uninsured deposits—merit closer risk review. This approach isn’t limited to banking. A recent report of the Brookings-Chicago Booth Task Force on Financial Stability, co-chaired by Donald Kohn and me, put forth a similar change-based approach to scrutiny of nonbank financial institutions.

Such an approach would have magnified supervisory attention to Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic Bank . It also suggests the desirability of greater scrutiny and stress testing of midsize banks generally facing interest rate and commercial real estate risk. Those stress tests can give the Fed and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. an indication of capital adequacy concerns that could give rise to mergers or bank closures.

Even with this enhanced regulatory and supervisory attention, two major questions remain: For bank liabilities, what role should deposit insurance play in forestalling costly runs? For bank assets, what role should banks play in commercial lending?

Actions taken since Silicon Valley Bank’s collapse have effectively increased deposit-insurance guarantees for troubled institutions. But the absence of a clearer policy framework for dealing with uninsured deposits dragged out the unwinding of First Republic Bank and threatens other institutions experiencing rapid deposit increases and interest rate risk. When regulators asserted in the wake of the runs that the status quo of a $250,000 limit remained unchanged, they lacked both credibility and a means to reduce uncertainty about future policy actions in a run. That makes runs at vulnerable institutions both more likely and more severe. One reform would be to increase deposit insurance limits for transaction accounts of households and small and midsize firms, as recently proposed by the FDIC. Of course, even this reform raises concerns about implementation, how to price the enhanced coverage, and whether supervision will shift toward the “focus on the changes” framework I outlined earlier.

Retaining a more modest role for deposit insurance raises a larger question: What role should banks play in business lending for working capital, investment, and commercial real estate? The FDIC is mandated to resolve bank failures at the least cost to the deposit-insurance fund, but following that path may lead to more mergers of vulnerable institutions into the nations’ largest banks. While consolidation may mitigate risks for depositors with greater diversification of deposits, it leaves open effects on the mix of lending. Knowing local borrowers better, small and midsize banks have a prominent local lending presence in commercial and industrial loans and real estate. Whether such projects would be financed in a similar mix by local branches of megabanks is a question. Congress should consider whether other alternatives might be reasonable. It might permit consolidation among smaller institutions, even if more costly in resolution in the near term to taxpayers. Or nonbank institutions could be permitted to play a role in resolving troubled banks. The latter mechanism should be considered, as nonbank asset managers like Blackstone or BlackRock could fund loans originated by local banks.

Two lessons for regulation loom large. The first is that attention should be paid to policy risk management as well as bank risk management in identifying areas of concern. Think easy money and the reach for yield, inflationary fiscal and monetary policy during the pandemic, and the Fed’s rapid-fire increase in short-term rates to combat stubborn inflation. Second, regulators and Congress need to be wary of both too much deposit insurance (with likely increased risk-taking and pressure on supervision) and too little deposit insurance (with likely jumps in banking concentration and disruption of local credit to businesses).

One can reasonably anticipate additional erosion of capital in non-money-center banks from rising interest rates and lower office real estate collateral values, hopefully motivating a quick grasp of these lessons. While banks don’t have to mark assets to market if current and can survive turbulence until monetary policy eases, potential runs can upset this equilibrium. Declining regional bank stock prices make this risk clear. Only good fortune or a more thoughtful policy stand in the way of additional bank distress and attendant credit supply reductions.